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ABSTRACT
At the Restoration of the English monarchy in 1660, Charles II inherited the existing
interregnum navy. This was a persistent, but loosely defined organization that included a
professional community of officers, a large number of warships, and substantial debts.
From the beginning Charles II used royal prerogative to define the Royal Navy. In 1661,
Parliament  created  legislation  that  simultaneously  defined the  English  state  and the
Royal Navy. These actions closely linked the Royal Navy’s development to that of the
English state, and the use of both statutes and conventions to define the Navy provided
the foundation for its development in the ‘Westminster Model’.
This  thesis  considers  the  Royal  Navy’s  development  from  the  Restoration  to  the
replacement of the Articles of War in 1749 in five distinct periods. The analysis shows
emphasizes both the consistency of process that resulted from the creation and adoption
of definitions in 1660, as well as the substantial complexity and differences that resulted
from very different institutional, political and geopolitical circumstances in each period.
The Royal Navy’s development consisted of the ongoing integration of structural and
professional  definitions  created both in  response to  crises  and pressures,  as  well  as
deliberate efforts to improve the institution. The Royal Navy was integrated with the
English  state,  and  became  an  institution  associated  with  specific  maritime  military
expertise,  and  the  foundations  laid  at  the  Restoration  shaped  how  the  Navy’s
development  reflected  both  English  state  development  and  professionalization.  In
particular, the aspects of the Royal Navy that Charles II and Parliament respectively
defined in 1660 provide important context for when first Parliament, then the Board of
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Andrew Lambert argues that '[n]avies developed alongside the nation states that 
they served. Only strong, centrally controlled states had the tax-raising powers to fund 
standing navies.'1 Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the nature of the relationship between 
a navy's development and that of its parent state is more complex than this observation 
allows. Given the global commercial, military, and imperial power of eighteenth-
century Britain, the exploration of this relationship has been of particular historical 
interest, giving rise more recently to an emphasis, not on strong, centralised monarchies,
as such, but to Britain's exceptional, parliamentary constitutional nature and on the 
long-term fiscal benefits of investment in a strong navy.2  Many histories of the Royal 
Navy, therefore, explore the links between its development and the growth of the state, 
building a narrative around key events or developments, such as the creation of the 
Bank of England in 1694, and privileging the particular constitutional nature and 
financial resilience of the state.
A premise of this thesis is that, although they were closely related, the processes 
of state development and of naval development were not one and the same thing, nor 
was the navy just the incidental product of countless political contests and economic 
and military imperatives.  To borrow a phrase from Kathleen Wilson's definition of 
empire, the navy 'was always in the making, changing, and in process', and it is this 
process that is of interest here.3  Like the Restoration state itself, which adopted and 
modified certain aspects of the Commonwealth before it, but which was really an 
attempted reconstitution of the state as it had existed prior to the civil wars, the navy 
1 Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail, London: Cassell, 2000. 24
2  N.A.M.Rodger, 'From the 'military revolution' to the 'fiscal-naval' state', Journal for Maritime 
Research 13, 2 (2011), 119-128.
3  Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the 
Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 12.
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experienced more than a mere re-branding of the Parliamentarian navy.  In its own 
process of change, the Royal Navy naturally built upon the existing fleet and the 
officers, along with the accumulated debt and experiences of its recent, turbulent 
history, but it, too, was the product of re-invention, or re-definition. This involved the 
revival of customs and precedents, such as the appointment of individuals to offices that
had been abolished under the Commonwealth.  It also resulted in new legal definitions.  
This thesis, therefore, is primarily a study of the development of the Royal Navy as a 
contested legislative space, the result of many political contests that left significant, 
observable traces in the legislative record.  It emerged out of the particular 
circumstances of the Restoration itself in 1660 and, notably, the subsequent insertion of 
the navy's Articles of War into statute law the following year. The period of study ends 
in 1749, when these statutes, which defined the Navy, were repealed and amended 
following the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48).
It is well-known that the Restoration navy needed to come firmly under direct, 
royal control from 1660 and that the creation of a close association between the navy 
and the monarchy and of a shared identity was an important moment in the Royal 
Navy's celebrated history.  Yet this study does not take the Royal Navy's future 
institutional form as a particularly treasured feature of the state or its later operational 
successes as natural or inevitable, nor as the basis on which to assess its early history.  It
is not such longer-term results that matter here but the process itself, and a new way of 
viewing this process can be gleaned from the constantly changing definitions of the 
navy that are found within statute law and other formal documents.  The choice of these 
'definitions' as the object of study was partly inspired by what has been referred to as the
'cultural turn' in political and imperial history.  Wilson's study of the eighteenth century, 
for example, defines political culture as 'the realm encompassing political values and 
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ideologies, the forms of their expression – verbal and non-verbal, embodied in both 
actions and artifacts – and the mechanisms of their dissemination and transformation'.4 
The definitions studied here are one such cultural 'artifact' from the past which, together,
can shed some light on the process of change in the navy over time.  
In this sense, something of an 'archaeological approach' to the historical record is
being taken here.  That is to say that, rather than another study of the many political 
contests and pressures that affected the navy themselves, it is their outcome in the form 
of legal definitions which is being uncovered and studied here for the light that they 
shed on the process of change. An important concept is that of royal prerogative. It has 
been described as:
[t]he personal discretionary powers which remain in the Sovereign's hands. 
They include the rights to advise, encourage and warn Ministers in private; 
to appoint the Prime Minister and other Ministers; to assent to legislation; to
prorogue or to dissolve Parliament; and (in grave constitutional crisis) to act
contrary to or without Ministerial advice.5
Following the Restoration, many powers remained in the King’s hands, 
including the power to define the state. In particular, it is clear from taking this approach
that early definitions of the Royal Navy were not simply imposed by Charles II. In 
1661, Parliament passed the Act for the Establishing Articles, which contained the 
Royal Navy's Articles of War. It also created limits on the authority and jurisdiction of 
the restored office of Lord High Admiral.6 This provided the Royal Navy with statutory 
definitions which, together with the customs inherited from the Commonwealth Navy, 
recreated or modified at the Restoration, in effect formed what will be argued in this 
4  Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 12.
5 Parliament, Select Committee on Public Administration Fourth Report, 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmpubadm/422/42202.htm accessed 
May 3, 2017.
6 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders for the regulateing and better 
Government of His Majesties Navies Ships of Warr & Forces by Sea.,' in Statutes of the Realm: 
Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 311-314. British 
History Online, accessed August 16, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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thesis was a ‘Westminster Model’ constitution. This is a twentieth-century concept that 
is used primarily to describe flexible constitutional arrangements within the 
Commonwealth, but which also best describes the nature of the subsequent evolution of 
the navy.  
This redefinition of the navy was an extraordinary departure that would set the 
foundations for the navy's subsequent legal development up to the 1740s. Indeed, the 
replacement of the Articles of War in 1749 appears to have defined another, distinct 
departure, as it was the first time that the definitions in the Act for the Establishing 
Articles were entirely replaced, as opposed to just supplemented as circumstances 
required.  By 1749, therefore, the Royal Navy was no longer quite the same contested 
legislative space that it had been after 1660. The amendments were initiated by 
members of the Board of Admiralty who sought to implement an institutional 
philosophy that emphasized discipline and hierarchy in a reaction to the Royal Navy's 
experiences in the War of the Austrian Succession. The Act for the Amending, 
Explaining and Reducing into One Act of 1749 contained the amended Articles of War 
and also rationalized the other legislation that had previously defined the Royal Navy.  
This reflected the sense that more fundamental, lasting changes were necessary than had
been attempted after the Restoration.
Professionalisation is also a major theme of this study.  At the Restoration, the 
Royal Navy was not only provided with structural definitions, but also professional 
ones. After 1660, the structural and professional definitions were increasingly 
integrated, so that a specific Royal Navy Officer profession was created that was part of 
the Royal Navy as an institution.  As Eric Ash argues,
In the modern period, it may be argued that expertise acquires full 
legitimacy only through the affirmation of certain established institutions 
such as universities, corporations, and government bureaus. Yet the origins 
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and forebears of many of these institutions have extensive premodern roots, 
and they evolved alongside the experts and states in question.7
The Royal Navy was absolutely one such institution. The active and continued 
definition of both its structural and professional attributes were defined in statute and in 
custom, and from 1660 to 1749 there was a general shift in the definitions contained in 
statutes, from focus on the structural attributes to the definition of the officer profession,
particularly following the end of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748.
Both developments reflect the main argument of this thesis which is that the 
Royal Navy followed a Westminster Model of constitutional development from 1660 to 
1749.  It is useful to apply this concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
because the piecemeal institutional evolution that it implies captures perfectly both the 
unique domestic institutional circumstances of the navy's early changes and, 
internationally, a development process that is different to, on one hand, the local 
admiralties and federalised Dutch navy and, on the other, the much more centralised 
navy of the French state, which was subject to a number of major, root-and-branch 
institutional reinventions by the crown through major acts of legislation in 1584, 1626, 
and 1629 which foreshadowed the great reforming projects of Colbert late in the 
seventeenth century.8  
The development of the Royal Navy was more than just a series of incremental 
changes that merely reflected broader transitions in the state and the Royal Navy officer 
profession. At the same time, it was not the long, gradual implementation of a 
preconceived ambition or clear institutional programme either. The argument in this 
study, however, is built almost entirely on the domestic context of change. Although all 
7 E.H. Ash, 'Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State' Osiris, Vol. 25, No. 1, Expertise and 
the Early Modern State (2010), p 19.
8 Jaap Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Columbia, S.C.: U of 
South Carolina Press, 1993).  Alan James, The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 
1572-1661 (Woodbride: The Boydell Press, 2004).
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institutions go through subsequent incremental changes, some English and later British 
institutions, entities and corporations were created effectively fully-defined. The Royal 
Navy on the other hand, was never granted a charter, and so was different in this way to 
corporations that would be otherwise comparable. The Royal Navy as an institution or 
organization was continually defined and re-defined over decades through slow, 
constitutional changes, the implementation of circumstance-specific agendas, and 
attempts to address issues raised by changing pressures. These pressures related to both 
the Royal Navy's relationship with the state and to the professional development of the 
service.
The emphasis on constitutional change, working through both custom and statute
together, which is part of the very definition of the Westminster Model, is also reflected 
in the nature of the sources available for this study. Two broad categories of primary 
sources have been consulted.  The first concerns legislation that defined the Navy, its 
attributes, and its interaction with the state. Legislation formed the 'statute' element of 
the Royal Navy's constitution. This legislation was found in the Statutes of the Realm 
and other similar volumes.  This provides none of the political background to the 
legislation, of course, but crucially it provides us with the definitions, the outcomes of 
political contexts that are needed. The Journal of the House of Commons, Journal of the
House of Lords, individual letters from key players and other documents provide 
important context. Sources for these letters include the Admiralty and Navy Board 
correspondence and letters from the politicians who participated in defining the Royal 
Navy such as Horace Walpole. 
The second category of primary sources includes orders-in-council and internal 
administrative documents, such as the Instructions or Regulations and Instructions, 
Establishments, orders to officers, commissions, and warship names. These sources 
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provide the 'conventions' aspect of the Royal Navy's constitutional definitions. They are 
found primarily at the National Maritime Museum (NMM), National Archives, and the 
National Museum for the Royal Navy (NMRN). The Papers of Samuel Pepys in the 
Rawlinson Manuscripts at the Bodleian Library, Thomas Corbett's volumes, and Navy 
Records Society volumes are also important collections. Often these documents also 
lack important context. For example, the fourth and fifth volumes of the Clumber House
collection at the NMM contains transcriptions of orders-in-council, and at times, not 
even the full text but only titles and summaries. Again, context for these definitions is 
provided by other documents. Likewise, the Corbett volumes at the NMRN refer to 
documents and precedents that defined both structural and professional aspects of the 
Royal Navy, though some of these documents were unavailable. In comparison, the 
Navy Records Society volumes contain many documents that defined the Royal Navy as
well as letters that provide important context. In other cases, letters were sourced from 
the Admiralty and Navy correspondence collections at the NMM, from the ADM series 
at the National Archives, and from published volumes of correspondence. Other 
documents consulted include commissions, warrants, lieutenant's logs, order books and 
officer lists. Not all such documents relating to the years 1660 to 1749 could be 
consulted, of course. Yet it is possible to be guided through them by the definitional 
outcomes and the complexity of the development process as it appears in the wording of
the various acts and statements upon which this study is based. Together they 
contributed to the evolving legal definition of the Royal Navy.
Literature Review and Methodology
The important literature that forms the foundations for this project is discussed 
in four categories: first, the discussion of the Westminster Model , which is the central 
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concept. The second group includes socio-cultural histories of the Royal Navy, as well 
as post-structural considerations of history, and which are linked by the 'Cultural Turn'. 
This group provides insight both into the studies that provide immediate context for the 
topic studied in this thesis and into the methodology used. The third section discusses 
the established literature regarding the Royal Navy's institutional history. The fourth 
section discusses the studies of professionalization. These latter two categories are 
important because of the creation of both structural and professional definitions in the 
Royal Navy's development.
Section I: The Westminster Model
The concept of the Westminster Model or 'Westminster System' is central to this 
thesis and is used to describe the process of the development of the English and British 
State and of the Royal Navy following the Restoration. This is a label normally used to 
discuss the current constitutional peculiarities of the government in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and other Commonwealth nations and their historical evolution. It is 
a concept borrowed from Political Science and is not normally applied to state 
development in this period.  
Early twentieth-century discussions of the attributes of a state laid the 
foundations for the later discussion of the Westminster Model .  James Garner argues 
that a state has four attributes: 'Population', 'Territory', 'Unity of Government' and 
'Sovereignty'.9 Both 'Population' and 'Territory' are material attributes, specifically over 
whom and where the state has authority. The implication is that without actual 
population or territory, a state does not exist. 'Unity of Government' refers to who has 
authority over the jurisdiction. The attributes of 'Population', 'Territory' and 'Unity of 
Government' are particularly important for discussing the Royal Navy. The first two are 
9 Garner, Political Science and Government (New York: American Book Company, 1928), 74-109.
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directly referred to in the first statutory definitions created for the Royal Navy and 
would shape its development until they were replaced in 1749. Likewise, 'Unity of 
Government' is important because the re-creation of the Royal Household, and the 
reintroduction of royal prerogative following the Restoration, created conflicts that were
directly responsible for defining the Royal Navy as an institution. 'Sovereignty' is less 
relevant, however, since although the Royal Navy was remarkably independent in some 
ways, it clearly was not a state itself but only an arm of one. The other three attributes 
are identifiable and are useful vectors for identifying the Royal Navy's structural 
definitions and their development. Further, they provide the foundation for the more 
detailed and nuanced discussion of the Westminster Model.
A Westminster Model state is defined as possessing several identifying 
attributes, but definitions and core concepts are not universally agreed upon. Rhodes, 
Wanna and Weller include such attributes as a head of state with a mostly ceremonial 
role that is distinct from the head of government, a bicameral parliament, an 
institutionalized opposition, parliamentary privilege, and also an 'unwritten' constitution 
with flexible constitutional conventions.10 Smith argues that it is
a constitutional system in which the head of state is not the effective head of
government; in which the effective head of government is a Prime Minister 
presiding over a cabinet composed of Ministers over whose appointment 
and removal he has at least a substantial measure of control; in which the 
effective executive branch of government is parliamentary in as much as 
Ministers must be members of the legislature; all and in which Ministers are
collectively and individually responsible to a freely elected and 
representative legislature.11
However, these are not the only descriptions. Lijphart interchangeably uses the term 
'Majoritarian' in place of 'Westminster' because he argues that one of the primary 
features is that they are dominated by two major political parties. Indeed in his study of 
10 R. A. W. Rhodes, John Wanna, Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster, (OUP Oxford, Aug 27, 2009) 
5-6
11 S. A. De Smith, 'Westminster's export models', Journal of Commonwealth Studies Vol 1 No. 1 (1961) 
p. 3 
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'Majoritarian' democracies he notes that the United Kingdom does deviate from what 
other nations have done since they have a bicameral parliament. Further, Lijphart's 
attributes include 'Unified Government', building on Garner's work.12 
For this thesis, the most important attributes of the Westminster Model are the 
forms of its definitions. Linda Colley has argued that there is '[a] substantially late 
Victorian-invented tradition of Britain's eternal, unsullied, and invariably distinctive 
unwritten constitution', but that '[a]fter the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, 
successive London governments worked hard to engineer public forgetfulness of
the innovations of the Civil War and republican eras: the Agreements of the People of 
1647–49, the Instrument of Government of 1653, and the subsequent codified 
constitution, the 1657 Humble Petition and Advice.'13 
This use of 'unwritten' is misleading, however, for some parts of the Constitution
were indeed written.  It was written into legal precedence and incremental statute law; it
was simply not all written into one single document.  Indeed, to describe an 'unwritten 
constitution' in this way is to some extent even more susceptible to the charge of 
anachronistic application of later concepts as the Westminster Model is, since early 
modern constitutions were rarely 'written' in the way that Colley implies.  More 
importantly, however, it is inadequate because it does not fully capture the positive 
nature of institutional change through statute and custom together which is a hallmark 
of the Westminster Model. Lijphart states that one of the key attributes of the 
Westminster Model is 'Constitutional Flexibility'.
Britain has a constitution that is 'unwritten' in the sense that there is not one 
written document that specifies the composition and powers of the 
12 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, 2012) pp 9-20.
13 Linda Colley, 'Empires of Writing', Law and History Review May 2014, Vol. 32, No. 2, 263.  Colley, 
'Empires of Writing', 241. Linda Colley, 'Writing Constitutions into British History' 
http://ias.umn.edu/2009/11/12/colley-linda/,  A.R. Carnegie, 'Floreat The Westminster Model? A 
Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective' The Caribbean Law Review Volume 6 No.1 June 1996 Pages 
1-12, G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987), 1. 
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governmental institutions and the rights of citizens. These are defined 
instead in a number of basic laws—like the Magna Carta of 1215, the Bill of
Rights of 1689, and the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949— common law 
principles, customs, and conventions.14 
It is easy to see why a study of such acts, or legal definitions in statute, is necessary and 
that by itself describing the constitution as unwritten is not enough to capture the nature 
of the process of change. Marshall describes customs and conventions as follows:
Most of them deal with the responsibilities of the major organs and officers 
of government and with the relations between them. It could be said that in 
general they are rules of non-legal accountability.15 
Importantly, however, the statutes that contain the definitions are no more or less 
important than the conventions.
It is necessary to examine the history of the application of the Westminster 
Model to understand its use in this thesis. The concept of the Westminster Model 
emerged in scholarly discussion in the early 1960s with reflections on the development 
of newly independent nations. These studies examine the creation of Westminster Model
states in Africa and their ongoing problems and development.16 During this period, it 
was also applied to other nations, such as Canada.17 Later, the Westminster Model has 
continued to be applied in further studies of Canada, for example and to the case of New
Zealand, which implemented new developments and definitions in the 1980s and 
1990s.18  In the latter studies, the Westminster Model is more clearly considered as a 
framework that develops in-situ. That is to say, it is a system that not only continues to 
14 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 18.
15 G. Marshall, Constitutional Conventions, 1.
16 Donald S Rothchild, 'On the Application of the Westminster Model to Ghana', The Centennial Review
of Arts  Science, Vol 4. No. 4, Africa Emergent: A Changing Continent (Fall 1960), pp 465-483., G.F. 
Engholm, 'The Westminster Model in Uganda' International Journal, Vol 18, No. 4 (Autumn, 1963), 
pp 468-487, John Fletcher-Cooke, 'The Failure of the Westminster Model' in Africa' African Affairs, 
Vol 63, No. 252 (Jul. 1964) pp. 197-208, and Newell M, Stultz, 'Parliaments in Former British Black 
Africa', The Journal of Developing Areas, vol 2, No. 4 (July, 1968), pp. 479-494.
17 Alexander Brady, 'The Westminster Model Overseas: The Canadian Case' International Journal, Vol 
23. No. 4, (Autumn, 1968) pp 585-599.
18 Graham White, 'Westminster in the Arctic, The Adaptation of British Parliamentarism in the 
Northwest Territories' Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue canadienne de science politique 
Vol 24, No. 3 (Sept, 1991) pp 499-523, Jack Nagel, 'The Lessons of the Impending Electoral Reform 
in New Zealand', The Newsletter of PEGS, Vol 3, No. 1 (Winter, 1993), pp. 11-12.
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develop, but does so in a way that incorporates local peculiarities and conditions not 
present in other nations. 
The Westminster Model , therefore, can be usefully applied to different 
individual national contexts. In a specifically British context, for example, the past and 
future development of the Westminster Model is an on-going discussion particularly in 
relation to the devolution of powers to Scotland, and to possible Scottish 
independence.19 There have also been studies of the interaction between the Westminster
Model and the development of military policy. In particular, Philippe Lagassé's work 
investigates the relationship between Canada's Parliament, the Canadian Forces and 
defence policy. Lagassé has examined the creation of defence policy under specific 
recent political circumstances, such as the recent Harper Conservative government, and 
addressed specific aspects of Canada’s constitution as it pertains to the Canadian 
Forces.20 He has also addressed specific aspects of Canada's constitution as it pertains to
the Canadian Forces. Most importantly, Lagassé has also considered the effect of 
institutional development on the relationship between the military and the ‘Westminster 
Model’ state.21 As the concept of the Westminster Model has been used, therefore, it has 
become more sophisticated and flexible as a means of shedding light on the state, 
military institutions, and formal, institutional definitions.
The clearest example of the application outside of the Westminster Model 
outside its original context of early Commonwealth states is recent work on Japan. 
Numerous scholars have studied Japan's constitutional development, and argued that 
19 W. Elliot Bulmer, Constituting Scotland: The Scottish National Movement and the Westminster 
Model (Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
20 Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie et Stéphane Roussel 'Le néoconservatisme en politiques étrangère et 
de défense canadiennes' in Le fédéralisme selon Harper. La place du Québec dans le Canada 
conservateur, Julian Castro-Rea et Frédéric Boily eds. (Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 2014), 
Philippe Lagassé, 'The Crown's Powers of Command-in-Chief: Interpreting Section 15 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867', Review of Constitutional Studies, 18(2), 189-220, 2013.
21 Philippe Lagassé, 'Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: 
Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control' Parliamentary Affairs No. 70, 
(2017) pp. 280–300
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there is development there towards a Westminster Model democracy, although it is 
being achieved slowly.22 In these studies,  the Westminster Model is represented as a 
possible end goal for Japanese state development, or as a logical extension of the 
changes being made, and the Japanese state is considered against the archetype for the 
Westminster Model . For example, Takanaka argues that 'Japan has experienced a series 
of political reforms since the 1990s. The British parliamentary system was a reference 
point in designing these reforms'.23  Estévez-Abe in kind argues 'Where is Japan going? 
The answer is, toward a Westminster system.'24 Both Takanaka and Estévez-Abe 
primarily consider the creation of statute definitions for the Japanese state, and Estévez-
Abe in particular describes how  codified definitions are being created to replace 
unwritten conventions, resulting in shifting power within political parties.25 Takenaka 
also described the creation of conventions in a study examining Diet reform, and the 
creation of the position of 'junior minister'.26 Taken together, these studies reveal the 
creation of both statute and convention definitions for the Japanese state, and clearly 
identify the development process in relation to the Westminster Model .  Crucially, the 
Japanese example also demonstrates the flexibility of the Westminster Model as a 
concept that can be usefully applied outside the original context of modern 
Commonwealth states.
The study of the early-modern English state and the Royal Navy following the 
Restoration is also substantially outside the normal Commonwealth context for 
application of the Westminster Model . Indeed in 1660, England was clearly not a 
22 Margarita Estévez-Abe, 'Japan's Shift Towards a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 
2005 Lower House Election and its Aftermath' Asian Survey, Vol. 46 No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 
632-651, Harukata Takenaka, 'The Frequent Turnover of Japanese Prime Ministers: Still a Long Way 
to a Westminster Model' in Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan, 
Ryo Sahashi & James Gannon, Eds. (Brookings Institution Press, Japan Centre for International 
Exchange: 2015).
23 Takenaka, Looking for Leadership, 79-80.
24 Estévez-Abe, 'Japan's Shift Towards a Westminster System' 651.
25 Estévez-Abe, 'Japan's Shift Towards a Westminster System' 648.
26 Harukata Takenaka, 'Introducing Junior Ministers and Reforming the Diet in Japan' Asian Survey, 
Vol. 42, No. 6 (November/December 2002), pp. 928-939
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Westminster Model democracy, although by 1749 several of the major attributes had not
only been developed but become sufficiently established to become the foundation for 
future change. Further, the development of the English and British state between 1660 
and 1749 is clearly composed of the creation of statutes and conventions that defined 
the state. Where Lijphart mentions the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the 
Restoration had its own Parliament Act of 1660.27 Other acts, such as those of the 
Clarendon Code provided other definitions for the State prior to the Bill of Rights 
(1689). On the other hand, the creation of conventions included the recreation of the 
Chapel Royal and other aspects of the monarchy, and other uses of royal prerogative. 
Following the Hanoverian Succession, the creation of the post of Prime Minister was a 
critical development of 'The Westminster Model' democracy in Great Britain.
Although there are apt comparisons between the Royal Navy as it was defined at
the Restoration and the State (in particular, the attributes of 'Population', 'Territory' and 
'Unified Government' raise interesting questions about the Royal Navy as an 
institution), it was no more a finished Westminster Model state than England. At the 
Restoration, the translation of the existing State's Navy into the Royal Navy was one 
part of the reconstitution of the English state. In 1661, Parliament passed The Act for the
Establishing Articles, which defined the authority of the Lord High Admiral, therefore 
also further defining the state and the navy, and it also included the Articles of War, the 
Royal Navy's internal legal code. At the same time, the Royal Navy was defined by 
royal prerogative, such as when renaming warships, using orders-in-council to define 
structural and professional aspects of the Royal Navy. These actions began a pattern of 
the Royal Navy as an institution being defined both in statute and in the creation of 
27 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 18. 'Charles II, 1660: An Act for removing and preventing all 
Questions and Disputes concerning the Assembling and Sitting of this present Parliament.,' in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 
1819), 179. British History Online, accessed May 2, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/p179.
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'conventions'. As a result, it is appropriate to use the Westminster Model to consider 
both the development of the English state and Royal Navy during the period 1660-1749.
This thesis demonstrates how the definitions created for the Royal Navy identify
and describe its development in the Westminster Model. This constitutes an identifiable 
development cycle, from the creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles in 1660 to 
its repeal and replacement with the Act for the Amending, Explaining and Reducing in 
1749 The definitions, both in statute and convention, are part of institutional 
development both in terms of the Royal Navy's structural and professional attributes. 
Even more than the creation of statutes and conventions, it is how they are built upon 
and extrapolated over time that demonstrates both the existence and internal complexity 
of the Royal Navy's development in the Westminster Model. 
Section II: Sociocultural History & The Cultural Turn
This approach to the subject was largely inspired by two broad groups in the 
historiography. The first are a group of studies from the 1980s that, amidst the 'Cultural 
Turn', started asking questions about the Royal Navy, society and culture. The context 
for these debates includes the conflict between 'Revisionists vs Marxists', and these 
authors explored new ways to consider the Royal Navy and its development.
Bernard Capp, J.D. Davies, and N.A.M. Rodger were amongst the first to use a 
social-historical approach to the study of the Royal Navy in the age-of-sail and 
produced studies of the Commonwealth, Restoration, and Georgian navies respectively. 
These histories provide a series of snapshots of the Royal Navy's institutional culture 
through the description of common behaviours, attitudes and institutional frameworks, 
in addition to descriptions of the lives and experiences of Royal Navy officers and 
ratings. 
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 Rodger's The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy provides an in-
depth examination of the day-to-day experiences of the officers and ratings of the Royal
Navy during the long eighteenth century. He tries to ensure that the reader understands 
the contemporary context and perspectives on the Royal Navy and the language used to 
describe it, without imposing anachronistic theories of modernisation or other 
sociological concepts. In the section dedicated to discipline aboard ship, for example, he
first examines how naval officers and ratings of the period would have defined, 
discussed, and considered discipline to distinguish it from the modern connotations of 
punishment.28 
The Wooden World examines a Royal Navy that had developed from the 
professional framework of the 1660s into an extensively defined professional 
institution. Rodger's examination of that framework and the day-to-day experiences of 
the service illustrates the binary nature of the Royal Navy's professional and 
institutional cultures.  Statutes such as the Articles of War and, on the other hand, 
official standing orders such as the Regulations and Instructions governed the social and
professional behaviour of Royal Navy officers and ratings. Rodger sees the Articles of 
War as a 'haphazard collection of regulations and admonishments largely concerned 
with court-martial offences by officers'. Likewise, he describes the Regulations and 
Instructions as 
a small volume... which purported to describe the duties of each officer, but 
did so chiefly in terms of accounting responsibilities, and said little about 
discipline.29 
Rodger's discussions of the Articles of War, including the statement that 'some of the 
commonest crimes were not mentioned at all' cast it only as the Royal Navy's private 
28 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Glasgow: William Collins 
Sons & Co, 1990) 205-208.
29 Rodger, The Wooden World, 218.
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legal code.30 He does not provide any indication that the Articles of War, has, can, or 
should be considered from any other perspective.  
Bernard Capp's Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, which 
was in the final stages of production when The Wooden World was released, was 
nevertheless clearly influenced by Rodger.31 Unlike Rodger and Davies, Capp is 
primarily a social historian, and he states outright that Cromwell's Navy is not a naval 
history 'per se but [aims] to explore a relatively uncharted aspect of the English 
Revolution'.32 Since Capp was accordingly less influenced by the history of, and myths 
about, the Royal Navy than a naval historian might be, he could more easily treat the 
officers and men of the Commonwealth's Navy as part of English society as a whole. He
uses a broader approach to his analysis, breaking down the different aspects of both 
Royal Navy society, major forces within that society, and how the members of that 
society were chosen. Like Rodger's discussion of the Georgian Royal Navy, Cromwell's 
Navy provides a snapshot of the Navy's structural and professional existence and 
attributes immediately prior to the changes forced by the restoration of Charles II. The 
primary importance of Capp's work is that discussion of the efforts under Cromwell to 
brand and redefine the Navy provides context for the Royal Navy's creation and 
development at the Restoration and beyond. In particular, his discussion of the role of 
individuals such as Lawson and Montagu in the selection of officers for the fleets under 
their command and therefore directly in the shaping of the Navy sets the stage for the 
Royal Navy's creation and development at and following the Restoration.33
The Restoration navy received the sociocultural treatment from J.D. Davies in 
1991 in his Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy. 
30 Rodger, The Wooden World, 221.
31 Capp, Cromwell's Navy, viii.
32 Capp, Cromwell's Navy, vii
33 Capp, Cromwell's Navy, 295-6, 365-6.
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Directly influenced by Rodger and Capp, Davies' examination focuses on what he refers
to as the sea-officers of the Royal Navy, whose interactions with each other, the naval 
administration and the developing naval bureaucracy were at the core of the creation 
and development of a Royal Navy officer socio-professional identity.34 Gentlemen and 
Tarpaulins is significant for three main reasons. First, Davies directly engages with the 
sociologists who studied the development of the naval profession.35 In particular, his 
arguments refer to Elias's dichotomy between the 'gentleman' and the 'tarpaulin'. Davies'
analysis emphasizes the existence of the national and institution-specific attributes and 
influences that belie the universality of the sociologically-derived frameworks and 
models. 
Second, Davies argues that the Royal Navy officer corps was significantly more 
diverse and the spectrum of socio-professional identities broader than Elias presented in 
his sociological analysis. For example, while Elias drew a simple logical equivalence 
between 'tarpaulin' officers and parliamentarians and between 'gentlemen' and royalists, 
Davies definitively shows that this was not true. In fact, both parliamentarians and 
royalists could be either 'tarpaulins' or 'gentlemen', to create four broad socio-
professional categories.36 This highlights the requirement to test a sociological 
framework against the specific realities of a particular institution. It also highlights the 
broad professional realities of the officer corps Charles II inherited in 1660, and it 
provides a more nuanced perspective on contemporary opinions.37 
Third, Davies argues that it was not the conflict between 'gentlemen' and 
'tarpaulins' that generated most of the sociocultural conflict for the post-Restoration 
Royal Navy, but rather what he describes as a 'generational gap'. This 'generational gap' 
34 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 2-3.
35 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 38.
36 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 3-6.
37 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 35-37.
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created conflicts because of the reintroduction and integration of political and military 
cultures that did not easily combine with those developed during the interregnum.38  
Unfortunately, development of Davies' work has been limited. Roger Manning, for 
example, reverts to the idea of a simple binary of 'gentlemen vs tarpaulins' in his recent, 
brief treatment of the subject.39 
In his two more recent volumes, Safeguard of the Seas and Command of the 
Ocean, Rodger examines English or British naval forces' warfare over a millennium and
draws many connections with developments in other aspects of English, European and 
global society.40 This approach combines the longer-term study favoured by sociologists
and the historian's emphasis on the contingent and immediate. This breadth is shown in 
variously thematic and chronological chapters that treat discretely the broad contours of 
operational history, social history, administrative history, and the ships themselves. In 
this way, Rodger takes forward a number of aspects of Royal Navy historiography, from
the administrative histories of Oppenheim and Tanner, the operational and strategic 
histories of Ehrman, Richmond and Graham, and modern social history. 
These sociocultural histories are important because their examination of the 
Royal Navy as both a society and as a group of individuals raises important questions 
about how those influenced the Royal Navy's development. This is particularly 
important because many of those individuals were also involved in developing the 
English or British state. They also emphasize the importance of personal relationships, 
such as patronage arrangements, and the importance of existing precedents, practices 
and inherited behaviours or attitudes that served as the foundation for the Royal Navy's 
38 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 231-233.
39 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, 434-435.
40 N.A.M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Seas: A Naval History of Britain 660-1649 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc. 1997), N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean, The Command of the 
Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
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specific institutional and professional culture. These studies provide an important basis 
for asking further questions about the Royal navy's development in this period.
This thesis was also influenced by a multi and interdisciplinary group of studies, 
generally classed as post-structuralist approaches which are part of the 'Cultural Turn'. 
These are influential for this project because they encouraged both the consideration of 
the sources and topic from a different perspective.
Discussion specifically considering the intersection between the disciplines of 
archaeology and history is important for it raises questions about similarities and 
fundamental differences. As an example, M.I. Finley considered first the practical ways 
that history and archaeology could interact and engage in their mutual research.
[T]o my mind, at least, there is a close kinship with the problems created by 
the trend toward 'serial history'... Implicit in this discussion is the 
assumption that contemporary historians, even of antiquity, are asking new 
kinds of questions. Anyone who is happy with kings and battles or with 
'calling ancient things to life' (I deliberately resort to a caricature) will find 
the discussion wholly irrelevant.41
It is clear that other academics were also considering the relationship between the two 
fields. For example, Joyce Mackay reflected on the work of Claude Levi-Strauss and in 
particular Structural Anthropology to consider theory and methods.
The archaeologist and historian both grope for meanings, whether they be 
represented by words or things. Thus, their quests both seek configurations 
held by past minds. If culture may be defined simply as a mental construct, 
then both the historian and the archaeologist study culture.42
Mackay further elaborates
[T]he historian does not deal solely with the particular. Generalizing, he 
may remove his view to a 'richer perspective'. Similarly, the archaeologist 
seeks those processes, the dynamic structures, suggested by his material 
evidence.43
41 M.I. Finley, 'Archaeology and History' Daedalus, Vol. 100, No. 1, Historical Studies Today (Winter, 
1971), 169.
42 Joyce Mackay 'The Coalescence of History and Archaeology' Historical Archaeology, Vol 10. (1976) 
93. 
43 Mackay, 'The Coalescence of History and Archaeology', 94-95.
23
In this last, Mackay effectively describes the main intent of this thesis, that is the 
consideration of the Royal Navy as a dynamic structure, and the treatment of the 
sources used (as described below) as material evidence. As the focus of this paper is the 
identification and discussion of the Royal Navy's development in the Westminster 
Model over a longer period of time, the focus is on the part played by definitions 
themselves rather than on the politics and debates that led to their creation. The 
definitions created and adopted at the Restoration in 1660 were the foundation for later 
developments. Each period studied, therefore, provides another layer of the stratigraphy,
to provide a real sense of how the Royal Navy as an institution was built. 
Post-structural approaches have also been directly influential in the conception 
of this project. Foremost is Judith Butler's consideration of 'performativity'. Butler 
applied this concept to gender and identity. She argues that gender is a construct, but not
one that is enacted, but rather defined as it is performed.44 This influenced this thesis' 
conception of the Royal Navy as a legislative space, as an entity that is continually 
defined with emphasis on the process of expression and definition. This is also reflected
in historical literature from the same period, such as the Invention of Tradition, the 
collected edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger and indeed published several 
years earlier than Butler's work. In particular, that work emphasized the importance of 
the act of creating traditions, in particular when new material is used in addition to re-
purposed or inherited ideas.45  
The approach used in this thesis, while by no means the only one possible, sheds
some light on the contemporary political debates and the internal complexity of the 
RN's development including some of its apparently contradictory elements. Indeed, the 
44 Judith Butler 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory' Theatre Journal, Vol 40. No. 4 (Dec., 1988) pp 519-531
45 Eric Hobsbawm, in The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, Eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.) 4-7.
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archaeological and post-structural inspiration have contributed to a new perspective  
that complements the existing understandings of the RN's development.
Section III: Institutional/Structural History
In the nineteenth century, the established tradition of English naval history was 
almost entirely narrative. Works by historians such as William Laird Clowes and James 
Froude satisfied a nationalistic need for myth-making at the end of the Victorian age in 
which Royal Navy officers (and their professional predecessors) became an 
embodiment of English Protestant fighting spirit.46 Although these were certainly not 
academic histories by today's standards, they influenced naval historians into the 
twentieth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, historians began to examine 
systematically the development of the Royal Navy as an institution by focusing on naval
administration. These administrative historians included dedicated amateurs like 
Michael Oppenheim, who trained as a merchant marine surgeon, and the professional 
historian J.R. Tanner, both of whom were founding members of the Navy Records 
Society in 1893. In particular, their studies of Carolinian and post-Restoration 
administration and finance created a new basis for the study of the Royal Navy.47 They 
highlighted the transformation of the naval administration from its reliance on the 
private financial wherewithal of the administration's members to a more integrated part 
of the functions of the state.
46 W.L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, (London: Sampson 
Low, Marston & Co., 1897-1903); J.A. Froude, English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century: Lectures 
Delivered at Oxford, Easter Terms, 1893-4 bu Jame Anthony Froude, (London: Longmans, Green, 
1907); G. Callender Sea Kings of Britain, (London: Longmans, Green, 1907-1911);W.H.G. Kingston,
A Popular History of the British Navy from the earliest times to the present, (Edinburgh: Gall & 
Inglis, 1876).
47 M. Oppenheim 'The Royal Navy under Charles I: Part III- The Administration',English Historical 
Review Vol. 9, No. 35, (July, 1894); J.R. Tanner, 'The Administration of the Navy from the 
Restoration to the Revolution' English Historical Review Vol. 12, No. 45 (Jan., 1897), J.R. Tanner, 
'The Administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the Revolution: Part II.-1673-1679 
(Continued)', English Historical Review, Vol. 13, No. 49 (Jan., 1898); J.R. Tanner, 'The 
Administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the Revolution. Part III.-1679-1688 (Continued)', 
The English Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 54 (Apr., 1899);  
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These types of studies continued through the mid-twentieth century. In 1953, 
John Ehrman published The Navy in the War of William III: 1689-1697, and in 1965 
Daniel Baugh published British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole. A later 
study is Andrew Turnbull's PhD Thesis, The Administration of the Royal Navy, 1660-
1673 which builds on Tanner's earlier work and examines the Royal Navy's 
administrative bodies in detail.
These studies are particularly important because they directly addressed the 
Royal Navy's transformation into a formal state structure in which Parliament assumed 
authority formerly exercised personally by the monarch under royal prerogative. 
Ehrman's narrative is narrowly focused on the Royal Navy following the Glorious 
Revolution.48 In comparison, Baugh's discussion of naval administration does reach 
back to the turn of the eighteenth century in order to provide context for his examination
of the War of the Austrian Succession.49 Turnbull considers the Royal Navy's 
administration in the context of the Second Anglo-Dutch war and the development of 
the State following the Restoration. He describes a 'stronger emphasis on civilian 
control over the navy' dating to the Commonwealth.50 These studies provided the basis 
for the development of the discussion of 'fiscal-military' or 'fiscal-naval State', which is 
considered below. 
 This group represents the most recent discussions that specifically examine the 
subject of this thesis: the relationship between the English or British state and the Royal 
Navy. Normally, this relationship is studied from the state-development point of view. 
Unfortunately, the Royal Navy is almost entirely absent from such works. Tim Harris' 
The Restoration (2005), for example, makes no mentions of the navy in over 500 pages.
48 J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III 1689-1697: Its State and Direction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 2012)
49 D.A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965)
50 A. Turnbull, The Administration of the Royal Navy 1660-1673, PhD thesis  Leeds University, 1974. 
512-513
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Claydon's Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760 (2007) is similarly silent. 
Kevin Sharpe's Rebranding Rule: The Restoration and Revolution Monarchy, 1660-
1714 (2013) is an excellent analysis of the relationship between monarch, state and the 
use of royal prerogative and has twelve mentions of the Royal Navy in 849 pages, 
compared to 43 mentions for the Order of the Garter.51 
 J.D. Davies, on the other hand, has examined the impact of state development 
on the Navy in the 1670s, specifically regarding the political crisis surrounding the 
place of the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral and its impact on the Navy's 
definition.52 This is an excellent example of a study that specifically examines the 
connections between the Royal Navy and the state and mentions the use of both royal 
prerogative and Parliamentary statutes to define the institution. For example, Davies 
discusses how the Duke of York continued to influence the Royal Navy's day-to-day 
operations following the loss of the office of Lord High Admiral.53 Further, he describes
an entity more like a county than an integral part of the state.
Like towns and counties, the navy witnessed, successively, attempted 
purges of catholics, then dissenters; like them, its 'government' was 
remodelled to accord with the prevailing political viewpoint.54
Davies provides an evocative description of how Charles II and James II's personal 
connections to the Royal Navy and the conflict over royal prerogative drew together the 
Navy's development with the state's.
Michael Braddick advocated in 1991 for a 'concentration on the process of state 
formation, as distinct from a concentration on the state as an entity.'55 In State 
51 In 2015, David Davies illustrated this at the Statesmen and Seapower conference when he noted how 
rarely the Royal Navy was mentioned in recent books on state development following the 
Restoration,  J.D. Davies, Kings of the Sea: Charles II, James II and the Royal Navy (Barnsley: 
Seaforth Press, forthcoming, 2017)
52 Davies, 'The Navy, Parliament And Political Crisis In The Reign Of Charles II' The Historical 
Journal, 36, 2 (I993), pp. 271-288 
53 Davies, 'The Navy, Parliament And Political Crisis In The Reign Of Charles II', p. 279
54 Davies, 'The Navy, Parliament And Political Crisis In The Reign Of Charles II', p. 288
55 M. Braddick, 'State Formation and Social Change in Early Modern England: A Problem Stated and
Approaches Suggested', Social History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), p 1.
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Formation in Early Modern England c. 1550-1700, he takes a longer view and 
illustrates the fiscal development of the government after the Restoration.56  He quotes 
Rodger describing the financing model of the Royal Navy prior to the Restoration as 
having 'obliterated the distinctions between public and private business', and he 
describes the fiscal revolution in England that made financing the navy possible, 
including the establishment of the Bank of England.57 This transition from private 
financing, including from members of the administration themselves, who paid for 
naval expenditures in anticipation of future reimbursement from the government, to a 
formal method in which the English government borrowed against future tax revenues 
is entirely consistent with the rationalization of government functions in other aspects of
state development.
 The greater significance of Braddick's work is located in two arguments that he 
makes in his conclusion. The first is the spontaneous development of the early modern 
state in England, described in the subtitle of his concluding section of the book as, 
'actions without design, patterns without blueprint'.58 To put it another way, 
'[i]nstitutional change is the outcome of negotiating legitimate responses to political 
problems and opportunities'.59 Braddick also argues that studying offices 'as social roles 
integrates intellectual and administrative history, and the abstract order of the state with 
the actual experience of political authority, thus drawing attention to the way that ideas 
and values can drive ... action'.60 These observations apply equally to the Royal Navy. 
Unlike most other studies, Sarah A. Kinkel's PhD thesis, Disciplining the 
Empire: Georgian Politics, Social Hierarchy, and the Rise of the British Navy, 1725-
1775, explicitly studies the relationship between the Royal Navy and the state's 
56 M. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c.1550 – 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 195. 
57 Braddick, State Formation, 207, 224-226.




development, starting after the rise of Walpole.61 Although her argument regarding what
she refers to as the rise of the 'Authoritarian Whigs' and the subsequent changes in 
British political culture, views on Empire, and alterations to the Royal Navy specifically
are convincing and important for providing context for the Royal Navy's development 
from the 1740s, Kinkel does not consider the Royal Navy's relationship with the state 
prior to the Hanoverian succession. Further, she consistently poses her analysis of the 
state and naval developments of the mid-eighteenth century with a view towards 
providing an explanation for the Royal Navy's victories during the Napoleonic Wars.
The Royal Navy's influence on state development is most commonly discussed 
in the context of the fiscal-military state. In the introduction to the Naval Records 
Society volume he edited, Baugh states, 'The process by which a nation fits itself for 
war deserves analysis. To examine the problems involved in mobilizing and maintaining
a fleet during the sailing-ship era may help naval historians understand precisely how 
administrative difficulties could narrow strategic choice and threaten the success of 
operations.'62 Baugh's idea provided a foundation for the discussions of the concept of 
the 'fiscal-military' state.
John Brewer's The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English state, 1688-
1783 argues that British parliamentary government and the apparent relative 
affordability of the navy upon which Britain relied, compared to large continental 
armies, gave it natural advantages.63 This has influenced much subsequent writing on 
navies, particularly the work of Jan Glete.64 
61 Kinkel, 'Disciplining the Empire', 1-4.
62 Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, (1965), 3-4.
63 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English state 1688-1783 (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989) 167-171.
64 J. Glete, 'The Swedish Fiscal-Military State and its Navy, 1521- 1721', 
http://www2.historia.su.se/personal/jan_glete/Glete-Swedish_Fiscal-military_state.pdf; J. Glete, 
Swedish Naval Administration 1521-1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities (Leiden: 
Brill, 2010) J. Glete 'Warfare at Sea 1450-1815' in J. Black (Ed.) War in the Early Modern World 
1450-1815 (London, Taylor & Francis, 2005); J. Glete Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime 
Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe (London: Taylor & Francis, 2002)
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With respect to the Royal Navy in particular, N.A.M Rodger has emphasized the
complexity and enormous cost of navies, and it has since become clear that it was, in 
fact, taxation and considerable direct investment in the navy that was the foundation of 
what has been termed the 'fiscal-naval state' in Britain.65 For example, Roger Knight, 
Roger Morriss and James Davey have published extensive studies which in different 
ways address this enormous investment.66 Most of this discussion, however, refers to the
late eighteenth century, the Napoleonic Wars, and later when the Royal Navy's 
operations and logistics were far more substantial than during the period this thesis 
examines. For example, in The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783, of nine 
papers included, only Roger Morriss' 'The British Fiscal-Military State in the Late 
Eighteenth Century, A Naval Historical Perspective' provides any substantial discussion
regarding the Royal Navy.67
There are some specific discussions of the English fiscal-naval state during the 
early modern period. J.S. Wheeler studied naval finances prior to the Restoration and 
argued that the 'financial revolution' was started during the Commonwealth, not after the
Glorious Revolution.68 Pepijn Brandon, on the other hand, has compared the English 
and Dutch fiscal-naval states and argued that the English example was created following
the Glorious Revolution.69 In 2013, the International Journal of Maritime History 
published 'The Contractor state: 1650-1815', a forum edited by Huw Bowen. Stephen 
Conway, Richard Harding and Helen Paul argue in their contribution that it was during 
65 N.A.M.Rodger, 'From the 'military revolution' to the 'fiscal-naval' state', Journal for Maritime 
Research 13, 2 (2011), 119-128.
66 R. Knight & M. Wilcox, Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor 
state, Boydell & Brewer, (2010). R. Knight, Britain Against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 
1793-1815, Penguin (2013), as well as many articles; R. Morriss, The Foundations of British 
Maritime Ascendency 1755-1815: Resources, Logistics and the state, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. as well as many articles; J. Davey, The Transformation of British Naval 
Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe 1808-1812, Boydell Press (2012).
67 A. Graham & P. Walsh, The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660- c.1783 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2016) 201-227.
68 J.S. Wheeler, 'Navy Finance, 1649-1660', The Historical Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1996)
69 Dr Pepijn Brandon, War, Capital and the Dutch state (1588-1795) , Brill 2015, 123.
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the wars of 1689-1697 and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) that the 
English or British Contractor state emerged.70 In the conclusion to the edition, Roger 
Knight and Martin Wilcox point out that 'Pepijn Brandon asks what it is that 
fundamentally differentiates the early modern state from its successors. This begs the 
question of the relationship between the contractor state and debates over state 
formation and military revolution.'71 Clearly, the development of a single military 
institution, in particular the Royal Navy, can be as important a concept as 'military 
revolution' itself. 72
The discussion of the fiscal-military or the fiscal-naval state is important because
it comprises the most modern examination of the development of the Royal Navy in 
relation to the development of the English state from the naval history perspective. 
Longer-term studies are made possible because financial information can be statistically
analyzed to provide useful data. In 'Commissioned officers' careers in the Royal Navy, 
1690-1815', Rodger adapts this kind of quantitative analysis to the Royal Navy's socio-
professional existence. He presents the Royal Navy officer community as a population 
that can be modelled, in this case specifically examining the numbers of officers in 
service. This statistical approach requires a relatively stable institutional hierarchy, and 
thus he argues that the methods that he uses cannot be applied to the Royal Navy prior 
to 1690 because of the impermanent and inherently fluid concepts of seniority and 
rank.73 
70 Bowen et al, 'The Contractor state: 1650-1815' International Journal of Maritime History, 2013, 251-
2
71 Bowen et al, 'The Contractor state: 1650-1815', 271
72 Other research questions England's existence as a fiscal-military state, particularly following the 
Glorious Revolution. Steven Pincus and James Robinson argue that English military spending was a 
smaller proportion of state income than it was in other states such as France, Austria and Prussia. The
Glorious Revolution simply made the later, 'precocious' development of an interventionist or 
developmental state possible. Pincus and Robinson, 'Wars and state‐Making Reconsidered: The Rise
of the Interventionist state' Unpublished Article, 21; 'Faire la guerre et faire l'État', Annales. Histoire, 
Sciences Sociales 1/2016 (71e année)
73 N.A.M. Rodger, 'Commissioned officers' careers in the Royal Navy, 1690-1815'. Journal of Maritime
Research, Vol 3, No. 1, (June, 2001), 89.
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In terms of methodology, the largely quantitative approache seen in the 
discussion of the Fiscal-Military/Naval State and Rodger's discussion of officers careers
is important because they facilitate the identification of long-term trends, whether 
financial, the number of officers employed or otherwise. This thesis builds on this 
existing literature by applying this general approach to the Royal Navy's qualitative 
attributes. The consideration of the Royal Navy's development as a process has allowed 
for the identification of a number of trends.
Section IV: Professionalization
The first studies of the Royal Navy's professionalization resulted from efforts by 
those responsible for teaching Royal Navy officer cadets between the First and Second 
World Wars. In 1939 the head of history at the Royal Naval College Greenwich, 
Matthew Lewis, published England's Sea-Officers: The Story of the Naval Profession 
and argued that 'by 1660 the Naval Profession had come into existence, and it had come 
to stay, but it was still quite amorphous, and in no sense yet an organism'.74 This was an 
astute assessment, and it applies more broadly to the wider Royal Navy as an institution.
Lewis recognized that the development of the Royal Navy officer profession was just as
important to understanding the Royal Navy as an institution as its administrative or 
operational history. He presented a set of attributes for a professional navy, but rather 
than concerning himself with professionalization as a concept, he focused more on the 
officers themselves, describing six phases of a professional naval career.75 Lewis, 
however, was still strongly influenced by his predecessor Geoffrey Callender and his 
hero and action-driven narrative. One important aspect is his discussion of areas of 
74 M. Lewis, England's Sea Officers: The Story of the Naval Profession, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1939) 51.
75 Lewis, England's Sea Officers, 55-58. These are discussed in detail in the opening chapter in the 
second section of this study.
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expertise and professional roles, particularly in tracing the origins of the Royal Navy 
officer profession. Lewis began with Anglo-Saxon 'butsecarles', who were both soldier 
and sailor. By the Elizabethan era, the professional functions had further 
differentiated.76 For example, Lewis argues that Frobisher was an explorer, a seaman 
and a fighter; he was not a seaman-fighter.77 
After Lewis' publication in 1939, sociologists analyzed the development of the 
naval officer profession as an international phenomenon. In an article that was 
posthumously published in a collection of his work as The Genesis of the Naval 
Profession, Norbert Elias, in particular, argued that the conflict between the 'tarpaulins' 
and 'gentlemen' defined the development of the naval profession in Europe.78 He also 
argued that the 'similar status-battles and struggles for position, longer or shorter as the 
case may be, can be found whenever individuals, initially independent, are about to 
merge into a group, or smaller groups into a larger one'.79 
In a manner that partially inspired this thesis, Elias examined the issue of 
professionalization, to address the phenomenon across the major European naval 
powers and provide a framework for analysis. While such an approach will highlight the
similarities between the different nations over the longer time periods studied by 
sociologists, the inherently sociological desire to create universal frameworks and 
systems is designed to accommodate the specific factors and differences in each country
or, importantly, each institution's case. This is one reason sociologists tend, as J.D. 
Davies argued, to misunderstand military professionalism during the early modern 
period.80 Elias' students responded with an intellectual salvo in the introduction to The 
76 Lewis, England's Sea Officers, 21-28. 
77 Lewis, England's Sea Officers, 39.
78 N. Elias 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession'. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1, No.
4 (Dec., 1950), pp. 293-294.
79 N. Elias, The Genesis of the Naval Profession, ed. R. Moelker and S. Mennell (Dublin: University 
College of Dublin Press, 2007) 49-50.
80 J.D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991) 5
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Genesis of the Naval Profession arguing that Davies and military historians examined 
phenomena over too narrow time frames to see the systematic realities.81 
 The tension between definitions of military professionalization as a concept and 
historical examinations of specific military professional organizations is also evident in 
the modern historiography, particularly David Trim's edited collection The Chivalric 
Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism. In his introduction, Trim argues
that social scientists have either ignored military professionalism during the early 
modern period or misunderstood it.82 He then provides a list of attributes of the military 
profession as a construct. Unfortunately, none of the collected articles in Trim's book 
discusses navies or maritime military forces. However, it is still relevant because the list
of attributes applies equally to navies as to the institutions and forces discussed in the 
collection.
Roger Manning provides an analysis of Royal Navy professionalization in An 
Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702. He argues that 'the 
professionalization of the officer class of the English navy proceeded more rapidly in 
the seventeenth century because the navy, unlike the army, became a standing naval 
force at an earlier date.'83 Further, he argued that, 
By contrast, the English navy had made more progress towards 
professionalization during the latter part of the seventeenth century because 
a greater degree of technical proficiency was required to integrate 
navigational and military skills under one command.84 
Manning also identified the Royal Navy's development of permanent internal socio-
professional status as important to professionalization.85 However, his discussion of 
81 Elias, Genesis of the Naval Profession, 2. 
82 D.J.B. Trim, introduction to The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism, 
ed by D.J.B. Trim (Leiden: Koninlijke Brill NV) 4.
83 R.B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 434.
84 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, 430-1.
85 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, 435-438.
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Royal Navy professionalization is substantially simplified, as it is included only to 
provide context for his much longer discussion of the Army's professionalization. 
The history of professionalization during the Early Modern period has also come
under substantial recent scrutiny. Of particular interest is the history of the 
professionalization of science and the importance of expertise and experts to early-
modern states. Eric Ash distilled the recent literature in his article 'Expertise and the 
Early Modern State.' His article provides two frameworks, first about the attributes of 
expertise and second about expertise's place in the early modern states. This is important
because it provides a modern example of professionalization outside the context of the 
Royal Navy. In the discussion of his frameworks, Ash provides examples from across 
Europe. The frameworks are further discussed below.
In her PhD thesis 'Half-Gods, Good Surgeons May Be Called': Surgery's Quest 
For Occupational Credit In England, 1590-1715, Sam Sandassie examines the 
professionalization of surgeons in England, roughly concurrent to the period studied by 
this thesis. She argues that
As the seventeenth century progressed, the Company of Barbers and 
Surgeons acted increasingly to shape the occupational identity of surgeons 
as separate from barbers and more closely related to physicians. The 
institution battled to be recognized as an organized body whose members 
were competent medical practitioners... Through both this institutional 
mechanism and informal patronage relationships, surgeons could ingratiate 
themselves with those who could provide both positions and patients... these
findings hold implications for the history of surgery and the occupation's 
advancement... during a period that lacked significant innovation in terms of
technique or even improved quality of care.86
Sandassie's argument provides some parallels for the development of the Royal Navy 
and the Royal Navy officer profession. As part of its development, the Royal Navy 
differentiated from both the English maritime profession as a whole and also from 
Trinity House. Further, 
86 Sam Sandassie, 'Half-Gods, Good Surgeons May Be Called': Surgery's Quest For Occupational 
Credit In England, 1590-1715 (PhD Thesis, Queen's University, 2014). 3.
35
Many rules implemented and enforced were not part of a planned, 
systematic reframing of institutional or occupational identity. Rather, they 
were piecemeal – and largely reactionary – changes over the course of 
several generations. As these tensions mounted, surgeons found increasingly
their occupational goals incommensurable with the status of barbers. 
Changes culminated eventually in the Company's 1745 split as the surgeons 
separated to form the Company of Surgeons.87
The Royal Navy's development process was very similar in its implementation. 
Although there are some substantial structural differences with the College of Surgeons,
its differentiation from the College of Barbers certainly provides context for the Royal 
Navy's professionalization.
A profession in the sociological sense is a construct, an archetype or framework 
for discussion. Norbert Elias argued that professions 'stripped of their gear and apparel, 
are specialized social functions which people perform in response to specialized needs 
of others.'88 George Ritzer's article 'Professionalization, Bureaucratization and 
Rationalization: The Views of Max Weber' was an examination and analysis of Weber's 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. In it, he discusses Weber's identification of 
professionalization as an 'aspect of the rationalization of society'.89 He notes how Weber 
examined several established professions including the law and the priesthood to derive 
the attributes of a profession, which he then identifies. David Trim took a similar 
approach by delineating attributes of military professions. Comparing Ritzer's list of 
attributes to Trim's provides an opportunity to consider the specialist attributes of a 
military profession as a subset of professions in general. Their lists of attributes are as 
follows:
87 Sam Sandassie, 'Half-Gods, Good Surgeons May Be Called', 199.
88 Elias, 'Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', 291.
89 G. Ritzer, 'Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationalization: The Views of Max Weber' 
Social Forces Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jun., 1975), 627.
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Ritzer's (Weber's) Criteria Trim's Criteria
1. Power
2. Doctrine, or general systematic 
knowledge. 
3. Rational training. 
4. Vocational qualifications
5. Specialization 
6. A full-time employment 




11. A distinctive way of life90
1. a discrete occupational identity
2. formal hierarchy
3. permanence
4. a formal pay system
5. a distinctive expertise and means of 
education therein
6. efficiency in execution of expertise 
7. A distinctive self-
conceptualization91
The comparison highlights differences between sociological and historical practice. The 
sociological approach on the left provides a greater number of more specific attributes. 
The historical approach provides fewer, less specific attributes. There are also attributes 
unique to each list that indicate sociological and historical preferences. Ritzer argues 
that power, and a clientèle is required for a profession, which is unsurprising given 
Weber's examination of the Law and the Church. Trim lists efficiency in execution of 
expertise or, to put it another way, being good at one's job. 
Michael Lewis examined the link between professions and institutions, and 
specifically the case of the Royal Navy. He provided a list of criteria that he argued are 
necessary for the ongoing maintenance of a permanent professional naval service. 
Lewis's List is as follows:
1. A continuous flow of entry of young officers, of the required material and in the 
required numbers.
2. There must be the provision of an adequate system of training the young officers
as they enter 
3. There must be the provision of regular employment for the officers thus trained. 
Employment must be as regular as possible, and when not forthcoming, the 
officer's professional connection must be maintained through half-pay.
4. There must be the provision of reasonable chances for the individual officer in 
rising gradually in professional, financial and social status as he becomes 
90 Ritzer, 'Professionalization, Bureaucratization and Rationalization' 630-632.
91 Trim, Chivalric Ethos, 6-7
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capable of bearing greater responsibility and thus giving more to the service and 
the state, e.g. rank and promotion.
5. There must be provision for a steady exodus at the other end of the service. 
Officers not suitable for promotion to command or flag rank need to be able to 
be superannuated or placed into the reserve.
6. Pecuniary provision for retired officers or dependants92
Lewis divided these six requirements into phases, which he describes as entry and 
training, post and rank, superannuation and after-care.93 Each of these attributes has both
institutional and socio-professional aspects. Although Lewis clearly struggled with the 
Royal Navy's professional antecedents, he understood that an institution that has an 
integrated profession must consider professional assets in the same manner as it would 
its materiel or financial assets. Lewis's attributes do overlap with those discussed above,
for example a mechanism for formal promotion, a specific professional education, and 
continued professional existence beyond active service. However, Lewis developed his 
attributes from a different perspective because his is specifically derived from the Royal
Navy's experiences, while Weber or Ritzer and Trim examined numerous professions 
not tied to a single institution. 
Lewis' list, and the list derived from Weber or Ritzer and Trim, are useful 
because they help frame the discussion of the Royal Navy's professional development, 
particularly in terms of the definitions and attributes that embodied the Royal Navy's 
transition from persistence to permanence. 
As mentioned above, Eric Ash developed two frameworks regarding expertise in
early modern states. These are useful for this thesis because they provide an example of 
how conceptions of the state, institutions, and expertise can be brought together. His 
first framework to a large extent repeats (albeit in different words) the attributes of 
professions discussed above.94 The second framework builds upon those attributes and 
92 Lewis, English Sea Officers, 55-58
93 Lewis, English Sea Officers, 55-58
94 Ash, 'Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State', 5-10.
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considers expertise and the state. First, the state provides a means for legitimizing 
experts and fields of expertise. Second, having experts in their service allowed states to 
use that expertise effectively at will. Third, states were able to use experts to greatly 
extend their reach and influence around the world. Fourth, the interaction of states and 
experts resulted in the creation of institutions that formalized, regulated and certified 
expertise.95 These four attributes are useful conceptual references for putting the Royal 
Navy's often protracted and incompletely implemented development into perspective.
The Royal Navy's development from 1660 to 1749 was composed of several 
distinct phases, which are recognizable in hindsight. Each chapter discusses a different 
phase, with divisions chosen to reflect major differences in the context for, and 
influences on, the Royal Navy's development. The first chapter examines the 
Restoration and the creation of the Royal Navy as a contested legislative space with a de
facto Westminster Model constitution. The second chapter examines developments 
during the reigns of Charles II and James II. The third chapter discusses how the 
Glorious Revolution and England's participation in two major wars significantly 
changed the dynamics of the Royal Navy's development. The fourth chapter examines 
the Hanoverian Succession and the Royal Navy's transformation into a largely 
peacetime navy, albeit one with increasingly global responsibilities and a shifting 
operational focus. The fifth chapter discusses the ramifications of the Royal Navy's 
transition into extended warfare in the 1740s and the replacement of the Articles of War 
in 1749. Taken together they demonstrate that the Royal Navy's development along the 
Westminster Model was a complex process, with shifting priorities and influences, but 
at all times shaped by the foundations laid and precedents created at the Restoration.
 In conclusion, therefore, the Royal Navy's development following the 
Restoration in 1660 has not been considered from a perspective that prioritizes 
95 Ash, 'Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State', 13-19.
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development process, nor has the Royal Navy's development from 1660 to 1749, framed
by the placement of the Articles of War into statute, been specifically considered. An 
examination of the creation and development of the structural definitions, and the 
development of a naval officer profession specific to the Royal Navy, provides an 
important opportunity to do both. 
This structure of this thesis reflects the importance of the definitions contained 
in both conventions and in statutes. Each chapter begins with a discussion of state 
development, following by the changes in the Royal Navy's administration during that 
phase. The first chapter examines the Restoration and the creation of the Act for the 
Establishing Articles and identifies the source of the foundations for the Royal Navy's 
later development amongst an intense flurry of definition. The second chapter discusses 
the period 1662-1688, a very different phase in which lingering questions and 
repercussions from the Restoration drove specific developments. The third chapter 
begins with the Glorious Revolution and addresses how very different political 
circumstances affected how Parliament directly defined the Royal Navy. The 
Hanoverian Succession and its aftermath is discussed in the fourth chapter. The final 
chapter positions the replacement of the Articles of War in 1749 as the end of the Royal 
Navy's first cycle of development in the Westminster Model and highlights a very 
different relationship between the Admiralty and Parliament than had existed since the 
Glorious Revolution.
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CHAPTER ONE:  THE RESTORATION AND THE ROYAL NAVY
The recreation of the Royal Navy at the Restoration was not merely a matter of 
substituting the formal authority that oversaw it; it was a complex interaction that 
involved the integration of many inherited and established practices, conventions, 
responsibilities, personnel and debt, with new statements of identity, and new statutory 
definitions. Certain aspects of the definitions created for the Royal Navy were chosen 
carefully, especially as pertained to the expression of Royal authority and identity. This 
included modifications to inherited definitions and attributes as well as the creation or 
recreation of 'new' definitions. However, much of what defined the Royal Navy was 
directly inherited from the interregnum State's Navy, and indeed from Charles I's Navy. 
In comparison, the state's transformation during the Restoration was much more 
dramatic, with the rational and deliberate reconstitution of the monarchy. It was by no 
means a 'Westminster Model' state. However, the creation of statutes and conventions 
that defined the state laid important foundations for the Navy's future development. For 
the Navy, the creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles was an important and 
dramatic change, although it was largely overshadowed by the Restoration itself. Like 
with the state's reconstitution, the creation of statutes along with conventions created the
foundation for the Navy to develop into a new institution. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the Restoration and the creation of 
definitions to reconstitute the Stuart monarchy. This is followed by a discussion of 
Charles I's Navy Royal prior to the interregnum, and of the State's Navy prior to the 
Restoration. This is then followed by a discussion of the creation of definitions for the 
Navy, first in conventions and then in statutes. This includes a new consideration of the 
modification of the Articles of War and their inclusion in the Act for the Establishing 
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Articles that provides a basis for the analysis of later developments throughout this 
thesis and complements existing considerations of that development.
Context: The Restoration
The transition of the English state from Cromwell's reign as Lord Protector, 
through to the Restoration of Charles II was complex. It was so complex, in fact, that 
'reconstitution' may be a better term. In addition to the King being invited to take up his 
throne, aspects of the state that had been discarded needed to be recreated. The efforts to
define the English state to permit the Restoration provide an important context for the 
re-creation of the Royal Navy.
Monck's entry into London in January 1660 along with Vice-Admiral John 
Lawson's blockade of the city created sufficient pressure that Monck was able to force 
the restoration of the 'Long Parliament', including all the members who had been 
excluded from the 'Rump'. The 'Long Parliament' dissolved itself in March 1660, and in 
April a 'free Parliament', known as the 'Convention Parliament' was elected, which 
included a significant number of royalists.96 The 'Convention Parliament' was 
responsible for reconstituting the English state in such a way that allowed for the 
Restoration. Specifically, it created statutory definitions for the English State, even prior
to the Restoration itself. One such statutory definition was the Parliament Act, which 
declared the 'Long Parliament' dissolved and restored the House of Lords. Although the 
monarch had not summoned it, the 'Convention Parliament' acted as if he had. 
For the preventing all Doubts and Scruples concerning the Assembling, 
Sitting and Proceeding of this present Parliament: Bee it Declared and 
Enacted, and it is Declared and Enacted by the King Our Soveraigne Lord, 
and by the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled and by Authoritie 
of the same That the Parliament begun and holden at Westminster the third 
day of November in the Sixteenth yeare of the Raigne of the late King 
96 T. Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms (Penguin Ebook, 2006) l. 26., G. Davies, 'The 
General Election of 1660' Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (May, 1952), 234-235
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Charles of Blessed Memory is fully dissolved and determined; And that the 
Lords and Commons now sitting at Westminster in this present Parliament 
are the two Houses of Parliament, and soe shall be, and are hereby Declared 
Enacted and Adjudged to be to all Intents Constructions and Purposes 
whatsoever, notwithstanding any want of the Kings Majesties Writt or Writts
of Summons or any Defect or Alteration of or in any Writt or Writts of 
Summons or any other Defect or Default whatsoever; as if this Parliament 
had beene summoned by Writt or Writts in His Majesties Name according to
the usuall Forme, and as if his Majestie had beene present in person at the 
Assembling, and Commencement of this present Parliament. [Provided 
alwaies That this present Parliament may be_dissolved by His Majestie after
the usuall manner as if the same had beene summoned by Writt or Writts in 
his Majesties Name.97
Although it clearly respected and acknowledged the King's ability to define the state, 
Parliament also took that authority for itself through this action. This kind of authority 
to define the state was also demonstrated by Parliament's declaration on 8 May 1660, 
following the arrival of the 'Declaration of Breda', that Charles II had indeed been 
monarch since 1649.98 These actions were statutory definitions for the English state and 
therefore constitutional documents. 
In April 1661, Charles II summoned the first 'Cavalier' parliament. Amongst its 
accomplishments was legislation which declared that the acts of the 'Convention 
Parliament' were legal.99 The 'Cavalier' parliament also passed other legislation that 
continued to define the English state. Two of the more important acts were The King's 
Sole Right over the Militia Act and, for the Navy, The Act for the Establishing Articles. 
These acts defined the authority of the Monarchy over military forces and 
97 'Charles II, 1660: An Act for removing and preventing all Questions and Disputes concerning the 
Assembling and Sitting of this present Parliament.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. 
John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 179, accessed January 26, 2016, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/p179
98 'House of Commons Journal Volume 8: 8 May 1660,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 
8, 1660-1667, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 16-18. British History Online, 
accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol8/pp16-18.
99 'Charles II, 1661: An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present 
ordering & disposing the same.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: 
Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 308-309. British History Online, accessed October 12, 
2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp308-309, 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for 
the Establishing Articles and Orders for the regulateing and better Government of His Majesties 
Navies Ships of Warr & Forces by Sea.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John 
Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 311-314. British History Online, accessed 
October 13, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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simultaneously placed limits on the use of royal prerogative in the use of those military 
forces. Parliament did undertake other actions to rebuke the interregnum and 
consolidate the monarchy, such as on 14 May 1661, when it was ordered in the House of
Commons that a committee should 'look into all the Journals of the Long Parliament... 
and make Report of what they shall think fit to be expunged thereout, as treasonable, 
and scandalous to his Majesty, and his Royal Father, of blessed Memory.' The same 
committee was also ordered 'make Search in the several Courts of Justice, whether the 
traiterous Writing, called The Instrument of Government, be there remaining; and that 
they report, how they find the same.'100
Another act passed during this session was An Act for Safety and Preservation of
His Majesties Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious practices and
attempts, which is interesting because of the context it provides for the acts described 
below. This act dissolved the Parliament of 1640, and made it illegal to suggest publicly
that Charles II was Roman Catholic or intended to reintroduce Roman Catholicism to 
England.101 Clearly, it was created to support the King. There were two sections that 
placed limits on the King's authority, however.
Provided likewise and be it Enacted That this Act or any thing therein 
contained shall not extend to deprive either of the Houses of Parliament or 
any of theire Members of theire just ancient Freedome and priviledge of 
debating any matters or busines which shall be propounded or debated in 
either of the said Houses or att any Conferences or Committees of both or 
either of the said Houses...102
100 'House of Commons Journal Volume 8: 14 May 1661,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 
8, 1660-1667, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 248-250. British History Online, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol8/pp248-250.
101 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for Safety and Preservation of His Majesties Person and Government 
against Treasonable and Seditious practices and attempts,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-
80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 304-306. British History Online, 
accessed March 12, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp304-306.
102 Ibid.
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While Parliament banned the kind of criticism of Charles II described above, they 
exempted themselves from the law in that they could not be prosecuted for making such
suggestions. 
The state was a contested legislative space, that is to say that there were several 
actors who could, and did define it. In this case it was Parliament, and the King.  Even 
after May 1660, it was certainly not clear that the Restoration would be any more 
successful than Charles' crowning and campaign in Scotland a decade earlier, as 
indicated by the 'Fifth Monarchists' attempt to capture London and kill the King in order
to bring about the end of the world.103  Charles II had been invited to resume the 
Monarchy, and while the 'Cavalier' Parliament was generally supportive, he did not, of 
course, have the strength or wherewithal to rule without Parliamentary support. As a 
result, in this period, Charles II found it necessary to remove some of the mystery of 
Monarchy, explain his aims, and work with Parliament to accomplish things.104 
Parliament was able to create and define limits for the Monarchy, as well as certain 
offices of state, specifically Lord High Admiral. While Charles II did have to accept 
Parliament's definitions for the state, he also retained royal prerogative, and for example
defined the state through the recreation of the Royal Household and appointments to the
Offices of State. For example General Monck was made Duke of Albermarle and named
Master of the Horse.105 The most important example for this thesis is the appointment of
James, Duke of York as Lord High Admiral. The ability for Parliament to define the 
state, and indeed their later willingness to define it contrary to Charles II's desires, is 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
103 Harris, Restoration, l. 129
104 K. Sharpe, Rebranding Rule (Yale University Press, 2013) Kindle Location 690
105 'The stables: Master of the Horse 1660-1837,' in Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Volume 11 
(Revised), Court Officers, 1660-1837, ed. R O Bucholz (London: University of London, 2006), 603-
604. British History Online, accessed October 13, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-
holders/vol11/pp603-604.
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Immediately after the Restoration, there was the rational and deliberate creation 
of definitions for the state that would allow it to function and be acceptable to the 
Stuarts. The immediate concern of implementing the reconstitution of the monarchy 
required Charles II to work together with Parliament and largely limited the scope of the
definitions that were created. From the modern perspective, the use of royal prerogative 
and statute to define the state laid the foundations for the development of a Westminster 
Model state, although no such motivation could possibly be assigned to those involved 
in the process.
Context: The Navies that Came Before
Charles II directly inherited his Navy from the interregnum state. This included 
warships, dockyards, officers and crew, responsibility for debts, and other features. 
Importantly, it also included the administrative structures. The structure of the Navy 
from 1660 was directly based on what had come before. N.A.M. Rodger has provided 
the generally accepted narrative for the Navy's development prior to the Restoration.
Since the death of Elizabeth I, the Navy had gone from neglect to war-pressured 
poverty, usually hampered by the corruption of its administration. Various councils 
sought to improve and grow the Navy during the reign of Charles I.106 In terms of the 
administrative structure, the Duke of Buckingham as Charles I's favourite had been 
appointed Lord High Admiral, and after his death in 1628 the office had been placed in 
commission. In particular, the Board was retained after 1631 when Charles I was 
impressed by how the Dockyards had been improved and revamped. This remained 
intact until 1638, when the Earl of Northumberland was appointed Lord High Admiral, 
in the wake of the infant Prince James being appointed Lord Admiral.107 The Earl of 
106 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 391-394.
107 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 391.
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Northumberland was responsible for generating instructions that would influence the 
Navy following the Restoration.108 With its origins in the reign of Henry VIII, and active
use since 1618, this was not a new creation. Indeed the origins of the Navy Board have 
been extensively examined.109The Navy Board was recreated in 1628, and with political 
changes, would remain active through to the 1640s.110 
This would change with the War of the Three Kingdoms. On the one hand, the 
Earl of Warwick and other entrepreneurs combined public office (Warwick was Lord 
High Admiral from 1643 to 1645 when he was forced to resign, then again until 1648), 
with private enterprise as owners, builders, surveyors and privateers. Parliament used a 
number of committees, including Admiralty Commissions, Navy and Customs 
Committee, and Navy Commissions (which replaced the Navy Board), the members of 
which were effectively the same. Members of these boards, such as William Batten, 
would be important to the Navy following the Restoration.  In 1649, after Pride's Purge, 
a military dictatorship removed all others and created the Committee for the Regulation 
of the Navy and Customs.111
The aftermath of this was extremely important to the Navy following the 
Restoration, because neither Cromwell's coup in 1653 nor the chaos following the fall 
of Richard Cromwell substantially reshaped the administration of the Navy.112 In 1649, 
the office of Lord High Admiral was replaced with the office of General-at-Sea, which 
was put into commission between Richard Deane, Edward Popham and Robert Blake. 
Monck replaced Popham after his death in 1651 and in December 1653, after Cromwell 
108 Instructions given by the Right Honourable Algernon Earle of Northumberland Admiral and General 
of His Majesty's fleet' 1636;, NMM, LEC/5 f1
109 C.S.L. Davies, 'The Administration of the Royal Navy under Henry VIII: The Origins of the Navy 
Board' The English Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 315 (Apr., 1965), 268.; M. Oppenheim, 'The 
Royal Navy under Charles I: Part III -- The Administration' English Historical Review, Vol. 9, No. 35 
(Jul., 1894) 480; A. Coats, 'English Naval Administration under Charles I- Top Down and Bottom 
Up- Tracing Continuities' in Transactions of the Naval Dockyard Society, Vol. 8 (June 2012) 12-3, 
19-20. Capp, Cromwell's Navy, 46-8.
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seized power, Desborough and Vice-Admiral William Penn were also commissioned. In 
1656 Edward Montague was also added to the commission. All of the Generals-at-Sea 
also served as 'Commissioners for the Admiralty and Navy'.113
In December 1652, the Navy Commission created the Laws of War and 
Ordinances of the Sea (hereafter Laws and Ordinances) which would become the 
Articles of War.114 This was in response to the Navy's defeat at the Battle of Dungeness, 
and was instigated by Blake in response to the behaviour of the captains of the ships 
under his command.115 This was the Navy's new disciplinary code, and it was annually 
endorsed by Parliament. Indeed, prior to the Restoration, Parliament's endorsement of 
the Laws and Ordinances had lapsed.116 This was an important document, which 
adapted following the Restoration would become central to Parliament's creation of 
definitions for the Navy. It was not entirely original to this period, and portions were 
certainly inspired by earlier Articles of War such as those issued by Lord Wimbledon in 
1625.117
The nascent Royal Navy drew on both the pre-1649 and the pre-Restoration 
Navy and naval administration. It is these consistencies and continuities that really set 
apart the originality of the inclusion of the Articles of War in the Act for the 
Establishing Articles, as they all together were the foundations for the Royal Navy's 
development in the Westminster Model. 
The Nascent Royal Navy
At the Restoration, there was no intention to create a new type of institution for 
the Royal Navy. Charles II's adoption of the fleet was a practical matter, like the 
113 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, Capp, 33
114 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 15.
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adoption of the regiment that would become the Coldstream Guards following their 
efforts to put down the Fifth Monarchists. The fleet had been directly involved in 
creating the opportunity for the Restoration, from its blockade of London under the 
command of Vice-Admiral John Lawson, to its voyage to the Netherlands to retrieve the
monarch. Edward Montagu not only commanded the fleet during that voyage, he had 
also been personally involved in the efforts to bring about the Restoration.118 In this 
period, a substantial proportion of the definitions for the nascent Royal Navy were 
conventions and precedents. The Act for the Establishing Articles, however, was the 
important exception, an act that effectively provided the institution with a Westminster 
Model constitution and a framework for further defining the institution.
The next section examines how the fleet defined its association with Charles II, 
and how he in turned defined his association with it. The second section investigates the
reconstitution of the Navy's administration. The section that follows discusses 
professional practices and identities that were adopted and inherited. The final section 
of this chapter discusses the Act for the Establishing Articles.
Making the Navy 'Royal'
The fleet's acknowledgement of the Monarchy and his public adoption of it was 
the first major phase of the creation of constitutional conventions. Initially, the Navy 
became 'royal' when the fleet proclaimed itself for the king and exchanged the 
Commonwealth's arms with those of the king. The fleet began to visibly redefine itself 
as a royal Navy prior to the actual voyage to the Netherlands. Samuel Pepys' diary 
discusses these first steps in the entry for 7 May 1660. 
My Lord went this morning about the flag-ships in a boat, to see what 
alterations there must be, as to the arms and flags. He did give me order also
118 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 9.
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to write for silk flags and scarlett waistcloathes. For a rich barge; for a noise 
of trumpets, and a set of fidlers.119 
On 11 May, the fleet began to implement actively the change in recognized authority in 
its preparations for departure.
[T]his morning we began to pull down all the State's arms in the fleet, 
having first sent to Dover for painters and others to come to set up the 
King's.120 
Pepys' diary shows that senior officers in the fleet, specifically in the person of the 
General-at-Sea, Edward Montagu, understood that the monarch was reclaiming power, 
but also that the fleet, like the New Model Army, was an independent actor that not just 
accepted but actively worked to execute the Restoration. 
Then to the quarter-deck, around which the tailors and painters were at 
work, cutting out some pieces of yellow cloth into the fashion of a crown 
and C. R. and put it upon a fine sheet, and that into the flag instead of the 
State's arms.121
The fleet under the command of General Montagu further recognized the authority of 
the king himself on 22 May 1660:
 By the time we came on board again, news is sent us that the King is on 
shore; so my Lord fired all his guns round twice, and all the fleet after him, 
which in the end fell into disorder, which seemed very handsome.122 
Through these actions, those individuals who together composed the community of the 
fleet specifically endorsed Charles Stuart, as King of England. This self-adopted 
association with the king was at the time limited to just the fleet that voyaged to The 
Netherlands. It was, however, an important step in the definition of Royal Navy 
institutional identity more broadly and would be spread to the other Commonwealth 
Navy ships that were not present but became part of the Royal Navy. 
119 Latham and Matthews, Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol I, 130.
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From a social history point of view, the change from the state's arms to those of 
the king would be less significant than the stability represented by the employment of 
the same officers and ratings, especially senior officers across the Restoration. For 
example, General-at-Sea Edward Montagu was given a peerage as Earl Sandwich and 
continued to serve as an admiral in the fleet until his death at the Battle of Solebay in 
1672.123 Furthermore, George Monck was made Duke of Albermarle and in 1666 was, 
with Prince Rupert, co-admiral of the fleet after they replaced the Duke of York.124 
Charles II also continued to employ Vice-Admiral John Lawson, despite his non-
conformist religious views and known republicanism.125 The stability among the senior 
officers was reinforced by the transition of the Commonwealth-built warships into 
Royal Navy service. 
The exchange of the arms on the flag was an expression of institutional identity 
and the redefinition of the authority the fleet recognized. The quote from 13 May was 
very specific and referred to the removal of the state's arms, which was a device created 
in 1654 that included symbols for England, Scotland and Ireland, and its subsequent 
replacement with the crown and initials C.R.126 This was more than just a recognition 
that the Monarchy had been restored; it was a direct statement of institutional affiliation 
to Charles II personally.
The Stuarts and specifically Charles II also directly claimed the fleet. These 
steps were taken by the monarch after the fleet's arrival, for example in the appointment 
of his brother James, Duke of York as Lord High Admiral.127 Another important step 
was the king's renaming of ships in the fleet, which occurred on 23 May 1660. This act 
of taking possession, unlike the fleet's proclamation, extended beyond the ships that 
123 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 164.
124 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 143.
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were present in the larger Commonwealth Navy. Samuel Pepys describes the event and 
illustrates the active erasure of the Protectorate identity: 
After dinner the King and Duke altered the name of some of the ships, viz. 
the Nazeby into Charles; the Richard, James; the Speaker Mary; the Dunbar 
(which was not in company with us), the Henry; Winsly, Happy Return; 
Wakefield, Richmond; Lambert; the Henrietta; Cheriton, the Speedwell; 
Bradford, the Success.128 
JD Davies has shown how this pattern was expanded to other ships that were inherited 
from the Commonwealth.
Charles followed these principles when changing the remaining interregnum
names: Marston Moor became York; Bridgwater, Anne; Torrington, 
Dreadnought; Tredagh (= Drogheda), Resolution; Newbury, Revenge; 
Lyme, Montagu; Preston, Antelope; Maidstone, Mary Rose; Taunton, 
Crown; Nantwich, Bredah (where Charles had signed the declaration 
promising liberty of conscience which guaranteed his Restoration).129
A consideration of the fleet at the Restoration puts these changes into perspective. 
Charles renamed three of four first-rates, one of eleven second-rates, nine of fifteen 
third-rates, seven of forty-six fourth-rates, and nine of thirty-seven fifth-rates. None of 
forty-one sixth rates, or of 7 yachts were renamed.130
The significance of these changes is especially clear in light of Jakub Basista's 
framework of the 'Sacred, Profane and Anti-sacred'.131 This is more sophisticated than a 
simple binary classification of symbols as either 'sacred', which implies a good message,
or 'profane', a bad message. Basista argues that 'anti-sacred' should be used to describe 
symbols that are intrinsically against the desired message and identities and that 
'profane' provides a classification for symbols that are neither inherently good nor bad. 
128 Latham and Matthews, Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol I, 154. J.D. Davies, 'Fubbs Yes, Mum No: The 
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Ships named for Parliamentary or Commonwealth symbols and victories were clearly 
'anti-sacred', and their renaming allowed Charles II to both rebuke the Commonwealth 
and emphasize the Monarchy's reconstitution. The renaming of warships was an effort 
to erase the bad memories of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. The Stuarts renamed the 
ships after royal symbols and individuals from the royal family, but not necessarily in 
honour of royalist victories. In most cases, the new royalist names created associations 
with a different type of symbol than the preceding name. For example, the Naseby was 
renamed for the King, and the Preston was simply renamed Antelope. The biggest 
exception was the Richard, named for Cromwell's heir, was named for James, who was 
at that time Charles's own heir (and eventual successor).132
The identities and associations expressed by the fleet's warships were not simply
'sacred' or 'anti-sacred', therefore. An example of a warship with a 'profane' name was 
the Hampshire, which was built in 1653 and served with the Royal Navy until it was 
sunk at the Battle of Hudson's Bay in 1697.133 Other ships to retain their name included 
the second-rate Rainbow, and the third-rates Essex, Fairfax and Gloucester.134
The interregnum regimes had imprinted their identity on the fleet through 
several measures. In addition to the Commonwealth's use of land-officers aboard ships 
and the use of army troops as crew (to a limit of no more than one man in eight), the use
of names such as Drogheda, Lyme, Taunton and Wexford associated the fleet, and its 
warships, with the victories that the New Model Army's regiments had fought and 
won.135 The interregnum regimes had not named warships after its naval victories, such 
as the Battle of the Gabbard.136 
132 “The Settlement of the Navy at the Coming of King Charles the Second”, NMM CLU/9 f5.
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Clearly, both the Interregnum regimes and the Stuarts were political in their 
naming of warships, but Charles II did not necessarily use the same types of symbols in 
warship names as the previous regimes had. Specifically, ships named after 
Parliamentarian victories were renamed to the Resolution, Revenge, Crown and Bredah, 
which did signify royalist victory, but on a conceptual level rather than on the field of 
battle.137 Also, the Stuarts erased the Navy's connections to the New Model Army in 
warships names, although Charles II did not add any specifically maritime associations, 
other than reviving Elizabethan warship names such as Dreadnought, which had been 
Torrington.138 The reuse of Elizabethan warships names also demonstrates that Charles 
II was aware of the Navy's pre-civil wars history and was influenced by it. The 
definitions created by the changes in warship names were deliberate, a rational 
statement of royal authority and the rebuke of the interregnum. They provide important 
context for the similarly rational statement of royal authority in the changes to the 
Articles of War discussed below.
The Reconstitution of the Naval Administration
After the Restoration, the Admiralty and Navy Board were both recreated, 
restoring the Navy's administration to what had existed pre-1649. In July 1660, the King
appointed the Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Royal Navy, popularly 
known as the Navy Board.139 The new Admiralty and Navy Board inherited the 
responsibilities of its predecessor organs. To be specific, the new administration was 
responsible for the ships, men, dockyards and debt of the State's Navy. This inheritance 
137 Ibid.
138 J.D. Davies, Kings of the Sea, (forthcoming), “The Settlement of the Navy at the Coming of King 
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would cause conflict between King and Navy only a few years after the Restoration, as 
is discussed in the next chapter.
One structural change after the Restoration was the addition of the Lord High 
Admiral to the Navy Board. Although this was not a change compared to practices prior
to the interregnum, it had an important effect on the Royal Navy's development during 
this period. Turnbull states that:
Prior to 1673, there was a strong tendency for the distinction between the 
Admiralty and the Navy Board to be blurred, but this was very much a 
temporary state of affairs caused by the reappointment of a single Lord High
Admiral.140
In practice, the Navy Board executed the orders of the Admiralty regarding 
administration.141Another important structural change was the addition of three 
additional commissioners to the Navy Board in addition to the four principal offices: the
Treasurer, the Controller, the Surveyor and the Clerk of the Acts. After Pepys was 
named Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board, he had to negotiate a payment or pension of
sorts for his predecessor from the reign of Charles I, Thomas Barlow, who owned the 
position despite Pepys' appointment.142 
The recreation of the Navy Board and Admiralty removed the Navy from 
Parliament's direct authority and placed it under royal prerogative, although the Navy 
itself was not part of the Royal Household. After the board was appointed, the Duke of 
York issued instructions for the Principal Officers and Commissioners, in which he set 
forth his interpretation of their responsibilities.143 
The Duke of York bluntly explained in both the sets of instructions why he 
issued them. The January 1661 instructions for the Principal Officers and Naval 
Commissioners begins as follows:
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Gentlemen, I having long deferr'd the sending to you a Book containing the 
Duties of the several officers belonging to His Majesty's Navy, not that I 
thought it unnecessary they should be instructed in it, but that I was inform'd
that the present want of money had so hardened and embolden'd many 
Persons in their negligences and abuses, that there was little hopes of their 
Amendment, and therefor thought it better to delay the Publishing of these 
Rules, until the Want, and in it the pretence of offending were remov'd...144
And again, in the same month, the Duke of York created another document addressing 
the duties of the standing officers of the Navy. That instruction begins:
Whereas I understand that there arise frequently doubts and disputes 
amongst divers of the Officer belonging to his Majesty's Navy, concerning 
the Dutys of their several places, whereby the said officers are not only 
much disquieted amongst themselves, But the King's Service is much 
prejudiced through the Neglects occasioned by said disputes or doubts. For 
preventing the growth or continuance of these, and the like inconveniences 
arising from these Ignorances or neglects of the duties belong to the Several 
Officers, I have thought fit to ratifie and confirm certain orders which I 
understand were formerly published by the Earl of Northumberland (being 
then Admiral).145
These included further instructions for some of the officers of the Navy, in particular 
boatswains, gunners, pursers, muster masters and others aboard ships under the care of 
the Navy Board.146 Given the substantial continuity in personnel between the pre-
Interregnum and post-Restoration navies, many of the personnel would have been 
familiar with those instructions specifically.
These instructions are an illustration of the use of royal authority to define the 
nascent Royal Navy by creating conventions. For example, the 'Duties of the Principall 
Officers and Commissioners of the Navy' was issued under the Duke of York's authority
as 'Lord High Admiral of England and Ireland, Constable of the Castle of Dover and 
Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports'.147 The recreation of the Navy's administration, the 
alteration of the pre-interregnum structure and the re-issue and of institutional 
144 Letter from the Duke of York to the Principall Officers and Commissioners of the Navy Board, 2 
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procedures from that same period, at the same time that it assumed the existing financial
responsibilities, is an important example of how the two important influences were 
combined. This also provides important context for the changes made to the Articles of 
War.
Adoption of Professional Definitions
Although at this point the profession of being a naval officer had not been firmly
differentiated from military service on land, there were professional definitions and 
established expectations which would serve as part of the foundation for the Royal 
Navy's development. These came from two broad groups of sources: published treatises 
upon naval service and the instructions issued from the Admiralty for naval officers. 
An early example that the Duke of York and other military and professional 
mariners would have been familiar with was Nathan Boteler's Six Dialogues about Sea-
services between an High-Admiral and a Captain at Sea. Originally compiled and 
written prior to the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, Six Dialogues was published multiple 
times including a version in 1685.148 Boteler directly addressed the socio-professional 
role of the Admiral, Captain and Lieutenant aboard warships, unlike the Duke of York 
who did not directly address the issue immediately post-Reformation.149 A comparison 
between Boteler's dialogues and the Duke of York's instructions for duty indicates a 
very different purpose to the documents. Boteler discusses an ideal role for each of the 
officers in a theoretical and directly educational way. The descriptions also bluntly 
describe the similarities in scope of practice between being an officer in a warship and 
an officer on shore, highlighting the reality of dual service and the lack of professional 
and institutional differentiation. Boteler describes the role of the Lieutenant as follows:
148 'Six Dialogues about sea services between an High-Admiral and a Captain at sea.', Nathaniel Boteler, 
1685' NMM TUN/166 ' 1
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A lieutenants place at sea is as the Lieutenant's place on the shore, for in the 
Captain's absence, he is to command in Chief; only he is to be admonished 
that he be not too fierce in his Way at the first, (which is an humour whereto
young men are much addicted) but to carry himself with Moderation and 
Respect to the Master Gunner, Boatswain and the other Officers, that so he 
may not be despised, but beloved and obeyed and when Experience hath 
taught him somewhat more fully to understand his place, he may grow to an 
higher strain, and at last attain to his affect Port, a Captain-ship.150
Boteler does not describe the duty of the Lieutenant, merely his place within the 
community that is a warship. This indicates that the office of Lieutenant was not, at that 
point, professionally differentiated in terms of scope of practice between land and 
maritime forces. He continues to describe Captains, presented as a response to the 
question 'What are the parts and properties requireable in a Captain at sea, who is to 
direct and command all the forenamed Officers'?151 
There is no doubt but that a Sea Captain commanding in Chief, in one of 
His Majesties Royal Ships, hath as enlarged a Charge under his Hand, and 
of as high as Nature as any Colonel at Land; for besides... He is also over 
and above to stand answerable to His Majesty for the whole Ship her self, 
and all her Ordnance.152
Again Boteler did not describe the operational, but rather the socio-professional, scope-
of-practice, the Captain's place in the Navy's social order and within the social order of 
the larger English military profession as well. Again, it was not a statement of the 
maritime aspects of the job, but rather the Captain's area of responsibility or authority. 
Admirals commissioned by James I and Charles I issued instructions specific to 
the Navy. The Marquis of Buckingham in 1623 laid out the duties of naval officers, and 
the Earl of Northumberland also issued further instructions in 1636.153 Another example 
is the Earl of Lindsay's instructions from 1635.154 Some of these were published, such as
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the Earl of Northumberland's manual Discourse on the Navy from 1638.155 An example 
comes from Lord Wimbledon's Instructions of 1625: 
You shall with the master take a particular account of the stores of the 
boatswain and carpenters of the ship, examining their receipts, expenses and
remains, not suffering any unnecessary waste to be made of their provisions,
or any work to be done which shall not be needful for the service.156
The Laws and Ordinances mentioned above were partially derived from the instructions
that had been presented to ships captains by Admirals in the English Navy prior to 1652.
Hence, these documents provided both the basis for the Navy's disciplinary code and 
extant statements of professional expectations. They, along with publications like 
Boteler's Six Dialogues, provided the foundations for the development of a later Royal 
Navy-specific officer profession. The adoption of the existing professional expectations 
and definitions was different from the two other categories of definitions discussed. The
professional expectations were not regime-specific, especially compared to the warship 
names or the structure of the Navy's administration. As such, they did not need to be 
immediately redefined and were not until the Duke of York's instructions in 1663.157 The
creation of professional definitions is further discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
The active use of royal prerogative and authority to define aspects of the Navy 
following the Restoration largely proceeded as would be expected. Although the 
renaming of warships, the use of the royal standard and the recreation of the Admiralty 
and Navy Board were substantial changes, they alone would not have provided the 
foundation for the development of a new type of naval institution. As well, the 
comparison of the way that the definitions inherited from the State's Navy were or were 
not directly replaced at the Restoration provides important insight into foundations for 
155 'A Brief Discourse of the Navy' 26 January 1638, NMM LEC/7 f1 
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the Navy's future development and the creation of the first statutory definitions for the 
Navy.
The Codified Definitions
The inclusion of the Articles of War in the Act for the Establishing Articles was 
the key action that provided the basis for the Navy to develop in the 'Westminster 
Model' because it provided the first statutory component. Current understanding of the 
Articles of War is shaped by two different historical approaches. The first involves the 
social and cultural histories that examine the impact of the Articles of War on the every-
day lives of the Royal Navy officers and sailors through discussions of discipline, crime
and punishment. The best example is N.A.M. Rodger's The Wooden World: An Anatomy
of the Georgian Navy, which provides a balanced appraisal of the Articles using an 
eighteenth-century definition of discipline.158 This foundation on a more nuanced 
discussion of crime and punishment results, however, in limited analysis of the Articles' 
influence on the Royal Navy's development process. J.D. Davies provides a different, 
more cultural perspective in his discussion of naval discipline during the seventeenth 
century and argues that the Articles' role as a disciplinary code was just one aspect of its
function. In particular, he discusses the first article's definition of the Royal Navy's 
official religion.159 As a disciplinary code, the most interesting thing was not their 
brutality, or the nature of the punishments themselves, but rather the lack of any official 
process for ratings or junior officers to register complaints with a higher authority.160 A 
similar approach is also evident in Bernard Capp's Cromwell's Navy. Capp discusses the
Laws and Ordinances, which were adapted into the Articles of War. He, too, implies that
the Articles of War acted as more than just the Navy's legal code, albeit prior to the 
158 Rodger, The Wooden World, 205.
159 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 92-93.
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Articles actually becoming legislation. He argues that the extreme fundamentalist 
Protestants who controlled the Navy Commission in December 1652 included a clarion 
call for a strident Christian identity and mission for the Navy.161 However, it was the 
influence of certain senior officers like John Lawson, who tended to favour co-
religionists professionally, that had more influence on the religious makeup of the 
Navy's officer community.162 
 The second major approach to the Articles of War is to provide narratives of the 
long process of legislative developments. Michael Oppenheim, when discussing the 
1653 Laws and Ordinances and the Articles of War following the Restoration argued 
that 'these latter... were only based upon those previously existing which are the 
groundwork of all subsequent modifications and additions experience showed to be 
necessary down to the present day'.163 More significantly, Reginald Acland, an 
experienced jurist who had served as the Royal Navy's Judge Advocate General 
examined the development of the Navy's Articles of War, beginning with the Cadiz 
expedition of 1596 and ending with the Victorian revisions of 1860 in an article from 
1921. However, he attributes no more significance to the Act for the Establishing 
Articles than Oppenheim and notes merely what he considers to be minor textual 
changes addressing the Monarchy and the addition of an article addressing sodomy.164 
Acland's study is notable in that he does not seem to notice, or at least does not consider
to be important for his narrative, the translation of what had always been a temporary 
document into a permanent one.165 N.A.M Rodger also ascribes relatively little 
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importance to the amendments to the Articles of War in 1660, emphasizing their origins 
in the Laws and Ordinances.166
The emphasis this study places on the inclusion of the Articles of War in the Act 
for the Establishing Articles is not an attempt to overturn the existing understanding, but
to complement it and to provide an additional perspective. This action is certainly much 
more important to the consideration of the Navy's development in the 'Westminster 
Model' than it is in for example, social histories of the Navy during this period.
The Act for the Establishing Articles and the codification of the Articles of War 
did not occur within a legislative or institutional vacuum. At the same time that the 
Stuarts asserted their control over government, the nation and the Navy, they were also 
asserting control over the other English military forces as well, as the regiments of the 
Land Forces and militia also had to be claimed and regulated. Of particular importance 
is the 1661 Militia Act, which received royal assent on the same day as the Act for the 
Establishing Articles. 
 The Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present 
ordering & disposing the same served to legally claim control of the militia and the 
Navy. Charles II was not proclaiming what Glete would refer to as a state monopoly on 
violence, but rather using Parliament to re-assert his authority over specific English 
military forces, including the Navy and militia. The Militia Act in particular defined 
Royal control over English military forces that were separate from the small number of 
standing regiments. The actual language contained within the act is important to 
ascertain the difference between how the government, including the king, controlled the 
Navy and the militia.
Foreasmuch as within all His Majesties Realmes and Dominions the sole 
Supreme Government Command and Disposition of the Militia and of all 
Forces by Sea and Land and of all Forts and Places of strength is and by the 
166 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 15, 59-60.
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Lawes of England ever was the undoubted Right of His Majesty and His 
Royall Predecessors Kings & Queenes of England and that both or either of 
the Houses of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same nor can 
nor lawfully may raise or leavy any Warr Offensive or Defensive against His
Majesty His Heires or lawfull Successors and yet the contrary thereof hath 
of late yeares beene practised almost to the Ruine and Destruction of this 
Kingdome and during the late Usurped Governments many evill and 
rebellious Principles have beene distilled into the minds of the People of this
Kingdome which unlesse p[re]vented may breake forth to the disturbance of
the Peace and Quiet thereof...167 
In the beginning of this section of the act, it was clearly stated that the crown and the 
king possessed sole control of all military forces, on land and at sea. However, that is 
the final mention of English naval or maritime military forces within this act. 
This was a direct and rational declaration of Royal authority. What is critically 
different here is that this act was written, and passed by Parliament. Parliament is 
defining the state as it had with the Parliament Act and as it received assent, created a 
definition that was acceptable to Charles II.  For example, it directly rebukes the 
challenges to the authority of the King from the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and makes
it clear that the Militia are under the King's authority and those officers he appoints as 
his Lieutenants. It explicitly required the Lord Lieutenants, their deputies, and militia 
officers to swear the Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Supremacy. These expressions of 
Royal authority are partially balanced by s. III, which aimed to restrict the demands the 
King could place upon counties to provide military forces by limiting them to 'their 
ancient proportion.' More importantly for the context of the Restoration, further 
restrictions were placed upon the King by s. IV, the 'Proviso against compelling 
Subjects to go out of the Kingdom,' which forbids the monarch from sending the militia 
abroad.168 These two sections were added by Parliament on 16 July 1661, after the first 
and second readings of the Bill and were formulated by a Committee of the Whole 
167 'Charles II, 1661: An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present 
ordering & disposing the same.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80
168 Ibid.
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House.169 Hence, the creation of those limits was important to Parliament. In the Militia 
Act, the militia was defined first and foremost as a royal force 'Foresmuch as within all 
His Majesties Realmes and Dominions the sole Supreme Government Command and 
Disposition of the Militia and of all Forces by Sea and Land'.170 Yet, where the Militia 
(and all forces by sea and land) were declared to be under royal control, the act itself 
was a result of Parliament continuing to define the state. 
Some context is also provided by additional interactions between Charles II and 
Parliament regarding the Navy. In December 1661, Charles II went to Parliament to ask 
for income to pay off the fleet. He 'invited the house to “thoroughly examine whether 
these necessities be real or imaginary” or whether the consequence of private royal 
profligacy rather than public need'. This was certainly a reflection of the consequences 
of Charles I's implementation of the Ship Money tax.171 Sharpe describes Charles II's 
relationship with Parliament as follows:
Charles II's speech early on in his own first parliament suggests- and helped 
to construct- a new openness, a new pragmatism, a different style of 
monarchy that was to emerge... In Parliament, while rhetorically denying the
need to do so, Charles understood that more than his predecessors, he must 
argue and justify his case.172
While Charles II used language that upheld royal prerogative, his actions, such as 
providing royal assent to the Militia Act and the Act for the Establishing Articles shows 
that he did understand that the acceptance of some restrictions was necessary. Further, 
he did not veto the acts (or withhold royal assent), as he would a bill in 1678 that 
suggested that Parliament rather than the monarch controlled the militia.173
169 House of Commons Journal Volume 8: 16 July 1661,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 
8, 1660-1667, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 302-303. British History Online, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol8/pp302-303.
170 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314., 
171 K. Sharpe, Rebranding Rule (Yale University Press Ebook, 2013) Kindle Location 680-90.
172 Sharpe, Rebranding Rule, Kindle Location 690.
173 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, 302-3.
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The Act for the Establishing Articles
The creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles was an unprecedented 
mechanism for defining the Navy. The inclusion of the Articles of War in statute 
definition provided a critical foundation for the Royal Navy's development in the 
'Westminster Model.' The Journal of the House of Lords and the Journal of the House 
of Commons from May to July 1661 describe the process of the Articles' passage into 
law, and illustrate how Parliament's continued ability to define the state in addition to 
the monarch's definitions informed and shaped the future development of the Navy.
 The act originated in the House of Lords, with the first reading on 6 July 
1661.174 Both houses contributed to the authorship of the bill. Following the second 
reading on 10 July, the Lords formed a committee that included the Lord High Admiral 
and Duke Albermarle along with thirteen others. They were ordered to meet the next 
day 'in the Princes' lodgings.'175 The bill was further considered by the Lords on 12 July, 
when the alterations and amendments created by the committee were read twice and 
then agreed upon.176 On 15 July, the bill was read for a third time, voted upon, and sent 
to the House of Commons.177 The Commons read the bill for the first time on 16 July, 
and then following the second reading on 22 July a committee was formed to meet that 
very afternoon.178 The future Lord Treasurer, Thomas Clifford, chaired the Commons' 
174 "House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 6 July 1661," in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 
1660-1666, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 300-301. British History Online, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol11/pp300-301.
175 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 10 July 1661,' in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 
1660-1666 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 304-305, accessed May 10, 2012, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol11/pp304-305; 
176 "House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 12 July 1661," in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 
1660-1666, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 306-307. British History Online, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol11/pp306-307.
177 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 15 July 1661,' in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 
1660-1666, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 309-310. British History Online, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol11/pp309-310. "House of 
Commons Journal Volume 8: 15 July 1661," in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 8, 1660-
1667, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 301-302. British History Online, accessed 
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committee, and other members included the naval commissioner Sir William Batten, 
and the Duke of York's personal secretary William Coventry.179 The House of Commons 
returned the Bill to the House of Lords with amendments (discussed below), to which 
the upper house agreed the same day.180
As mentioned above, the direct origins of the Articles of War contained in the 
Act for the Establishing Articles was the Laws and Ordinances from 1652.181 As both 
Acland and Rodger have stated, the relatively few alterations made to the content of the 
1652 Laws and Ordinances indicates that contemporary opinion of them was that they 
were successful.182 Some aspects of the Commonwealth's Articles were clearly 
unacceptable in that they reflected 'anti-sacred' identities and symbols and had to be 
altered to recognize royal authority. Samuel Pepys did not comment on it in his diary, 
although he would be personally involved in the aftermath and did comment on the 
passage of other legislation at the same time.183 The importance of the act in setting a 
new pattern for the Royal Navy's development can only be appreciated with the benefit 
of considerable hindsight.
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The Proviso and Articles: Codified Constitutional Aspects
Where the inclusion of the Articles of War into legislation was the single most 
important foundation for the development of the future Royal Navy institution, the 
'Proviso touching the powers of the Lord High Admiral' was the single most important 
section within the Articles of War, as it, rather than the other alterations, additions and 
deletions, was the reason they were translated into legislation at all.184 The bill in 
general had been a creation of the House of Lords, and had been amended by a 
committee led by the Lord High Admiral, but the Proviso was a creation of a 1661 
House of Commons committee and was specifically written by a sub-committee chaired
by William Coventry who, in addition to sitting as an MP, was personal secretary to the 
Duke of York.185 The administration of the Royal Navy, which the previous year had 
been appointed using royal authority had a direct role in the creation of the text that 
Parliament used to limit royal authority. From the Journal of the House of Lords, the 
direct role of the Duke of York is clear and points to de facto cooperation between the 
Admiralty and Parliament. The text of the Proviso is as follows:
Provided alsoe and bee it further Enacted by the Authority aforesaid That 
this Act or any thing or things therein conteyned shall not in any  manner of 
wise extend to give unto the Lord High Admirall of England for the time 
being or to any his Vice-Admiralls Judge or Judges of the Admiralty his or 
theire Deputy or Deputies or to any other the Officers or Ministers of the 
Admiralty or to any others having or claiming any Admirall Power 
Jurisdiction or Authority within this Realme and Wales or any other the 
Kings Dominions any other Power Right Jurisdiction Preheminence or 
Authority then he or they or any of them lawfully have hath or had or ought 
to have and enjoyed before the making of this Act other then for such of the 
Offences specified in the severall Articles conteyned in this Act as hereafter 
shall be done upon the main Sea or in Ships or Vessells being and hovering 
in the maine Streame of great Rivers onely beneath the Bridges of the same 
Rivers nigh to the Sea within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty and in none 
184 Acland argued that the most significant changes in 1661 were in article XIII, which altered the 
penalty for being paid by merchants in a convoy, and article XXXII, which made sodomy a capital 
offence. Acland, 'The Naval Articles of War' 198.
185 HMSO, Journal of the House of Commons Vol 8, 307/308.
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other places whatsoever and comitted only by such persons as shall be in 
actuall Service and Pay in his Majesties Fleete or Ships of War.186
It is the Proviso, rather than the articles themselves, that provided the Royal Navy with 
its first 'constitutional' definitions. It covers two of Garner's four attributes of a state, 
specifically 'Territory' and 'Population'. It also defined the Royal Navy as a jurisdiction, 
rather than an entity embodied by ships, personnel, or other aspects of its material 
existence.
The Proviso was added to the Articles of War because of the political fallout and 
conflicts of the Restoration. It was designed to limit the Lord High Admiral's 
jurisdiction, authority and power. This Parliament was the first 'Cavalier' parliament and
included many returned Royalists, but also a number of those who had supported the 
Parliamentarian cause. For example, Richard Ingoldsby (who was a member of the New
Model Army during the Commonwealth) and William Coventry were both elected in 
1661.187 The 'Cavalier' parliament supported the monarch, but MPs had concerns about 
royal authority.  The creation of the Proviso reflects Parliamentary concerns about royal 
authority, given the context provided by the Common's creation of the limits on that 
authority in the Militia Act as described above.
The Proviso provided other definitions for the Royal Navy as a contested 
legislative space and further specified the nature of the Lord High Admiral's 
jurisdiction. The limits of the Lord High Admiral's powers were defined for where, 
when, and over whom the Articles of War applied. The title of the legislation itself 
defined the Navy as the 'ships of war and forces by sea'.188 Naval officers could only be 
186 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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prosecuted under the Articles of War when actively serving in the Navy and specifically 
only when aboard ship in certain locations, just as militia officers only held authority as 
such when the militia was mobilized. This was a reflection of the established limited 
jurisdiction of English military authority, as demonstrated by the fourth clause of the 
Militia Act, which stated that 
Provided That neither this Act nor any matter or thing therein contained 
shall bee deemed construed or taken to extend to the giving or declaring of 
any Power for the transporting of any [of] the Subjects of this Realme or 
any way compelling them to march out of this Kingdome otherwise then by 
the Lawes of England ought to be done.189
In other words, the Militia was defined as an internal military force, which did not exist 
outside of England. In comparison, the Royal Navy was strictly defined as an external 
military force, with no legal authority or operational existence in England itself. It was 
also defined as a geographically dynamic jurisdiction and contested legislative space co-
located with the Navy's ships. 
The Articles contained within the document also provided definitions for the 
existence of the Royal Navy and Royal Navy officer profession. A number of terms 
were used to describe the individuals who were subject to the Articles of War, further 
describing those Garner would have classified as 'population'. Article XI explicitly 
referred to 'Every Captaine Commander and other Officer Seaman or Souldier of any 
Shipp Frigott or Vessell of Warre', while Articles XVI and XVII specifically refer to 
'Sea Captains'.190 In many cases, this language was copied directly from the Laws and 
Ordinances, such as from Article XIV of the 1652 edition, which referred to 'Every 
Captain, and all other Officers, Mariners, and Soldiers of every ship, Frigot, or Vessel of
War'.191 In some of the articles adopted, the terms were specifically altered. For 
189 ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Parliament of England and Wales, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea Ordained and Established 
by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England; for the and better government of the navies, 
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example, 1652's Article XIII specified that 'Every Captain and Commander of any ship, 
Frigot or Vessel of War shall duly observe the Commands of the General at Sea'.192 In 
comparison, 1661's Article XI, which is otherwise the same, adds 'every … seaman or 
Souldier' to the list of those who must observe the commands of the 'Admirall or other 
his Superior or Commander of any Squadron'.193 Further, the references in 1661's 
Articles XVI through XVII to Sea-Captains replace the term Captain in the equivalent 
articles from 1652.194 The replacement of Captain with Sea-Captain could be easily seen
as a specific and positive definition that provided a foundation for the 'maritimization' of
the Royal Navy officer profession. The text clarified the practice of a ship's 
commanding officer as a maritime officer, without actually changing the practices for 
employing warship officers and captains. However, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, there was indeed a desire for Royal Navy officers to become maritime 
professionals.
The alteration of 'General at Sea' to 'Admiral' was a reflection of the Restoration,
the abolition of the offices of the Generals-at-Sea and the restoration of the Lord High 
Admiral. This change removed a term very directly connected to, not just the 
Commonwealth's Navy, but also the Commonwealth Government's specific measure to 
take control of the Navy. This was a symbolic gesture, as both remaining Generals-At-
Sea, Montagu and Monck, would serve as admirals for the Royal Navy following the 
Restoration. From the perspective of the Royal Navy as a contested legislative space, 
this alteration created a positive, specific definition of senior naval officers as admirals, 
an office associated with royal authority, rather than the Parliamentary authority that 
ships and vessels thereunto belonging; (London: John Field., 1652). 8. via Early English Books 
Online ID No. 99866122
192 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 8.




created the office of 'General-at-Sea'. The Proviso introduced the most significant 
symbolic and practical change by definitively placing the Navy under royal authority at 
the same time that it limited the authority of the Admiral, but the relatively minor 
amendments and the use of more maritime terms did also provide some foundations for 
the development of a specifically maritime and military identity.
The Proviso did not specifically provide definitions that would differentiate 
naval officers or require them to use their Royal Navy professional identity ashore. 
Officers who were ashore often adopted their army rank, or civilian social position, in 
their interactions with the world rather than their naval rank.195 In some cases, this was 
due to the individual having more than one commission. For example, the Earl of 
Sandwich was Colonel of a cavalry regiment at the same time as he was Admiral of the 
Fleet at the Restoration.196 There were exceptions, of course, such as Lieutenant 
Lambert, who served aboard Montagu's flagship and was an acquaintance of Samuel 
Pepys.197 
Defining Identities
The alterations to the Articles of War were one mechanism for the 
implementation of a new 'Royal' identity for the Navy, specifically in its direct 
connection to Charles, the monarchy and to the Church of England. This was not simply
accomplished by stating that the Navy was under Royal authority. Many specific articles
needed to be altered or removed, particularly any that referred to the Commonwealth 
directly. Article XIX of 1652, as an obvious example, was removed, though elements of 
it can be found elsewhere in the revised Acts. It stated that any captains of ships who 
had either taken Parliament's commission, or served as private warships for Parliament 
195 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 58-60.
196 Latham and Matthews, Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol I, 242.
197 Latham and Matthews, Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol I, 27, 105.
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or the Commonwealth, who then declared for the Crown or attacked any Parliament or 
friendly vessels or who turned pirate would be sentenced to death.198 Other articles were
simply adapted to reinforce Stuart identity. It was not intended to provide the framework
for the development of a specific Royal Navy institutional identity. As the Act for the 
Establishing Articles proved to be permanent, these changes together would provide the 
statutory foundations for just that.
The important first article of the 1661 act, which defined the Royal Navy's 
religious identity, was largely adapted from the 1652 Articles. The alterations were a 
direct reflection of the Restoration and specifically the anticipated legal codification of 
the Episcopacy and the Church of England, which were political priorities for Charles II
because the re-establishment of the Church of England was a non-negotiable aspect of 
the Stuart state. It was also an emphatic and powerful symbol of Stuart, royal victory 
and the repudiation of the religious changes under the Commonwealth.
 The text of the 1652 Article I reads as follows: 
ALL Commanders shall endeavour, that Almighty God be solemnly and 
reverently served in their respective Ships, all Prophaneness and 
Irreligiousness avoided, and other Religious Duties be excercised and duly 
frequented, and the Lord's Day Religiously observed.199
Capp argues that the Naval Commission which created the 1652 Articles of War had 
been controlled by some of the more radical Protestant members of English 
Parliament.200 However, the naval commissioners in 1652 only added the line 'all 
Prophaneness and Irreligiousness avoided, and other Religious Duties be exercised and 
duly frequented' to the Earl of Warwick's earlier instructions upon which they were 
based. As Capp argues, a common religious identity in the Navy did not develop during 
the interregnum.201 The 1652 articles had thus failed to impose a uniform religious 
198 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 9.
199 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 3.
200 Capp, Cromwell's Navy, 296.
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identity on the Navy which had so many different confessional elements within it. There
was, therefore, an obvious determination for the 1661 version to be more effective. 
To this end, Article I was altered in 1661 with very specific references as 
follows:
That all Co[m]manders Captaines and other Officers att Sea shall cause the 
publique Worshipp of Almighty God according to the Liturgy of the Church 
of England established by Law to be solemnly orderly and reverently 
performed in theire respective Ships And that prayers and preachings by the 
respective Chaplaines in holy Orders of the respective Ships be performed 
diligently and that the Lord Day be observed according to Law.202
Where the naval commissioners in 1652 had only provided a very general directive to 
act in a Christian way, the Stuarts clearly intended to make the Royal Navy an Anglican 
Navy. Although according to Capp the 'average sailor did not become a puritan' during 
the interregnum, the religious definitions included in the Act for the Establishing 
Articles hint at a much more determined effort to define a common confessional 
identity.203
Similarly, throughout the articles, repeated references to the king and to 
monarchy more generally further cemented the Navy's royal identity. Article II refers to 
'[e]very person and persons in his Majesties pay', and Article VII to 'None in his 
Majesties pay', where in the Laws and Ordinances, the phrase 'none shall' is used 
instead.204 Article XX also addresses treasonous behaviour and includes the phrase 'His 
Majestie or Government'.205 Article XII, which dealt with the requirement for every ship
in the fleet to support it and not to act independently, referred to 'His Majesties Ships'.206
Finally, the Proviso also directly referred to the monarch, explicitly to the 'Kings 
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Dominion' and also to his 'Majesties Fleete or Ships of War'.207 While these might seem 
like rather unsurprising, descriptive alterations, from a legal point of view they indicate 
a rather profound change. They show that the Act for the Establishing Articles was 
unlike any document previously used to control or define the Navy and that the Navy 
had at least the potential to develop into something more than just a temporary force. 
Specifically, Article III includes a reference that implied a long-term institutional
application: 'Rebellion against His Majesty His Heires and Successors'. Likewise, 
Article IV, which also addresses treason, includes the slight variation 'the Kings Majesty
His Heires and Successors'.208 Because there had never been any persistent professional 
continuity between military campaigns or periods of employment, this type of language 
was uncommon within definitions of the Navy. Of course a close association remained 
between the creation of military forces and their specific, time-limited missions making 
the appearance of such forward-looking language all the more striking. It contributed to 
the stability of the 1661 Articles of War. 
Definition of Procedures and Practices
Definitions of procedures and practices were at the core of the Articles of War. 
The majority of these definitions were limited to the delineation of expectations for 
behaviour and the specification of the required institutional response to failures to live 
up to those expectations in terms of both the judicial procedures and the appropriate 
punishments. The specification of the Navy's religious practices and the paired selection
of courts-martial and the de-selection of councils-of war as the Navy's judicial process 
were more particularly important. They are statutory embodiments of definitions 




As indicated above, Article I from The Act for the Establishing Articles required 
the Royal Navy to use the Liturgy of the Church of England. Through this, Parliament 
specified that in at least this respect, the Royal Navy's practices would be externally 
defined. The expectation was that the contemporary Savoy Conference of 1661 would 
produce a Book of Common Prayer that was acceptable to Anglicans, Presbyterians and 
other groups that the king wanted to bring back into the Church of England. Yet the 
failure of the conference perpetuated the divisions between Anglicans and Presbyterians
and resulted in the Parliamentary creation of the Book of Common Prayer released in 
1662 and legally mandated under the Act of Uniformity.209 In this case, the Royal Navy 
was required to follow procedures that were externally defined (by Parliament) and 
were also not contained with the Act for the Establishing Articles. But for the failure of 
the Savoy Conference, the Royal Navy's religious practices could have been 
significantly different. Stability and consistency in practice required the stability and 
consistency of the established church, which was by no means certain when the Act for 
the Establishing Articles was created. 
 The most substantive of the doctrinal or procedural changes made in the 1661 
Articles of War was the specification of the court-martial as the Royal Navy's designated
disciplinary and investigative process. This involved ending the practice of 
administering punishments through councils of war that provided yet another way for 
Parliament to place limits on the power of the Lord High Admiral and specifically on 
his judicial prerogative. Councils-of-war were traditionally an internal, informally 
regulated process akin to the land forces' regiments system of regimental courts-martial 
and what Reginald Acland described as a 'complete system'.210 Further, the Laws and 
209 Susan McMahon, 'John Ray (1627-1705) and the Act of Uniformity 1662' Notes and Records of the 
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Ordinances had specified these councils to adjudicate over offences that did not require 
a court-martial.211 By making the court-martial the described judicial mechanism for the 
Royal Navy and by placing limits on courts-martial, Parliament introduced an element 
of oversight, or checks and balances, intended to govern the personal authority of the 
Lord High Admiral.212
The earlier Laws and Ordinances specifically named councils-of-war in its 
various articles. Article VI, for example, ordered the harbouring of enemies or enabling 
their movement abroad to be dealt with by a council-of-war. Similarly, article XVIII, 
which dealt with wasteful expense of ammunition and shot, also ordered punishments to
be decided by a council-of-war.213 However, the existence of courts-martial is implicit 
due to the specified punishments for more serious offences, such as article XXVI, which
dealt with the death of Generals-at-Sea or Admirals and article XXXIII for murder and 
intentional killing.214 Other articles specified either death or a lesser punishment, such as
article XXXII, which addressed sleeping while on watch, negligence in duty or 
abandoning one's station.215 In addition, articles XXXVII and XXXVIII addressed 
punishments for poor behaviour during a court-martial and the duty of officers to 
apprehend offenders respectively, explicitly stating the importance and use of the court-
martial. 
In the 1661 Articles of War, however, Parliament's eradication of the councils-of-
war and the careful elaboration of courts-martial removed any ambiguity and 
implemented a single judicial procedure, the parameters and details of which were 
defined by Parliament itself. This was not done at a single, legislative stroke. Rather the 
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212 R.E. Glass, 'Naval Courts-Martial' in New Interpretations in Naval History: selected papers from the 
Twelfth Naval History Symposium held at the United States Naval Academy, 26-27 October 1995' 
W.B. Cogar, Ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007) Turnbull,  The Administration of the Royal 
Navy 1660-1673, 77-78.
213 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 9.
214 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 13.
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predominance of courts-martial is revealed in repeated references. Typically, articles 
refer to infractions that should 'be punished by Fine imprisonment or otherwise as the 
Offence by a Court martiall shall be adjudged to deserve'.216 To be sure, some articles, 
however, continued to specify that some offences should simply be punished by death 
such as setting of fire to one's own ship and murder.217 
The limits placed upon the Lord High Admiral were extended by two specific 
articles, which defined the process of the court-martial. Particularly, article XXXIV 
addressed the consideration of capital punishment:
And it is hereby further Enacted That the Lord High Admirall for the time 
being shall by vertue of this Act have full power and authority to grant 
Commissions to Inferior Vice-Admiralls or Commander in Cheife of any 
Squadron of Ships to call and assemble, consisting of Commanders and 
Captaines and no Court martiall where the paines of death shall bee inflicted
shall consist of lesse then Five Captaines at least the Admiralls Lieutennant 
to be as to this purpose esteemed as a Captaine and in no case wherein 
sentence of death shall passe by vertue of the Articles aforesaid or any of 
them (except in case of mutiny) there shall be execution of such Sentence of
Death without the leave of the Lord High Admirall if the offence be 
committed within the Narrow Seas But in case any of the Offences aforesaid
be committed in any Voyage beyond the Narrowe Seas whereupon Sentence 
of Death shall be given in pursuance of the aforesaid Articles or of any of 
them then Execution shall not be done but by Order of the Commander in 
Cheife of that Fleete or Squadron wherein Sentence of Death was passed.218
Article XXXV further specified courts-martial processes:
And be it further Enacted and Declared That the Judge Advocate of any 
Fleete for the time being shall have full power and authority to administer 
an Oath to any person or witnes in order to the Examinac[i]on or Tryall of 
any of the Offences aforesaid and in the absence of a Judge Advocate the 
Court marshall shall have full power and authority to appoint any person to 
administer an Oath to the purpose aforesaid219
With the Proviso, the courts-martial, and the inclusion of these articles, the Royal Navy 
chose a single process for prosecuting serious offences. This was an expectation for how
216 in this case quoted from article XXV, ''Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and 
Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp311-314.




the Navy would operate in specific circumstances and provided the foundation for the 
future development of the Royal Navy's judicial procedures, which are discussed in the 
following chapters. Remarkably, in this respect, the Royal Navy's legal code was more 
centralized than English Common Law.220 
Judicial and professional precedents did have an important role in the definition 
of the Royal Navy's judicial practices. Article XXXIII of the Act for the Establishing 
Articles stated that 'All other Faults Misdemeanors and Disorders committed att Sea not 
mentioned in this Act shall be punished according to the Lawes and conventiones in 
such cases used att Sea.'221 This is important, because of some alterations that reflected 
the shift from the Articles of War as standing orders, to the Royal Navy's legal code and 
statutory constitutional definitions. The 1661 Articles of War made certain offences 
triable by court-martial, where they had not been so in 1652. For example, article XXV 
of the Laws and Ordinances forbade fighting and quarrelling amongst crew. It was 
punishable 'upon imprisonment, and such other punishment as the Offence shall 
deserve.'222 In 1661, it became 'upon paine of Imprisonment and such other punishment 
as the Offence shall deserve and the Court martiall shall impose.'223 In comparison, the 
directive in the Laws and Ordinances for Captains to keep his ship fully manned, the 
crew healthy, a sufficient number of sailors and mariners, and not to be 'pestered with 
Idlers and Boys', was simply removed and not present in the Act for the Establishing 
Articles.224 
220 R. W. Cannon 'Judge-Made Law in the Colonies' The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 284-288  
221 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
222 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 11.
223 ''Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
224 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 11-12. ''Charles II, 1661: An Act for the 
Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 1628-80, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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The inclusion of the Articles of War in the Act for the Establishing Articles did 
not remove the need for standing orders, and general directions, issued from a 
commander-in-chief to the fleet as a whole. Obviously, courts-martial were not the only 
judicial procedure employed by the Royal Navy, and captains had quite a bit of 
authority for imposing punishments for minor offences. Classically, this included 
flogging.225 The reference in the Laws and Ordinances and in the Act for the 
Establishing Articles enabled these established practices to continue. Specifying them in
the Articles of War would have been unnecessary. In the former example, the 
importance of peace and order aboard ship was emphasized when fighting and 
quarrelling was made a court-martial offence. The removal of the latter example from 
the Articles of War is important because similar directives were included in the 
Instructions issued to Captains by the Duke of York. They were convention rather than 
statutory definitions and are discussed in the next chapter.
The creation of a permanent institution was not the purpose of the amendments 
or new material within the Act for the Establishing Articles. The reality was that the 
Royal Navy remained a temporary force, and the established processes for the creation, 
use, and disbandment of fleets was recognized and incorporated into the Act. The 
Proviso's limit of jurisdiction to 'only by such persons as shall be in actuall Service and 
Pay in his Majesties Fleete or Ships of War' does not speak directly to a philosophy or 
practice for the creation and use of permanent military forces, but reflects the temporary
nature of a person's service in in the fleet and their subjection to the Articles of War and 
the Lord High Admiral's authority.226 Importantly, however, this definition of the Lord 
High Admiral's authority, like the statement of the King's authority in the Militia Act, 
225 Rodger, The Wooden World, 211-214.
226 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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was permanent and not subject to Parliament's renewal or endorsement as the Laws and 
Ordinances had been.
Differentiating the Royal Navy
The creation of a new type of institution in the shape of the nascent Royal Navy 
also involved its differentiation from other existing institutions, professions and 
communities. Differentiation is a different type of process, in that it was embodied more
through the ratification and formalization of the side-effects and developmental by-
products of the first three processes. Although this had not yet progressed far during the 
Restoration, the early differentiation of the Royal Navy can be ascertained most clearly 
in a specific clause from the Laws and Ordinances that was not included in the Acts for 
Establishing Articles. 
Article XIX of the Laws and Ordinances alluded to the varied composition of 
the Commonwealth's naval forces, although they are not explicitly delineated. It 
acknowledged that Parliament's maritime military efforts included private vessels of war
that operated independently of the fleet or fleets.
All Captains of ships, having once taken any commission for taking of 
Prizes, according to any Act, Ordinance or Order of Parliament, or served as
any private man of War, or received any Pay or Impress, or been otherwise 
employed from or under the Parliament that shall either turn to the Enemy, 
or declare themselves against the Parliament, or wilfully set upon, fight 
with, surprize, or take any ship or vessel standing in obedience to 
Parliament or any of its adherents, or shall turn robber, or use to exercise 
piracy either against any Merchants or other ships, shall be punished with 
Death.227
Clearly there had been some equivalence between the Captains of privateers and the 
Captains of the ships in the fleet. The decision to remove this article in the 1661 Act 
rather than to amend it suggests that no such equivalence could any longer be 
considered appropriate. 
227 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 9-10.
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The adoption and alteration of similar articles from the Laws and Ordinances 
into the Act for the Establishing Articles provides further evidence of the definitional 
foundations of the Royal Navy. Article XIX of the Laws and Ordinances was one of a 
set of three articles which discussed mutiny and desertion and which should be 
considered together. According to Article XVII:
All Captains, Officers and Seamen, that either have or shall betray their 
Trust, and turn to the Enemy, and either run away with their ship, or any 
ordnance or ammunition, or Provision, to the Weakening of the Service, or 
yield the same up to the Enemy, shall be punished with Death.228
Article XVIII followed with:
All Captains, Officers or Mariners that desert the service, or their 
employment in the ships, or shall run away or entice others so to do, shall be
punished with Death.229
Together, articles XVII, XVIII and XIX framed the responses to different types of 
mutiny and desertion as described by the Generals-at-Sea. In 1661, however, Article 
XVII was transformed as follows:
All Sea-Captaines Officers and Seamen that shall betray theire Trust or 
turne to the Enemy Pirate or Rebells and either run away with theire Shipp 
or any Ordnance Ammunition or Provision to the weakning of the Service or
yield the same up to the Enemy Pirate or Rebells shall be punished with 
death.230
Article XVIII was modified to become the following as article XVII
All Sea Captains Officers or Mariners that shall desert the Service or theire 
Imployment in the Ships or shall run away or intice any others soe to doe 
shall be punished with death.231
In the second example the changes are minimal, with only the substitution of 
'Sea Captains' for 'Captains'. The first, however, was more significantly altered to 
include turning to 'Pirate or Rebells' in addition to the enemy, an absorption of the 
banned behaviours detailed in Article XIX. This confirmed the removal of equivalency 
228 Parliament, Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea, 9.
229 Ibid.




between the captains in the ships of the fleet, those individually deployed ships also part
of the nascent Royal Navy, and privateers who were no longer under the jurisdiction of 
the Articles of War. This had an important effect on the future development of the Navy,
in that it created the potential for socio-professional, institutional and legal 
differentiation among English practitioners of maritime warfare. It also created the 
possibility of the specialization of the Royal Navy officer profession as a profession 
directly tied to the Royal Navy, rather than to maritime warfare in general.
The Act for the Establishing Articles contained the Navy's private legal code and
a legal definition of its existence as a jurisdiction, but it was not an all-encompassing 
document that regulated all aspects of the Royal Navy's day-to-day existence. In 
addition, despite the Royal Navy's origins in an undifferentiated military profession and 
set of practices, the Articles of War tellingly did not include a mechanism for the Navy 
to operate ashore when needed and so legally, if not practically, limited the Royal 
Navy's operational abilities.232 
At the heart of the Articles of War was an inherent flexibility that matched the 
established mechanisms for the mobilization of forces when needed and their 
disbandment when not. For example, the Act for the Establishing Articles does not 
contain any language about the specific maritime duties of the officers in relation to the 
ship, and yet Article X sets forth the punishment for Captains who 'shall not put all 
things in his Ship in a fitt posture for fight'.233 These duties were understood and defined
by established precedence and discussed, for example, in Boteler's Six Dialogues and 
the Earl of Northumberland's instructions.234 Later, they would be encompassed within 
the General Instructions, a document created to replace the Articles of War as the set of 
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 'Six Dialogues' NMM TUN/166; 'Earl of Northumberlands Instructions' NMM LEC/5.
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standing orders. However, those were first issued in 1663 and so are discussed in detail 
in later chapters.235
Conclusion
The consideration of the Royal Navy's development in the Westminster Model 
provides a new perspective that complements the approach of existing studies to the 
Restoration. It emphasizes the substantial continuities, such as the ships, officers and 
financial responsibilities inherited from the State's Navy. The discussion of the 
'convention' definitions in particular highlights the use of royal authority to deliberately 
impart new identities to inherited ships, to reintroduce previous sets of instructions in 
context with the straightforward adoption of existing professional standards and 
expectations. The creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles must also be 
considered from that perspective as well. As Rodger and others have argued, the Laws 
of War and Ordinances of the Sea of 1652 was at the core of the modified Articles of 
War. Like the warships built by Cromwell's regime, the Laws and Ordinances was a 
resource that could be suitably modified and then used. That they were so directly 
modified to include statements of royal authority and then included into legislation built
directly on the precedents established by Parliament during the interregnum. 
The creation of definitions for the Royal Navy during this period did not 
automatically or fully render a new type of military institution, no more than the 
definitions for the state created during this period rendered a 'Westminster Model state'. 
In both cases, what was created was the foundations that would frame their respective 
development in the future. These development processes were bound together by the 
Act for the Establishing Articles, which simultaneously defined by the state and the 
Navy, although their development cannot be conflated into a single process. 
235 'General Instructions' 1663 Bodleian MSS Rawl A/187 f3.
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This chapter has described the definitions created in an intense burst of activity, 
as Parliament and Charles II strove to define the state, and the Navy, in order to make 
them consistent with the restored Stuart monarchy. The definitions created did not 
address the entirety of the state or the Navy's existence and did not provide long-term 
solutions for actions such as the restored Navy Board and Admiralty taking 
responsibility for the ships and especially the debts incurred by the State's Navy. The 
next chapter examines the period 1662-1688 and the continuation of the Royal Navy's 
development process under largely different circumstances. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CHARLES II AND JAMES II
The Restoration did not transform the English state into a 'Westminster Model' 
state, nor did the State's Navy become a fully defined institution capable of, or funded 
for, world-wide operations. Rather, the Restoration involved the creation of the 
foundations for the development of the state and Navy. In this period between the 
Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, a desire to trace an ascending line of 
development would be disappointed. By 1688 both Charles II and James II would rule 
without Parliament, and the Navy would prove to be almost ruinously expensive to 
maintain. The process of development through the creation of statutes and conventions 
continued, framed by the definitions created in 1660 and 1661. The reconstitution of the
monarchy and the creation of the Royal Navy had ramifications that were at the core of 
conflicts that were no less intense than they were at the Restoration. 
The conflict between King and Parliament over royal prerogative was central to 
much of the state development during this period, and indeed N.A.M. Rodger provides 
the following summary: 
Two themes sum up the administration of Charles II and James II: the 
struggle to make the administration of the Navy more efficient... and the 
contest between King and Parliament for control of the Fleet.236
The standard approach to this contest has been the discussion of the provision of funds 
for the Navy, whether it was to service debts, create fleets to serve at sea or to build 
warships, which is an important perspective. Nevertheless, an examination of the 
definitions created for the Navy during this period provides a complementary 
perspective. Another aspect of control over the Navy was the ability to create 
236 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 110.
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definitions, to imbue the institution with identity, to define professional processes and 
qualifications, and to create deployments and order operations abroad. 
The creation of The Act for the Establishing Articles provided the precedent for 
Parliament to directly define the Royal Navy as an institution, and there were a small 
number of statutes that directly built on that precedent early in Charles II's reign. The 
emergence of conflict between the King and Parliament brought an end to much of that 
cooperation (with a small number of exceptions), and so Parliament ceased to directly 
define the Navy through statute. However, it did pass statutes that defined the state as a 
whole and placed limits on the King's authority and royal prerogative, which indirectly 
defined the Navy. In comparison, Charles II and James II maintained much of their 
ability to define the Navy's diverse attributes and actively did so throughout their reigns.
This chapter will therefore provide a new perspective on the struggle between King and 
Parliament over royal prerogative, especially as it pertains to the Royal Navy's 
development between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution.
State Development Context
Following the Restoration, Charles II was in an unfamiliar situation.  Unlike the 
Parliamentarians, he had not come to power through the use of force. Parliament had not
been defeated but, instead, internecine conflict following Cromwell's death drove the 
state asunder. Charles II's acceptance of the invitation to resume the throne created a 
variety of conflicts that reflected the reality the he had very little actual power or ability 
to use force to guarantee his reign. Nevertheless, he had to perform the monarchy. It was
not merely a question of accepting the responsibility and doing the job, he had to be 
seen to rule, to demonstrate to his supporters and the nation at large that his reign was 
solid. Sharpe argues that Charles II removed some of the mystery of monarchy and 
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more openly explained his reasons and ideas to Parliament during the early years of his 
reign because if he had not, he would be unable to perform the role of monarch. 'In 
1660, a returning king had to again make the case for monarchy; to argue for rather than
assume his authority.'237 Following the Restoration, first there was a period where 
Parliament created laws that defined the State with the King's cooperation. This was 
followed by active conflict between the King and Parliament over definitions of the 
state. Thereafter, Charles II and James II ruled directly without Parliament. This latter 
phase can be interpreted as movement away from a 'Westminster Model State', however 
the last phase cannot negate the reality that for much of this period, Parliament did 
contribute statutory definitions to the English constitution. Further, the statutory and 
convention definitions established at the Restoration and afterwards continued to be the 
foundation for state development at and after the Glorious Revolution. As such, the 
state's development should still be considered to be in the 'Westminster Model', at least 
in terms of process. 
Immediately following the Restoration, a series of acts collectively described as 
the 'Clarendon Code' specifically defined the state church and created formal legal 
definitions that excluded Presbyterians and religious non-conformists. These were the 
Corporation Act of 1661, Act for the Uniformity of Publique Prayers (1662), 
Conventicle Act (1664) and Five-Mile Act (1665). These acts directly defined the state, 
but only indirectly defined the Navy. For example, the Corporation Act required 
municipal officials to abjure the Solemn League and Covenant, swear allegiance to the 
crown, and to attend the Church of England and receive communion.238 
237 Sharpe, Rebranding Rule, L.267
238 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the well Governing and Regulating of Corporations,' in Statutes of the 
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The Corporation Act received royal assent at the same time as the Act for the 
Establishing Articles.239 It stipulated that individuals could not be elected to 
corporations or to local government without first swearing the loyalty oath, proving that
in the past year they had taken communion in the Church of England, and specifically 
renouncing the Solemn League and Covenant.240 One of the keys to the Royal Navy's 
development in the Westminster Model was that unlike other institutions, such as Trinity
House, the East India Company or the Hudson's Bay Company, it was not a corporation,
and it did not have a charter. Its officers were commissioned by the King, not elected or 
otherwise appointed. It follows that the Royal Navy was not directly affected by the 
passage and implementation of the Corporation Act. This serves to further emphasize 
the difference between the Royal Navy and other corporate institutions and to 
emphasize another similarity to the state since it was not affected by the act. It is 
relevant because it provides context for later acts that did affect the Navy's officers.
A second act, one that would define the Navy, was the Act for the Uniformity of 
Publique Prayers.  In the Act for the Establishing Articles, the first article made it clear 
that a liturgy was expected to be created. The Savoy Conference, the first attempt 
following the Restoration to create a somewhat unified, national Book of Common 
Prayer, was convened by the Bishop of London Gilbert Sheldon at his quarters in the 
Savoy Hospital on the Strand in London.241 This was an attempt to get the 'Anglicans' 
and 'Presbyterians' to agree on a common liturgy and resolve issues around the structure
of the established church and the presence of the episcopacy or the role of bishops. The 
Conference consisted of a meeting between twelve bishops representing the 'Anglicans' 
239 House of Commons Journal Volume 8: 31 July 1661,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 
8: 1660-1667 ( London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802) 
240 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the well Governing and Regulating of Corporations,' in Statutes of the 
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and twelve representatives of the Presbyterians and Puritans (as well as deputies for 
both sides), and began on 13 April 1661.242 The Puritan Richard Baxter presented a new 
liturgy on behalf of the nonconformists, which was rejected.243 On 25 July, the 
Conference was dissolved without accomplishing anything, and the Nonconformists 
removed themselves from the discussions.244 The collapse of the conference left a void, 
an expected presence which was not defined until the next year, with the creation of the 
1662 Book of Common Prayer through the Act for the Uniformity of Publique Prayers 
that specifically defined the religious aspects of the English State. Mark D. Chapman 
described Parliament's intervention as the 'invention of Anglicanism'.245 
The Act for the Uniformity of Publique Prayers defined both the state and the 
Royal Navy.  On 25 June 1661, a month before the Savoy conference was dissolved, the
House of Commons ordered: 
That a Committee be appointed to view the several Laws for confirming the 
Liturgy of the Church of England; and to make Search, whether the original 
Book of the Liturgy, annexed to the Act passed in the Fifth and Sixth Years 
of the Reign of King Edward the Sixth, be yet extant; and to bring in a 
compendious Bill to supply any Defect in the former Laws; and to provide 
for an effectual Conformity to the Liturgy of the Church, for the Time to 
come.246
At that point the House of Commons took it upon themselves to create a new Book of 
Common Prayer and liturgy and therefore one that would be heavily influenced by the 
Anglicans and by the royalist members of parliament. On 30 April, 1662, the House of 
Commons returned the 'Uniformity Bill' to the House of Lords for its final reading with 
alterations.247 On 8 May, the House of Lords voted on the amendments and read the bill 
242 Listed in John Henry Blunt, The Annotated Book of Common Prayer (1872)., Manual of Dates, 852.
243 Walter B.T. Douglas Richard Baxter and the Savoy Conference of 1661, (PhD Thesis, McMaster 
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for a third time.248 The next day, the House of Lords sent a message that they had agreed
to the 'Uniformity Bill' as amended by the House of Commons.249 The Act for the 
Uniformity of Publique Prayers received royal assent on 19 May 1662, the end of the 
first session of the 'Cavalier Parliament'.250 The Book of Common Prayer affirmed a 
'Royal' identity for England's national religion, and included services of thanksgiving 
for the Restoration of Charles II, and the Gun-powder Treason, and for 'King Charles 
the Martyr'.251 The language in these prayers reflected the language in legislation such as
the Act for Safety and Preservation of His Majesties Person and Government.252 
Another act from this early phase of cooperation between King and Parliament 
was the 1664 Triennial Act. This repealed an act from 1641, which required Charles I to 
hold a Parliament of at least fifty days every three years.253 If he did not summon 
Parliament, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to do so. In the 1664 act, Charles II 
was again required to summon Parliament at least every three years. However, it 
removed the measures that had been in place in 1641.254 This is an important example of
Parliament defining the state, and the King's responsibilities, albeit one that actually 
248 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 8 May 1662,' in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 1660-
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removes a limit from royal prerogative. It also created a foundation for similar acts 
following the Glorious Revolution, which are discussed in the next chapter.
During the 1670s, tensions between Charles II and Parliament increased. An 
important conflict in 1669/70 was over the renewal of the expired Conventicle Act. This 
was part of the 'Clarendon Code'. At first, Charles II prorogued Parliament. In 1670 he 
relented, and Parliament was able to renew the act with its harsh penalties against 
nonconformists.255 Parliament responded by providing Charles II with generous funds.256
However, conflict between the King and Parliament escalated. One of the results of the 
Treaty of Dover was Charles II's attempt to issue the Declaration of Indulgence, which 
would remove the prohibition and penalties on Roman Catholics.257  Negotiations and 
discussions on the policy continued from February into March 1673.258 On 7 March 
1673, the declaration was cancelled.259 However, this was not the end of the affair, and 
Parliament used the threat of not providing Charles II any funds to pass a Test Act. 
On 5 March, the bill was read for the first time, and a week later, the bill was 
read for the third time and sent to the House of Lords.260 On 29 March, An Act for 
preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants received royal assent 
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realm/vol5/pp648-651.
256 "House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 6 December 1670," in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 9, 1667-1687, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 176-178. British History 
Online, accessed March 13, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp176-178
257 Andrew Browning, English Historical Documents 1660-1714 (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1966) 
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Stationery Office, 1802), 260-261, accessed November 11, 2015, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp260-261
259 Browning, English Historical Documents 1660-1714, 81.
260 'House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 5 March 1673,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume
9, 1667-1687 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 262-263, accessed November 9, 2015,
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp262-263, 'House of Commons Journal Volume 
9: 12 March 1673,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 9, 1667-1687 (London: His 
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history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp267-268
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and Parliament was prorogued.261 This again was a constitutional document and created 
another important connection between the definition of the State and the Royal Navy in 
the second section.
Bee it further enacted by the authoritie aforesaid That all and every person 
or persons that shall be admitted entered placed or taken into any Office or 
Offices Civill or Military or shall receive any Pay, Salary, Fee or Wages by 
reason of any Patent or Grant of his Majestie or shall have Command or 
place of Trust from or under his Majestie His Heires or Successors or by his 
or their authority or by authoritie derived from him or them... take the 
severall Oathes of Supremacy and Allegiance... take the severall Oathes of 
Supremacy and Allegiance262
Where the Corporation Act had not affected the Royal Navy or the state directly, the 
Test Act (as it has become known) explicitly affected both. An immediate result for the 
Navy was that the Duke of York was forced to leave the office of Lord High Admiral.  
The religious aspects were especially contentious given the offices held by the Duke of 
York and his continued influence (especially over the Navy) following his resignation.263
Religious fear, and specifically the invention of a 'Popish Plot' in 1678, provided 
an important context for future developments. It created further suspicion for the Duke 
of York and those associated with him including Samuel Pepys.264  That year Parliament 
passed An Act for the more effectuall preserving the Kings Person and Government by 
disableing Papists from sitting in either House of Parlyament.265 This extended to the 
House of Lords the restrictions included in the 1673 Act.266 Further, in 1679 the Whigs 
261 'House of Lords Journal Volume 12: 29 March 1673,' in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 12, 
1666-1675 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 579-585, accessed November 11, 
2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol12/pp579-585
262 'Charles II, 1672: An Act for preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants.,' in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 
1819), 782-785, accessed November 8, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp782-785
263 Davies, “The Navy, Parliament, and Political Crisis in the Reign of Charles II', pp. 277-80.
264 J.R. Tanner, “Pepys and the Popish Plot' The English Historical Review, Vol. 7, No. 26 (Apr., 1892), p
281
265 'Charles II, 1678: (Stat. 2.) An Act for the more effectuall preserving the Kings Person and 
Government by disableing Papists from sitting in either House of Parlyament.,' in Statutes of the 
Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 894-896, 
accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp894-896
266 'Charles II, 1678: (Stat. 2.) An Act for the more effectuall preserving the Kings Person and 
Government by disableing Papists from sitting in either House of Parlyament.,' in Statutes of the 
Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 894-896. 
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introduced the Exclusion Bill, which would have excluded the Duke of York from 
succession. In response, Charles II dissolved Parliament. On 21 March 1681, a new 
Parliament assembled. On the 26th, the House of Commons again voted to bring a bill to
exclude the Duke of York from succession.267 Two days later, Charles II dissolved 
Parliament, and commenced personal rule that lasted until his death.268
These familiar developments are one side of the development of the state, and 
they are put in context by the use of royal prerogative both before and after the 
resumption of personal rule. Although neither the Declaration of Indulgence nor the 
Exclusion Act was successfully implemented, they very much influenced the active 
definition of the state. In this period, royal prerogative was mostly used to define the 
state after 1682, during what is known as the 'Tory reaction'.269 From 1682, Charles II 
'began the crusade against the charters'.270 He began to remodel charters both for 
corporations like Trinity House, and for other corporations like boroughs. His efforts to 
promote political unity ended, and he actively worked to place political allies into 
corporate office.
[O]nce the King had found there were plenty in the corporations ready to 
work with him to remodel their charters, the political will and means were at
last created for undertaking a radical restructuring of the relationship 
between corporate bodies and the sovereign who gave them life.271
The new charters during this period provided the King the power to set aside any 
corporate officer. 
British History Online, accessed August 16, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp894-896.
267 'House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 26 March 1681,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 9, 1667-1687, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 710-712. British History 
Online, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp710-712.
268 'House of Lords Journal Volume 13: 28 March 1681,' in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 13, 
1675-1681, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 756-757. British History Online, 
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Following his succession, James II used that ability to cast out the allies his 
brother had so carefully placed into power. In new charters he actively ignored the 
statutory definitions of the Clarendon Code (particularly the Corporation Act) and 
allowed Roman Catholics and dissenters into corporate office.272 He, too, issued a 
Declaration of Indulgence, first in Scotland in 1687, and then in England in April 1688. 
He then commissioned Roman Catholics into both the Land Forces and into the Navy. 
For the former, by 1686, Roman Catholic officers and soldiers numbered 3,409 from a 
total strength of 8,629.273 That far outweighed the Roman Catholics commissioned into 
the Navy. The most famous was Admiral Sir Roger Strickland, who was later removed 
from command after attempting to have Mass celebrated in the fleet.274 Strickland's 
commission is further discussed below.
The use of royal prerogative was not limited to England, and in 1675 the 
Jamaican assembly redefined St. Dorothy's Parish so that its territory extended out to 
sea. The purpose of this was so that ships illegally trading in slaves ships were not 
subject to the Vice-Admiralty Court, but to the Court of Common Pleas and therefore a 
jury trial. Deputy Governor and Admiralty Court judge Sir Henry Morgan admitted to 
Henry Coventry that the law was intended to make it difficult for the Royal Africa 
Company to successfully prosecute slave traders violating their monopoly. This attacked
royal prerogative by challenging the Royal Africa Company's monopoly and the 
authority of the Lord High Admiral and his courts. The reaction from England nullified 
these attempts, and reinforced both the authority of the Admiralty Courts, and the 
authority of the King to grant monopolies.275 
272 Halliday, Dismembering the Body Politic, 19.
273 J. Miller, 'Catholic Officers in the Later Stuart Army' The English Historical Review, Vol. 88, No. 346
(Jan., 1973), pp. 39
274 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 204-5.
275 Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, 100.
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The three distinct phases of the state's development in the period between the 
Restoration and the Glorious Revolution can be differentiated by the working 
relationship between the King and Parliament, or lack thereof. In the first, they 
effectively worked together, not because Charles II believed necessarily in working with
Parliament, but because he had to be seen to perform the duties of the Monarchy. In the 
second period, from the 1670s, there was conflict between Parliament and King Charles 
II, where Parliament used its control of finances to force through Acts that placed 
restrictions on religious nonconformists and directly limited the use of royal 
prerogative. In the third phase, Charles II and James II defined the state through royal 
prerogative and authority alone. These phases provide important context for the Royal 
Navy's development in this period, and bring another perspective to the relationship 
between the authority of the King and the authority of Parliament over the Navy.
Defining the Royal Navy
The previous chapter discussed how the immediate concerns of the Restoration 
shaped the creation of definitions for the Royal Navy. The key examples included 
Charles II creating a personal connection with the Navy through warship names, the 
reintroduction of the office of Lord High Admiral, and Parliament's creation of the Act 
for the Establishing Articles. These definitions were all created in reaction to immediate
concerns and provided the framework that would allow the Royal Navy to function and 
be subject to the crown. The repercussions from these definitions, however, continued to
reverberate throughout the important formative period for the Navy between the 
Restoration and the Glorious Revolution. 
The conflict between King and Parliament over the Navy during this period was 
not about control as such. Despite the financial responsibilities that Charles II inherited 
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from the Commonwealth, Parliament did not vote him sufficient funds required to 
entirely pay the Navy's debts, nor to fully provide for its operations during the Second 
Anglo-Dutch War. Accordingly, the famous discussion in Parliament in 1667 following 
the Medway Raid was about financial mismanagement, not about control of the Royal 
Navy.276
The career of Samuel Pepys has, in the past, been used as a conceptual shorthand
for the Royal Navy's development during this phase.277 However, Charles II and James 
II definitely had a strong personal role in shaping the Royal Navy. It was paid for by 
royal funds (albeit often provided by Parliament). Officers were appointed through royal
commissions. Warships were named in ways that promoted, first and foremost, 
connections between the Royal Navy and the monarch as an individual.278 The 
implications of all of this are very different over the roughly twenty-five years 
preceding the Glorious Restoration than they were in the short period at the Restoration 
because they reflected a relatively stable hierarchy, rather than the flux of regime 
change. 
The traditional narrative of this phase is one of contrast between 
professionalization, driven by Pepys, and operational failures and institutional 
embarrassment.279 It would be fairer, however, to describe the Royal Navy as having to 
deal with the repercussions of the Restoration. First of all, despite the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars of 1665-7 and 1672-4, it was largely a period of peace, especially with the French 
and Spanish. On the other hand, there were ongoing defensive responsibilities, such as 
the protection of Caribbean colonies and Tangiers. The Anglo-Dutch wars did present 
276 R. Latham & W. Matthews, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Vol IX1668-9 (London: HarperCollins, 2000)
104-5.
277 Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves, 182. A chapter is named 'Mr Pepys' Navy'.
278 This is the major argument behind J.D. Davies' forthcoming book Kings of the Sea: Charles II, James
II and the Royal Navy, also Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 26-7.
279 Herman, To Rule the Waves, 182-207. Herman is a good example of this as he derived his narrative 
from existing scholarship.
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issues that were addressed, but the transitions from wartime to peacetime and those 
ongoing colonial responsibilities more directly influenced the creation of the Royal 
Navy's new professional definitions during this phase. 
Both Charles II and James II had a direct influence on the creation of structural 
and professional definitions for the nascent Royal Navy. However, they were not the 
only such individuals to have an influence. Shortly following the Restoration, many of 
the individuals who were important senior officers were veterans of the civil wars. 
These individuals represented in many cases inherited patronage relationships, and 
Charles II made an effort to reward or compensate families who had supported and 
served his father. These attempts to reward service also happened after the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars and represented established practice.280 
J.D. Davies identified a significant generational issue in the socio-professional 
conflicts within the Royal Navy following the Restoration. For example between 1678 
and 1685, the Royal Navy's senior officers were almost entirely turned over. With the 
exception of the Duke of York, the flag officers who had served in the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars were either dead or retired by 1685. They were replaced by a much younger group
of individuals who were part of new patronage families and who collectively remained 
important to the Royal Navy right through into the first decades of the eighteenth 
century. These officers were instrumental in helping to provoke or define the Royal 
Navy's professional developments of the 1670s and were amongst the first to be 
certified by those regulations. These officers, like Arthur Herbert and Cloudesley 
Shovell, were a product of the Tangiers station and the impetus it provided for 
professional development.281 
280 Order-in-Council 'For the Allowances to given to the Widows and Orphans of Seaman slain at sea' 12 
Jan, 1672/3. NMM CLU/5 f31, Order-in-Council 'For a Reward to Officers Wounded in Sea Fight' 6 
June 1673,  NMM CLU/5 f37
281 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 177-8.
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The further establishment of the Royal Navy institutional identities reflected the 
direct connection to the King and attributes of his personality and an ideal Stuart 
monarchy that he considered important. The creation of professional definitions, and 
integration of the Royal Navy officer profession into the Royal Navy institution was 
critical, and it reflected the influence of serving officers and the comparisons between 
established practices for rewarding service and the proactive creation of definitions to 
improve future service. Most importantly, however, it reflected the ability of an 
Admiralty that derived its authority to define the Navy from the King, rather than from 
parliament.
The Naval Administration
Between the Restoration and Glorious Revolution, the Royal Navy's 
administration went through several distinct phases. From 1660 to 1673, the Duke of 
York was Lord High Admiral and sat on the Navy Board. This effectively created the 
impression of a merging of the two bodies.282 After the Test Act of 1673, he was forced 
to resign, and his duties were assumed by the King. He was assisted by Pepys as 
Secretary of the Admiralty as well as by an Admiralty council including Prince Rupert. 
Some of the other commissioners included the 2nd Earl Shaftesbury, the Earl of 
Buckingham and the Duke of Monmouth.283  
The 'Popery Plot Crisis' resulted in James' resignation, and Charles II created an 
Admiralty Commission to fulfill the office of Lord High Admiral. The first commission 
was chaired by Henry Capell and formed of those people who had criticized the Navy 
282 Turnbull, The Administration of the Royal Navy 1660-1673, 117.
283 "Lord High Admiral and Commissioners of the Admiralty 1660-1870," in Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 4, Admiralty Officials 1660-1870, ed. J C Sainty (London: University of London, 
1975), 18-31. British History Online, accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol4/pp18-31., N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 87.
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and been politically responsible for the Duke's fall from office.284 These commissions 
were unstable, having five different sets of members appointed prior to Charles II's 
resumption of the office in 1684.285 This was accomplished through the issuance of a 
patent 'To revoke the Commission of Admiralty'.286 Following Pepys return from 
Tangier, he once again became the Secretary of the Admiralty. Upon his succession as 
monarch, James II took the offices of Captain-General and Lord High Admiral for 
himself.287 Importantly, Charles II and James II were both actively involved in the 
management and creation of definitions for the Navy.288 
Precedents and convention
Throughout the entire period from 1662-1688, the Royal Navy was consistently 
and thoroughly defined through the use of royal authority, either by the Monarchs 
themselves or by their deputies such as the Admiralty and the Navy Board. The creation 
of 'conventions' included building upon what had been created at the Restoration, but 
also issues and concerns that had not been addressed then. These developments included
the beginning of the integration of the Royal Navy's structural developments and the 
nascent Royal Navy-specific officer professional definitions. The frequency and 
thorough use of convention to define the Royal Navy provides another perspective on 
conflict between King and Parliament during this period.
Defining the Navy as Royal
284 J.D. Davies, 'Pepys and the Naval Commission 1679-1684' Historical Research, Vol. 67, No. 147, pp.
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At the Restoration, introduction of royal identity to the Navy was accomplished 
through the modification of assets that already existed, specifically the renaming of 
warships and the modification of the Laws and Ordinances. The period from 1662-1688
not only was much longer, but also included the building of a large number of new 
warships, which provided an incredible insight into the impact Charles II had on the 
Royal Navy's expression of royal identities and associations. James II after him did 
likewise, though the much longer reign of Charles II had more impact and there were 
significant differences in how they went about shaping the Navy's identity.
The personal affinity of both Charles II and James II with the Navy led to the use
of certain names that were intensely personal, but it was the larger scope provided by 
the period between 1662-1688 that provided the greatest potential for the monarchs to 
personally shape the Navy. An example was the fifth-rate Sweepstakes, built in 1665 
and so named to celebrate Charles II's fondness for gambling.289 In 1682, Charles II 
named a yacht Fubbs to express his appreciation for his mistress Louise de Kerouaille's 
physical attributes.290 The use of these names shortly following the Restoration marks 
the flamboyance of Charles II's personality and his willingness to exercise the king's 
personal authority over the Navy. It is also consistent with the manner in which he 
removed some of the mystery of the monarchy during his concurrent dealings with 
Parliament.291 
Monarchs were not the only members of the royal family to be associated with 
the Royal Navy in this way. Again, this was not new to the restored Stuarts. In addition 
to the example of Henry VIII's Mary Rose, Charles I had named the Henrietta Maria for
his Queen.292 During the interregnum, the Richard was named for Oliver Cromwell's son
289 Winfield,  British Warships 1603-1714, 286; Davies, 'Fubbs Yes, Mum No: The Naming of British 
Warships, c.1660-c.1714, Part 1' 
290 Davies, 'Fubbs Yes, Mum No: The Naming of British Warships, c.1660-c.1714, Part 1' 
291 Sharpe, Rebranding Rule,  L. 267 
292 Davies, 'Fubbs Yes, Mum No: The Naming of British Warships, c.1660-c.1714, Part 1'
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and heir, and later the Royal James for Charles II's heir.293 However, the thirty ships 
program of 1677 provided substantial scope for Charles II to build upon the precedents 
he established at the Restoration. For example, he named the third-rate warships 
Monmouth, Grafton, Lenox, Burford, and Berwick after illegitimate children whom he 
publicly recognized.294 
Other warship names that made the connection between the monarchy and the 
Navy were not named for the royal family, but for important events. Consider the third-
rate ship Restoration, which was launched in 1678.295 It was lost in a great storm in 
1703 and replaced by a third-rate of the same name in 1706, which was subsequently 
wrecked at Livorno in 1711.296 The name was not reused. James II also named several 
warships for personally important events, such as the second-rate Coronation which was
launched shortly after his own coronation ceremony, but was not commissioned until 
1690, during the reign of William III and Queen Mary.297 The fourth-rate ship 
Sedgemoor celebrated a personal military triumph for James over the Duke of 
Monmouth.298 The use of Sedgmoor set a different precedent and was in some ways a 
restoration of the naming practices under the Commonwealth in that it was named for a 
military victory, rather than a personal cause. This change in precedent can be explained
by James II's self-perception as a soldier and that he had a closer personal relationship 
to the Army than his brother. Later monarchs who also favoured the land forces rather 
than the Navy mirrored that connection. 
293 Winfield,  British Warships 1603-1714, 27.
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Some associations between the monarch and the Royal Navy persisted beyond 
the circumstances of their creation, and Charles II more strongly imparted his identity 
on the Royal Navy than his successor monarchs. This occurred from the reuse of 
warship names associated with him and the perpetuation of practices that reaffirmed his 
connection to the Navy. A good example was the use of the name Royal Oak, which 
recalled the oak tree he climbed to escape following defeat at the Battle of Worcester in 
1651. The name was initially given to a second-rate ship in 1664. After her loss during 
the 1667 Medway Raid, the name was sufficiently important enough for Charles II to 
reuse it for a third-rate ship built in 1674. She was subsequently rebuilt several times 
during the period examined by this thesis, and retained her name until she was broken 
up in 1764.299
Charles II’s imprint upon the Royal Navy is also clear in the creation of a 
specific format for naming ships to honour monarchs personally as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Both of the names Royal Charles and Royal James were reused for 
new warships, specifically for replacements following their loss during the Medway 
raid. They were replaced with a new Royal Charles launched in 1673, and two further 
Royal James being built one in 1671 and another in 1675.300  When these ships were 
later renamed for other monarchs, the ships themselves came to express not just 
individual but collective royal identity. Further, the reuse of these names reinforced the 
practice of adding the prefix 'Royal' to ships named for the monarch, which continued 
until the reign of Queen Victoria.301 
The Royal Navy did not only express connections between the institution and 
the monarchy through warship names. Another way was the firing of salutes.  For 
example, the Royal Navy began to fire salutes on 29 May to honour both the 
299 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 308.
300 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 10.
301 Last was HMS Royal William, launched 1833. Lavery, The Ship of the Line Vol. I, 192
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Restoration and Charles II's birthday. In 1678, the Mary Rose recorded the firing of nine
guns to salute the King's coronation and birthday.302 However, this procedure was not 
always followed by ships. For example, ships on active duty, or those in the process of 
working up for sea did not necessarily fire the salutes every year. In May 1678 the 
Montague was riding in the Downs waiting to be decommissioned, as recorded in the 
log of the Second Lieutenant, Abraham Hoare.303 In May 1683, the Montague was 
deployed as part of the force sent to Tangiers and she again did not fire a salute on 28 
May as she was in the process of making ready for sea, and receiving gunners' stores as 
Lieutenant William Rigby noted in his log.304 Thiswas not due to disrespect to the King, 
but a reflection of circumstances that did not always permit for the salutes to be fired.
 The Book of Common Prayer was another mechanism for expressing royal 
identity in connection with the Navy. The very first prayer in the order of service 
specifically named the monarch as a focus for the prayer.305 
Preserve us from the dangers of the sea, and from the violence of the enemy;
that we may be a safeguard unto our most gracious Sovereign Lord, King 
Charles, and his kingdoms, and a security for such as pass on the seas upon 
their lawful occasions.306
Further, the collect to be said after a battle also refers to the monarch, although not 
individually by name.
And, we beseech thee, give us grace to improve this great mercy to thy 
glory, the advancement of thy Gospel, the honour of our Sovereign, and, as 
much as in us lieth, to the good of all mankind.307
These invocations, which would have been read to the crews of Royal Navy ships 
during holy service,  were designed to continually reinforce the connection between 
302 29 May 1678, Log of Lt. John Lomax, NMM, ADM/L/M/254/B f2 
303 Log of Lt. Abraham Hoare, NMM, ADM/L/M/254/A np
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the King and the Navy.
Connecting the Navy to the Nation
The Royal Navy's existence as a national armed force is taken for granted by the 
public as well as by historians. At times, the 'Royal' seems to be taken simply to mean 
'English' or 'British'. Despite the Act for the Establishing Articles defining the Royal 
Navy as external to England, extensive associations between the Navy and the nation 
did exist. The practice of naming warships for English towns and counties was inherited
by Charles II at the Restoration and had been used extensively for naming warships 
built during the interregnum. For example, the group of third-rates ordered in 1652 
included the Essex, Gloucester, Lyme, and Plymouth.308 These geographical names were 
'profane', and as noted in the previous chapter these ships were not renamed. In the 
period following the Restoration, Charles II and James II continued to use geographic 
names.
Following the creation of the Royal Navy, the major building programs such as 
Charles II's thirty ships clearly demonstrated national identity being expressed through 
ship names. One of the first ships built during the reign of Charles II was the first-rate 
Loyal London (1666), which signified the importance of the support of the capital city 
to the Stuart monarchy.309  Despite Cambridge's strong connections to the 
Parliamentarians, a ship was not so named until after the Restoration, with a 70-gun 
third-rate ship launched in 1666. It was succeeded in that name by an 80-gun third-rate 
ship that was launched in 1695 and served until 1750.310 Third-rate ships built under the 
thirty ships program included the Pendennis, Northumberland, Essex, Kent, Exeter, and 
308 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 46-52. Other ships in this group were the Torrington, Marston
Moor, Tredagh, Newbury, Langport, Bridgwater. These ships were all renamed at the Restoration.
309 Lavery, Ship of the Line Vol. 1, 160.
310 Lavery, Ships of the Line, Vol. 1, 169.
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Suffolk.311 James II named a fourth-rate St Albans in 1687, which although it had been 
used before the Restoration may have been a reflection of his Roman Catholicism, in 
memory of England's first martyr.312 
The Royal Navy's continued existence, and continued use of geographic names 
combined to allow the it to become a symbol for the expression national pride. As with 
previous aspects of identity, the importance of this can be ascertained from the size and 
importance of the ship being named. As the connection between the nation and the Navy
became more prominent, so too did the expression of national identity through warship 
names. However, there was a limited number of the larger first and second-rate ships to 
provide the most powerful expressions of identity. 
The one warship that did provide such a symbol, and an enduring one, was the 
first-rate Britannia. Originally built by Phineas Pett II at Chatham Dockyard in 1682, it 
was rebuilt in 1719 and served until 1749.313 Another such example was the Neptune, a 
second-rate from the same building program. Launched in 1683, she certainly 
represented another national symbol of pride, an obvious reference to the Roman god of
the sea.314 This kind of association was absolutely in line with more a symbolic 
representation of the monarchy. These representations were consistent with how James 
and Charles I had represented their monarchy, and also followed on similar connections 
Charles II had made performing his role as monarch, such as , such as the royal entry 
to London in 1661.315 It was also consistent with portrayal of the Duke of York as Mars, 
god of war, in Lely's famous portrait. England was not the only nation to be represented 
either, and Royal Navy warships were named to connect it to Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland. In 1665, a 50-gun fourth-rate was named St Patrick, followed in 1667 by the 
311 Lefevre, ''We have … great work which the Nations Eyes is upon''
312 Davies, 'Saints and Soldiers'
313 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 11.
314 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 33.
315 Latham and Matthews, Diary of Samuel Pepys, Vol. II, 1661 (London: HarperCollins, 2000)  81-82.
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similar St David, and in 1670 by the first-rate St Andrew. A ship was not named for 
England's patron saint until the first-rate Charles (launched 1668) was renamed St 
George in in 1687.316 Further, these four ships were clearly national symbols, rather than
mere geographic associations. 
Institutional and Maritime Identity
Previous institutions, such as the various navies under Charles I and Parliament, 
had the potential to create permanent identities over time, but their limited short-term 
existences made this practically impossible. Nevertheless, people still referred to 'the' 
Navy, so there had been some limited, permanent identity. The nascent Royal Navy's 
institutional and professional identities gained importance as it's persistence after the 
Restoration allowed for them to be perpetuated. Continued reuse of a warship names, or 
a label for the institution, would build on the significance of that name, label, or practice
for internal Royal Navy audiences, as well as for external audiences. In this phase 
between the Restoration and the Glorious Restoration, although the Royal Navy was 
recognized as an organization that existed, it had not had the persistence yet to become 
an institution with its own identity. Likewise, the Royal Navy's maritime identity and 
attributes were seldom celebrated or advertised. Between the Restoration and the 
Glorious Revolution, the Royal Navy was a medium for communicating the King and 
nation's attributes, symbols and associations. In comparison, the regiments of the land 
forces each had their own uniform, to broadcast their own identity.317 The absence of 
deliberate institutional and maritime identity-making puts the deliberate celebration and 
communication of royal and national identity into sharper relief. 
316 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 8-9, 110-11
317 Manning, Apprenticeship of Arms, 294.
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In this period, there were few examples of warship names being used to build 
institutional identity. One example was the aforementioned Royal Oak. Its replacement 
in 1674 was rebuilt four times before being turned into a prison ship in 1756.318 By the 
time the second ship was removed from service, its original meaning would have been 
lost to many, because Restoration Day became Oak-Apple day, a 'harmless' nature 
celebration with no ties to Jacobitism.319 However, the name had become a sufficiently 
important part of the Royal Navy’s institutional identity that a new third-rate was named
Royal Oak in 1769.320  Although the reuse of names would create institutional 
importance, at this point the Royal Navy had not been persistent enough for that to be 
so.
Given the importance of the other types of identity expressed through warship 
names, it is unsurprising that relatively few names actively expressed connections to the
Royal Navy, or celebrated Royal Navy officers. During the reign of Charles II and 
James II, warships named for those who served in the Navy were less celebrations of 
institutional heroes, than part of the Charles II's large pattern of naming warships for 
favoured courtiers. 
An early example is the Rupert, a third-rate built in 1666, named for Prince 
Rupert of the Rhine who served the Royalist Navy prior to the Restoration and at the 
time co-commanded the fleet with the Duke of Albermarle.321 Another example is the 
second-rate Sandwich (1679), built to commemorate the Earl of Sandwich, who had 
commanded the fleet that retrieved the King from the Netherlands and was serving in 
the fleet when he was killed at the Battle of Solebay in 1672. The second-rate 
Albemarle, launched in 1680, was actually the third warship named for the Duke of 
318 Winfield,  British Warships 1603-1714, 308; Winfield, British Warships 1714–1792 44,49.
319 P.K. Monod, Jacobitism and the English People 1688-1788 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) 209.
320 Lavery, Ships of the Line, Vol.1, 169.
321 J. Corbett, Ed. Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Publications Of The Navy Records Society Vol.
XXIX (Navy Records Societ, 1905). 129
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Albemarle after the Restoration.322 This did not include the Monck, a 52 gun third-rate 
launched in 1659 and which retained her name following the Restoration.323 The 
second-rate Ossory, launched in 1682, was named to commemorate Thomas Butler, the 
6th Earl of Ossory, who had served as both an officer in the fleet, a Commissioner of the 
Admiralty, and died before he could take office as Governor of Tangiers.324 
The number of important naval officers who did not have ships named for them 
prior to the Restoration is an indication that the naming of warships for Royal Navy 
heroes as such was not an important influence.  For example, neither Sir William Penn, 
Sir John Lawson, nor Sir John Narborough had warships named for them until the 
expansions of the fleet for the First and Second World Wars.325 In each case, these men 
were important flag officers of the Royal Navy during the reign of Charles II and 
influenced the early development of the institution as well as the Royal Navy officer 
profession. Penn was a member of the Navy Board from the Restoration, the Duke of 
York's flag captain in the Second Anglo-Dutch War and was appointed 'Great Captain 
Commander' in 1666.326 Lawson was an important Commonwealth flag officer and had 
helped to bring down the Rump Parliament by blockading London. He was knighted for
his service in helping the Restoration and retained his position until his death in 1665 at 
Lowestoft despite being a Republican and nonconformist.327 Sir John Narborough was a 
vice admiral, and in the 'peaceful' phase following the Third Anglo-Dutch War he was 
commander-in-chief of the Royal Navy squadron in the Mediterranean and partially 
responsible for the creation of the examination for Lieutenant in 1677.328 From 1680 
322 Winfield British Warships 1603-1714, 33.
323 Lavery, Ship of the Line vol I, 159.
324 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 33.
325 Narborough was honoured by two ships named for him, one an M Class destroyer built 1916, and a 
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until his death in May 1688, Narborough was a Commissioner of the Navy on the Navy 
Board.329 That these individuals did not have ships named for them by either Charles II 
or James II indicates that the recognition of the Royal Navy as an institution was either 
not considered or not a priority. 
Further evidence of this is the several names that were used to describe the Navy
in documents. Tacit acknowledgements of these developments of the Royal Navy as an 
institution with a specific institutional identity can be found in internal documents such 
as instructions and officers' commissions that defined the institution's existences and 
practices. Many different terms were used to discuss the nascent Royal Navy institution.
The term 'Navy' was not only used to refer to the fleet but also the nascent institution. 
Certainly, the use of terms 'Navy Officer' to describe the 'Principall Officers' of the 
Navy (who were not necessarily naval officers), and the lack of formal institutional 
coherence between the Navy Board, the later Board of Admiralty, the Victualling Board,
Greenwich Hospital, other institutions and the individual elements fleet can confuse the 
picture somewhat.330 In the Act for the Establishing Articles the preamble used the label 
'Majesties Navies Ships of War and Forces by Sea'.331 In 1661, the Duke of York issued 
instructions to the 'Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy' that used both the
terms 'His Majesty's Navy' and 'The King's Service'.332 In this case, it seems that he was 
not referring a nascent institution, but instead to the actual performance of service to the
King. 
In the 1662 Book of Common Prayer, the section 'Form of Prayers to be Used at 
Sea' included the instruction 'these two following prayers are also to be used in his 
Majesty's Navy every day'.333 In the 1673 Order-in-Council that established the Duty of 
329 George Jackson, Naval Commissioners, 97.
330 'Instructions for Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy' 28 July 1661, NMM CLU/5 f11
331 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80
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the Lord High Admiral, following the resignation of the Duke of York, it was written, 
'That the Lord High Admiral be able at all times to give his Majesty a perfect account of
the State of His Navy'.334  This essentially only applied to the fleet, but it does provides 
context for the use of the label. In 1687, an order-in-council setting procedures for 
salutes included 'His Majesty's Royal Navy' in the title.335 But in March 1688/9, another 
order-in-council referred to 'His Majesty's Service'.336  Thus in this period, there was not 
a single standard label that was applied exclusively, the repeated use of which would 
have been an anchor for the creation of institutional identity. 
Similarly, the active expression of the Royal Navy's maritime identity and 
existence was rather limited. The proviso and other definitions discussed both in the 
previous chapter and in this chapter did not necessarily denote a corresponding internal 
maritime identity, merely a maritime environment of operations and jurisdiction. Nor 
did it imply that the 'forces at sea' were fundamentally distinct from His Majesty's land 
forces. This external application of a maritime identity was common throughout the 
Articles of War, and shown in the critical passage at the end of the Proviso:
shall be done upon the main Sea or in Ships or Vessells being and hovering 
in the maine Streame of great Rivers onely beneath the Bridges of the same 
Rivers nigh to the Sea within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty...337
 Clearly the navy was considered to be inherently maritime, although the proviso did 
not really define it as such.  In fact, it was not really the that sea that defined the 
existence of the Navy, but rather the ships and the Lord High Admiral's jurisdiction. 
The Book of Common Prayer, on the other hand, did explicitly state the Navy's 
maritime existence. Both the text of the various prayers and the orders of service 
334 'Instructions for ascertaining the Duty of the Lord High Admiral' 13 June, 1673 NMM, CLU/5 f41
335 'Order in Councill Establishing a new Regulation concerning Csalutes to be observed in His Majesty's
Royal Navy', NMM, CLU/5 f83
336 Order-in-Council requiring Commissioned and Warrant officers to swear an oath to James II, 14 
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337 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80
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specifically express their understanding that the wholly and uniquely a maritime 
organization whose duty it was to fight at sea. This is clear in the first prayer for use 
every day, which reads 
O Eternal Lord God, who alone spreadest out the heavens, and rulest the 
raging of the sea; who hast compassed the waters with bounds until day and 
night come to an end; Be pleased to receive into thy almighty and most 
gracious protection the persons of us thy servants, and the Fleet in which we
serve. Preserve us from the dangers of the sea, and from the violence of the 
enemy; that we may be a safeguard unto our most gracious Sovereign Lord, 
King CHARLES, and his kingdoms, and a security for such as pass on the 
seas upon their lawful occasions; that the inhabitants of our Island may in 
peace and quietness serve thee our God; and that we may return in safety to 
enjoy the blessings of the land...338
The Royal Navy is implied to be the temporal maritime protector of the nation, and the 
maritime aspect is further emphasized in the other prayers provided for service before, 
during and after a storm.339 The language used to describe the danger of the maritime 
environment is similarly dramatic to that used to describe the power of God and the 
baseness of humanity. The BCP codified and provided a religious expression of an 
existing civilian understanding of the Navy and provided for the Royal Navy's specific 
use of the liturgy of the Church of England as required by the Act for the Establishing 
Articles
 The opportunity was rarely taken to give warships names that expressed the 
Royal Navy's maritime identity. Perhaps their association with the sea was already too 
obvious. Yet the Royal Navy did not just represent the Royal Navy, it also represented 
the monarchy, the state and the nation. The lack of inherently maritime warship names 
raises the question of whether the presence of the Royal Navy was considered sufficient 
to express that England was a maritime nation, or whether this was not a concept that 
was considered important enough to communicate through these types of symbols. 
338 Book of Common Prayer, 310.
339 Book of Common Prayer, 310-12.
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 The lack of warship names with an explicitly nautical or maritime theme 
suggests that, when it came to naming, the broader political agenda was more important 
than reinforcing an already obvious connection to the sea. There were a large number of
ships named for ports and maritime counties. However that fits entirely within the 
practices for geographical naming described above. During the reigns of Charles II and 
James II, there was not a single warship of any rate named for a marine animal, 
although warships were named for terrestrial animals and birds. Examples of these types
of names include the frigates Greyhound (1672) and Roebuck (1666), and the third-rate 
ships Eagle (1679) and Tiger (1681).340 These names do not provide a maritime identity,
but express certain qualities with positive associations for military units. For example 
the Greyhound's implication of speed and Tiger's implication of ferocity. 
The expression of the Royal Navy's maritime identity was less important than 
Royal aspects of identity. The understanding of the Navy as a maritime entity was part 
of the foundations on which the Royal Navy was built, rather than an attribute that 
needed to be communicated to both internal and external audiences. The lack of specific
promotion of institutional and maritime identities provides an interesting comparison 
for the active building of royal and national identities during this phase. However, it 
also provides an important baseline for early identity creation, and provides context for 
the active differentiation of the Royal Navy that occurred later and is discussed in the 
chapters that follow. 
Defining the Royal Navy's Professional Attributes
The period between the Restoration and Glorious Revolution included several 
major new definitions for the Royal Navy Officer profession. These new definitions also
integrated the Royal Navy's professional development with its structural components. 
340 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 289-92.
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The developments in this period built upon, but also expanded the professional 
definitions and standards that were adopted at the Restoration. They are also an 
important example of the use of royal authority to define the Navy, since Charles II and 
James II were involved in the process and the Admiralty derived its authority from the 
Monarch. 
 The use of naval commissions to reward Royalists and supporters meant that 
there was effectively no consistency in Royal Navy officers' experience, qualifications 
or competence. Indeed, the active role of the monarch meant that Charles II and James 
II actively defined the standards required of an officer when they commissioned them. 
Beginning in the 1670s, professional definitions were created in response to operational 
experiences and royal interest in navigation and the Navy. What resulted were the 
foundations for the development of Royal Navy-specific professional qualifications. 
The most significant professional development between the Restoration and the 
Glorious Revolution was the development of professional qualifications. Specifically, 
the creation of the lieutenant's examination arose from complaint a by Vice-Admiral 
John Narbrough about the quality of the lieutenants commissioned to the Royal Navy's 
warships in the Mediterranean in 1675. This led to the creation of the December 1677 
Establishment that created the phenomena of the examination for lieutenant and 
established the experience requirements to qualify to sit the exam. The use of orders-in-
council reflected Charles II's increased involvement in the Navy's administration 
following the Duke of York's removal as Lord High Admiral in 1673. Samuel Pepys is 
given much credit for the creation of the qualifications and the exam, and Charles II 
endorsed the establishments.341 The establishment that defined volunteers-per-order and 
341 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulin, 40., 'Establishment made 8 May concerning Volunteers and 
Midshipmen-Extra' 8 May, 1676, NMM CLU/5 f49, 'Establishment for Defining the Duty and 
Qualifications of Lieutenants of His Majesty's Ships', 16 December 1677, NMM CLU/5 f56 
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midshipmen extra in 1676 happened during the 'Long Prorogation'.342 At the 
introduction of the Order-in-Council creating the qualifications for lieutenant in 1677, 
Parliament was between the first and second seating of the 15th session of the Cavalier 
Parliament, which further emphasizes that Parliament did not have a role in creating 
these professional definitions.343
Just as under Cromwell and the Commonwealth, Charles II valued aristocrats 
and wealthy families who placed their sons into his service. The Order-in-Council from 
May 1676 was created to encourage the 'familys of better quality amongst our subjects' 
to encourage their younger sons into naval service, but specifically in the art of 
navigation for future service in the Navy.344 
Whereas out of our Royal Desire as well of giving Encouragement to the 
Familys of better Quality among our Subjects to breed up their younger sons
to the Art and Practice of Navigation in Order to the fitting them for the 
further employments in our Service at Sea, as for the better Support of Such 
Persons as having Served us in the Quality of Commanders or Lieutenants 
of our Ships during War...345
In terms of differentiation, this order at the same time reaffirmed a royal desire for 
gentlemen to serve as officers and provided a limited framework and limits on how 
those gentlemen were to serve. Where volunteers-per-order were not permitted servants,
midshipmen-extra were.346 On the other hand, the volunteers-per-order were not to be 
provided with extra cabins and were to bunk with the midshipmen.347 The order-in-
council reflected both a desire to improve the supply of qualified English naval officers 
and the reality that Charles II preferred gentlemen to serve as his officers.  
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This standard for volunteers-per-order still emphasized external social standing 
over internal professional standing, and this did not escape notice. In October 1677, 
Colonel George Legge (the future Admiral Lord Dartmouth) gave a letter to Pepys, 
addressing the role of gentlemen as junior officers. He strongly argued that gentlemen 
should serve as midshipmen, and not just as volunteers. He argued that the duties of a 
midshipman not only required them, but forced them to be intimately familiar with all 
aspects of the organization and operation of a warship. 
That being midshipmen, everything belonging to, and done in a ship must 
necessarily come to their knowledge, all sorts of provisions and stores, the 
trim of the ship, and storage, the bringing of the ship port & to an anchor, all
concerns between decks and in the hold, must come to their knowledge 
when as volunteers it comes little under their cognizances. The navigating 
part, rigging and working the ship is constantly their business to attend, it 
keeps them upon the quarter deck in the eye of the Capt'n and makes them 
upon all occasions usefull unto him, it brings them to distinguish between 
good and bad seamen and they have an instruction into the business of every
officer. It instructs them in everything belonging to a ship before they come 
to command her which if they arrive before they understand their duty they 
then think is a shame to be instructed and then for rather choose to continue 
ignorant.348
This letter addressed aspects not specifically discussed in the 1676 Order-in-Council, 
which merely referred to the 'art of navigation'.349  He also argued that forcing 
gentlemen to serve as midshipmen would address the socio-professional conflicts that 
the Royal Navy was experiencing. 
It will unite the officers and destroy the distinction between gentlemen and 
tarpaulins for as all Tarpaulins are made Gentlemen by receiving the King's 
Commission. So every gentlemen having performed his duty cannot to deny
to be as capable of employment as any... When this method is settled it will 
be the Lord High admiral from importunity of those that have not passed by 
this rite, and consequently suffer none to be Commanders but such as 
undoubtedly fit for it. It qualifies the Gentlemen to be more capable of his 
Majesty's favour in their future preferment without prejudices to his 
service.350
348 Letter from Col. George Legge, 8 Oct 1677, Bodleian, Rawl Mss 191 A49 
349 'Establishment made 8 May concerning Volunteers and Midshipmen-Extra' 8 May, 1676, NMM 
CLU/5 f49. 
350 Letter from Col. George Legge, 8 Oct 1677, Bodleian, Rawl Mss 191 A49 
115
Legge clearly appreciated the different perception of the professional skills of the 
different social groups within the Royal Navy Officers. He also explicitly acknowledges
that there are both social and professional expectations for Royal Navy officers. 
Legge recognized the lack of formal mechanisms for the training and qualifying 
officers,  and the role of patronage and royal favour in the selection of Royal Navy 
officers. His argument for the implementation of a standard requirement for service as a 
midshipman was not born of a theoretically optimal system, but from established 
practices. It is also important to note that Legge did not refer to service as midshipman 
as a requirement for further service as lieutenant, but rather as a prerequisite for ship's 
commanders. His solution reflected one aspect of the reality of royal patronage and the 
still extant connections between an officer's external social status and the role it could 
have in the creation of their Royal Navy socio-professional identity. It is important to 
note that he did not criticize the role of patronage, as such, nor the possibility for 
gentlemen to be appointed commanders of warships without actually having served 
aboard one. Rather, he suggested a 'rite' that would improve the professional abilities of 
those who were likely to be selected as officers and ships commanders within the 
existing system. To put it another way, Legge argued for a universal method for creating
a socio-professional identity and consistent maritime expertise for Royal Navy officers 
compatible with the patronage system, but that would also ensure that Royal Navy 
officers were capable of the duties they would be selected for, regardless of pedigree.
This letter was received between the implementation of the orders-in-council for 
Midshipmen (in 1676) and Lieutenants (in 1677). Only a month after Legge's letter was 
received, the Order-in-Council that defined the qualifications the rank of lieutenant was 
released.  The first section of the Order-in-Council sets out that the lieutenant's role is to
serve as an officer under the captain and be ready to serve as ship’s captain given the 
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need.351 The order also provided a general definition of the role of the lieutenant within 
the Royal Navy as a whole. 
In his obeying and executing all orders he shall at any time receive from his 
Commander, or from any other his Superior Officers in the Fleet where he is
employ'd352
This defined each lieutenant as a member of a larger body of lieutenants, socio-
professionally subordinate to all the captains and flag officers of the fleet. This is quite 
different from earlier descriptions of the lieutenant's role, such as in Boteler's Six 
Dialogues. From Capp, Boteler and Monson it is clear that the lieutenant aboard a 
warship was not simply a captain in miniature, in waiting or in training, but rather had a 
specific role within warship as both a community and a combat unit.
Narbrough's complaints from 1675 about the competence of the lieutenants in 
his fleet should not be interpreted as a criticism of the entire structure of the profession, 
but only of a single role. The result created the first definitions of what was required to 
hold the office of lieutenant. These requirements were:
1) Three years service at sea in the Royal Navy including a year as Midshipman, or
two years as Volunteer-per-order.
2) No less than Twenty years of age
3) To be able to produce references from previous commanding officers
4) To pass an examination board composed of three officers with experience 
commanding warships.353
These requirements show how the Royal Navy officer profession was being specialized,
as well as the development of the interdependence of the Royal Navy and the Royal 
Navy officer profession.
These orders-in-council were supplemented by later orders that further 
developed the definitions of the Royal Navy Officer Profession's most junior ranks. 
Professionally, the 1677 Order in Council did respond to Legge's criticisms in that only 
351 'Establishment for Defining the Duty and Qualifications of Lieutenants of His Majesty's Ships', 16 
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those who had served as midshipmen were allowed to take the exam for lieutenant, 
because service as volunteer alone was not sufficient.354 
The social aspects were not entirely neglected, and the requirement to provide 
endorsements from previous commanding officers ensured that an officer's ability to 
adequately function in their social role in the warship as a community would be 
considered for promotion.
To produce good Certificates under the hands of the several Commanders 
under whom he hath served, testifying that the Several Voyages he hath been
employed in with his Sobriety, Diligence, Obedience to Order, Application 
to the Study355
Together, the professional qualifications bound together the social, and the professional, 
aspects of the Royal Navy officer profession. To be successful, it was necessary to 
understand not just the technical aspects of serving aboard a warship, but also the social 
realities of a naval chain of command. The importance of social status was bound into 
the Royal Navy's professional qualifications and the development of what Michael 
Lewis described as 'rank'. 
The Royal Navy officer profession was being defined from the bottom up and 
actively integrated into the existence of the institution as well. The introduction of these 
professional standards, along with those for Volunteers-per-Order, and Midshipmen 
Ordinary would require junior officers to conform to a minimum standard. Eventually, 
the existence of a completely qualified group of lieutenants would inevitably result in 
captains and flag officers who were also qualified as they were promoted and previous 
non-maritime officers were replaced. However, this narrative makes several 
assumptions that are not quite accurate. It assumes that the entirety of the Royal Navy 
officer profession was developing in lock step. This narrative also extrapolates one 
354 'Establishment for Defining the Duty and Qualifications of Lieutenants of His Majesty's Ships', 16 
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specific set of requirements and reactions to operational experiences onto the entire 
structure of the profession. 
Other documents help us to understand the maritime specialization of the Royal 
Navy Officer Profession, such as the records of the results of the lieutenant’s exam. The 
formal language of successful reports specifically mentioned the maritime aspects of the
duties that the successful entrants had been certified for. The description ran as follows 
'and can answer to all points qualifying him to the Duty of an Able Seaman & 
Midshipman.'356 
A second consequence of the Order-in-Council was the creation of the 
Instructions for Lieutenants, issued at the same time. These further demonstrate the 
further definition of the Royal Navy officer profession and the extrapolation from the 
established definitions. The second instruction stated:
You are not to go on Shore, or otherwise depart from on Board his majesty's 
said ship, whereto you are appointed Lieutenant, without the Knowledge 
and Leave of your Commander357
This was reinforced by the third instruction:
You are to take upon yourself the entire Charge and Conduct of His 
Majesty's aid ship, and stand accountable for the well executing of the 
whole Duty of Commander thereof... with respect as well to the Printed 
General Instructions given to Commanders...358
As a result, lieutenants were responsible for the maritime aspects of the General 
Instructions to Captains, for example the admonishment to mind their ships' topmasts.359
Lieutenants were also required to keep a log or journal, a duty also required of masters 
and captains.360 Over time, as captains began to be selected from the list of lieutenants, 
the Royal Navy officer corps was increasingly defined, fulfilling the expectations set 
356 Lieutenants Passing Certificates, TNA ADM 107/1 f69
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through these definitions of the Royal Navy Officer Profession. Charles II and James 
II's use of orders-in-council and royal authority to define the existence of the Royal 
Navy officer profession established a precedent, and future orders-in-council would 
modify the professional qualifications. The precedent consisted of both the process and 
the content of the instructions and definitions. 
The rank of lieutenant was not the only one to be so developed during the reign 
of Charles II and James II. There were also important developments for the employment
of masters aboard the Royal Navy's smallest ships. In 1681, an order allowed the 
commanders of sixth-rates to retain the title 'captain'.361 In 1682, it was ordered that 
sixth rate warships of over sixty men were to include a Master, while sixth rates under 
sixty men were only to carry a Master when sailing in foreign waters.362 The rank of 
'Master and Commander' had its origins in the pre-Restoration Navy.363 These 
developments are important because they provide context for the Royal Navy's 
development of internal professional qualifications. 
Where after this period, the Royal Navy would certify lieutenants as capable of 
navigation, it was Trinity House's responsibility to qualify Masters. The treatment of the
post of Master and Commander is a reflection of the incomplete manner in which the 
Royal Navy's professional qualifications were implemented. Further, the creation of the 
lieutenant's qualifications meant that the Royal Navy was developing into an institution 
with a control over a specific set of maritime military expertise, as per Eric Ash's 
framework. The treatment of 'Master and Commander' and the requirement that Trinity 
House certify Masters indicates that the conception around the Royal Navy was 
specifically limited, and other related knowledge would continue to be certified by other
361 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 61.
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external institutions. There were also establishments that set out the requirements for 
chaplains to serve in the Royal Navy, including external certification.364
Another aspect of the professional development of the Royal Navy was the 
extension of professional identity and existence beyond active service. First, the 
practices of half-pay and the registration of sailors used financial ties to extend service 
connections. The payment of a retainer, either in the form of the payment for 
registration or as half-pay, secured the future services of those paid. Payment was also 
one aspect of the extension of socio-professional identity beyond active service. This 
was accomplished through the creation of a system that did not simply award half-pay 
to individuals, but to those individuals in the same roles and offices as when they were 
employed. 
One important example was the development of the Royal Navy's 'half-pay' 
system, which began with stipends paid to those who served as Admirals in the Anglo-
Dutch Wars.  Beginning in July 1668, vice-admirals were awarded £250 per annum, 
with lesser flag officers awarded correspondingly lesser amounts and the 'Captains of 
the Admirals ships' being awarded £150 per annum, the same as rear-admirals.365 In 
1672, this was followed by the introduction of pensions for superannuated officers.366 In 
1674, following the end of the Third Anglo Dutch War, an order-in-council provided the
same pensions for flag officers as had been granted in 1668.367 In May 1675, the next 
expansion awarded half-pay to the masters of first and second-rate ships from the war.368
Prior to the creation of the official officer lists, establishing relative seniority 
between officers was often problematic. Size of ship commanded was an important 
factor for determining seniority. This is demonstrated by the development of the half-
364 Establishment for the Future Choice and Qualifications of Chaplains for his Majesty's Navy', 16 
December 1677, NMM CLU/5 f58
365 Order-in-Council, 17 July 1668 NMM CLU/5 f29.
366 Order-in-Council, 6 December 1672 NMM CLU/5 f39.
367 Order-in-Council, 26 June 1674 NMM CLU/5 f47.
368 Order-in-Council, 19 May 1675 NMM CLU/5 f48
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pay establishments. In 1674, captains of first and second-rate ships were allowed half 
pay, which was to be calculated according to 'the best quality's they had served'.369 
Larger ships were more important ships and therefore bestowed the most prestige on 
their captains and officers. This differentiation, according to ship's rate, was not 
restricted to pay for commanding officers, but was also reflected in the pay of other 
officers as well. This is demonstrated by the establishment in 1677 that laid out the 
'Gratuities to the Relations of Such as are Slain in his Mats Service at Sea'. Widows of 
captains of first-rate ships were to be awarded £200, while widows of sixth-rates were 
to be awarded only £70.370 This distribution was also reflected at higher ranks, and the 
half-pay establishment of 1668 provided, for example that vice-admirals of the fleet 
were to be paid £250 per annum, while rear-admirals of squadrons were to be paid £150
per annum.371 These different levels of pay for different rates of ships were an important 
socio-professional motivator for Royal Navy personnel. It is an indicator of the 
temporary nature of seniority and that the primary service relationship was between an 
individual and their ship, rather than the individual and the service or institution as a 
whole. 
The creation of half-pay had socio-professional implications that pensions alone 
would not. While they were both financial connections to the Navy, half-pay was a 
retainer that required future service. Royal Navy officers on half-pay were not subject to
the Articles of War or to courts-martial. Given the importance of patronage and internal 
politics in the creation of future employment opportunities, officers on half-pay and 
hopeful of future employment would be required to respect the naval socio-professional 
hierarchy. Further, officers on half-pay were not able to gain employment in a trade 
369 Order-in-Council, 6 May 1674 NMM CLU/5 f45
370 'A Table of Gratuities to the Relations of Such as are Slain in his Majesty's Service at Sea' NMM 
CLU/4 f97
371 Order-in-Council, 17 July 1668 NMM CLU/5 f29
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which would provide a socio-professional identity to clash with their Royal Navy 
identity, such as sailing aboard merchant vessels.372
Deciding seniority through the size of one's command also created issues due to 
the irregularity of progression in peacetime, and the reality that men who had 
commanded large ships in wartime were employed to command much smaller ships in 
peacetime. For example, Henry Carverth was captain of a first-rate in 1673, but from 
1674-1678 was in command of sloops and sixth-rate ships.373 
In 1672, the Duke of York's sailing instructions stated 'that a younger captain 
should give way to an elder if they were in ships of equal size', but no criteria for 
defining 'younger' or 'elder' were provided'.374  In 1683, Admiral George Legge, the Earl 
of Dartmouth, established rules that precedence should be determined from the date of a
captain's first commission instead of the rate of his ship, a system that was adopted by 
Charles II.375 The officer lists that developed reflected this development. For example 
The Hardy list followed this system, dating from 1673.376 A 'Navy List' compiled at the 
Admiralty Office from 1688 did as well.377 Another, similar document, 'A Generall List 
of all the Captains that have Served in the Royal Navy from the year 1688 as they stand 
in Seniority, showing the Dates of their first Commissions as Captains for which they 
were allowed to take Post' extended that list into captains commissioned in 1695.378 
Operations
Throughout their reigns, Charles II and James II retained personal control over 
the deployment of the fleet. This definitely should be considered definition of the Navy, 
372 Ordrer-in-Council, 6 June 1673 NMM CLU/5 f137
373 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 61
374 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 60
375 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 61-62.
376 NMRN Hardy's List, i.
377 'List of Captains in the Royal Navy, 1688-1732 NMM PRN/18 f1
378 'An account of the names of the Lord High-Adm and Commissioners from King Charles to 1735' 
NMM PRN/7 f1,58
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as it defined operational responsibilities and practices. This section discusses two prime 
examples.
The direct authority of the King over the Royal Navy allowed for the creation of 
temporary practices and orders, the execution of which further solidified that authority. 
From 1670, warships were ordered not to require French ships to salute in passing as 
other foreign ships were required to do. These instructions were a result of the secret 
negotiations with the French that led to the Treaty of Dover. The instructions not only 
stated that Royal Navy warships were not to salute the French, but that they were not to 
expect salutes either, as a way of eliminating a source of tensions between England and 
France prior to signing of the treaty.379 
On 31 August 1670, orders to Captain Wylde of the Assurance contained the 
postscript 'The two Articles forbidding saluting the French, taking in Merchants goods 
as is in Captain Robinson's Instructions aforegoing'.380 On 24 September of the same 
year, Captain Langston of the Newcastle had within his orders 'The usuall orders 
forbidding to salutes of French and to take on board any merchants goods'.381 On the 
same day, Captain Elliott of the Reserve had identical text in his orders.382 Still later, on 
29 November 1670, Captain William Jennens of HM ship Princesse was 'forbid... to 
carry Merchant Goods and to salute the French'.383 Months later, this temporary practice 
was still in force because on 15 March 1670/71 Captain Tyrwhitt of the Adventures 
orders contained 'the Usuall orders forbidding ... saluting the French'.384 Later still, on 
26 May, Captain Finch of the Crown had again identical language in his orders to 
Captain Tyrwhitt's.385 And on 5 August, again the identical language for Captain Holmes
379 J.D. Davies, 'The Secret Naval Treaty and the Battle of Solebay' unpublished chapter
380 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
381 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
382 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
383 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
384 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
385 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
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of the Diamond.386 As late as November 1672, orders to John Narbrough, Captain of 
Fairfax and the senior officer on the Smyrna convoy in the fall of that year, contained 
the same language regarding salutes of the French, as well as regarding salutes in 
Genoa.387 In 1673, Captain Munden of the Princesse was ordered to provide convoy for 
a homeward bound convoy of the East India Company, and those orders stipulated that:
Whereas the King my Sovereign Lord and Brother hath been pleased to 
direct that none of his Majesty's Ships of Warre shall until further Orders 
expect or require any Salutes from any of the Ships of Warre belonging to 
the most Christian King, nor shall they give any salutes to the same 
shipps.388
This instruction indicates the personal role of the Monarch and the Duke of York in the 
creation of definitions of procedure for the Royal Navy and the reflection of their goals 
in institutional practices.  These orders were followed by the inclusion of this directive 
in the 1683 General Instructions.389 However, they were excluded from subsequent 
versions of the General Instructions, particularly those published in the 1690s.390  
The second major example from this period was the Royal Navy's deployments 
to the Mediterranean, and specifically to the English colony at Tangier.  England had 
experience deploying its ships to the Mediterranean, with the Commonwealth's Navy 
defeat versus the Dutch at Livorno in March 1653 (known to the English as the Battle of
Leghorn) as just one example.
Charles II's wedding to Catherine of Braganza resulted in his taking possession 
of Tangier. Tangier was not an English colony, but Charles II's personal property. The 
forces deployed there, including both naval forces and regiments, were there as the 
result of royal prerogative alone. In 1684, the abandonment of Tangier was further an 
act of royal prerogative. The deployments to Tangier were critical to the Royal Navy, 
386 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
387 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
388 Admiralty: Out-letters, 1656-1689, TNA ADM/2/1 np.
389 'General instructions to be observed by the Commanders of HM Ships' NMM RUSI NM/135 f8
390 Admiralty Instructions, 2 Feb 1683-4 Oct 1699  NMM CAD/A/16
125
because many of those involved would be directly involved in other facets of the Royal 
Navy's development. Rear-Admiral John Narborough had been deployed in 1675 to 
fight the Barbary corsairs, and again the next year to combat Algerines. He remained in 
the Mediterranean commanding a fleet until the summer of 1679.391 Arthur Herbert 
served as a subordinate flag officer under Narborough, and from July 1680, Herbert was
appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean as rear-admiral. He defended 
English commerce as well as the colony at Tangiers and returned to England in June 
1683.392 
This deployment was very important to the future development of the Royal 
Navy. First, it was a long-term peacetime deployment to foreign parts, where the flag 
officer was not only responsible for the operations of a squadron but also for interacting 
with other parts of the English state as well as the local powers. For example, Herbert 
worked towards the 1682 Peace Treaty with the Algerines.393 Second, it was an 
important deployment in that it generated a chain of patronage that was unrelated to 
service in a large fleet under the Lord High Admiral. To quote John Hattendorf, 
Herbert's years in the Mediterranean were seminal through the patronage 
and leadership he provided to young officers such as Matthew Aylmer, 
George Byng, John Graydon, Thomas Hopson, David Mitchell, George 
Rooke, Cloudesley Shovell, Woolfran Cornwall, and Francis Wheeler, who 
later provided the dedicated nucleus of like-minded conspirators who 
carried the Navy through the revolution of 1688–9, many of them becoming 
leaders of the Navy afterwards.394
This provided a second body of officers, and while Herbert was a close client of James 
II, those who followed and learned from him were a distinct group from James II's other
391 J. D. Davies, 'Narbrough, Sir John (bap. 1640, d. 1688)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19776, 
accessed 17 Nov 2015]
392 Peter Le Fevre, 'Tangier the Navy and It's Connection with the Glorious Revolution of 1688', 
Mariner's Mirror Vol 73 No. 2, 187
393 Ibid.John B. Hattendorf, 'Herbert, Arthur, Earl of Torrington (1648–1716)', Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13017, accessed 17 Nov 2015]
394 Ibid. 
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clients such as Sir Roger Strickland and Lord Dartmouth. However, it must be 
remembered that they had been deployed there as a result of the use of royal 
prerogative, and so represent the King defining and controlling the Navy.
James II also directly controlled and defined the Royal Navy following his 
succession to the throne in 1685. He took on himself the roles of Commander-in-Chief 
of the Land Forces and the Lord High Admiral. Orders from James II to Lord 
Dartmouth in 1688 demonstrate that to the end, the King attempted to maintain direct 
control.395 A particularly illustrative example is the King's direct definition of the fleet 
by Roman Catholic officers into the fleet, such as Sir Roger Strickland who was given 
command of the Channel Fleet in 1688. Strickland then attempted to introduce Roman 
Catholic chaplains into the fleet and have Mass performed. This led to significant upset 
within the fleet, and Lord Dartmouth, who was another of James II's favourites but not a
Roman Catholic replaced Strickland in command.396 However, Strickland was not 
removed from the fleet.397
James II's introduction of Roman Catholic Irish and English officers to both his 
army regiments and to the Royal Navy directly violated the Test Acts, just as 
Strickland's attempt to have mass held was in violation of the Act for the Establishing 
Articles and the Act for the Uniformity of Publique Prayers. Although the Glorious 
Revolution (discussed in the next chapter) would undo much of James II's definitions 
for both the state and the Royal Navy, he did directly define them during his reign.  
Establishments: Early Developments
395 Copy of an order from the King to Lord Dartmouth to proceed to hostilities with the Dutch, 12 Nov 
1688', Bodleian, Rawl Mss. A/186, f401
396 Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins, 201-4.
397 Letter to Pepys from Sir Roger Strickland aboard the Mary in the Downs, 8 Sept 1688, Bodleian, 
Rawl Mss. A/186 f40.
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Establishments were a frequently used tool to define material or financial aspects
of the Royal Navy's material and socio-professional existence. Examples of 
establishments include pay rates, the size of crews for different vessels, or the specific 
details of the organization of artillery for ships. The Navy Board and the Admiralty 
created these documents in this period, under the authority of the King. They are 
important because they provide precedents for developments discussed in later chapters.
An early and detailed example was An Establishment of the Numbers & Natures 
of the guns to be made & confirmed onboard every of his Maties Ships according to the 
Opinion of the Principal Officers & Commissioners of the Navy, Humbly presented by 
them to the Lords Commissioners for Executing the Officer of Lord High Admiral, 
which was the result of an order from the latter on 16 March 1673. This establishment 
reflected the variegated and non-standardized nature of the fleet at that time, and each 
ship of the fleet is addressed individually. For example, of the first-rates, while the 
Royal Charles, Royal James and Royal Prince had identical establishments, they were 
different to the Royal Sovereign as the former was equipped with twenty-eight 'Whole 
Culverin', while the latter was armed with an equal number of 'twenty-four pounders'398 
With lesser-rates, there was a greater degree of uniformity, and for example fourth-rates 
Leopard, Oxford, Greenwich, St David, Yarmouth, Newcastle, Happy Return, and 
Princess all had the same establishments.399 
In March 1677, Parliament provided funds for the building of thirty warships, in 
response to the expansion of the French Navy. Parliament required these ships to be 
built within two years in order to prevent funds being misspent.400 Although it was not 
strictly an establishment, the Act for raising the Summe of Five hundred eighty foure 
398 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 v14, 134.
399 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 v14, 135.
400 'House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 5 March 1677,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume
9, 1667-1687 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 392, accessed December 15, 2015, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/p392, P Le Fevre, 30 ships article, 
www.BritishNavalHistory.com 
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thousand nine hundred seaventy eight pounds two shillings and two pence halfe-penny 
for the speedy building Thirty Shipps of Warr did include specific measurements for the 
ships to be built.
...Thirty Shipps of Warr whereof one to be of the first-rate and to containe 
and measure Fowerteene hundred Tunns and not under Nine to be of the 
Second-rate and to containe and measure each of them Eleaven hundred 
Tunns and not under and Twenty of them to be of the Third-rate and to 
containe and measure each of them Nine hundred Tunns...401
The act specified tonnage rather than dimensions, but it was the first case of a large 
number of ships being built for the Royal Navy to some kind of standard, rather than 
individually as they had been previously as shown by the building of ships since the 
Restoration. However, this is the only major example of statutory definitions being used
to create these kinds of definitions for the Royal Navy in this phase. For context, a 
contemporary establishment for the number of guns specified standard artillery fits for 
each-rate. For second-rates, this was defined as twenty-six 'Demi-cannon', the same 
number 'Whole Culverin', twenty-six and ten, from two different sizes of 'Sakers', and 
finally a pair of 'two pounders'.402 It is telling that the carriage of guns, which was purely
an internal matter, was defined in convention while the dimensions of the 'thirty ships' 
built from 1677 were defined in statute, due to the need for Parliament to provide the 
funds. The Act for...  building Thirty Shipps of Warr provided a precedent that would be 
built on, then replaced during the reign of William III and Mary II, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
 Creating Statutory Definitions
401 'Charles II, 1677: An Act for raising the Summe of Five hundred eighty foure thousand nine hundred 
seaventy eight pounds two shillings and two pence halfe-penny for the speedy building Thirty Shipps 
of Warr.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record 
Commission, 1819), 802-836, accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp802-836
402 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 v14, 139.
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Charles II and James II extensively contributed to the definitions for the Royal 
Navy during their reigns. Their ability to name ships, commission officers, create 
deployments or push for professional development was not interdicted by Parliament. 
However, Parliament did also directly define the Navy.  The discussion above illustrates
how the precedents created, while informed by state-related influences, were concerned 
primarily with day-to-day operations and existence. In comparison, the statutory 
definitions discussed next explicitly defined the Royal Navy's institutional existence just
as they defined the state and placed limits on royal prerogative. While the acts discussed
did not specifically build on the language and definitions contained within the Act for 
the Establishing Articles, they were the continuation of the conflict over the definition 
of state religion and royal prerogative. While the Royal Navy was defined as being 
exterior to the English state, the limits placed on the monarch directly affected their 
ability to define the Royal Navy. 
Following the Restoration, there was a period in which Parliament and the King 
did work together, and Parliament continued to define the Navy directly. The details of 
Parliament's provision of funds to the Charles II and James II is already well 
understood, but they are necessary to provide a context for the later statutes that defined 
the Navy.
One example is from 1664/65, which stated:
Your Majestie hath found Yourselfe obliged to equip and sett out to Sea a 
Royall Navy for the preservation of Your Majestyes auntient and undoubted 
Soveraignty and Dominion in the Seas and the Trade of Your Majestyes 
Subjects...403
403 'Charles II, 1664 & 1665: An Act for granting a Royall Ayd unto the Kings Majestie of Twenty fower 
hundred threescore and seaventeene thousand and five hundred Pounds to be raised leavyed and paid 
in the space of Three Yeares.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: 
Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 525-552. British History Online, accessed March 10, 2017,
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp525-552.
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Further funds were provided in 1666, and these acts proved to be insufficient to pay for 
the Navy during the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War.404 Another such act, from 1677, is discussed 
below, although for reasons other than the finances per se.
There were far fewer statutes that directly defined the Navy in this period, but 
the ones that were created provide an important context. The Act for the Establishing 
Articles set the precedent that Parliament could define the office and authority of the 
Lord High Admiral. Parliament continued to do so, however the acts in which they did 
so included limits on their duration so that they would expire.
The first example is the Act for providing Carriage by Land and by Water for 
the use of His Majesties Navy and Ordnance, of 1662. It provided the authority for the 
Admiralty to impress carriages on land and certain vessels for transport. First, to do so 
required the signature of two judges. Further, the Admiralty could not impress any 
vessels that were full of cargo for an outbound journey, nor could they could be seized 
'if there be other Vessels in the Port fitting for the Service'.405 Finally, this statute was 
only in force 'untill the end of the first Session of the next Parliament and no longer'.406 
As such, it expired in 1663.
A series of similar acts were created to provide the Navy Board additional 
authority, beginning in 1664.
Whereas diverse fightings quarrellings and disturbances doe often happen in
and about his Majestyes Offices Yards and Stores for his Majestyes Royall 
Navy and frequent differences and disorders are occasioned in the Office of 
his Majestyes Treasury of the Navy on Pay dayes in London Portsmouth and
other places of meeting for the Service of the said Navy, and that either by 
the unreasonable turbulency of Seamen and others attending on or relateing 
404 'Charles II, 1666: An Act for granting the Summe of Twelve hundred fifty six thousand three hundred 
forty seaven pounds thirteene shillings to the Kings Majestie towards the Maintenance of the present 
Warr.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record 
Commission, 1819), 616-623. British History Online, accessed March 10, 2017, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp616-623.
405 'Charles II, 1662: An Act for providing Carriage by Land and by Water for the use of His Majesties 
Navy and Ordnance.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great 




to that Service or their Creditors or by the rudenes of the Officers intrusted 
with his Majestyes Stores on Land, or in his Royall Shipps when they are 
questioned by the principall Officers and Co[m]missioners of the said 
Navy...407
This was a reflection of the ramification of the Navy Board inheriting the debts and 
responsibilities of the State's Navy, specifically the frequent inability to pay off 
warships. Also, the duration of the act was stated to be two years from 1 June 1664, and 
then from thence to the end of the session of Parliament, to provide time for its 
replacement. The act was subsequently renewed in 1666, with the expiry of that act 
dated for two years from 1 February 1666/1667 and thence again to the end of the 
session of Parliament.408 The next session of Parliament was from October to December 
1669, but the act was not renewed.409 
In 1670, however, Parliament passed An Act to revive an Act, Entituled An Act to
prevent the disturbances of Seamen and others, and to preserve the Stores belonging to 
his Majestyes Navy Royall, with some Alterations and Additions. There was one 
significant alteration, and that was the extension of the duration of the act, from two 
years to seven years plus the next session of Parliament from 1 June 1670. Second, the 
Lord High Admiral was authorized to execute the powers given to the Navy Board to 
punish sailors, hence extending the authority of the Articles of War.410 The context for 
this last is important, since it was the same session as the renewal of the Conventicles 
407 'Charles II, 1664: An Act to prevent the Disturbances of Seamen and others and to preserve the Stores
belonging to His Majestyes Navy Royall.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John 
Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 520-521. British History Online, accessed 
March 10, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp520-521.
408 'Charles II, 1666: An Act to prevent the Disturbances of Seamen and others and to preserve the Stores
belonging to His Majesties Navy Royall.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John 
Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 615-616. British History Online, accessed 
March 10, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp615-616.
409 http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/parliament/1661
410 'Charles II, 1670 & 1671: An Act to revive an Act, Entituled An Act to prevent the disturbances of 
Seamen and others, and to preserve the Stores belonging to his Majestyes Navy Royall, with some 
Alterations and Additions.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great 
Britain Record Commission, 1819), 741-743. British History Online, accessed March 10, 2017, 
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Act, and a session in which Parliament provided significant funds to the King.411 
Likewise, it was concurrent with Charles II's secret treaty with Louis XIV. These acts 
provide a different perspective, for example that in 1670 additional authority was 
accorded to the Lord High Admiral, and also that the relationship between the King and 
Parliament regarding the Navy was not simply about finances.
The 1677 An Act for...  the speedy building Thirty Shipps of Warr is a further 
extension of this. This was a tax act and specifically provided funds to the King in order
to pay for new warships. 
That the Summe of Five hundred eighty fower thousand nine hundred 
seaventy eight pounds two shillings and two pence halfe peny shall be 
raised leavyed and paid unto your Majestie within the space of Seaventeene 
Moneths in manner following.412
In comparison, the 1666 funding act referenced above provided the funds specific to 
Charles II over three years.413 The short time period allowed for the building of the ships
was a measure to restrict his use of the funds specifically to building warships.414    
Penalties be inflicted upon the Officers of the Exchequer, Navy, and 
Ordnance, and all other Persons respectively, through whose Hands any Part
of the said Supply shall pass, in case the said Supply, or any Part thereof, 
shall be otherwise diverted or misapplied415
This aspect completely falls in line with the understanding of the relationship between 
Parliament and Charles II. The Act for... the speedy building Thirty Shipps of Warr also 
included very specific directions on what ships should be built.
411 http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/parliament/1661
412 'Charles II, 1677: An Act for raising the Summe of Five hundred eighty foure thousand nine hundred 
seaventy eight pounds two shillings and two pence halfe-penny for the speedy building Thirty Shipps 
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Commission, 1819), 802-836, accessed January 6, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol5/pp802-836
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Moneyes... are hereby appropriated for the building and for the Gunns, 
Rigging and other Furnishing of Thirty Shipps of Warr whereof one to be of 
the First Rate and to containe and measure Fowerteene hundred Tunns and 
not under Nine to be of the Second Rate and to containe and measure each 
of them Eleaven hundred Tunns and not under and Twenty of them to be of 
the Third Rate and to containe and measure each of them Nine hundred 
Tunns and not under and to noe other intent use or purpose whatsoever.416
This is a distinct departure from Parliament's direct definition of the Navy since the 
Restoration. This act defined both the number of ships to be built for the funds 
provided, but also provided rough definition for the size of those ships. This would 
provide a direct precedent for Parliament doing the very same thing following the 
Glorious Revolution. The House of Commons discussed providing funds from 'Tonnage
and Poundage.' However, this was voted down even before the bill was drafted.417 
There was certainly tension between England and other nations, for example, 
and forces were raised in case of a possible war, as shown by an act the next year which 
provided funds for paying-off troops, and indeed additional funds to pay for the Navy 
(as well as the engagement of Princess Mary to the Prince of Wales)
And whereas Wee Your said Majestyes obedient Subjects the Commons of 
England in Parlyament assembled are engaged unto Your Majestie for the 
repayment of the summe of Two hundred thousand pounds which Your 
Majestie hath beene pleased to raise upon the Creditt of a certaine Act 
passed in this present Parlyament in the Twenty ninth yeare of Your 
Majestyes Raigne entituled An Act for an additionall Excise upon Beere Ale
and other Liquors Wee... doe hereby give and grant to Your most Excellent 
Majestie the Summe of fower hundred and twelve thousand nine hundred 
twenty five pounds fowerteene shillings & six pence.418
416 'Charles II, 1677: An Act for...  the speedy building Thirty Shipps of Warr.,' in Statutes of the Realm: 
Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby
417 'House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 5 March 1677,' in Journal of the House of Commons: Volume
9, 1667-1687,
418 'Charles II, 1677 & 1678: An Act for granting a Supply to His Majestie of Six hundred nineteene 
thousand three hundred eighty eight pounds eleaven shillings and nine pence for disbanding the Army
and other uses therein mentioned.,' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, ed. John Raithby (s.l:
Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 867-883, accessed January 10, 2015, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp867-883 
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This act did not include any further definitions for the Navy, but was a straight-forward 
supply statute that also provided Charles II funds for paying off ships and regiments that
had been raised in 1677, but not deployed.
After this period, the next legislation that directly defined the Royal Navy came 
after the Glorious Revolution. The statutes discussed above show that Parliament did 
continue to directly define the Navy following the Restoration, however its ability to do 
so was limited. 
Conclusion
The narrative of King vs. Parliament dominates the existing studies of the Royal 
Navy's development in this period. N.A.M. Rodger argues that 'Though Parliament had 
for a time gained substantial control of the Navy of Charles II, his brother had the fleet 
firmly back in his own hands'.419 The examination of the definitions created for this 
period illustrate that Parliament's control over the purse strings did limit what Charles II
could do operationally, but that it could not remove or even reasonably limit the King's 
authority, or that of his deputies, to define many of the Navy's attributes.
After the Restoration, the Royal Navy continued to develop in the 'Westminster 
Model', in that it continued to be defined in both statute and in conventions. Further, the 
Navy's development was also affected by the State's continued development during this 
period. Although the Act for the Establishing Articles was created with a limit on its 
duration, other statutes that directly defined the Navy were not. As the reign of Charles 
II progressed, the ability for Parliament to directly define and to create statutes for the 
Navy was limited to the opportunities when Parliament was in session, and when their 
legislative agenda was not sufficiently offensive to Charles II that he would rather 
prorogue than get badly needed funds. 
419 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 111.
135
This was a period of intense development for the Royal Navy, both in terms of 
structural and professional definitions. One significant reality that did not change, 
however, was the Navy's dire financial situation. Indeed, Davies argues that the King's 
and the Admiralty Board's ability to use royal prerogative to define the Navy 
exacerbated these problems during the period 1679-1694, for example with the massive 
building plans of the thirty ships.420 However, financial restraints did not affect Charles 
II and James II's ability to define the Navy.
James II's succession resulted in his personal resumption of the office of Lord 
High Admiral, of continued direct rule, and the creation of convention definitions for 
the Navy that directly violated the statutory definitions that Parliament created. These 
are issues that would be addressed following the Glorious Revolution and would bring 
new complexity to the Navy's development in the Westminster Model.
420 Davies, 'Pepys and the Admiral Commission', pp. 47, 50, 52-53.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND LATER STUARTS
Between the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian Succession, the Royal 
Navy underwent significant development that created the framework for it to shift from 
being primarily a temporary organization, to one with much substantial professional 
permanence. By the end of James II's reign, the Royal Navy was certainly persistent, as 
even in peacetime the Royal Navy was responsible for commerce protection and other 
duties. However, it could not be considered to be permanent, especially its socio-
professional aspects and attributes.421 Further, the beginnings of the integration of the 
institutional and socio-professional aspects which began with the introduction of the 
examinations for Lieutenant had not been more widely implemented. 
These precedents were critical to the Royal Navy's development following the 
Glorious Revolution. Some of the Royal Navy's developments built directly on these 
precedents, while other developments rebuked James II's actions and definitions. Others
yet were attempted solutions for new problems. William III's campaigns against the 
Jacobites in Ireland and against France in the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1689-97) 
were followed by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) during the reign of 
Queen Anne. These placed entirely different strains and pressures on the Royal Navy 
and the English state's ability to support and provide for it. Some of these pressures 
resulted in the increasing differentiation of the Royal Navy from the Army. Other 
pressures required the creation of new approaches to managing the Royal Navy's 
resources, including the officers and crew, ships and finances. The Royal Navy certainly
did continue to be defined in both in statute and in convention. However, the status of 
the Admiralty and the Navy Board and its relationship to Parliament and to the King 
significantly changed following the Glorious Revolution. While William III personally 
421 Rodger, 'Commissioned officers' careers in the Royal Navy, 1690-1815'. 165
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commanded the Army against the Jacobites, neither he nor his co-monarch Mary had the
personal and close connections to the Admiralty that Charles II and James II had built. 
Parliament was once again more directly involved in defining the Navy, building on 
existing precedents as well as setting new ones. Different pressures also pushed the 
Admiralty and the Navy Board to continue to define the institution.  This puts a very 
different perspective on the Navy's development in the 'Westminster Model' in this 
period. 
The first part of this chapter discusses the Glorious Revolution and the state 
development that provided context for the Navy's development. The analysis of the 
Navy's development begins with a discussion of the substantial changes to the Royal 
Navy's administration and provides perspective for the developments that occurred. This
is followed by a discussion of the rebuke of James II's legacy, as well as the introduction
of William and Mary's identity to the Navy. The next section examines the development 
of tools for the management of the Royal Navy's resources. The discussion of statutory 
definitions begins by looking at new statutes that directly built on the definitions in the 
Act for the Establishing Articles. The final section discusses the developments that 
paired both conventions and statutory definitions. This includes the transition from 
statute to convention in the management of warships and also how new statutes and 
contention together perpetuated the Royal Navy's transition from persistence to 
permanence. 
State Development Context
The development of the English and, after 1707, the British state was spurred 
first and foremost by the ramifications of the Glorious Revolution and secondarily by 
the involvement in a generation-long war. While the Revolution did result in active 
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definition of the English state, it was unlike the Restoration in that William III and Mary
positioned themselves as the legitimate heirs to an abandoned but also legitimate throne.
Like Charles II, they needed to work with Parliament to perform the monarchy. The 
creation of statutory definitions for the English state during this phase involved the 
specific creation of limits on royal prerogative and the monarch's ability to govern 
directly. 
The Glorious Revolution was not just an unsettled succession; it was an 
invasion, even if there were not any significant battles between James II's forces and the
invaders.422 As with the Restoration, the monarchy was not assured continued 
succession. Like Charles II, who had to justify both his presence and that of the 
monarchy itself, William III and Mary had to demonstrate that their possession of the 
monarchy was legitimate, a perception that James II opposed both militarily and 
through propaganda.423 It was critical for the co-monarchs to been seen as cooperating 
with Parliament in governing England and so this was a phase in which statutory 
definitions far outweighed the creation of conventions.
After James II's flight and William and Mary's arrival in England, the succession
was complex as well as contested. William refused to simply seize the crown, and in 
January 1689 summoned a 'Convention Parliament' setting aside the 1685 election of 
James II's 'Loyal Parliament'.424 Although he summoned Parliament, it did not have the 
same status as a parliament convened by a reigning monarch and was in much the same 
tenuous position as the 'Convention Parliament' had been at the Restoration. At the end 
of January 1689, Parliament confirmed that England was a Protestant state, and began 
the process of creating the 'Declaration of Rights', which detailed James II's errors as 
422 Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory (HarperCollins Ebook, 2008) L.
458.
423 Sharpe, Rebranding Rule, L. 8303-8311.
424 T. Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy 1685 – 1720 (Penguin Ebook, 2007) 
L. 758-762
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monarch and provided Parliament's terms for William and Mary.425 In early February, 
William III dissolved the 'Convention Parliament', then reconvened a new Parliament. 
An early action of the new parliament was The Crown and Parliament 
Recognition Act 1689.426 That year, as in 1660, the acts of the 'Convention Parliament' 
were fully endorsed and became law. This was not some minor formality, because the 
'Declaration of Rights' became the Bill of Rights (1689), one of England's most 
important constitutional documents and one that defined the state in much more detail 
than had been specified in statutory definitions at the Restoration. This was backed by 
the Coronation Oath Act, which provided a new oath that emphasized the monarchs'
 responsibility to uphold the agreed-upon terms.427 
The Bill of Rights banned standing armies in times of peace. However, the 
ramifications of the Glorious Revolution included the creation of English armies to fight
against James II's army and also against France and its allies. The legal permission for 
the land forces came from a series of acts entitled the Mutiny Acts, which were 
legislated annually beginning immediately after the Glorious Revolution. The Mutiny 
Acts were not comparable to the Act for Establishing Articles, in that they did not 
include an equivalent to the Navy's Articles of War. Rather, they stated that for the 
duration of the Act the monarchy was permitted to raise an army for a specific, listed, 
purpose. For example, in 1690 the army was permitted for the purpose of fighting the 
425 The Declaration of Rights, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, University of Yale, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp accessed 24 October, 2016. Harris, Revolution, 
L.799-809. 
426 'William and Mary, 1689: An Act for Recognizing King William and Queene Mary and for avoiding 
all Questions touching the Acts made in the Parliament assembled at Westminster the thirteenth day 
of February one thousand six hundred eighty eight. [Chapter I. Rot. Parl. pt. 1. nu. 1.],' in Statutes of 
the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 156. 
British History Online, accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol6/p156.
427 'William and Mary, 1688: An Act for Establishing the Coronation Oath. [Chapter VI. Rot. Parl. pt. 5. 
nu. 3.],' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record 
Commission, 1819), 56-57. British History Online, accessed October 15, 2016, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/pp56-57.
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Jacobites, or 'reducing Ireland'.428 In 1695, the Army was permitted for the 'defence of 
Europe's Liberties and to fight against the French'.429 It is notable that no such 
permission was required for the Navy. Thus, from the Glorious Revolution, the land 
forces, like the Royal Navy were defined both in statute and with conventions. The 
Mutiny Acts provide important context for the Royal Navy's development as they are 
another example of Parliament placing limits on royal authority. That the Royal Navy 
and land forces had distinct statutory definitions also provides context for the socio-
professional differentiation discussed below. 
Another early action following the Glorious Revolution was the consideration of
a new Book of Common Prayer. As a Calvinist, William III introduced a new religious 
identity to the monarchy that was very different from that of Charles II and James II. 
The Dean of Canterbury, John Tillotson led the creation of what would become the 
Liturgy of Comprehension.430 Ultimately, this version was not adopted and was not even 
published until 1854.431 Although these alterations did not become law, its creation is an 
indication that William III was willing to work to heal some of the divisions caused 
within English society by the state-development that followed the Restoration such as 
the Clarendon Code. Although the Liturgy of Comprehension did feature many changes 
to address Presbyterian concerns, the aspects of the Book of Common Prayer that 
428 'William and Mary, 1690: An Act for Punishing Officers and Soldiers who shall mutiny or desert their
Majestyes Service and for punishing false Musters. [Chapter VI. Rot. Parl. pt. 3. nu. 5.],' in Statutes 
of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 
227-230, accessed January 18, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/pp227-230
429 'William III, 1695-6: An Act for continueing severall former Acts for punishing Officers and Soldiers 
who shall Mutiny or Desert His Majesties Service and for punishing False Musters and for Payment 
of Quarters for One Yeare longer [Chapter XXIII. Rot. Parl. 7 & 8 Gul. III.p.5n.9],' in Statutes of the 
Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1820), 107-
109, accessed January 18, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol7/pp107-109
430 Timothy J. Fawcett, The liturgy of comprehension 1689: An Abortive Attempt to Revise the Book of 
Common Prayer, (Great Britain: Mayhew McCrimmon, 1973) 26.
431 The Revised Liturgy of 1689; Being the Book of Common Prayer (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 
1855) 577., Justus.Anglican.org 'Liturgy of Comprehension',
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directly concerned the Royal Navy would not have changed. The note against the forms 
of 'Prayers for Use at Sea' was 'the whole standing without alteration'.432
In 1694, the Act for the frequent Meeting and calling of Parliaments further 
defined the English state. In 1664, the Triennial Parliaments Act had specified that 
Parliament should meet at least once every three years.433 The Meeting of Parliament 
Act required Parliament to meet every year and general elections to be held every three 
years. This directly built upon the requirements listed in the Bill of Rights.434 This act 
also created political instability a period known as 'Rage of Party'. In the twenty years 
that followed there were ten general elections.435
Following the Glorious Revolution, the state – Parliament and the monarchy 
together- became more directly involved in the economy. This is usually referred to as 
the development of the 'fiscal-military state', or 'fiscal-naval state'.436 Robinson and 
Pincus also describe the English state following the Glorious Revolution as an 
'Interventionist' or 'Developmental' state. This provided increased revenues for military 
spending as well as other causes.437 The creation of the Bank of the England in 1694 
allowed for the centralization and service of the government's debts. This act restricted 
royal prerogative, because it gave Parliament the ability to approve borrowing by the 
432 The Revised Liturgy of 1689; Being the Book of Common Prayer (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 
1855) 577., Justus.Anglican.org 'Liturgy of Comprehension',
433 'Charles II, 1664: An Act for the assembling and holding of Parliaments once in Three yeares' in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 5, 1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/p513.
434 "William and Mary, 1694: An Act for the frequent Meeting and calling of Parliaments [Chapter II 
Rot. Parl. pt. 1. nu. 2.]," in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great 
Britain Record Commission, 1819), 510. British History Online, accessed August 17, 2016, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/p510.
435 Cruickshanks, Handeley & Hayton Eds. The history of parliament: the House of Commons, 1690–
1715
436 See J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783. (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989.), N.A.M. Rodger, 'From the “military revolution' to the “fiscal-naval' state', Journal 
for Maritime Research 13, 2 (2011), 119-128. There is some discussion that the 'fiscal innovation' 
that contributed to the 'Fiscal-Military' state began in the 1640s in England. Graham and Walsh, ed. 
The British Fiscal-Military States, 7.
437 Pincus & Robinson, 'Faire la guerre et faire l'État', Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 1/2016 (71e 
année) , p.5-36
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Crown, have approval over the budget for the Royal Household, and to audit Crown 
spending.438 
Further, this was a phase of twenty-five years of nearly constant warfare on 
several fronts. With the exception of the period between the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 
and  the beginning of the War of the Spanish succession in 1702, England was 
constantly at war with France. Until 1691, William III was also actively fighting against 
against Jacobites in Ireland. This tested the English state's ability to raise funds for war, 
although it has been shown that other states were spending far more of their available 
funds on warfare. For example, at times the Austrians spent, 93% of income on warfare,
Peter the Great of Russia spent 90%, and the Danes 88% in the early seventeenth 
century.439 Setting such comparisons aside, the English state vastly increased its 
spending on military forces, as from the Glorious Revolution it needed to support a 
growing army in addition to its navy. These forces were not simply maintained at home,
but were operationally deployed, which cost far more money. Accordingly, the Statutes 
of the Realm during this phase have many taxation acts which provided funds to the 
monarchs for the war efforts, as well as other legislation created to aid the military 
effort and indeed the English economy and industries. The important development was 
of institutions and practices which facilitated long-term state financial planning and 
spending.
The state was further defined in the 1701 Act of Settlement, which reconfirmed 
its official Protestant status and implemented rules governing succession to maintain 
that in perpetuity.440 This act also removed the monarch's ability to use royal prerogative
438 John Wells and Douglas Wills. 'Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat 
to England's Institutions and Economic Growth' The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 
(Jun., 2000), 422.
439 Pincus and Robinson, 'Wars and Statemaking reconsidered', 7.
440 'William III, 1700 & 1701: An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown and better securing the 
Rights and Liberties of the Subject [Chapter II. Rot. Parl. 12 & 13 Gul. III. p. 1. n. 2.],' in Statutes of 
the Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1820), 
636-638. British History Online, accessed October 13, 2016, http://www.british-
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to dismiss judges.441 Another important definition for the state, of course, was the 1707 
Union with Scotland. During the reigns of Charles II and James II, the kingdoms 
remained distinct. During the reign of William III and Mary, this was made more 
complicated as William was Stadtholder as well, with responsibility to England, 
Scotland and to the Netherlands. The Union with Scotland was an incomplete 
rationalization of the territories controlled by the English monarch. It can be seen from 
the titles that Queen Anne and Prince George used that the British monarchy also held 
authority over several non-contiguous that were not unified with England and Scotland, 
for example those in the Caribbean and North America known as the 'Plantations'.442 
William III and Mary did use royal prerogative to directly define the state, 
although not to the same extent as Charles II or James II. Indeed their use of royal 
prerogative was limited to the use of the veto, rather than direct rule per se. From 1692 
to 1696, William III vetoed five Acts of Parliament. These were the Judges, Royal 
Mines, Triennial, Place and MP Qualifications bills. In comparison, Charles II had 
vetoed only a 'handful' of bills, none of which sparked a political crisis, and Anne 
vetoed only one.443 Further, the creation of new charters and the appointment of Royal 
Governors for the colonies following the Glorious Revolution, is another demonstration 
of the use of royal prerogative to define the state.444 
Indeed, William's behaviour in other respects indicates that the Crown's working 
with Parliament was really quite restricted. Once he was monarch, William effectively 
took personal control of English foreign policy. Although originally he was willing to be
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol7/pp636-638.
441 Wells and Wills. 'Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation', 422.
442 Patent appointing Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral, 4 October 1712. 
NMM CAD A/3 f1., Warrant for Prince Lord High Admiral to wear the Standard of England when at 
Sea. NMM CAD A/3 f18.
443 J. J. Carafano, 'William III and the Negative Voice' Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1987), 510-11.
444 V.F. Barnes, 'The Rise of William Phips' The New England Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Jul., 1928), 292-
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largely reliant on his English advisors, he became increasingly frustrated with them. He 
did not share his policies, intentions, or actions with Parliament. This continued even to 




Following the Glorious Revolution, the Royal Navy's administration 
substantially changed. William III and Mary simply did not have the close relationship 
and were not as personally involved in the Navy's day-to-day administration as Charles 
II and James II had been. Further, following the resignation of Samuel Pepys, the Royal 
Navy did not have an effective administrative head. Individuals such as Lord 
Nottingham (as Secretary of State for Naval Affairs), Torrington and Russell had 
significant influence over the fleet but they lacked the strong connections to the King. 
Torrington was initially First Lord, followed by Russell from 1694, and the latter 
became even more influential when the Whigs came to power. After a political split 
between Nottingham and Russell following the Battle of Barfleur, Parliament backed 
Russell and the Admiralty.446 Rodger argues that '[t]hroughout this period, [Parliament] 
judged the Navy by ideological, not practical, standards, and their interventions in naval
affairs were often ignorant and vindictive.'447 The admiralty commissions in place in the 
early 1690s were not effective and over the winter of 1692-1693, William became more 
personally involved in the coordination of the Anglo-Dutch joint naval effort in the 
Mediterranean while on the Continent.448 In 1696, the King took personal control of the 
445 G. Davies, 'The Control of British Foreign Policy by William III' in Essays on the Later Stuarts (San 
Marino: Huntingdon Library, 1958) 96-99.
446 Rodger, Command of the Oceans, 181-183.
447 Rodger, Command of the Oceans, 183.
448 J. Ehrman, 'William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy 1692-1694', Cambridge 
Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1949), 272.
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Royal Navy's administration, building on his earlier personal involvement.449 However, 
his emphasis was strongly on grand strategy, rather than the lower-level administration 
that Charles II and James II had involved themselves in.
A Tory Admiralty appointed in 1699 lasted until 1702, when the King, sick of its
petulance, appointed the Earl of Pembroke as Lord Admiral. He was replaced in May 
1702 by Queen Anne's consort, Prince George of Denmark, who had an advisory 
council including Admiral George Churchill. The Earl of Pembroke was appointed Lord
High Admiral again in 1708 following Prince George's death and after his resignation in
1709, a Board of Admiralty was again appointed with Earl Orford as First Lord. 
However, he was not a major member of the Cabinet. This changed in 1712 when the 
Earl of Strafford was appointed First Lord.450 Further, in 1713, Queen Anne gave 
Parliament the authority to define what deployments were necessary for commerce 
protection.451 
Ehrman argues that 'no competent naval authority existed after the simultaneous 
disappearance from the naval scene of Russell and Nottingham.'452  This agrees with 
Rodger's argument that 'the Admiralty lost most of its responsibilities' after 1689, in 
parallel to the Navy Board's loss of prestige.453 Rodger further argues that 'There was a 
partial vacuum in naval policy-making, and Parliament was slowly drawn into it'.454 The
analysis of the definitions created in this period does back up these arguments, however 
they are also put into perspective. It is entirely understandable that the Lord High 
Admiral or commissioners would be insubstantial following the Glorious Revolution, as
the previously nearly thirty years was dominated by Charles II, James II and indeed by 
Pepys. The structures that existed prior to the Glorious Revolution, specifically the 
449 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 608. 
450 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 183-185.
451 Ibid.
452 Ehrman, 'William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy 1692-1694', 493.
453 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 187.
454 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 186.
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Admiralty, the Navy Board, Parliament and the Monarchy all existed following the 
tumult. However, the system that had been in placed to manage the Admiralty prior to 
1688 was erased. The deliberate and dramatic shift away from direct rule meant that it 
could not be reconstituted with individuals politically acceptable to the new monarchs. 
Further, the political shifts during the reign of William III and Mary made it impossible 
to have any sort of real administrative stability. Consider that this was the period of the 
'Rage of Party', of consistent political instability. That very political instability resulted 
in appointments such as the political non-entity, the Earl of Pembroke, to First Lord 
once and Lord High Admiral twice. The greatest period of stability during this period 
was during Prince George's tenure as Lord High Admiral, and he could not have the 
political presence to strongly direct the Royal Navy's development. 
Despite the political weakness of the Admiralty and the Navy Board, this was a 
critically important period of the Royal Navy's development, and in particular the 
creation of foundations for professional permanence for Royal Navy officers. 
Navy and the Monarchy
The task of imprinting the Stuart monarchy upon the restored English state had 
been a relatively simple political task for Charles II. In the case of the Royal Navy, he 
was able at a stroke to remove names that celebrated the interregnum and replace them 
with royal names. The political situation for William III and Mary was more complex, 
and they relied on their connections to Charles II to legitimize their reign. They engaged
in a propaganda campaign to legitimize their reign, beginning with the Declaration of 
Reasons in October 1688, prior even to landing at Torbay.455 The naming of warships 
455 T. Claydon, William III and The Godly Revolution (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
24.
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with associations to the new monarchs needs to be considered in light of that campaign, 
as well as the precedents established by Charles and James II.
After the Glorious Revolution, the 'anti-sacred symbols' that embodied 
associations between James II and the Royal Navy had to be removed and associations 
with the new regime created. In some cases, ships did not have to be renamed. The 
Sedgemoor was wrecked in 1689, and the name was not reused.456 For other ships, the 
symbols did have to be actively replaced. The Royal James was renamed in 1691 to 
Victory, after being extensively rebuilt. The first-rate Prince (1670) was rebuilt in 1692 
and renamed the Royal William, the name she retained until broken up in 1813.457 
Similarly, the first-rate Royal Charles (1673) was renamed Queen in 1693 to celebrate 
Mary, and the name was retained until after the Hanoverian Succession.458 This pattern 
continued, and in 1702 the Duke was renamed Prince George for Anne's consort. The 
first-rate St Andrew was renamed Royal Anne the next year.459 This name was retained 
until being broken up in 1727.460 In this way, and with the largest warships usually 
taking on the name of monarchs themselves, a post-Revolution identity was reinforced 
in the navy and one which in some ways extended even beyond the Hanoverian 
succession.
Following James II's example, William III named warships to honour his 
personal victories. Since William III was away on campaign when some ships were 
named, it is possible or even likely that Mary named or approved names in her 
husband's stead.461 The newly built second-rate Boyne launched in 1692 was named for 
a victory over Jacobite forces in Ireland, for example. In 1693, the second-rate Torbay 
456 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 120.
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was named to celebrate where William III landed.462 Another example was the second-
rate Association (1697), named after the Loyalist Association following the 
assassination attempt of 1696. This important ship, which was Cloudesley Shovell's 
flagship in the Mediterranean, was lost in 1707 in the great navigation disaster which 
cost the Admiral his life.463 
In addition to creating new symbols, the reuse of names specific to Charles II 
reinforced the historical connection and thus the legitimacy of William and Mary's 
succession. In particular, the Royal Oak (1674) retained her name through rebuilds in 
1690 and 1713.464 After the Bredah was wrecked in 1666, the name was reused for new 
ships built in 1670 and 1692.465 That name was important to Charles II because it was 
where he had issued the Declaration of Breda.466
Navy and Nation
The expression of the Royal Navy's associations with the nation also perceptibly 
changed. Just as with the 1677 Thirty Ships programme, many of the ships built after 
the Glorious Revolution had geographic names. In the Twenty-Seven Ship program 
(which Parliament provided funding for in 1691), twenty-four of the ships built had 
geographic names.467 For smaller warships such as fourth-rates, geographic names were 
used almost exclusively. There were 33 fourth-rate ships of 50 guns built between 1691 
462 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 68-9.
463 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 34; Davies, 'Saints and Soldiers'
464 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 29, 61, 67, 82.
465 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 106,66,74.
466 Commissions also played a role in creating associations between Royal Navy officers and the 
monarchs. Though it naturally changed with the circumstances, the language used in them remained 
remarkably similar from the 1680s right to the end of the period of this project. As just two examples 
among many, the commissions of Lt. Thomas Miles and Admiral Arthur Herbert in 1689 referred to 
'their Majesties ship' and 'their Majesties service'. Commission for Lt. Thomas Miles, 1689. NMM 
ADL Q/22, Commission for Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1689 NMM ADL Q/20
467 The exceptions were the third-rates Boyne, which was named for William's victory, Russell, named 
for the Admiral, and Torbay, named for where William's forces landed. Winfield, British Warships, 
68-69.
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and 1697, all but one of which had a geographic name.468 One change was 'a new wave' 
of Welsh warships names. For example, the name Pembroke was used for new ships in 
1690, 1694 and 1710. There was also the 50 gun fourth-rate Anglesea, built 1694.469
 The union of 1707 changed the nation that the RN represented, and there was 
some inconsistency in how it was represented in the documents.  An illustration is an 
order-in-council from 1702 in which Prince George of Denmark was appointed Lord 
High Admiral of England, though Anne was referred to as 'Queen of England, Scotland, 
France and Ireland'.470 A commission for councillors to serve as Commissioners 
executing the Office of Lord High Admiral in 1710, on the other hand, referred to 
Queen Anne 'of Great Britain'. The gentlemen and officers in question were named to 
execute the office of: 'Lord High Admiral of our Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and of the dominions, islands and territories respectively belonging, and of our high 
Admiral of New England, Jamaica, Virginia', and of various other territories.471 
This incomplete rationalization was also represented in the way that Royal Navy
warship names created associations with territories following Union. The first Royal 
Navy warship Edinburgh was a former Royal Scottish Navy vessel transferred in 1707 
and sunk as a breakwater in 1709. The name was reused in 1721 when the Warspite was
renamed.472 Also following the Union, the Scottish warship Royal Mary was brought 
into Royal Navy service as the Glasgow.473 In comparison, very few warships were 
named for the other territories under the crown outside of Great Britain. Exceptions 
included the Port Mahon, a sixth-rate launched in 1711, and the Jamaica, a sloop 
468 The exception to the group was the Centurion. Winfield, British Warships, 130-139.
469 J.D. Davies, Britannia's Dragon: A Naval History of Wales (Stroud, the History Press, 2013), 57-58. 
Winfield, British Warships, 132-33.
470 Warrant for Prince Lord High Admiral to wear the Standard of England when at Sea. NMM CAD A/3
f18.
471 Patent appointing Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral, 4 October 1712. 
NMM CAD A/3 f1
472 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 181. 83.
473 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 204.
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launched in 1714. These locations were important to the Admiralty even if they were 
associated with these very small warships that did not have the same symbolic weight of
the first and second-rate ships discussed above.  Indeed, in this period, there is evidence 
that the Admiralty was responsible for naming such smaller vessels.474 In this period, 
there was some evidence of the Admiralty being responsible for naming small vessels, 
especially smaller ones. During the reign of Queen Anne, Admiral George Churchill 
was responsible for renaming three second-rate warships to Marlborough, Blenheim, 
and Ramilies to honour his brother, the Duke of Marlborough.475 Yet this influence of an
individual member of the naval hierarchy should not be confused with the expression of
any sort of wider identity of the state. 
The definition of Royal Navy identity and the creation of associations with the 
monarchy and the nation following the Glorious Revolution reflected important changes
to the monarchy and to the state. This process was framed, adapted, and reinforced by 
the symbolic associations established by both Charles II and James II. Indeed, the 
naming of warships was an aspect of the Royal Navy where the monarchs retained at 
least strong symbolic associations, even as other aspects of the institution were 
increasingly integrated with the state. 
Socio-Professional Developments
The Glorious Revolution had a significant impact on the Royal Navy officer 
profession. Those who were loyal to James II departed with him or were dismissed from
the service. Dartmouth was imprisoned, while Strickland, Sir Williams Jennings, John 
Tyrwhitt and John Grimsditch were quickly dismissed on suspicion of being Roman 
Catholics. Patronage was an important part of regime change, because those who did 
474 Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 229, 205.
475 Davies, 'Saints and Soldiers'
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not get along with Admiral Herbert also left. By 1689, twelve percent of Royal Navy 
captains had left the service. The same number left the next year so that in 1690 
seventy-five percent of ships had Captains who had been commissioned under James II. 
Inevitably, for an officer to succeed, they needed to share the politics of their patrons, 
and this would shift political associations in the Royal Navy officer community.476 
The extended periods of warfare following the Glorious Revolution further 
stimulated the development of the Royal Navy's socio-professional definitions. These 
new developments were closely linked to wartime and peacetime circumstances, the 
transition between them, and the management of Royal Navy officers as a professional 
resource. From 1701, volunteers-per-order were only required to have acted as 
midshipmen for a year, rather than paid as such, in order to qualify for the lieutenants' 
exam.477 In 1703, the requirements changed again to four years at sea, with two years 
paid as a midshipman, but in 1710 this was modified so that three years' service as 
midshipman was again sufficient.478 Also in 1710, an order-in-council stipulated that 
since lieutenants commissioned after 1697 (the 'commencement of the war') were not 
eligible for half-pay when not employed, they could serve aboard warships as 
midshipman-extra. From 1713, volunteers-per-order, and midshipmen-extra were no 
longer to be carried as supernumeraries, but rather within the complement and were also
entitled to temporary canvas cabins.479 
The continued development of policies regarding the employment of masters is 
another example. In 1692, it was established that masters were to be carried aboard 
sixth-rate warships on voyages abroad. However, on 7 Feb 1697/8 the Admiralty 
ordered commanders of sixth-rate warships and fireships be commissioned as 'Master 
476 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 201.
477 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f98
478 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f99, Order-in-Council 12 May 1703, NMM CLU/5, f161
479 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f114
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and Commander', and those ships not to carry masters in addition.480 These two 
examples reflect the reality that professional development was not directional. As 
circumstances and needs changed, so did the Royal Navy's procedures. These changes 
reflect the moves made to adapt the existing socio-professional hierarchy and 
establishments to meet those circumstances. Importantly, these measures were entirely 
done using the Admiralty's authority, or orders-in-council, and so Parliament was not 
involved in these professional developments.
Following the Glorious Revolution, the Royal Navy continued to operate a large 
'Home Fleet', which worked in cooperation with the Dutch as shown at the Battles of 
Beachy Head, Barfleur and La Hogue. In addition, in 1694 a combined Anglo-Dutch 
fleet operated in the Mediterranean.481 However, the Royal Navy also built on the 
example of the long-term deployment to Tangiers. The fleet's expansion to a global 
sphere of operations was complicated by the development of operational patterns that 
involved multiple detachments, for example in the Mediterranean, and the Carribbean, 
and India. Each permanent detachment needed a senior officer, but unlike the fleets of 
the Anglo-Dutch Wars did not require the full spectrum of flag officers. For example, in 
1698 Benbow was deployed to the Caribbean as a rear-admiral, and when he returned in
1702 he was promoted to vice-admiral of the white482. In his fateful last action as vice-
admiral he had only seven ships under his command.483The creation of the rank of 
commodore meant that as many such officers could be commissioned to provide the 
required number of junior flag officers, without compromising the inherited structure of 
the fleet. 
480 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f121 
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 The development of the rank of commodore began with the practice of senior 
captains flying broad 'pennants of distinction'. In 1692, it was ordered that no captain 
could fly a 'pennant' without specific orders permitting them to do so, except in the 
Downs.484 In 1693, Captain Peregrine Osborne Lord Danby as commander of the Royal 
William flew such a pennant, and was junior to the flag officers, yet 'stood with' them. In
1695, a Captain Hubbard commanded a squadron in the Soundings and flew a broad 
pennant. In 1697, a Captain Norris was ordered to fly a broad pennant when he 
commanded in Newfoundland. He also had a captain under him aboard his ship.485 Like 
the ongoing definitions of the junior officer positions, the post of commodore resulted 
from ongoing pressures on the Royal Navy. Unlike them, it was not a formal post or 
rank, but specifically a temporary position. 
This period also featured continued professional differentiation of the Royal 
Navy from both the merchant marine, and from the Land Forces. In the previous 
chapter, it was mentioned how captains' orders in the 1670s consistently specifically 
forbade them to carry merchant goods. Following the Glorious Revolution, that 
proscription was then included in the General Instructions.486 This continued a process 
that had begun in the 1670s with both the restrictions on carrying merchant goods, but 
also the creation of officer qualifications that were both specific and internal to the 
Royal Navy. The officer profession developed symbiotically with the Royal Navy as an 
institution. It was more than simply the development of a military profession at sea, but 
one that reflected the stresses and responsibilities of the new Royal Navy. As such, the 
development of the Royal Navy officer profession did not represent the creation of 
some universal standard of naval officer but of a profession that fit alongside other 
English institutions. The symbiotic development of the Royal Navy officer profession 
484 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f17-18
485 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v7 f17 
486 'General Instructions' NMM CAD/A/16, f18.
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with the navy as an institution included the differentiation of the Royal Navy from the 
land forces.
Prior to 1685, it was not necessary to define the Navy as an entity different from 
the Land Forces. The way that regiments were raised, effectively as private military 
forces was not too terribly different from how ships/fleets were put into service during 
the Anglo-Dutch wars. This made it possible for individuals to have commissions for 
both land and sea. Further, the army was very small prior to the Glorious Revolution. In 
1686, James II had a larger army than had existed under his brother, but it only 
numbered 6,286.487 The estimate put forward for William III's army for 1691 included 
69,636 officers and men amongst regiments of foot, Dragoons and Horse. In 
comparison, the Navy's estimate called for 28,710 men for the Summer Fleet for eight 
months service, and 51,150 for the Winter Fleet for five months service. Of course, 
many individuals would serve in both the Summer and Winter fleet. The Estimate asked
for payment for a further 7,071 men for 'cruisers and convoys', for commerce protection
duties.488 These estimates provide a notion of the scale of the British armed forces 
immediately following the Glorious Revolution.
 The practice of officers holding commissions in both the Navy and Army was 
still sufficiently pervasive that the October 1693 treatise Details Proving the Negligence
of the Admiralty chastised the Navy and the state for the handling of the Naval War to 
that point. Amongst the primary complaints was that 
chiefly Land Officers who have places on shore, as most of the present 
Commanders have, Some are Colonells, others Governors, Commissioners 
of the Navy, Lords of the Admiralty, Captains of Companies, Lieutenants 
and Ensigns, in ye Guards and other Regiments, by which ye Kingdom is 
Detrimented two ways, once by their ignorance of the sea, the other by the 
487 J. Miller, 'Catholic Officers in the Later Stuart Army' 39. 
488 'House of Commons Journal Volume 10: 9 October 1690,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 10, 1688-1693, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 430-432. British History 
Online, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp430-432.
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neglect of their land employment, for they cannot be in two places at 
once.489 
Concurrent commissions like this in the army and the navy affected both forces, and 
they were particularly impractical when fighting occurred on land and at sea at the same
time. Such considerations encouraged greater differentiation of the Royal Navy, 
however, especially as personnel connections declined as the navy grew and fewer 
officers served in both.
The Marines provided another connection between the Royal Navy and the land 
forces. The creation of marine regiments during the reign of William III and Queen 
Mary placed soldiers aboard warships.490 The professional association between Royal 
Navy officers and warfare ashore was promoted by the appointment of some of them as 
Colonels of marine regiments (known as Blue Colonels). For example, John Lord 
Berkeley was appointed a Colonel of Marine when he was commissioned Admiral of 
the Blue in 1694.491 In 1696, Parliament legislated that 40,000 men was to be the 
maximum size of the Navy, and as a result that year's Establishment for the Regiments 
of Marines ordered the Marines to be considered part of that number.492 In 1699, three 
regiments of foot (commander by Colonels Seymour, Mordaunt and Dutton Colt) were 
transferred to the Marines, while the two existing marine regiments (commanded by the 
naval officer Sir Cloudesley Shovell and the Marquess of Carmarthen) were combined 
into a single regiment.493 This transfer demonstrated that there was at least some kind of 
recognized difference between the Navy and the land forces, in that the transferred 
regiments were not simply stationed aboard warships, but needed to become a Marine 
regiment in order to do so. Part of this difference at least was the financial responsibility
489 'Details Proving the Negligence of the Admiralty' NMM CAD D/20, the treatise is bound and the 
entire volume. 
490 'Marine Establishments' NMM CAD A/2 np.;
491 'Hardy's Navy List, 1673' NMRN, 3.
492 'Marine Establishments' NMM CAD A/2 np.;
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for them, as when they were transferred they were specifically placed on the naval 
estimates.494
The Marines did present an issue aboard ships when it came to discipline. The 
jurisdiction and courts-martial powers of Marine officers were associated with the 
regiment and therefore extended ashore, unlike Royal Navy officers whose remit was 
physically limited by the Articles of War. In 1694, however, the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General ruled that, notwithstanding that Marine officers received their 
commissions from the King, they were still subject to the Navy's Articles of War when 
aboard ship.495 Marine detachments in the fleet were not directly associated with the 
ship in the same way as seamen and officers were, but to the Regiment and the 
Regiment's account books.496 This may account for why the General Instructions in the 
1690s provided a mechanism for Marines to join the ships company, but no such 
measure for members of the ship's company to transfer to the Marine detachments.497 
Indeed in 1696, the Navy Board specifically mentioned the debts that  could arise in a 
discussion of individual marines becoming sailors.498 These measures also institutionally
differentiated the Navy from the Regiments of Marines.
 The Marines were also politically problematic, and in 1698, a request for money
for the Navy and a number of marine regiments was specifically rejected by Parliament,
although they provided funds for a greater number of sailors than had been  requested in
the estimates.499 Accordingly, in 1699 the marine regiments were disbanded.500 In 1701, 
six regiments of Marines were raised to a new Establishment, and placed under the 
command of the Land Forces, and they were paid not by the Treasurer for the Navy, but 
494 Ibid.
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496 Corbett Papers, NMRN, Mss 121 Vol 16, f66
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the Paymaster of the Forces.501 This was found to be impractical and on 23 March 
1702/3 they were put under the direct command of Prince George, the Lord High 
Admiral.502 At the same time, Brigadier Seymour's regiment was transferred to the 
Marines, and Colonel Mordaunt's regiment to the list of foot regiments. This did include
a transfer from the Army's estimates to the Navy's and vice-versa.503 This also required 
structural changes, as marine regiments were structured differently than Land Forces 
regiments.504 
The further development of the process for the training and qualification of 
junior officers, the creation of the rank of commodore, and the differentiation of the 
Navy from the Army and from the Marines were critical because they demonstrate the 
different ramifications of the processes begun prior to the Glorious Revolution, under 
the new pressures of war. Further, the repeated and frequent creation of establishments 
for marine regiments and their substitution for and with regiments of foot provides a 
very different perspective on institutional development, one based entirely on orders and
royal prerogative, rather than statutory definitions. As such, Parliament's only method 
for defining the Marines during this period was to provide or deny funding for them, as 
they did in 1699.
Establishments
Following the Glorious Revolution, the management of the Royal Navy's assets, 
such as the use of establishments, provides context for the professional development 
described above. In particular, peace-time establishments demonstrate management of 
501 "Minute Book: May 1702," in Calendar of Treasury Books, Volume 17, 1702, ed. William A Shaw 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), 28-38. British History Online, accessed March 18, 
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professional and material assets. During this period, the Royal Navy was dramatically 
expanded, from 173 ships displacing 101,892 tons in 1688, to 323 ships of over 160,000
tons in 1689.505
 In 1699, the Admiralty defined an aspect of the Establishment of Guardships, 
which brought together various things including personnel and finance. The order 
defined the relationship between the number of officers, and their servants on guard 
ships. For example, the captain was allowed two servants, the three lieutenants were 
each allowed one, as were the warrant officers and the midshipman-extra. However, the 
midshipmen were not permitted any.506 Another example was the General Instructions 
from 1699, which described the establishment for certain types of personnel aboard 
other warships. Labelled 'A Table of the Number of Inferiour officers allowed to His 
Majesty's Ships and Vessels in War and Peace, by the Establishment and Rules of the 
Navy now in Force' it supplied the theoretical number of berths for midshipmen, 
masters' mates, quartermasters' mates, and many other positions including corporal, 
trumpeter and captain's clerk for peacetime, and wartime. This was provided for ships of
the first through sixth rates, as well as smaller vessels such as 'Yachts and Bomb Vessels
of 40 Men' and 'Ketches of 50 Men'.507 
Likewise, the establishments for the marine regiments provided a framework for 
use in the creation and regulation of the material existence of those units. Like the 
Navy's establishments, they defined the personnel allowed for the unit, and other 
material and financial details. The establishment from 31 January 1688/89 created two 
marine regiments, of 15 companies each, with a strength of 8 sergeants, 8 corporals, 4 
drummers and 200 privates per company. Two years later, the strength per company was
halved. In July 1698, a further establishment created four regiments of 13 companies 
505 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, xx.
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each, again with the strength of the companies halved. In 1701, six regiments were 
raised to the former establishment. The 1703 establishment dictated that an officer who 
was acting as both Colonel of the Regiment and as Captain of a unit would be paid ten 
shillings per day, while each of the 700 private soldiers in the regiment were to be paid 
five shillings and eight pence a week. With only minor adjustments to the strengths of 
each company, the 1703 establishment remained in force until 1713 when the Marines 
were again disbanded.508 
These establishments provided a structure or framework with which consistent 
purchasing and management decisions could be made. They were an important tool for 
creating structural definitions for the Royal Navy, and they showed an active effort to 
rationalize the management of the Navy's assets. Further, the Establishments were 
devised by the Admiralty and the Navy Board, and so were created with their interests, 
rather than Parliament's, in mind. 
The continued development of the professional definitions and establishments 
shows that although the Admiralty and Navy Board were politically weak, there was 
still some continued development that was entirely on their behalf, and not implemented
by Parliament, even if this was in decline. 
Statutory Definitions
Following the Glorious Revolution, the use of statutes to define the Royal Navy 
focused on three issues: First were the geographic and operational limits which defined 
the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral; second was the relationship between the 
Royal Navy's legal processes and the English civilian judicial system; and the final 
focus was Parliament's assumption of some of the responsibilities of the Admiralty. The 
508 'Marine Establishments', Navy and Marine Orders, 1660- 1712 NMM CAD/A/2 Unfortunately, this 
section of the volume does not have page numbers.
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development of the Royal Navy's statutory definitions reflected the definitions 
contained within the original legislation, but also reflected the changed relationship 
between the monarch and Parliament. They served to supplement the Act for the 
Establishing Articles, and indeed to begin an incomplete integration of the Royal Navy 
with the state.  Parliament's direct definition of the Navy through statute in the 1690s is 
a reflection of a politically weak Admiralty and of opportunities with which it was 
presented.
In 1690, the first supplementary legislation was passed, An Act concerning the 
Commissioners of the Admiralty. The Act for the Establishing Articles had set the office 
of the Lord High Admiral as the Royal Navy's highest authority, and it was that office 
which had the power to hold courts-martial or to commission others to do so. Charles I 
had placed the Lord Admiral's office into a commission during the 1630s, and Charles II
did the same after 1673, and particularly from 1679-164.509 This act provided a means 
for Parliament to directly define the Navy and address the management void following 
Samuel Pepys's resignation as Admiralty Secretary in 1689.510
The Act concerning the Commissioners of the Admiralty was composed of three 
sections, the first of which included the main intent and explanation:
Whereas the Office of Lord High Admirall of England hath at sundry times 
and for severall yeares beene executed and all the Authorities to the same 
belonging exercised by diverse Commissioners for that purpose appointed 
by their Majestyes and the late Kings but of late some doubt hath risen 
whether certaine Authorities belonging to the said Office of Lord High 
Admirall did or doe of Right belong to and might may or ought to have 
beene or be exercised by such Com[m]issioners for the time being Now for 
avoiding all such Doubts and Questions Bee it declared and enacted by the 
King and Queens most excellent Majestyes by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in this present 
Parliament assembled and by the authoritie of the same That all and singular
Authorities Jurisdictions and Powers which by any Act of Parliament or 
509 J.D. Davies, 'Pepys and the Naval Commission 1679-1684' Historical Research, Vol. 67, No. 147
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Britain: Volume 4, Admiralty Officials 1660-1870, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-
holders/vol4/pp18-31
161
otherwise have beene and are lawfully vested setled and placed in the Lord 
High Admirall of England for the time being have alwayes appertained to 
and of right might have beene and may and shall be had enjoyed used 
exercised and executed by the Commissioners for executeing the Office of 
High Admirall of England for the time being according to their 
Commissions to all intents and purposes as if the said Co[m]issioners were 
Lord High Admirall of England.511
This was followed by a clause that clarified that the jurisdiction and authority defined in
An Act for the Establishing Articles was not altered, and by a third section which set out 
an oath to be taken prior to courts-martial.512 This legislation normalized and provided 
formal statutory approval of the practice Charles II had used at the end of his reign. The 
bill had been the focus of some discussion in Parliament, which demonstrates the 
important of the issue. After some debate in the Commons and the Lords and 
amendments and additions, the legislation simply normalized, and provided formal 
statutory approval of, the practice at the end of the reign of Charles II.
This act is an important indication of the closer integration of the Royal Navy's 
administration into the state. On 10 November 1691, Admiral Russell appeared in the 
House of Commons, on orders from the commissioners. The House of Commons then 
ordered the Commissioners should 'upon Saturday Morning next, [to] lay before this 
House the several Orders that have been issued to Admiral Russell, during the last 
Summer's Expedition,' and 'lay before this House, upon Saturday Morning next, a List 
of the Ships that have been lost or damaged since the Year 1688, and of the Captains 
Names of the same.'513 
This relationship is again shown on 11 January 1693, when the House of 
Commons debated 'Advice to the King' regarding the Commissioners for the Officer of 
511 'William and Mary, 1690: An Act concerning the Comissioners of the Admiralty. [Chapter II. Rot. 
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Lord High Admiral. It was moved that Parliament form a commission, which would be 
responsible for issuing orders to the fleet: 'Resolved, That his Majesty be humbly 
advised, That, for the future, all Orders for the Management of the Fleet do pass through
the Hands of the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of 
England'.514 This was a reflection of the conflict between the Commons and the Lords, 
with the House of Commons backing Russell and the Admiralty.
The passage of the Act did not result in the elimination of the office of Lord 
High Admiral as a working office, as shown by Queen Anne's appointment of her 
consort Prince George, and also the Earl of Pembroke.515 Procedures surrounding the 
office also continued to be refined. During the reign of Queen Anne, the office of Lord 
High Admiral was declared in Council, and Letters of Patent for the office were also 
issued to Prince George of Denmark.516 Beginning in the 1694, the Commissioners for 
execution of the Office of the Lord High Admiral covered not just England, but the 
Plantations as well.517 Other forms of the office included The Earl of Pembroke's 
appointment as Lord High Admiral of England, and Ireland in 1701.518 Further, after the 
union of 1707, it became the Office of the Lord High Admiral of Great Britain.519 
Following her consort's death, Queen Anne was to the first to hold the office, before 
appointing the Earl of Pembroke again.520 
That the office was held alternatively by an individual or by commission like 
this is an important example of the relationship between statutory and convention 
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definitions. The ability to put the office of Lord High Admiral into commission was a 
matter of royal prerogative; the King did not need Parliament's permission to do so. This
can be seen as Parliament's endorsement of that potential, which therefore became part 
of the definition of the institution. It is not a question of the relative merits of each 
approach, as the Earl of Pembroke was a 'weak' Lord High Admiral, and the various 
commissions following the Glorious Revolution were similarly 'weak'. The placement 
of the office into commission certainly allowed for Parliament to have a greater say over
the Admiralty. However as the creation of the statutes described below will show, 
having that say did not require direct control of the Admiralty. The effectiveness of 
either format directly corresponded to the qualities of either the Lord High Admiral or 
the Commissioners. The creation of this act is less important for its actual content than 
for revealing parliament's active role in the creation of definitions for the Navy, and the 
assertion of its ability to continue to develop those definitions that Parliament had 
created following the Restoration.
In 1694, the Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall 
redefined the legal relationship between the Navy's and the State's judicial processes. 
The Act stated that after 24 June 1694, all actions that contravened the 1661 Articles of 
War could be 
prosecuted tryed and determined in theire Majesties Court of Kings 
Bench att Westminster or before Justices of Oyer and Terminer to be 
constituted by theire Majesties Comission which said Court or Courts are
hereby impowered to hold cognizance thereof by Informac[i]on or 
Indictment and to proceede upon heare try and determine the same 
according to the course of the Co[m]mon Lawe of this Realme.521
This act is a good example of what Rodger referred to as Parliament's 'vindictive' 
interference in the Royal Navy's development. This statutory definition was a reaction 
521 'William and Mary, 1694: An Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall [Chapter 
XXV Rot. Parl. pt. 5. nu. 5.],' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: 
Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 507, accessed January 9, 2015, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/p507a
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to the events following the Battle of Beachy Head. Admiral Lord Torrington had 
commanded the joint Anglo-Dutch fleet in that defeat, following which he was 
imprisoned in the Tower of London. He was also court-martialled, but was subsequently
acquitted.522 This bill was a reaction to circumstances, but it was also substantially 
different in purpose than the previous statutory definitions in that it sought to provide 
the state greater oversight over the Navy and its officers.
The bill was written by Paul Foley, MP, who was a member of the 'Country 
Whigs' and in opposition to the 'Court party' during this phase.523 On 18 January 1694, 
Foley was ordered to 'prepare and bring in' the bill, which upon review was passed 
without amendment by the House of Lords, and subjected to a few amendments in 
committee.524 The bill received Royal Assent on 23 April 1694, which provided two 
months for the Act to be distributed to the fleet before it took effect.525 This redefined 
the Royal Navy as subject to the Court of King's Bench, and allowed for charges to be 
brought against individuals who had committed offences even if the Royal Navy was 
unwilling to hold courts-martial. 
This act did not really bring the Navy into the civilian justice system, however. 
Rather, it allowed the Court of King's Bench to assert jurisdiction in the way that the 
Navy was expressly forbidden to do.
And be it further enacted That where any of the said offences shall be 
co[m]mitted out of this Realme in such case the same may be alledged and 
laid in any County within this Realme.526
522 Copies of papers relating to the court martial of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, TNA ADM 7/831
523 N. E. Key, 'Foley, Paul (1644/5–1699)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9787, accessed 9 Jan 
2015]
524 'House of Commons Journal Volume 11: 18 January 1694,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 11, 1693-1697 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1803), 62-63, accessed January 9, 
2015, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol11/pp62-63
525 'House of Commons Journal Volume 11: 23 April 1694,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 11, 1693-1697 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1803), 169-170, accessed January 9,
2015, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol11/pp169-170
526 'William and Mary, 1694: An Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall' in Statutes
of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/p507a
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These two sections created a possible conflict with the creation of two separate courts 
with jurisdiction over the same offences. However, these issues were also resolved. 
First, while the Court of King's Bench was given jurisdiction over offences committed 
at sea, this was limited to offences against the Articles of War. The matter of possible 
double jeopardy, was resolved through the final section of the act.
Provided alwaies That noe person who shall be tryed in a Court Martiall 
shall for the same offence be againe tryed by virtue of this Act nor shall any 
person tryed by virtue of this Act be for the same offence tryed againe by a 
Court Martiall.527
This section confirmed the separation of court systems, but it locked them into a unified
framework that ensured that conflicts between them would be minimal. 
Unlike the Act for Establishing Articles, but like the Mutiny Acts passed by 
William and Mary, the 1694 Act for Better Discipline included a sunset.
Provided alsoe that this Act shall continue in Force for Three yeares and 
from thence to the end of the next Session of Parliament528
It duly expired in July 1698, at the end of William and Mary's fourth parliament and was
not renewed. Indeed further integration of this type was not implemented until the 
1740s, as is discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. This act still did build upon the 
Act for the Establishing Articles in that it was a response to an established statutory 
definition. This action of Parliament asserting the state's authority not just over the 
creation of definitions for the Navy, but also particular aspects of its operation has to be 
considered along with other such statutory definitions created during this period.
Other acts were also created in which Parliament directly defined the Navy's 
operations, rather than its structural aspects. In 1694, Parliament passed the Act for 
granting to theire Majesties severall Rates and Duties upon Tunnage of Shipps and 




Advantages in the said Act mentioned to such Persons as shall voluntarily advance the 
summe of [£1,500,000] towards the carrying on the Warr against France. This is the act
that created the Bank of England, after the state was unable to raise funds from private 
lenders. It also continued precedent by levying taxes, as had been done in earlier 
legislation to fund the Navy and the war following the Glorious Revolution. The act did 
indeed specifically mention the Royal Navy, first addressing earlier funding 
appropriations, and then specifically setting funding aside for the payment of wages for 
the it and for the Marines.529
In these cases, the importance is not in the texts of the acts necessarily, but in the
existence of the acts themselves together with the earlier orders-in-council. During the 
reign of William III and Mary, a series of legislation actively defined the Royal Navy's 
operational duties and other featyres. Several times, these definitions were tied to 
financing. In 1694, the Act for granting to Their Majesties an Aid of Foure Shillings in 
the Pound for One yeare for carrying on a vigorous War against France was passed 
ehich required that:
for the better secureing the Trade of this Kingdom be it further enacted by 
the authority aforesaid That over and above the Ships of Warr for the Line of
Battle and for Convoys to remote parts att least Foure Ships of the third rate 
Sixteen Ships of the Fourth Rate Thirteen Ships of the fifth rate and Ten 
Ships of the Sixth Rate shall be from time to time directed and 
appointed...530
This instruction did not stand alone, as the next section specified that 
529 'William and Mary, 1694: An Act for granting to theire Majesties severall Rates and Duties upon 
Tunnage of Shipps and Vessells and upon Beere Ale and other Liquors for secureing certaine 
Recompenses and Advantages in the said Act mentioned to such Persons as shall voluntarily advance 
the summe of [£1,500,000] towards the carrying on the Warr against France:- [Chapter XX. Rot. Parl.
pt. 4. nu. 3.],' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record
Commission, 1819), 483-495, accessed November 18, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol6/pp483-495
530 'William and Mary, 1693: An Act for granting to Their Majesties an Aid of Foure Shillings in the 
Pound for One yeare for carrying on a vigorous War against France [Chapter I. Rot. Parl. pt. 1.],' in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 
1819), 426-442, accessed January 10, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol6/pp426-442
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Provided always and be it enacted That nothing in this Act contained shall 
restrain or be construed to restrain the Lord High Admiral of England or the 
Commissioners for executing the office of the Lord High Admiral of 
England for the time being from directing any of the Ships appointed by this
Act to be Cruisers to bee employed in the Line of Battle in cases of great 
necessity.531
So although Parliament was funding the Navy, and specifically defining some aspects of
its operations, and therefore at that time assuming part of the authority of the Admiralty 
to define the fleet's disposition, it was not attempting with this act to permanently seize 
that aspect of the Admiralty's authority.  The same year, these instructions were also 
addressed in the 1694 act addressed above creating the Bank of England. 
That for the better secureing the Trade of this Kingdome over and above the 
Shipps of Warr for the Line of Battell and for Convoys to remote parts att 
the least Four Shipps of the third-rate Sixteene Shipps of the Fourth Rate 
Thirteene Shipps of the fifth-rate and Tenne Ships of the Sixth Rate shall be 
from time to time directed and appointed by the Lord High Admirall of 
England or Co[m]missioners for executeing the said Office for the time 
being to such proper Stations as they shall deeme mete to cruise for 
secureing the Merchant Shipps in theire goeing out and returneing home532
However, this was not the full extent of the act. Having created such instructions for the 
Admiralty, Parliament required the Lord High Admiral or the Commissioners to report 
back:
That the Lord High Admirall of England or the Co[m]missioners for 
executeing the Office of Lord High Admirall of England for the time being 
shall and are hereby respectively required to exhibitt to the Co[m]mons...   
the Shipps by him or them respectively sett out in pursuance of the said 
recited Clause expressing therein the Names and Rates of the Ships sett out 
and the times when by him or them respectively ordered as alsoe the 
Stations to which they were directed and the Times how long they were 
continued att Sea in that Service533
This clearly demonstrates both the weakness of the office of the Lord High Admiral in 
this period, and Parliament's willingness to step and define the Navy. 
531 Ibid.
532 'William and Mary, 1694: An Act for granting to theire Majesties severall Rates and Duties' in 




In 1707, Parliament again actively and directly intervened to stipulate the Royal 
Navy's commerce protection deployments with An act for the better securing the Trade 
of This Kingdom by Convoys and Cruisers.
Over and above the Ships of War for the Line of Battle and for Convoys to 
remote parts at least forty three ships of War be imployed as Cruisers in 
Proper Stations vis. Six Ships of the third-rate, and Twenty Ships of the 
Fourth Rate and Thirteen Ships of the fifth-rate and Four ships of the Sixth 
rate...534
Further, it provided specific directions to the Admiralty on how those ships were to be 
managed, careened, and maintained. For example, crew from designated cruisers were 
not to be transferred to serve aboard other Royal Navy ships.535 Even when replicated 
instructions contained in the General Instructions, their inclusion in this act is 
noteworthy because they are the Admiralty's business even more so than setting 
deployments.
In 1707, the situation was somewhat different because Prince George was Lord 
High Admiral. However he too was politically weak and was not a member of the 
Cabinet.536 So although the organization of the Admiralty's senior leadership was 
different, the practical effect- Parliament creating definitions due to the Admiralty's lack
of leadership- was similar. Further, in 1713, even though the Earl of Strafford was 
First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of Cabinet, Queen Anne specifically 
delegated the authority to define deployments for 'Convoys and Cruisers' to 
Parliament.537 She was not involved in the creation of strategy as William III had been; 
this delegation of the Admiralty's authority to Parliament makes sense given the 
precedents established by the previous acts. One of the most important details of these 
pieces of legislation is their duration. In the cases of the tax legislation, they were to 
534 HMSO, Statutes of the Realm Vol 8. 1702-1707, 811
535 HMSO, Statutes of the Realm Vol 8. 1702-1707, 812-813
536 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 185. 
537 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 183.
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apply while it was in force. The final clause of the 1707 act specifically defined the act 
as '[continuing] during this war and no longer.'538 Parliament was not permanently 
defining this authority as theirs, much like Anne's later instruction was one of royal 
prerogative and could have been rescinded.
 
Statutes and Conventions Together
Parliament's creation of statutes to define the Navy did not only serve to 
temporarily use the Admiralty's authority; the redistribution of power amongst 
Parliament, the Admiralty and the Navy Board resulted in the creation of statutes and 
conventions that together created new frameworks for the Navy. These developments 
illustrate how all three actors worked to define different aspects of the Navy's attributes.
In December 1690, Parliament debated and voted to fund the building of 27 
warships. The Act for Granting to their Majesties severall Additional Duties of Excise 
upon Beere Ale and other Liquors for foure yeares..., directly built upon the 1677 Act 
for ... the speedy building Thirty Shipps of Warr, and contained specific language 
regarding tonnages:
And whereas the Encrease of the Navall Strength and Force of this 
Kingdome is one of the best and most effectuall means for carrying on the 
Warr against France and for maintaining the Honour and Safety of the 
Realme ... all Moneys to be collected levyed and paid by vertue of this Act 
shall be applyed to the uses following (that is to say) the Summe of five 
hundred and seventy thousand pounds part thereof shall be applyed and 
appropriated and is hereby appropriated for the Building and for the Guns 
Rigging and other Furnishing of seven and twenty Shipps of Warr whereof 
seventeene to be of the third-rate and to containe and measure eleven 
hundred Tuns or thereabouts and to carry eighty Guns apiece and ten to be 
of the fourth Rate and to containe and measure nine hundred Tuns or 
thereabout and to carry sixty Guns apiece.539
538 HMSO, Statutes of the Realm Vol 8. 1702-1707, 813.
539 'William and Mary, 1690: An Act for Granting to their Majesties severall Additional Duties of Excise 
upon Beere Ale and other Liquors for foure yeares from the time that an Act for doubling the Duty of 
Excise upon Beere Ale and other Liquors dureing the space of one yeare doth expire. [Chapter X. 
Rot. Parl. pt. 3. nu. 9.],' in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great 
Britain Record Commission, 1819), 238-243, accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/pp238-243
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In this act, Parliament continued to exercise authority that, under the terms of the 
definitions created in 1661, belonged to the Navy Board and the Admiralty, but also 
reflected the more complicated division of authority in 1677. 
 However, another precedent would take priority, that of the creation of the 
Establishments of Dimensions. This built on the existing Establishments and it also 
retrieved some of the authority for the Navy Board and Admiralty that Parliament had 
assumed in the 1677 and 1690 acts. On 7 January 1702 there was issued 'An Order-in-
Council... Establishing the Number of Men, & Guns for her Majestys Ships of War'.540 
This resulted in the further issue of An Establishment of Men and Guns for her Maties 
Several Ships from the First to the Sixth Rate Inclusive which underlines the 
standardization of the Royal Navy. Unlike the 1677 Establishment of Guns, which only 
addressed the thirty ships of the building program, the 1703 version addressed the main 
classifications of ships in service. The classifications were divided primarily by rate, 
and then within that rate by the number of guns. For example, the classification of fifth-
rate included ships with forty-two, thirty-six, thirty-two and twenty-eight guns.541 This 
was further altered in 1716, and the most important difference was that the classification
system was altered, to reflect the creation of the Establishment of Dimensions.542 
The Establishment of Dimensions was an important legacy of Prince George's 
tenure as Lord High Admiral, and they were first created in 1706. This establishment 
created a framework which was divided into tranches according to the number of guns 
carried, from 90 gun second rates, through several categories down to those ships of 50 
guns, and then of 40 and 30 guns. Within the 1706 Establishment of Dimensions, only 
the most significant measurements were specified, building on the specifications 
contained in the 1677 and 1690 statutes. First rates were not included, because they 
540 Order-in-Council, 7 Jan 1702. NMM CLU/5, f157
541 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v14, 139.
542 Corbett Papers NMRN Mss 121 v14, 149.
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were so very different from each other. For example, following the Restoration the 
Royal Sovereign (formerly Sovereign of the Seas), Royal Charles (formerly Naseby), 
and Royal James (formerly Richard) were all first-rates but had 102, 90 and 70 guns 
respectively.543 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Royal Navy first-rates all 
had approximately 100 guns, but were designed and built on an individual basis. 
 The 1677 and 1690 acts had been created in order to provide funding and 
authority to build new warships. In comparison, the Establishment of Dimensions like 
the Act for the Increase and Encouragement of Seamen provided a set of rules to use 
when were required. Specifically, these provided a framework for use in the building of 
new warships or rebuilding of existing warships, but the creation of the establishments 
or the amendments thereof were not supposed to trigger the building or rebuilding of 
ships to those dimensions. Further, the Establishment of Dimensions did not necessarily 
reflect the actual material state of the Navy's various warships, much less the 
consistency of design in any single category. The pace of rebuilds and regular 
amendments meant that the consistency was never fully achieved.
 The creation of theoretically permanent, conceptual standards for the Royal 
Navy's fleet was not intended to stifle the creativity of its naval architects, of course, but
rather to improve the material consistency of the fleet. Importantly, they also represent 
an area of authority which the Navy Board and Admiralty reclaimed from Parliament.   
Following the Glorious Revolution, Parliament also became much more 
involved in regulating the Royal Navy's financial assets. One aspect of this was the 
annual presentation of Estimates to Parliament, as has been mentioned above. Although 
superficially, the monarchs remained financially responsible for the navy (and military 
forces in general) that Parliament was financially responsible for military spending can 
be seen by the large number of tax statutes which voted funds to William III and Mary 
543 'The Settlement of the Navy at the Coming in of Charles the Second' NMM CLU/9, f5. 
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for the war effort. Parliament also had a direct role in defining both the Royal Navy and 
the land forces through the estimates, or budgets, which were presented to Parliament. 
For example, an Estimate from 23 March 1689 was read into Parliamentary Records on 
26 March.
Navy Office, 23 March 1688-9.
An ESTIMATE of the Charges of the Wages, Victuals, and Wear and Tear, 
for One Year, of Fifty Ships of War, of the Second, Third, Fourth Rates; 
Fifteen small Ships, and Eight Fire-ships, as by a List thereof apart, to be 
employed in the narrow Seas, and Mediterranean; and also of One Third, 
Nineteen Fourth, Two fifth-rates, and Two Fire-ships, for the Plantations and
Convoys; according to a Project thereof herewith presented...544
On the same day, the land forces had their estimate presented to Parliament, and again, 
in October of 1690, another navy estimate was presented to Parliament.
Then Sir Thomas Lee, one of the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
acquainted the House, That he had, by his Majesty's Order, an Estimate of 
the Navy for the Year ensuing, including the Ordnance, to present to the 
House: And he delivered the same in at the Clerk's Table: Where the same 
was read; and is as followeth;
An ESTIMATE for the Charge of the Navy for the Year 1691, and building 
some Ships; in which the Ordnance is concluded.
Men. Months.
Summer Fleet 28,710 for 8
Winter Fleet 51,150 5
Convoys and Cruisers, being, for various Months, reduced to 7,071 13
£. s. d.
Which, being reduced to Thirteen Months, amounts to 
Twenty-nine thousand and Twenty-six Men for that Time;
and, in Money, to
1,603,686. 10. -
Ordinary Charge of the Navy 100,000 - -
Building Three Third-rate Ships, Eight Fireships, Eight 
Ketches, and a Dock at Plymouth,
88,008 11 6
Total  1,791,695 1 6545
544 'House of Commons Journal Volume 10: 26 March 1689,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 10, 1688-1693, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 65-66. British History 
Online, accessed August 28, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp65-66.
545 'House of Commons Journal Volume 10: 9 October 1690,' in Journal of the House of Commons: 
Volume 10, 1688-1693, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), 430-432. British History 
Online, accessed August 24, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp430-432.
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The Estimates built on the precedent of the 1677 Act for the Speedy Building by 
providing more details to Parliament as to specifically where the money was to be spent.
The use of these estimates provided direct ways in which the Parliament could 
contribute to definitions for the Navy, although the Estimates rarely reflected actual 
spending. One example of that was the 1699 Estimates where parliament rejected 
funding for Marines and instead voted for additional funding for Sailors instead.546
Members of the Royal Navy officer profession were increasingly treated as 
assets like warships, to be individually or collectively laid up when not actively 
employed. While previously the Navy Board's care for warships not in service provided 
a physical aspect of institutional permanence, in this period, statutory definitions and 
conventions were used together in order to manage the officers as assets. The systematic
expansion of these measures also provided an enduring mechanism for professional 
identity to continue to exist even when officers or sailors were not actively employed.
The land forces and Navy were considered together for the purpose of providing 
funds to the Monarchs, through various Taxes acts, which for example supported the 
'vigorous prosecution of war against France'.547 However, estimates for the Royal Navy 
and army were presented to Parliament separately.548 Other acts, such as the Acts For 
the Encouragement of Seamen of 1695 and 1696, which legislated that seamen and 
officers should be registered for future service in the Navy, did not address the land 
forces at all.549
546 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 183.
547 'William and Mary, 1691: An Act for Granting an Aid to Their Majesties of the Sum[m]e of Sixteene 
hundred fifty one thousand seven hundred and two pounds eighteen shillings towards the Carrying on
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The 'convention' part of this aspect of financial planning was the systematic 
implementation of half-pay. The precedents for half-pay had been established under 
Charles II. This was effectively limited to the most senior officers. From 1690, half-pay 
was re-established. This provided the foundation for an enduring mechanism for 
managing Royal Navy officers as assets in both wartime and peacetime. It was also 
critical for the creation of socio-professional permanence and therefore also contributed 
to socio-professional differentiation.
In December 1690, a further order-in-council expanded pensions for officers550 
Finally in 1693, another order-in-council 'settled half-pay to sea officers in time of 
Peace'. This document not only awarded half-pay to sea officers, which would include 
Flag officers, Captains, Commanders and Lieutenants, but also ordered that half-pay 
would be part of the Navy's ordinary estimate, that is to say its annual budget.551 In 
1700, another order-in-council expanded upon half-pay by further defining the 
regulations, and expanding upon the purpose of the practice.552 This was to place limits 
on the numbers of officers who could qualify for half-pay, and accordingly it included 
further regulations. For example, officers would be ineligible for half-pay if, after 
leaving the Navy, they signed aboard merchant vessels, making them unavailable to 
serve. Also, officers with 'Public Employment' were ineligible.553 In March 1705, half-
pay was expanded again, to the lieutenants of the largest ships for the times when 
unemployed, subject to the same requirements as the earlier order.554 These orders were 
replaced in 1713, and that establishment of half-pay expanded on again in 1715.555
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol7/pp257-259
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The statutory aspects of these developments were the The Act for the Increase 
and Encouragement of Seamen from the Parliamentary session 1695/96 and the next 
year's Act to enforce the Act for the Encrease and Encouragement of Seamen. The 
preamble for the former act states:
Forasmuch as the Strength and Safety of this and other His Majesties 
Realmes and Dominions doe very much depend upon the furnishing and 
supplying of His Majesties Royall Navy with a competent number of able 
Mariners and Seamen which may bee in a Readinesse att all tymes for that 
Service.556
These acts, like other legislation that affected the Royal Navy, but unlike the Mutiny 
Acts, worked so that the later act supplemented and reinforced the former, rather than 
supplanting it. The fourth section of the earlier act defined the maximum number of the 
sailors that could be registered and the framework for doing so:
And bee itt further enacted by the Authority aforesaid That in every or any 
Yeare computeing the Yeare to beginne from the First day of January 
dureing which the whole Number of registred Seamen there alive or in 
being shall not exceed Thirty thousand and every such Seaman entred 
registred as aforesaid shall have paid and allowed to him from His Majesty 
His Heires and Successors (whether hee bee in actuall Service or not).557
 It also specifically defined the retainer to be paid as forty shillings a year, of which 
sixpence was to be deducted monthly, to be paid to Greenwich Hospital to which those 
so registered had priority access.558 The same year, the connection to the hospital was 
reflected in an order from the 'Commissioners Executing the Office of Lord High 
Admiral' who directed the Treasurer of the Hospital to receive those funds.559 The latter 
act provided clarifications on the former, including the eligibility of those over the age 
556 'William III, 1695-6: An Act for the Increase and Encouragement of Seamen' in Statutes of the 
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of fifty, a process for those who did not live within reasonable distance of a justice of 
the peace, and provisions for Quakers.560
The development of half-pay was clearly influenced by the changes between 
peacetime and wartime in two ways. First, with the transition from pensions to half-pay,
the payments shifted from rewards for past service to retainers for future service. 
Second, the expansions and developments of the half-pay establishments and practices 
were closely tied to the transition between war and peace. For example, in 1700 the 
Treaty of London was signed, an attempt to minimize tensions over the Spanish 
Succession. The 1713 establishment for half-pay then followed the end of the War of the
Spanish Succession. The developments of the half-pay regulations were a careful 
balance between retaining sufficient numbers of officers for future service and limiting 
expense through the implementation of restrictions. On the one hand, the development 
of the 'half-pay' framework was an embodiment of the new Royal Navy. The constant 
replacement of the 'half-pay' establishments was also completely consistent with the 
Westminster Model's process of situational replacement.
The two schemes were of two completely different scales, because thirty 
thousand men were far larger than the number of officers on half-pay. In the half-pay 
establishment of 1700, it was limited to ten officers under the category of flag officers, 
fifty captains, one hundred lieutenants, and fifty masters.561 While half-pay would 
become an integral part of the Royal Navy officer profession, the registration of seamen
was not a success, and the program was discontinued and replaced by other legislation, 
for example the Recruiting Act of 1703 which provided for the press for the Army and 
the Marines. Specifically for the Navy, the 1705 Act for the Encouragement and 
560 'William III, 1696-7: An Act to enforce the Act for the Encrease and Encouragement of Seamen' in 
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol7/pp257-259
561 Order-in-Council, 18 April 1700. CLU/5 f134. 
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Encrease of Seamen and for the better and speedier Manning Her Majesties Fleet 
essentially abandoned the registration of seamen in favour of the permission of forced 
enlistment in essentially the same manner as the 1703 Recruitment Act created for the 
land forces.562 Given the requirement to provide manpower for the Navy, Marines and 
land forces, the act also provided guidelines for how the different requirements should 
interact. 
AND for the better Encrease of Seamen and supplying the Want of them it is
hereby further enacted by the Authority aforesaid That all and every the 
Powers Authorities Directions Clauses Matters and Things contained or to 
be contained in any Act of this Session of Parliament for recruiting Her 
Majesties land forces and Marines for the Year One thousand seven hundred
and six shall and may be executed practiced and put in Ure for supplying 
Her Majesties Navy with able bodied Landmen being such Persons as are 
liable to be raised for Land Service by such other Act and Her Majesties 
Service in raising such able bodied Landmen shall and may be performed 
and carried on by such Justices Magistrates and other Persons and in such 
Manner and Form (the reading of any Articles of War excepted) and under 
such Rules and Restrictions as are or shall be prescribed by such Act for the 
Land Service563
This extrapolated on an existing act to legally extend the press as a means to crew Royal
Navy ships. However, it was an act that was developed from a statute that related to the 
Army and Marines, rather than the previous legislation for the registration of seamen. In
this case, these definitions provided a coherence through the provision of a ready 
reserve from which to draw relatively consistent crews. It is interesting that half-pay as 
a practice was retained, given that Royal Navy officers were qualified through a process
that was designed to create specifically Royal Navy officers, while for ratings the 
professional knowledge was not so specific that individuals and institutional experience 
had to be retained through a similar system.
In hindsight, it is clear that the registration of seamen and establishment of half-
pay implemented socio-professional permanence by establishing mechanisms that 
562 'Statutes of the Realm Vol 8. 1702-1707', Hein Online, 468.
563 'Statutes of the Realm Vol 8. 1702-1707', Hein Online, 470.
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maintained individual officers' professional existence between phases of active 
employment. They were not a response to the end of the hostilities, in order to maintain 
ties to personnel as preparation for current and future conflicts. Rather, they were 
created in wartime in an attempt to ensure that officers and seamen would be available 
for future employment, even if they were not required at any given moment. These 
measures were not the implementation of a planned development of a permanent naval 
institution, but were developed as solutions to contemporary and specific institutional, 
financial and operational problems. The cooperation of the royal authority and 
parliamentary action to define the Royal Navy was markedly different than the 
combative interactions described in the previous chapter. These solutions were made 
possible because of Parliament's increased role in directly defining the Royal Navy 
particularly in the 1690s. Further, the creation of both the Establishments for Half-Pay 
and the Acts for Encouragement and Encrease represents a rational, deliberate approach
to the problem of managing the Royal Navy's manpower resources, in that both the 
ratings and officers were addressed. This is similar to the approach taken with the 
creation of the Establishment of Dimensions, but also dissimilar to the development of 
professional definitions discussed both earlier in this chapter and in previous chapters.
Conclusion
The examination of the definitions created for the Royal Navy in this period has 
provided another perspective on the effects of the Glorious Revolution on the Navy, 
particularly the ineffectiveness and instability of the naval administration after 1688. At 
this time, things drastically shifted for both the development of the English state and for
the Royal Navy. Parliament acted to define both, and to build on their authority to do so.
No longer was the Navy a point of conflict between King and Parliament, and the nature
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of the relationship between the Navy and those who had the power to define it changed 
substantially. The most important change to the Royal Navy's development in this 
period was that the Admiralty in particular was relatively politically weak until the 
Hanoverian Succession, which provided an opportunity for Parliament to take a greater 
role in directly defining the Royal Navy through statute. These new statutes both built 
on established foundations and created new precedents for executing the Admiralty's 
authority, especially the deployment of ships. However, this should not be considered as
a victory for Parliament over naval administration by royal prerogative. Rather it 
stepped in when it perceived that the Lord High Admiral, Admiralty Commission or 
Board of Admiralty was incapable of performing its established duties. Further, the 
Navy Board and Admiralty did not entirely relinquish their authority to define the Navy,
as shown by the creation of the Establishments for Dimension, the further development 
of procedures for professionally qualifying junior officers and the creation of the rank of
commodore.  This radically different relationship between Parliament and the Admiralty
is best illustrated by the roughly concurrent creation of the Establishments for Half-Pay 
and the Acts for the Encouragement and Encrease. These rational efforts to manage the 
Royal Navy's resources built on the policies Charles II had created to reward loyal 
officers, but the purpose and the methodology were dramatically different in that 
Parliament and the Admiralty effectively worked together on similar aspects of the 
Navy's definitions, where previously the King (through the Navy Board and the 
Admiralty) and Parliament had effectively defined different areas of the institution, with
conflict where they overlapped, specifically the creation of restrictions on the King's use
of royal prerogative to choose his officers. At the end of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, the Royal Navy's existence was much more more complicated than it had 
been before. There were new definitions which created professional permanence for 
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officers, and new frameworks for managing the Navy's financial, material and personnel
resources. The next chapter examines how the Hanoverian Succession, and a quarter-
century of peacetime further influenced the Royal Navy's development.
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CHAPTER 4: THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION TO WALPOLE'S RESIGNATION
In September 1714, the as-yet-uncrowned George I alighted in Greenwich, and 
ushered in a new age for the United Kingdom. This was a time of tumultuous change; 
the Treaty of Utrecht marking the end of the War of the Spanish Succession the previous
year had ended twenty-five years of mostly continuous warfare for England. The death 
of Queen Anne resulted in the transfer of the monarchy to the House of Hanover, her 
closest protestant relatives. In September 1715, nearly a year later, Louis XIV of France 
died and was succeeded by the five-year-old Louis XV. The stage was set for substantial
transformations for both the British state and the Royal Navy.
The greatest hazard for considering the Royal Navy and the state's development 
in the Westminster Model during this period would be to think in terms of 'advances'. 
Yes, this was the period in which certain attributes of the modern conception of the 
'Westminster Model' state were created, or rather the aesthetic or visual arrangement of 
such a state were created, for example the development of the office of Prime Minister. 
Likewise, a similar narrative could be created for the Navy. The definitions examined in
the last chapter underscored that the Admiralty in particular did not have the same 
'strength' as it had during the reigns of Charles II and James II, resulting in Parliament 
taking a more direct role in defining the Navy. Daniel Baugh and N.A.M. Rodger both 
argue that following the Hanoverian succession this dramatically changed. For example 
Baugh refers to the 'rise of the Board of Admiralty', while Rodger argues that 'The 
British Admiralty... achieved in the Walpole years the stability which had so eluded it'.564
This chapter examines the period from the Hanoverian Succession to about 
1742, when Robert Walpole resigned as 'Prime Minister', although many patterns 
564 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 17.  Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 294.
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continued after this date. The Hanoverian Succession, however, was a critical point in 
the state's development, and is reflected with significant changes in the Navy's 
administration. The foundations for the Navy's development in this period were laid for 
the Navy's administration at the end of Queen Anne's reign, when the First Lord of the 
Admiralty specifically became a member of the Cabinet. The new forms of 
administration inherited rational frameworks for the management of the Royal Navy's 
resources. However these frameworks had not been created for a peacetime navy that 
would often be needed in the eighteenth century. Further, the Navy's ability to manage 
its resources was stretched as the Royal Navy extended its peacetime presence to the 
Caribbean. 
The Royal Navy's development in the 'Westminster Model' at this time had 
several major strands. First, the Board of Admiralty was more powerful, politically 
connected and therefore took the lead in defining the Royal Navy, while Parliament's 
use of statute to directly define the Navy was much more limited. Second, the 
frameworks established during the period 1688-1714 were directly built upon, although 
frequently in a piecemeal fashion. Third, there were also deliberate efforts to continue to
centralize and standardize, which is particularly important because the Royal Navy's 




The relative peace that followed the Hanoverian Succession can seem 
anticlimactic, considering, Britain's increasingly direct participation in European wars. 
However, this would be a misunderstanding of the period, as Jeremy Blacks' studies on 
British foreign policy in the 1720s and 1730s demonstrates.565 In his consideration of 
565 See Jeremy Black, George II: Puppet of the Politicians? (Liverpool University Press, 2007)
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Great Britain's foreign policy during the 1720s, Black describes a 'politics of frustration,
despair and anger', resulting from the interventionists' structuralist approach to the 
policy of others states, which helps to explain the contrast between the ostensibly 
rational and consistent formulation of Britain's role in the international system, and its 
incoherent response to situations in which other states did not act as expected.566
This period was also critical to the state's development in the Westminster 
Model, as some of the features of such a state emerged. One was the development of the
'Opposition'. In 1717, at the baptism of his second son, the Prince of Wales insulted the 
Lord Chamberlain the Duke of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. As an extension of this conflict, 
he established a second, rival 'court' at Leicester House. This provided a location to 
congregate for those Whigs who opposed George I's ministers, leading to what has been
called the'Whig Split'.567 With the Tories excluded from government, this splintering of 
the Whigs was a defining aspect of eighteenth-century politics and would prove central 
to the Royal Navy's development even following Walpole's resignation in 1742 (as is 
examined in the next chapter).
This period also featured the creation of the office of prime minister, largely in 
response to Georges I and II's time in Hanover. The Hanoverian monarchs were not 
figureheads; George I and George II did spend much time in Hanover, but according to 
E.A. Smith, 
they retained, and exercised, considerable power over policy and the 
composition of their ministries. Even Sir Robert Walpole, who was the 
leading minister for twenty-one years, depended for his security in office on 
the King's continuing confidence in his ability and on his own skill in 
cultivating and retaining that confidence.568 
566 Black, 'Interventionism, Structuralism and Contingency in British Foreign Policy in the 1720s' The 
International History Review, Vol. 26 No. 4 (December, 2004) 743.
567 Black, George II, 45-52.
568 E.A. Smith, "The King's Servant's" In George IV, 205-15. (Yale University Press, 1999.) 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4c6g.23.
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Robert Walpole is considered to be Great Britain's first Prime Minister. He had been 
involved in Government from the Succession, becoming Paymaster of the Forces in 
1714, and Commissioner of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1715. In 
1717, he resigned from the Cabinet and joined the 'opposition', where he became close 
to the Prince of Wales's wife Caroline. He also helped to ease the conflict between the 
King and the Prince.569 On 3 April 1721, following the South Sea Bubble and the crisis 
that followed, Walpole was reappointed First Lord of the Treasury, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Leader of the House of Commons. Walpole simultaneously held three of
the most powerful offices in the Cabinet, and he had the monarch's backing.  It was 
from that point that he began to create what would become the role of 'Prime 
Minister'.570
There were some statute statements of state development.  The 'Act for enlarging
the Time of Continuance of Parliaments', or Septennial Act of 1715/16 redefined the 
British state by requiring general elections to be held only every seven years. This 
statute was in response to the political instability that had resulted from the Meeting of 
Parliament Act of 1694, which required that general elections be held every three 
years.571 This act was created as a reaction to the repercussions of the earlier statute, and
did provide the basis for the foundation of stable ministries of longer duration.
569 'Walpole, Robert, first earl of Orford (1676–1745),' Stephen Taylor in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. David 
Cannadine, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28601 (accessed May 1, 2017).
570 'Treasurers and Commissioners of the Treasury 1660-1870,' in Office-Holders in Modern Britain: 
Volume 1, Treasury Officials 1660-1870, ed. J C Sainty (London: University of London, 1972), 16-
25. British History Online, accessed October 11, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-
holders/vol1/pp16-25. And "Chancellor of the Exchequer 1660-1870," in Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 1, Treasury Officials 1660-1870, ed. J C Sainty (London: University of London, 
1972), 26-28. British History Online, accessed October 12, 2016, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol1/pp26-28.
571 Cruickshanks, Handeley & Hayton Eds. The history of parliament: the House of Commons, 1690–
1715
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The second major statute that defined the British state was the Regency During 
the King's Absence Act 1728.572 This built on the precedent of the Act for the Absence of 
King William, which had put the government under the control of Queen Mary while 
William III led his armies.573 This new act provided a statutory definition for procedure 
to deal with George II's absences. The Queen was appointed as regent, but as Jeremy 
Black has noted, it was largely the Ministers who were responsible for government 
including foreign policy.574
That the ministers exercised authority and governed, despite what was contained
in the statute, demonstrates the importance of the developed convention. Further, 
Walpole could not have had such a lengthy tenure as Prime Minister, especially during 
the King's absences, without the direct support of both George I and II, as illustrated in 
1733 during the 'Excise Crisis' which threatened his ministry.575
This was also a period when the British state realigned itself in terms of foreign 
policy and international rivals. England's wars, each a decade apart (the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance, the Anglo-Spanish War of 1726/27, and then the War of Jenkins 
Ear from 1739) were fought against Spain, not France, although the latter spilled into 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1747). Walpole's approach was 'politics of 
reasonableness, rather than righteousness', although the willingness to use, or to threaten
to use the Royal Navy (as Britain repeatedly did from 1726 to 1730) does strongly 
support the notion of an interventionist government, albeit one focused on Foreign 
572 '1729: 2 George 2 c.27: The Regency Act' The Statutes Project, http://statutes.org.uk/site/the-
statutes/eighteenth-century/1729-2-george-2-c27-regency-act/ Accessed 15 April, 2017
573 "William and Mary, 1689: An Act for the Exercise of the Government by her Majestie dureing his 
Majestyes Absence. [Chapter VI. Rot. Parl. pt. 1. nu. 8.]," in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-
94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 170. British History Online, 
accessed May 2, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/p170.
574 Black, 'Interventionism, Structuralism and Contingency in British Foreign Policy in the 1720s' 743.
575 Black, George II, 140.
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Policy, rather than domestically as it had been during following the Glorious 
Revolution.576 
The Navy
As a result of ongoing tensions with, there was a discernible 'Caribbean Pivot' in 
British foreign policy. This placed far different peacetime requirements and pressures on
the Royal Navy than had the Tangiers deployments of the 1670s and 1680s. This period 
directly laid the groundwork for the Royal Navy's increasingly global operations in the 
remainder of the eighteenth century, as has been appreciated by several naval historians.
Jeremy Black argued that 'the effort made in 1726 and 1729 to protect Britain's position 
overseas by deploying its naval strength helped to make such actions normative'.577 
Christian Buchet placed the Royal Navy's operations during this period into the context 
of the period from the Glorious Revolution to the end of the Seven Years War (1756-
1763). He identified three main points: first, the development of deployment rotations 
from Great Britain to the Caribbean; second, the use of New England for resources;  and
finally, the extensions of the Navy Board and naval administration to the Caribbean 
bases.578 Duncan Crewe also emphasizes the importance of this period for the 
development of in-situ experience and contacts for the Royal Navy's later Caribbean 
operations after 1739. However, he makes these points in order to ask why the Royal 
Navy continued to be unable to solve problems such as disease and Teredo worm 
despite their gained experience.579 Richard Harding has likewise argued that 'The British
576 Black, 'Interventionism, Structuralism and Contingency in British Foreign Policy in the 1720s' 743. 
577 Black, 'Interventionism, Structuralism and Contingency in British Foreign Policy in the 1720s' 735.
578 Christian Buchet 'Les Modalité de la Logistique Anglaise en Matériel Naval dan L'espace Caraibe 
(1689-1763)' Histoire, Économie et Société, Vol 11, No. 4 (4e trimestre 1992), pp 571-596
579 Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-
1748 (Liverpool University Press, 2003). 297-8.
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were showing that sustainable global naval power was becoming a reality for 
Europeans. It was based on investment in infrastructure.'580
Consider for a moment Jeremy Black's observation regarding, on the one hand, 
rational creation of foreign policy and on the other hand incoherent reactions to the 
actions of foreign states.581 For some aspects of the creation of the Royal Navy's 
definitions, there was clearly a rational and coherent effort to apply specific changes. 
This is most evident in how the House of Hanover insinuated itself into the relationship 
that it inherited between the crown and the Navy by following established precedents in 
terms of expressions of the Royal Navy's identity. Another example is the rationalization
of the diverse Instructions into the Regulations and Instructions.
The Royal Navy's extended peacetime experience provided challenges to the 
foreign states that the Ministers had to deal with. For much of 1715-1740, the Royal 
Navy sent to sea and employed many fewer ships and officers than they would during 
nominal wartime. However the Royal Navy remained active. In addition to the major 
deployment of 1726, and the fleet raised in 1729, there were standing forces deployed to
the Caribbean, under the command of various Commodores.582 These operations placed 
very different stresses on the Royal Navy, which was a much more substantial 
organization than it had been during the extended periods of peacetime during the reign 
of Charles II. Further, the creation of professional permanence such as half-pay and 
seniority lists created lasting repercussions and problems for managing the Royal 
Navy's officer corps that required reactive, and often subsequently contradictory 
developments when solutions did not prove adequate. Indeed, there are expressions of 
frustration, as will be shown below. The discussion of developments to the 
580 Richard Harding, Modern Naval History: Debates and Prospects (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2016) 
87.
581 Black, 'Interventionism, Structuralism and Contingency in British Foreign Policy in the 1720s', 743.
582 In 1729, The Royal Navy created a fleet (alongside some Dutch ships) to intimidate the Spanish into 
signing a treaty to end the Anglo-Spanish War. Sarah Kinkel, 'The King's Pirates? Naval Enforcement
of Imperial Authority, 1740-46', The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol 71, No. 1 (Jan 2014), 13-14. 
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Establishments, for managing the Royal Navy officers as a resource, the expansion of 
Dockyards abroad and the differentiation of the Navy from the Army will provide a 
different perspective from the rational developments described above.
There were far fewer statutory definitions for the Royal Navy created between 
1715 and 1740. Those that were created did not build upon the interventionist statutes 
created by Parliament in the 1690s, and marked a return to Parliament's role in defining 
the Royal Navy from the foundations created at the Restoration. This near-total absence 
of statutory definitions from this period highlights the changes made to the Royal 
Navy's administration.
The Naval Administration
The transition of the naval administration following the Hanoverian Succession 
was as substantial as the transition following the Glorious Revolution, and the 
Admiralty in particular regained much authority and accordingly had a much more 
direct role in defining the Navy after 1715. Where previously the position of First Lord 
of the Admiralty had been appointed for political purposes, which resulted in those such
as the Earl of Pembroke serving, after the Hanoverian Succession the Board of 
Admiralty included members with substantial naval experience. This included the Earl 
of Orford's final tenure as First Lord from 1714-1717. His successor, Vice-Admiral 
James Berkeley was First Lord from 1717-1727, and had to deal with longer-term 
problems. He did not join the Royal Navy until the 1690s, and so his previous 
experience of peacetime was as a junior officer.583 
583 'Berkeley, James, third earl of Berkeley (1680–1736),' John B. Hattendorf in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., 
ed. David Cannadine, May 2009, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2216 (accessed May 1, 
2017). 
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The rise and permanence of the Board of Admiralty, that developed in this 
period, tied the Royal Navy very directly to state development. Daniel Baugh has 
argued, in respect to the relationship between the Navy Board and the Admiralty Board, 
that 
...there was a subtle change in the relationship of the two boards. To speak 
of "the rise of the Board of Admiralty" during the early Eighteenth century 
may be too dramatic, but there is ample evidence of the Admiralty's 
increased role in administration. One reason was the enlargement of the 
activities that had always been the business of the Secretary and clerks of 
the Admiralty Office. Another was the firmer lines of executive authority 
that were developing at this time.584
Thee 'rise of the Board of Admiralty' must be considered in the same vein as the 
creation of the office of Prime Minister. The Board was put in a position to have 
authority, and used that authority to define the Navy. Over time, that authority would 
become more and more solidified. Although the Royal Navy did not have the single 
leader to rival Walpole in his longevity, to have four leaders over twenty-five years is an
impressive feat of durability, albeit during a period of unmatched political stability. On 
the other hand, from 1705 to 1741 Josiah Burchett was the Admiralty Secretary. He had 
also served in that office (sometimes jointly) since 1694.585 This was an almost 
unmatched feat of civil service, and certainly puts Walpole's roughly contemporary, 
though later, service as Prime Minister in perspective. Second, the 'firmer lines of 
authority' reflect the reality that the Cabinet, the ministers, who had the Monarch's 
backing, drove the government. They chose and executed foreign policy. They 
threatened other nations with the Navy. The Admiralty and the Navy Board defined and 
managed the Navy in an effort to better provide the forces required by the Ministers in 
their decisions. This is reflected in the definitions created for the Navy. The reassertion 
584 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750 (The Navy Records Society, London: William Clowes & 
Son 1977) 1.
585 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 494.
190
of the Admiralty's authority provides important context for the interaction between the 
Admiralty and Parliament in the phase of development discussed in the next chapter.
Deliberate Actions and Definitions
Expressions of Royal Associations
It was important for the incoming Hanoverians to participate in the Royal Navy's
established tradition of naming warships and creating associations with the monarch and
crown. This was discussed in the previous chapters, but it is still important at this point 
for several reasons. First, repetition of the process restated or reinforced the importance 
of naming, or renaming warships in general, and those named for the monarch 
specifically. Second, whereas with Charles II at the Restoration, and William III and 
Mary II after the Glorious Revolution, it was necessary to rename warships with anti-
sacred symbology and actively reject old associations, the Hanoverians had a slightly 
different agenda. They needed to show that they were the true heirs, and as such needed 
to insinuate themselves into the extant symbology, rather than reset it. 
Again, the most important symbols were the ships directly named for the 
monarch. With the first and second Hanoverian monarchs having the same name, this 
was rather limited but still important. It was important to rename warships for George I, 
but at the same time considering the small number of appropriate ships (first-rates), care
needed to be taken with which symbol or connection would be displaced. The decision 
to change the names of the Stuart warships, rather than later ones suggests a need to 
maintain a link to their immediate predecessors, William and Mary, and Anne, and to 
take a different political tack than had happened at the Glorious Revolution. 
The first-rate Royal James had been renamed Victory in 1691, and the Royal 
Charles renamed Queen in 1693. These two first-rates now had the odd privilege of 
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being named the Royal George in quick succession. First, the Victory was renamed in 
1714, as the Queen was being rebuilt.586 When the latter was launched in September 
1715 she was renamed Royal George, and the ex-Royal James reverted to Victory. 
These were deliberate and was one implementation of the Hanoverian Succession. An 
important legacy of Charles II's very important personal connection to the Navy was his
pattern of naming warships, and particularly third-rates, for members of his family 
including his illegitimate sons. This was not a practice that had been continued by 
James II, William III and Mary II, or Queen Anne. 
However, after the Hanoverian succession, the Royal Family once again had 
sufficient members to allow for a larger number of warships to be so named and to 
create more extensive connections between the Crown and the Royal Navy. Very soon, 
several ships were renamed for members of the Royal Family. First, the third-rate 
Expedition was renamed Prince Frederick in 1715.587 Another example, and one oft-
renamed was the second-rate Ossory, built in 1682 and named for one of Charles II's 
favourites. It was renamed from Prince to Princess in 1716, to recognize George I's 
daughter Princess Sophia Dorothea. She was later renamed Princess Royal in 1728 to 
honour George II's daughter Anne, who was given that title the previous year.588 
George II did not neglect any of his daughters. Three ships were named for 
Princess Louisa, the first of which was a fifth-rate ordered in 1726 and launched in 
1728.589 Following her loss in 1736, the 60 gun fourth-rate Swallow was so renamed 
after four years of service, although she was broken up in 1742.590 The final Princess 
Louisa was a 58 gun fourth-rate, built in 1744.591 Princess Mary, the youngest of George
II's daughters, did not have a ship renamed for her until 1744, when the 60 gun fourth-
586 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, Vol. 1, 165.
587 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 44. 
588 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 12.
589 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 167
590 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 120-21.
591 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792,  128.
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rate Mary was rebuilt.592 As a further example, a new 44 gun fifth-rate was named 
Prince Edward in 1744 for the younger son of the then Prince of Wales, Prince 
Frederick William.593 
Naming third-rates for members of the Royal Family allowed ships that 
embodied connections between them and the Royal Navy to continue to serve important
roles during the extensive periods of peace, when the first and second-rates were less 
frequently employed. For example, in 1726/27 Vice Admiral Francis Hosier's flagship in
the Caribbean was the third-rate Breda, rather than one of the larger ships.594 This 
pattern was continued following the succession of George II, when the 80 gun third-rate
Humber was renamed Princess Amelia after his daughter in 1727. From 1729 to 1731 
the Princess Amelia was flagship for Vice Admiral Sir George Walton, and from 1735-
1736 flagship for Vice Admiral John Balchen.595 In 1728, the 80 gun third-rate 
Ranelagh, while being rebuilt, was renamed Princess Caroline, for another of George 
II's daughters. The Princess Caroline would serve as a flagship for Sir Chaloner Ogle, 
Admiral Vernon, and Admiral Sir John Byng in the 1740s on three different 
deployments.596 
Over time, the Hanoverians continued to emphasize the connection between the 
crown and the Royal Navy by continuing to have ships named for members of the 
extended royal family, and especially the more active, smaller types of ships. Further, 
this demonstrates that the Hanoverians continued to follow, and reinforce the precedent 
of renaming ships that were being rebuilt or newly built. With each generation, the 
associations between the Royal Navy and the house of Hanover thus became stronger.
592 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 116.
593 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 172.
594 Winfield, British Warships 1603-1714, 74.
595 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 32.
596 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 31-32.
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The introduction of Hanoverian warship names did not necessarily require the 
removal of names associating the Navy with William III and Mary II, or Queen Anne. 
The first-rate Royal William, originally built in 1670 as the Prince, retained its name 
even after being rebuilt in 1719. Similarly, the first-rate Royal Anne, also built in 1670, 
retained her name until broken up in 1727.597 There are also other examples ships that 
retained their names and had not been named for the past monarchs. For example, the 
90 gun second-rate Namur (1697), named for William III's capture of that city, was 
rebuilt in 1729, but not renamed.598 Similarly, the second-rate Marlborough, renamed to 
honour the Duke, was rebuilt from 1725-1732, and retained her name.599 Another 
example was the Boyne, which retained its name even through its second rebuild, which 
was completed in May 1739. The Boyne would then serve with Venon's fleet in the War 
of Jenkin's Ear.600 The retention of a ship's name celebrating victories over the Jacobites 
is unsurprising, given that the Hanoverians also named warships for their own victories, 
such as the fourth-rate Salisbury (1698), which was renamed Preston in 1716, to 
celebrate the victory there over the Jacobites.601
These are rational and deliberate creations of definitions and identity. In each 
case, the ships named for Hanoverian monarchs, their families, and their victories had to
be renamed from something else. Another example of how the Hanoverians were 
inserted into the Royal Navy's expression of identity with the monarchs was in the firing
of salutes. Salutes fired to pay respects to the Monarch were particularly important, and 
demonstrated both Charles II's continued connection to the Royal Navy for decades 
following his death, while the associations made with other monarchs as individuals 
597 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 2.
598 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, Vol. 1, 167.
599 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, Vol. 1, 169.
600 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, Vol. 1, 170.
601 Winfield. British Warships 1603-1714, 128.
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was more transient. In 1731, the first edition of the Regulations and Instructions 
included as Article XXII in the section Of Salutes
The Anniversary Days of the Birth, Accession, and Coronation of the King, 
of the Birth of the Queen, of the Restoration of King Charles the Second, 
and of Gun-Powder-Treason, mail be solemnized by His Majesty's Ship, if 
they are in Port, with such a Number of Guns as the Chief Officer shall 
think proper, not exceeding Twenty one each Ship.602
The practice occurred alongside similar celebrations for the Hanoverian monarchs, and 
Royal Navy ships were required to fire salutes for monarchs' birthdays and other 
holidays, as well as also containing the instruction to celebrate the 'Happy Return'. This 
reinforced the connection between the navy and the current king.603  
For example, Lieutenant George Bayley's logs record include the following entry
for 29 May 1715: 'Att noon fired 15 guns it being King Charles Happy Return unto 
England'.604 The day before, the log included 'this morning spread our Colours it being 
the King's birth day & at noon fired a gun'. The Yarmouth was in the process of 
preparing for Channel service. The following year, it was 'att noon fired 21 guns it being
King Charles' Happy Return to England'.605 In 1717, there was no salute fired for the 
Restoration, but there was one on 28 May for George I's birthday. A subsequent log 
from a different Lieutenant reveals that when the Yarmouth was based at Plymouth in 
1721, the pattern continued with a salute fired for the Restoration.606 In 1723, following 
a salute on the 28th for the King's Birthday, it was reported that the next morning
all the ships in commission spread our extra colours again in 
commemoration of the restoration of the Royal Family & at noon fired 21 
guns.607 
This pattern continued following the death of George I and the succession of George II. 
The journal of Lt. Douglas shows in March 1734 that the Ipswich no longer celebrated 
602 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea (1731), 86.
603 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea (1731), 86.
604 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Yarmouth NMM, Adm/L/Y/3/4 np
605 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Yarmouth NMM, Adm/L/Y/3/4 np
606 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Yarmouth NMM, Adm/L/Y/3/4 np
607 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Yarmouth NMM, Adm/L/Y/3/4 np
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George I's birthday, but had begun to celebrate the birthday of Princess Caroline of 
Ansbach, George II's consort.608 However, following her death it was no longer 
celebrated, as shown by the log of Centurion in 1740.609 Again, these patterns continued
alongside the celebration of connections to Charles II, and Lt. Piercy Brett of HMS 
Gloucester recorded in 1739 that 'at 1 PM fired 15 guns, being the Restoration of HM. 
Charles ye 2nd'.610 Later, the logs of HMS Centurion record that on 28 May 1740 salutes 
were fired to celebrate the Restoration.611 
Just as with the naming of warships, the Hanoverians were inserted into these 
practices, and so strengthened their connection to the Navy at the same time as they 
asserted their belonging in the succession. The continued firing of salutes to celebrate 
Charles II and the Restoration was similar to the continued use of warship names from 
reign of William III.
However, not every form could accommodate both the current monarch and past 
monarchs. Commissions, for example were about direct connection between the 
Monarch and the individual commissioned. However, there was important continuity 
since much of the language remained similar from the 1680s through to the end of the 
period of this project. They did accommodate the succession, as is shown by the 
commissions of Lt. Thomas Miles and Admiral Arthur Herbert in 1689 which referred 
to 'their Majesties ship' and 'their Majesties survice'.612 These documents are very similar
in language and content to later commissions. In particular, they show strong 
similarities to Admiral Vernon's commission from 1730. The language specifically 
addressing the monarch did change, from 'Their Majesty' to 'His Majesty' from the reign
of William III and Mary II to George II. In 1749, Lieutenant Charles Loeffe's warrant to 
608 Journal of Sir James Douglas, 1734-36 NMM, DOU/1 np.
609 Lieutenant's lobgbooks for HMS Centurion NMM, ADM/L/C/83 np.
610 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Gloucester NMM, ADM/L/G/53 np
611 Lieutenant's lobgbooks for HMS Centurion NMM, ADM/L/C/83 np.
612 Commissions, NMM ADL/Q/20, ADL/Q/22
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serve as third Lieutenant of Plymouth referred to 'his Majesty's ship', 'his Majesty's 
service' and 'his Majesty's reign'.613  These documents did not only link the officers to a 
specific monarch, each commission created an instance of the practice that linked 
officers to the then current representative of the monarchy as an institution. The 
changing of the language in the commissions was, frankly, relatively minor, but it was 
part of a pattern of deliberate changes made to incorporate the Hanoverian monarchs 
into the expression of authority over the Royal Navy. These provide a context for the 
rather less deliberate, more reactive creation of definitions for some of the navy's other 
aspects.
The Regulations and Instructions
The 1731 Regulations and Instructions was an important development, and 
another deliberate action. It rationalized the diverse instructions which had been issued 
by the Lord High Admiral, by flag officers, and by the Admiralty. In effect, what had 
been published as the General Instructions in 1664 became just one section of the later, 
expanded Regulations and Instructions. 
A December 1730 memorandum to the King-in-Council described the decision 
to create the Regulations and Instructions:
May it please your Majesty,
The affairs of the navy, which your Majesty is pleased to commit to our 
management, having given us occasion to observe that the captains and 
other officers of your Majesty's ships are liable to fall into mistakes and 
omissions in the execution of their duty, by reason of the perplexity of their 
present instructions, occasioned by length of time; we have therefore 
thought it necessary for their better direction to collect into one volume the 
several rules and orders now in force in the navy, to which we have made 
such additions and alterations as (with the advice of the Navy, Victualling, 
and Ordnance Boards) we have judged proper. And having reduced the 
whole into distinct chapters, and under particular heads, that the officers 
concerned may have a more speedy and easy recourse to them, we do 
613 Royal Navy Records: commissions and appointments for sea officers granted by the Admiralty, 
Admirals and Captains, 1746 – 1793, NMM PLA/P/9/2
197
herewith humbly present the said book to your Majesty for your royal 
approbation, the intent of these instructions and regulations being to support
and improve the discipline and good economy of the navy.614
The expansion of the Instructions into the Regulations and Instructions was not an 
indiscriminate gathering of documents, but a carefully curated guide to service at sea. 
The Instructions were intended for commanders, lieutenants, victuallers, pursers and 
others. The Regulations and Instructions rationalized their instructions in a single 
document that would continue to function as the Navy's standing orders. This is the key 
example of rationalization and centralization of expectations, hand in hand with the 
practical expansion and decentralization of Royal Navy authority to the Caribbean and 
other places. 
Comparison between the early examples from 1663, and those of 1731 and 
1734, clearly demonstrates the expansion of the Royal Navy as a maritime military 
institution, and how the Royal Navy's shift from persistence to permanence enabled it to
define its scope-of-practice. In 1663 the document was relatively limited, and 
complemented the Articles of War. The General Instructions consisted of instructions to
the Captain or Commander, Instructions for the preservation of good order, an example 
of a Muster Book, as well as 'Instructions for the Vending of Slops'.615 By 1693, the 
General Instructions included instructions for Lieutenants.616 The 1731 Regulations and
Instructions reflected the internal expansion of the Royal Navy by defining the role of 
Commodore within fleets sent abroad, referring to 'broad pendants'.617 The same volume
included a section on the 'Appointment of Officers in Foreign Parts'.618 
A comment in a memorandum from the Navy Board to the Admiralty Secretary 
in November 1730 highlights the Royal Navy's professionalization and the importance 
614 Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council 22 December 1730, in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 62/63.
615 Bodleian, Rawl MSS A187 f8
616 'General Instructions' NMM CAD/A/16
617 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea (1731), 11.
618 Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea (1731), 14-16.
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of officers being able to perform their duties so that the other organizations involved 
with the administration and functioning of the fleet could also function.
That as there is no article in these instructions that directs their being 
publicly read monthly, and as the duties of the several officers are 
interwoven through the whole, it is proposed that every captain, lieutenant, 
master, boatswain, gunner, carpenter and purser at their first appointments 
should have one of the books of instructions delivered to him; which he is to
keep by him and carry with him from ship to ship, it being absolutely 
necessary for the better government of the whole that each officer should 
not only be perfectly informed of his own duty, but likewise of the duty of 
every officer of the ship.619
 The Regulations and Instructions were not just rules to be followed when aboard ship, 
but were an official expression of the integration between Royal Navy officers' 
professional expectations and the functioning of the institution as a whole. Even with 
rationalization, these instructions were not considered to be perfect, and they were 
modified again in 1734.
[And] we having lately taken those Regulations and Instructions into 
consideration, and not only advised with the Principal Officers and 
Commissioners of the Navy, but the Commissioners for Victualling therein; 
and it being found that, if some alterations and additions be made therein, it 
may tend to the advantage of your Majesty's naval service, some whereof 
are only to explain and make more clear what hath been already 
established;620
The Regulations and Instructions then were replaced in their entirety and, again, several
times, so that the version published in 1746 was the 6th edition.621 This continued well 
beyond the time considered by this thesis.  The Regulations and Instructions provide an 
important example of the most deliberate and rational form of development, which was 
entirely fitting with its purpose. Each subsequent version entirely replaced the version 
that came before, in that there were not sections or addenda published to be added to 
previous editions. The development was not necessarily about the content, as much as it 
619 'Navy Board to Admiralty Secretary' 9 November 1730 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 
11-12.
620 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 17 December 1733 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 13.
621 NA Kew, ADM 7/202
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was about providing the content within a standard package. This is quite different from 
how other aspects of the Royal Navy's rationalization were then further developed, as is 
discussed below.
An important indication that the Royal Navy as an institution, and its socio-
professional existence were appreciated as permanent was the creation of complete, but 
not official, handbooks and reference guides for Royal Navy officers. For example, in 
1715 Jonathan Greenwood published The Sailing and Fighting Instructions or Signals 
as they are observed in the Royal Navy of Great Britain. This was a pocket reference 
book, with large clear graphical depictions of all the signals.622 Although a civilian 
publication, that it was able to be produced indicates the stability of the Navy's signals 
instructions by that point. 
Another example is the differentiation of the Navy and Army. During this period,
the relationship between the Royal Navy and the land forces was further defined 
through a few measures which, in some ways, formalized the differences. One 
important definition for differentiating the Royal Navy from the land forces was the 
creation of conventions that defined the relationship between land forces officers and 
Royal Navy officers, or rather, equivalent ranks. Although it was not contained in the 
edition of the Regulations and Instructions published in 1734, in that year a regulation 
was created that established the marks of respect that land forces in garrisons and forts 
were to observe for flag officers.623 As with many other regulations handed down, it was
incomplete. The developments upon it will be discussed further in the next chapter.
Reactive Definitions, building on Rational Frameworks
622 'The Sailing and Fighting Instructions or Signals as they are observed in the Royal Navy of Great 
Britain, Jonathan Greenwood, 1714' NMM HOL/9
623 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 82.
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In comparison to the Regulations and Instructions, other frameworks developed 
in a much more reactive and piecemeal way, reflecting both the foundations they were 
built upon, as well as the circumstances of their development. As shown previously, the 
Royal Navy's professionalization had been disjointed to this point. Definitions were 
created for parts of officers' careers, but not for careers as a whole. However, following 
the Hanoverian succession, there were two major examples of professionalization, one 
relating to the rank of commodore and the other to qualifications required for 
lieutenants.
Professional Definitions
The fleet's expansion to a global sphere of operations was complicated by the 
development of operational patterns that involved multiple detachments, and in the 
previous chapter, it was noted how the post of commodore evolved. In this period, as 
the Royal Navy solidified its presence in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean by 
building dockyards, so too was commodore further used and developed for those 
deployments. In 1718, Captain Cavendish commanded a squadron against Barbary 
pirates, and was entitled to wear a broad red pennant, albeit not hoisted at the staff, as an
admiral's would be, and not when in the company of a flag officer. Corbett noted that it 
'resolved that in the future no commodore shall wear any other pendant of distinction'.624
Commodore was an important post with real authority, though its temporary and 
only loosely defined existence created problems for the Royal Navy. In December 1730,
the memorandum to the King-in-Council referring to the Regulations and Instructions 
that were issued the next year, also included a request for the formal provision of 
commodores
624 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 V. 9 f16-18
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And as in time of war, when several squadrons have been sent to remote 
parts, there has been a necessity to appoint occasional flag officers and 
commodores, we do most humbly propose that your Majesty will be 
graciously pleased to establish in the royal navy three officers under the title
and appellation of commodores to rank next to rear admirals and to have the
pay and other allowances proposed in this book, which will be agreeable to 
the practice of other nations, be a great encouragement to your sea officers 
and, we hope, redound to the advantage of your Majesty's service.625
There were certainly peace-time commodores appointed to stations at this time, such as 
Edward Vernon, who raised his ''broad pennant' as commodore and Commander-in-chief
of the Jamaica Station in July 1719.626 In 1727, Edward St Lo was commodore at 
Jamaica, in command of the ships there.627 In 1734, Sir Edward Chaloner Ogle was 
commodore at Jamaica.628 In 1746, Robert Griffin was appointed to command the East 
India station as Commodore.629 Nevertheless, although Britain was at peace when the 
request for the formal provision of commodores was received in January 1731, the 
proposal was postponed, or in other words rejected.630 This decision was no doubt 
related to the Royal Navy's performance in the Anglo-Spanish War. 
The temporary nature of an appointment as commodore led to some socio-
professional problems. The following is a 1738 letter from Admiral Sir Charles Wager, 
First Lord of the Admiralty to the Duke of Newcastle.
Your Grace having communicated to me the contents of a letter from Mrs. 
Clinton relating to her husband, Captain Clinton, I am to acquaint you that I 
have a letter from Captain Clinton upon the same subject, viz.: that as he has
been a commodore or commander in chief, he seems to think that he cannot 
serve afterwards as a private captain, as he must do under Admiral Haddock,
especially as there are several captains in that squadron elder than [i.e. 
senior to] Captain Clinton. But if the case were, as he seems to think it, that 
a captain who had once been a commodore could not serve afterwards as a 
625 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 22 December 1730 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 63
626 Richard Harding, 'Vernon, Edward (1684–1757)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28237, 
accessed 14 Dec 2015]
627 'Commodore Edward St. Lo to Admiralty Secretary' 7 December 1727 in Baugh, Naval 
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628 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 328.
629 'Orderbooks of Princess Mary, orders received 12 Feb 1745-15 Jul 1747 and orders issued 14 Mar 
1745-21 Apr 1748' NMM GRI/18
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private captain, we should be very cautious how we made commodores. But
several captains have been commodores who returned to their former posts 
without making any claim on account of such commands, that command 
ceasing when they are recalled or when an elder captain comes to succeed 
them.631
These troubles occurred during peacetime, because there were fewer ships in service, 
therefore fewer posts requiring commodores than there would be in wartime. This letter 
in particular shows that the post of commodore, and its relationship to both captain and 
flag rank were firmly established precedents.
Similarly, the professional qualifications for lieutenants continued to be defined 
in the eighteenth century in further orders-in-council. From 1701, volunteers-per-order 
were only required to have acted as midshipmen for a year, rather than paid as such, in 
order to qualify for the lieutenant's exam.632 In 1703, the requirements changed again to 
four years at sea, with two years paid as a midshipman, but in 1710 this was modified so
that three years' service as midshipman was again sufficient.633 The development of 
other ranks was directly related to requirements for lieutenants in the fleet, and from 
1718, when midshipmen-extra were present in a squadron, commanders-in-chief were 
obliged to put them into vacancies.634 The way that these sets of professional 
qualifications continued to develop highlights the lack of qualifications for higher ranks 
and the absence of preconceived targets for developmenet.
 The development of half-pay lists also affected the procedures for promoting 
officers. After the coming of peace in 1715, it was decided that the Royal Navy required
70 ships in service, which would 'employ 70 captains and 98 lieutenants, so that of the 
whole number there will be unemployed of the former 188 and of the latter 261.'635 
631 'First Lord of the A dmiralty to the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State'6 June 1738 in Baugh, 
Naval Administration 1715-1750, 13-14
632 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 V. 9 f98
633 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 V. 9 f99
634 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 V. 9 f99, Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 48.
635 Order in Council, 15 September 1715 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 44
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Although ranks and posts were the active embodiment of the Royal Navy 
institutional and socio-professional definitions, they were by no means permanent 
additions after their creation. For example, an Order-in-Council from 1717 established 
that ships of the sixth-rate would not include a master among the crew, and as a result 
the ship's commander would be henceforth a master and commander. This establishment
required that for an officer to hold such an office, they were required to present 
certificates from Trinity House as to their qualification to act as master.636 This was 
repealed in 1720.
And there being no master allowed by the present establishment to any ship 
of the sixth-rate of his Majesty's royal navy, we do most humbly pray leave 
to propose unto his Majesty that such an officer may be established to such 
ships for the future at the allowance of four pounds per mensem, in regard it
may not only very much tend to their safety, especially in the nighttime, 
when it is necessary that such an officer should relieve the lieutenant by 
taking on him the charge of the watch, but [also] that the employing such 
persons in small frigates, which are generally more at sea than others of 
larger dimensions, may contribute towards the breeding up a constant 
supply of able masters for the service of his Majesty's navy.637
The Royal Navy's sixth-rates were amongst the ships most often deployed in peacetime.
For example, the Admiralty calculated in 1715 that they would employ 24 sixth-rates in 
peacetime, in comparison to 10 fourth-rates and 15 fifth-rates.638 They were sufficiently 
small that they presented problems in the way that larger ships, which were in 
peacetime allotted a full complement of officers, did not. Although after 1720 
commanders no longer actually served as masters, the title was given to those who 
commanded non-post ships, in other words the smallest of the Royal Navy's rated 
ships.639 In 1737, those who had served as master and commander were allotted four 
shillings per diem under the half-pay establishment.640 In 1738, the Admiralty proposed 
636 Corbett Papers, NMRN Mss 121 V. 9
637 Order in Council, 15 September 1715 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 49.
638 Order in Council, 15 September 1715 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 44.
639 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 41
640 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 2 February 1737/8 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
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that the commanders of sixth-rates no longer be allowed to additionally function as 
pursers, but that such ships should carry a purser and their servant. This additional cost 
was offset by reducing the establishment for sixth-rates by two able-bodied seamen.641 
In addition from 1743, seniority lists were published for those of master and 
commander rank.642 Both the ranks of commodore and master and commander were 
excellent examples of internal expansion or interpolation, and the resultant creation of 
custom definitions specific to the Royal Navy's usage. 
By the 1730s, the ramifications of socio-professional definitions and 
permanence began to be appreciated. At that time, the Board of Admiralty expanded on 
the definitions created for the beginning of officers' careers, by providing an alternate 
route to achieve the qualifications for lieutenant. They also sought to define a means of 
removing very senior officers from the seniority lists in order to provide opportunities 
for younger officers.
Recall the first two of Matthew Lewis's attributes for a professional institution: 
first, a continuous flow of entry of young officers, of the required material and in the 
required numbers; and second, that '[t]here must be the provision of an adequate system 
of training the young officers as they enter'.643 The Royal Naval Academy, which was 
created in 1733 and received its first students several years later was an attempt to 
address this issue within the context of the Royal Navy's increased permanence and, of 
course, peacetime. By the 1730s, the requirements for lieutenant had become so 
ingrained into the Royal Navy's institutional and professional existence that extended 
periods of peacetime would deprive the Royal Navy of a usable supply of very junior 
641 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 29 September 1738 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 70-71.
642 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 42.
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officers. In this Admiralty memorandum to the King in Council from January 1729/30, 
the reasons for creating the Naval academy are addressed:
May it please your Majesty,
Having taken into our consideration the establishments now in force relating
to Volunteers at Sea, and the inconveniences attending the same from the 
shortness of time allowed to qualify them for lieutenants, and from the 
limited education they receive from the schoolmasters on shipboard, where 
they are only taught the theory of navigation; in order therefore to qualify 
young gentlemen in a better manner for your Majesty's service, we do 
humbly propose that the aforesaid establishments may be laid aside, and that
instead thereof an academy be erected at Portsmouth for the education of 
forty young gentlemen to be trained up for your Majesty's service at sea, 
with proper masters and ushers644
This was accompanied by a list of rules and procedures for the use of the academy. 
Another important inspiration was the inclusion in the 1731 Regulations and 
Instructions of the instructions for a schoolmaster.645 The 1734 Regulations and 
Instructions retained these after the opening the Academy, which reinforced that the 
Royal Navy was creating a secondary system for educating officers, not replacing the 
existing system. Also interesting is that although Schoolmasters were to be educating 
the Midshipmen and Volunteers to prepare for the Royal Navy's lieutenant's exam, they 
themselves were not required to have passed that exam and indeed were to be certified 
by Trinity House, the same as ships' masters.646
 Although the Academy might have been intended to provide a first step before 
service as midshipman, it was also an attempt to guarantee that a certain number of 
entry-level officers would be regularly available for service. Graduates of the college 
would not necessarily be immediately employed upon leaving the Academy, but it 
would create a pool of qualified individuals to serve, when necessary. This is shown by 
instructions 16 and 18 for the Academy's establishment. The former stated 'No scholar 
644 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 30 January 1729/30 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 57-58.
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shall be less than two years nor longer than three years in the Academy before he is sent 
to sea' and the latter provided that 'When any scholars are ordered to serve on board his 
Majesty's ships, the vacancies in the Academy shall be filled up and the established 
number always kept complete.'647
Several sections of the instructions for the Academy demonstrated the intention 
to standardize Royal Navy officer education, particularly those that describe the 
modification of the volunteer per order scheme to accommodate the Academy. For 
example, instruction 19 ordered that the 'scholars shall be rated as Volunteer Per Order, 
be paid as able seamen, will be required to perform the duties of AB, but have the 
privilege of walking the quarterdeck'. The 'scholars' were to be able to use their time in 
the Academy towards the requirement of sea-time and only spent four years at sea, 
being rated as midshipman ordinary after two. Further, when ships arrived in Spithead, 
the scholars aboard would be required to present their journals to the Academy's 
Mathematical Master, so that he could certify their adherence to the requirements and 
competence.648
As Daniel Baugh has discovered, the Academy was not as successful as hoped. 
In the early days there were number cases of the 'scholars' escaping from the Academy 
and running wild. For example, in February 1733/4, shortly after the academy opened, 
Commissioner Richard Hughes wrote to the Secretary:
I find there is like to be an ill custom introduced into the Academy by the 
young gentlemen already admitted...  they went to the Sun Tavern which is 
near the dock gate and obliged Mr. Dashwood... They all came home very 
drunk, and Mr. Dashwood...  so very bad that Mr. Haselden was obliged to 
call on the Surgeon of the Yard for assistance and relief.649
647 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 30 January 1729/30 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 59-60
648 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 30 January 1729/30 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
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Further, the Commissioner identified the first two young scholars to lead the action, 
expelled them.650 This was not the end of the incident, and only ten days later another 
letter followed.
[T]hree of the scholars belonging to the Royal Academy have endeavoured 
to make their escape from thence, namely Mr. Edward Rich, Richard Stacey,
and Edward Medley... Last night four of them eloped, viz. Richard Teal, 
George Dashwood, William Wilder and Lord Henry Manners, who cannot 
be heard of... The young gentlemen frequently discourse among themselves 
that although Mr. Baber and Colepeper were expelled the Academy, yet they
have been received on board some of his Majesty's ships.651
Two years later the efficacy of the Academy, and particularly the goal of sending young 
scholars to sea after two or three years, was very much called into question, as a letter 
from Commissioner Hughes from 4 March 1735/6 shows.
[I]t is not only my opinion but also the several masters' that the time 
established in the 4th article, viz. for the young gentlemen to leave the 
Academy at the expiration of two years, is too short for them to make any 
considerable proficiency in the various parts of the plan which their 
Lordships have been pleased to approve of and confirm.652
Hughes went on to criticize the resources for the Academy. For example he complained 
that the Success and her rigging and gear were not suitable for hands-on training. 
Further, the scholars only trained with weapons once a fortnight, which the master at 
arms felt was insufficient for personal competence, let alone learning about the use of 
cover, platoon firing and other concepts. Lastly, no provision had been made for a 
Gunner to teach the scholars the use of ships' guns.653 
There was also a significant difference between the creation the Academy and 
the previous measures used to regulate the Royal Navy officer profession, in that it was 
a significant outlay of funds to create a new supply of junior officers. In that way, it is 
650 '[Messrs. Baber and Culpeper were immediately discharged from the Academy by the Admiralty.]' 
Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 65.
651 'Commissioner Richard Hughes to Admiralty Secretary' 12 February 1734/5 in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 65.
652 'Commissioner Richard Hughes to Admiralty Secretary'  4 March 1735/6 in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 66.
653 'Commissioner Richard Hughes to Admiralty Secretary' 4 March 1735/6 in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 67.
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much more similar to the approach taken in the creation of Half-pay and the registration
of seamen in the 1690, than the constant back and forth creation of the qualifications 
necessary to take the lieutenant's exam.
Another of Michael Lewis's six attributes or phases of a professional military 
service was the superannuation of officers who were surplus to requirements.654 The 
creation of seniority lists and socio-professional permanence meant that officers simply 
remained on lists. There was no commensurate mechanism created for the removal of 
officers from the seniority list, especially senior captains. The result, as demonstrated by
Hardy's Navy List, was that as long as they were alive, Captains continued to accrue 
seniority, potentially blocking the career of younger officers.655 This problem was not 
just noticed in wartime, but there had been some thought given to it in peacetime. The 
1734 Regulations and Instructions had a section on pensions for superannuated officers,
but this only applied to Warrant Officers, such as Boatswains, Gunners, Surgeons and 
Pursers.656 
Its expansion to commissioned officers was also considered, and what was 
proposed was that the half-pay establishment for Lieutenants be changed to 
accommodate the reality that many officers on the seniority list would be unable to be 
employed in future conflicts.
The first twenty senior lieutenants at five shillings a day, because the said 
twenty lieutenants may reasonably be supposed to be very aged, infirm and 
entirely incapable of service, so that as a reward for their former services the
whole pay of a first-rate is allowed them to pass the remainder of their days 
comfortably.
Second class. Thirty lieutenants at four shillings a day, because the said 
thirty lieutenants will be found in very near the circumstances of the first 
class, and in consideration of their long and former services the whole pay 
of a third-rate, etc., is allowed them.
654 Lewis, English Sea Officers, 55-58
655 'A chronological list of the captains of His Majesty's Royal Navy; with the dates of their first 
commissions, promotions, and other occurrences; commencing the 21st June 1673, and brought down
to the year 1778' NMRN V11. Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, xiii.
656 1734 Regulations and Instructions, 156-57.
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Third class. Consists of fifty lieutenants. Though many of them may be 
capable of service, yet in consideration of their long services three shillings 
a day are allowed them when out of commission. Thus in case this third 
class should continue to miss preferment, they may expect as they advance 
in age and seniority to come into the second and first classes, which will be 
a great comfort and encouragement to them.657
An Admiralty memorandum to the King-in-Council from February 1737/8 directly 
addressed the superannuation of Lieutenants:
Therefore we do most humbly recommend to your Majesty thirty of the 
eldest lieutenants, who, though they have not arrived to the rank of captains,
have served the Crown with a long and unblemished fidelity, some of them 
having been lieutenants in the War of King William, and all of them more 
than thirty years, and are now worn out with age and infirmities, without 
other support for themselves and families than their half pay, which is no 
more than half a crown a day. 
We do therefore most humbly propose that your Majesty will be graciously 
pleased to order a pension equal to four shillings a day (which is the lowest 
class of half pay allowed to a master and commander) to be settled upon 
them for their lives on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy, and that the same 
may be paid in like manner as the other pensions; and that as any of them 
die, we may be empowered to superannuate other lieutenants in their 
room...658
The development of this scheme to superannuate Lieutenants is a prime example of the 
reactionary approach to developing the Royal Navy officer profession from the 
foundations created following the Glorious Revolution. It was created as the result of a 
crisis. However, it directly built on the established framework, specifically half-pay. It 
was also clearly a rational approach, and created a framework meant to address the issue
not just once, like Charles II's pensions to his officers, but permanently. This established
a precedent that would be followed in the 1740s, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Foreign Dockyards
657 'Document in possession of Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty' c. 1737 in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750 68-69.
658 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 2 Feb 1737/8 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-
1750, 69.
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The Royal Navy's development was made more complex by pressures placed on 
it by growing long-distance operations and the decentralization of authority that was 
required. The creation of the Regulations and Instructions, and the further development 
of the rank of Commodore were two definitions from the Admiralty that created 
standards that could be followed by Royal Navy forces around the Globe.  Some aspects
of the Royal Navy's existence, such as the Navy Board, Dockyards, Ordnance, 
Victualling Board, were specifically associated with supporting the Royal Navy's 
operations, and their functions had to be expanded as the Royal Navy began to operate 
on a global scale. The Royal Navy's increasingly decentralized deployments resulted in 
a complex situation that influenced the development of Royal Navy procedures. The 
ability of central authority, specifically the Navy Board and by this time the Board of 
Admiralty, to deploy individual or groups of ships as standing forces to disparate 
geographic locations, as well as forces for specific missions, illustrates that the Royal 
Navy could be defined at the periphery, as well as at the centre. During this period, such
deployments included that of Admiral Francis Hosier in the West Indies in 1726/7, Rear 
Admiral Thomas Griffin and Boscawen to the East Indies in 1746 and 1747 
respectively, and of Keppel to the Mediterranean the same year.659 
The investment in the dockyards and physical facilities the Royal Navy enjoyed 
at Deptford, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, allowed the Royal Navy to be materially and 
logistically supported in the wars of the eighteenth century. In 1714, the Royal navy had
a single overseas dockyard at Port Mahon. By 1739, they also had established bases at 
Gibraltar, Jamaica and Antigua.660 However, physical attributes did not alone create a 
naval base, they also required officers, agents, workers, and stores.
659 'Copy of Admiralty instructions to Adm Hosier about operations in the West Indies and extracts from 
letters written to him, 1726-27' NMM HSR/H/15 'Orderbook of Princess Mary, orders issued 23 Apr 
1748-25 Mar 1749' NMM GRI/19, 'Orderbook containing orders received and issued, 21 July 1747 to
21 June 1759' NMM HWK/1
660 Rodger, Command of the Oceans, 300.
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One of the most important bases was at Jamaica, where in the late 1720s much 
money was spent at Port Antonio and Port Royal. Instructions were drawn up for the 
Master Attendant (who was also Master of the hulk Southampton), Master Caulker, and 
for surgeons attending the wounded and sick at Jamaica.661 These roughly concurrent 
instructions were created following the hulking of the Southampton in 1728.662 These 
instructions were created proactively in that they were not issued for a specific 
individual, but rather to govern the specific offices over the employment of a succession
of individuals. Other conversations were very specific. For example, Captain John 
Gascoigne of the Greyhound wrote to the Navy Board in February 1727/8. 'Since my 
arrival in this island, I have had the honour to receive a letter from Sir Jacob Ackworth, 
about the careening wharf proposed to be built here.'663 Port Royal had been devastated 
by two hurricanes within recent memory, and so was no longer a thriving port. In the 
same letter, Gascoigne addressed what was needed to make it a useful base for the 
Royal Navy:
And I don't doubt but (as I am informed) that one article of sails that have 
been spoiled and blown to pieces in covering tents since Admiral Hosier's 
squadron came hither, would be found upon a nice enquiry to amount to 
more than the necessary conveniences might be made for, that would serve 
to careen ships for twenty or thirty years, without any considerable charge 
for repairing (hurricanes excepted); which I apprehend would be only a 
wharf faced with piles and filled up with earth; one capstan (unless two 
should be thought more convenient) to be fixed, and sheds over them that 
may spread without the bars to keep the people from the sun; beams to be 
laid in the pit to lash the lower blocks to; skids to lay the guns on, on each 
side [of] the lower blocks to prevent the beam rising; proper sheds for the 
stores; another for the carpenters to repair boats and do other works in when
masts or yards are making in the shed built for that purpose; one for the 
riggers, another for a cooperage and to hold all the casks whilst the ship is 
careening; a pitch house and a fence to keep the seamen from straggling; a 
powder house, which should stand on the other side [of] the harbour, against
the town.664
661 'Misc. Instructions for Navy Board officials 1660-1735' TNA ADM 7/639 f164-173
662 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, Vol. 1, 167.
663 'Captain John Gascoigne to Navy Board Greyhound, Port Royal, Jamaica' 14 February 1727/8 in 
Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 343.
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However, concerns about Port Royal resulted in much effort being spent in creating Port
Antonio as a major base. In June 1729, the Navy Board wrote to the Admiralty 
Secretary regarding the benefits of Port Antonio:
[W]e are to acquaint you for their Lordships' information that we have 
discoursed with Sir Yelverton Peyton, Captain Gray, Captain Lawes and 
Captain Young, and also Mr. Scott, the gunner of the Spence sloop, who is 
well acquainted with that harbour. They all unanimously agree that both the 
east and west harbours of Port Antonio are very commodious and safe for 
shipping, that there is a great plenty of good water... They farther inform us 
that the depth of water is very convenient for anchoring from 7 to 9 fathom, 
which may be more particularly seen by a draught which we herewith send, 
and... they inform us the sea and land breezes for the most part blow regular,
which make the navigation in and out very practicable and contributes to the
healthiness of the place.665
In 1731, Charles Knowles was commissioned master and commander of the 
Southampton, 'in order to make a careening wharf and erect a storehouse at Port Antonio
upon the said island, and to fortify the harbour, which works he performed to the 
satisfaction of the Admiralty.' However, after completing that task, Knowles was 
assigned to perform a similar task at Port Royal.666
Despite the investment in Port Antonio, it did not remain the most important 
facility in Jamaica, rather Port Royal once again became so. This was demonstrated 
when funds and efforts were diverted to Port Royal rather than Port Antonio, as shown 
in this letter from November 1737 from the Navy Board to the Admiralty Secretary:
And in order thereto [we] desire you will please to propose to the Rt. Hon. 
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty as our humble opinion that the 
boatswain and carpenter borne on the books at Port Antonio, as they were 
on the Southampton hulk, may be either put into ships as vacancies happen, 
or discharged and sent home by the first opportunity if they desire it;... And 
as Port Royal is now made convenient for careening ships, that the 
careening gear and stores may from time to time be brought from Port 
664 'Captain John Gascoigne to Navy Board Greyhound, Port Royal, Jamaica' 14 February 1727/8 in 
Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 345.
665 'Navy Board to Admiralty Secretary' 30 June 1729 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 
347/348
666 'Commodore Charles Knowles to the Lords of the Admiralty Louisburg, 30 March 1747' in Baugh, 
Naval Administration 1715-1750, 78. 
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Antonio to Port Royal in the men of war, especially such as are wanted.667
At the end of 1749, the Navy Board brought suggestions forward about the disposal of 
Port Antonio as a yard.668
The creation of new dockyards in the Caribbean underscored the changed 
authority in the administration of the Royal Navy from the time prior to the Hanoverian 
succession. In the 1720s and 1730s, it was the Navy Board that was pushing and driving
the expansion of their facilities abroad to support the Admiralty's responsibilities for 
operations. Further, the Navy Board was capable of ending such projects, despite the 
investment and funds required, without losing their authority. 
The Establishments 
Another example of the Navy Board using its authority to define and develop the
Navy were the Establishments. As discussed in the previous two chapters, the 
development of the establishments was an important aspect of the Royal Navy's 
development in the Westminster Model because they built on the precedents established 
and reflected contemporary circumstances. In this period, the establishments, and 
specifically the Establishment of Dimensions underwent significant and numerous 
changes. The Establishment of Dimensions reflected a kind of partial rationalization in 
1706, in that it created a framework that addressed most of the categories of major 
warships in service in the fleet. However, unlike the Regulation and Instructions where 
all the various instructions were incorporated together, the Establishment of Dimensions
did not also incorporate the Establishment of Guns. 
667 'Navy Board to Admiralty Secretary' 4 April 1737 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 
365/366.
668 'Navy Board to Admiralty Secretary' 26 December 1749 in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 
395.
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After the 1706 Establishment of Dimensions, there was still no equivalent for the
artillery carried until 1716, when a new establishment of guns was published that 
defined not individual batteries, but rather standard batteries for the rates. This 1715 
letter from the Navy Board to the Admiralty illustrates that although the establishments 
had been created, the application to the fleet, and the peculiarities of the fleet presented 
problems. 
We have in pursuance of your Lordship's order of the 24th past perused and 
considered of the copy of the report from the flag officers (received therein) 
of the number, nature, lengths and weights of ordnance proposed for the 
several rates of his Majesty's fleet, and do humbly return your Lordships our
observations thereupon as followeth, viz... 
3. That the Rupert, Monmouth, Swiftsure, Warspite and Defiance will not 
square with the class of the 3rd rates of 70 guns, the said ships carrying but 
66 guns each; and there are likewise several of the 70-gunned ships that 
have but 12 ports on their quarterdecks and cannot at present carry 14 guns 
there as is proposed; and 12 of those proposed are judged to be a sufficient 
weight for that deck...
9. No further observations appear to us at present to the said proposals, 
presuming that most of the ships of the royal navy now in being, which are 
of the dimensions of the establishment in 1706, and all that shall be built or 
rebuilt for the future of those dimensions, may be made capable of carrying 
the guns proposed, regard being had to the two articles immediately 
preceding this...669
These observations were made in peacetime, and unlike the Establishment of 
Dimensions, where ships dimensions could not change between peacetime and wartime,
this was not so for other aspects
7. That by all former establishments of guns for his Majesty's fleet there 
were made two distinctions of their numbers, natures, and weights, a higher 
and a lower complement for war and peace, suitable to their complements of
men, which is not found in this proposal.670
That the Establishment of Guns proposed had not provided different rules for peacetime 
and wartime is another example of how the Establishments were not rationalized as the 
Regulations and Instructions were and so did not provide the same kind of universal 




document. This seems to be a reflection of the reality that the Royal Navy's warships 
were still built and equipped within reasonable communication distance of the Navy 
Board's central office in London.
The development of the Establishment on those foundations was substantially 
different from that of the Regulations and Instructions. In 1719, the Admiralty 
promulgated a new Establishment of Dimensions, which expanded on the 1706 
Establishment by including measurements for first-rates. This letter from the Master 
Shipwrights of the Dockyards describes the changes, and the reasons for them.
And [we] are humbly of opinion that if the bodies were shaped to lines of as
little resistance as is consistent with the nature of the service expected, the 
dimensions of ships, the scantlings of the frame and other parts, with 
directions for ordering the same together with proportions of masts and 
yards, herewith laid before you, were conformed to, they would answer 
what may be expected from them...671
This first generational shift featured a wholesale replacement. Indeed there was 
significant expansion. Where in 1706 only the most major dimensions had been 
specified, the 1719 Establishment included a much more complete set of measurements 
for each rate.672 However, after that, the process was more piecemeal. In 1733, new 
dimensions were created for ships of 50 and 60 guns, followed by other rates.673 In 
1741, dimensions were again changed, and indeed the categories were changed. Thus, 
for example, what had been 70-guns ships became 64-gun ships. Baugh argues that 'the 
"establishments" of 1733 and 1741 never acquired formal approval, but they were 
widely followed and certainly broke the authority of the establishment of 1719.'674
Lavery argues that '[t]he twin policies, rebuilding and the establishments, were 
dovetailed together to form a devastatingly conservative system of ship design'.675 Roger
671 'Master Shipwrights of the Dockyards to Navy Board' 7 November 1719 in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 208-209
672 Lavery, The Ship of the Line, 78-79.
673 'Committee report on Admiralty proposals for a new establishment of men and guns for ships of the 
Navy' TNA PC/1/5/13 
674 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 199.
675 Lavery, The Ship of the Line Vol. 1, 70.
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Albion has argued that it bound the hands of shipwrights for a century.676 Lavery and 
Albion's arguments regarding the effect of the Establishments of Dimensions on Royal 
Navy warship design seem to ignore a primary purpose of those documents. They were 
not created to define the Royal Navy's warships as the most capable sailing or fighting 
ships, they were meant to provide a mechanism for creating consistency across the fleet,
for simplifying logistics, and creating rules so that when ships were rebuilt or built, 
victualled, crewed, or armed, the requirements and costs would be roughly predictable. 
However, with only a handful of shipyards needing to be regulated, compared to 
hundreds of naval officers and warrant officers, it would have been less critical to 
develop the Establishments in the same strict way. Nevertheless, the Establishment 
represented the same type of definition as the Regulations and Instructions, in that they 
were a centralized form of expectation that could be disseminated so that everybody 
was operating from the same playbook. 
Statutory Definitions
The first expansion of the geographic limits placed on the jurisdiction of the 
Articles of War were codified in the 1719 legislation An Act for making Perpetual, 
which took effect from 1 January 1720. This was the result of 'operational influences' 
and acknowledged that the Royal Navy's operational sphere was no longer just aboard 
ship. The Act was an omnibus act and addressed three disparate aspects of the British 
justice system. It is the third section that is most important to the development of a new 
legal definition of the Royal Navy as an institution and the Royal Navy Officer 
profession. The text of the applicable clause is as follows: 
But no provision is by the said Act made for the tryal and punishment of 
such Persons who shall be guilty of any of the Crimes of Offences 
676 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), p. 80. in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 199.
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mentioned in the said Articles, in case the same be committed upon the 
Shore in Foreign Parts; For Remedy thereof, Be it further Enacted by the 
Authority aforesaid, That if any Person or Persons, who, from and after 
the First Day of January One thousand seven hundred and twenty, shall 
be in actual service and pay in his Majesties fleet, or ships or vessels of 
war, shall commit any of the said Crimes of Offences mentioned in the 
said Articles, upon the Shore in any sovereign Part of Parts, the Person or
Persons so Offending, shall be, and is hereby declared to be subject and 
liable to be tryed and punished for the same, in the same manner, to all 
Intents and Purposes, as if the said Crime or Crimes, Offence or 
Offences, had been actually committed or done upon the main Sea, or on 
Board any of his Majesties Ships or Vessels of War.677 
This Act provided a basic expansion of the geographic limits of the jurisdiction of the 
Lord High Admiral and the Articles of War. This was followed by an Admiralty 
memorandum which discussed the officering of Royal Navy ships. 
Having taken into our consideration how the ships of war of the royal navy 
are officered according to the present establishment, and being humbly of 
opinion that if one more lieutenant were added to the number now allowed 
to all his Majesty's ships of forty guns and upwards, it may conduce very 
much to the advantage of his Majesty's naval service, especially in time of 
action... we do most humbly represent to his Majesty that the additional 
charge of adding such a lieutenant to every ship of war of forty guns and 
upwards will be no more than half of the allowed pay to each, in regard they
will be taken from those who will otherwise be allowed half pay if not so 
employed.
And there being no master allowed by the present establishment to any ship 
of the sixth-rate of his Majesty's royal navy, we do most humbly pray leave 
to propose unto his Majesty that such an officer may be established to such 
ships for the future at the allowance of four pounds per mensem, in regard it
may not only very much tend to their safety, especially in the nighttime, 
when it is necessary that such an officer should relieve the lieutenant by 
taking on him the charge of the watch, but [also] that the employing such 
persons in small frigates, which are generally more at sea than others of 
larger dimensions, may contribute towards the breeding up a constant 
supply of able masters for the service of his Majesty's navy.678
It is interesting that this memorandum used the phrase 'breeding up' of navigators, 
similar to Charles II's order in council regarding midshipmen-ordinary in 1676.679 This 
was then confirmed by an Order-in-Council dated 20 March 1720, which directly 
677 HMSO, Public General Acts 6 Geo I, Vol 8., 1719. 387.
678 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 15 February 1719/20 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
1715-1750, 48-9.
679 'Establishment made 8 May concerning Volunteers and Midshipmen-Extra' 8 May, 1676, NMM 
CLU/5 f49
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addressed the use of Royal Navy personnel ashore. This Order-in-Council directed that 
on all Royal Navy sixth-rate warships of forty guns or greater, an additional lieutenant 
would be added to the establishment. Several reasons were provided: 
in regard to those Lieutenants who will besides the performance of 
their Duty as such be particularly appointed to train up and supervise 
the Seamen in the use of small arms which is the more necessary to 
be done, since there are not now any of the Marine Regiments 
subsisting, and that a greater number of commission officers are 
aboard the ships of war of other maritime nations, and particularly 
for exercising the small shot men, and ordering the in time of 
fights.680
The use of Navy personnel in what were effectively amphibious assaults was not a new 
phenomenon within the practice of English maritime warfare. Setting aside the many 
examples prior to the Restoration such as the Elizabeth expeditions against Cadiz, or the
capture of Jamaica in 1655, there were still examples where Royal Navy personnel had 
participated in amphibious operations despite the jurisdiction of the Articles of War 
extending only aboard warships. For example, Royal Navy ratings and officers 
participated in the amphibious attacks on Gibraltar in 1704.681 
The Act for Making Perpetual (1719) directly extrapolated from the Act for the 
Establishing Articles in three important ways. The first is that it was also legislation. As 
the precedent had been defined in legislation, it was necessary to use further legislation 
to expand upon that definition with the same legal authority. Second, it continued to 
define the Royal Navy as an institution with no legal authority ashore in British 
territory. The Articles were an internal legal code, and so if crimes against the Articles 
were to occur on foreign soil it was less likely that they would involve murder or theft 
against their own crew, but rather mutiny or desertion. The Act for Making Perpetual 
also reflected the Order-in-Council, and the training of seamen to use small arms. This 
680 'Order-in-Council 20 March 1720'  NMM CLU/5 f223/4.
681 C. Ekins, The Naval Battles of Great Britain from the Accession of the Illustrious House of Hanover 
to the Throne to the Battle of Navarin (London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1828) 7.
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is further confirmed by the third direct mode of extrapolation from the Articles of War. 
The Act for making perpetual specified that offences were to be prosecuted 'as if the 
said Crime or Crimes, Offence or Offences, had been actually committed or done upon 
the main Sea, or on Board any of his Majesties Ships or Vessels of War.'682 The 
extension of shipboard discipline was not an attempt to regulate personnel's shore leave 
behaviour, but to ensure that naval officers had the legal authority to issue commands to 
their crews, and to punish those who failed to obey when operating ashore. The terms of
this act only applied to those who were in actual pay and service aboard a Royal Navy 
warship or other vessel. It also perpetuated an unaltered version of the operational 
definitions for the limits of Royal Navy jurisdiction. Also importantly, the use of the Act
for Making Perpetual together with the order-in-council of 20 March 1720 shows that 
again in this period, statutory and custom definitions were together used to define the 
Royal Navy. 
Previous chapters have discussed the measures taken to suppress the carriage of 
merchant goods aboard warships. In 1721, this ban was incorporated into a statutory 
definition in the Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy, which legislated that 
any officers who carried goods on board in order to trade them privately and were 
convicted of such by a court-martial would suffer the loss of their commission, as well 
as be banned for future service in the Navy.683 
The problem was npt represented by the movement of personnel between the 
Navy and merchant ships, but rather by the increasing opportunities for Royal Navy 
officers to participate in trade as the Navy's operational sphere expanded. The key 
phrase in the Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy is 'At home or abroad', 
which describes a common situation for naval officers and their ships.684 If a warship 
682 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 8, 6 Geo I, 1719. 387
683 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 10, 8 Geo I, 1721, 374.
684 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 10, 8 Geo I, 1721, 374-75
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was deployed to a major fleet, for example in the North Sea or in the English Channel, 
there would be limited opportunities for private trade. The Royal Navy was an 
institution based in Britain, where it commissioned its ships, and whence they were 
deployed. The forces the Royal Navy deployed to the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, 
and the Indian Ocean were not locally commissioned, but rather organized, 
commissioned and dispatched from Britain. The passages to and from deployment areas
provided opportunities for officers aboard warships to ship goods, either on personal 
account or as a minor version of carriage trade. As the Royal Navy's duty stations 
abroad became permanent instead of seasonal missions, there was an increase in the 
opportunities for the carriage of goods, and also a growing need to formally suppress 
the practice. 
Conclusion
After the Hanoverian Succession, the relationship between the Royal Navy and 
the state changed as the Admiralty and Navy Board used their authority to actively 
define the Royal Navy. Indeed, the way that those organizations did so was similar to 
the way that Charles II continued to defined the Royal Navy through royal prerogative 
despite Parliament's tight control on funds during his reign. This is even more apt since 
during the 1720s and 1730s, Parliament did not provide any funds for building new 
ships, just for rebuilds.685 
Like after the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, this was a period in 
which the new monarchs inserted themselves into the relationship with the Navy. This 
was a rational, deliberate creation of identity that provided context for the other 
developments. Further, like during the period following the Glorious Restoration, 
immediately after the Hanoverian Succession there continued the seemingly coordinated
685 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 292.
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use of statute and convention together to define the Royal Navy, particularly regarding 
the expansion of the authority of the Articles of War ashore, and the provision of extra 
Lieutenants to provide officers to lead the men in combat on land. 
However, this relationship between Parliament and the Admiralty was largely 
superseded by an active partnership between the Board of Admiralty and the Navy 
Board. The Board of Admiralty and Navy Board supported the Cabinet and minsters in 
their foreign policy goals. The Board of Admiralty developed methods for managing the
supply of junior officers, and the superannuation of elderly officers in peacetime. They 
also further developed the rank of commodore to provide junior flag officers for foreign 
stations. In comparison, the Navy Board continued to develop the Establishments and 
established dockyards in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. The development of the 
Naval Academy, the superannuation of lieutenants, and the Establishments provided for 
better management of resources. The further development of the rank of commodore 
and the development of the Dockyards provided the structure and facilities for the Navy 
to fulfill the missions that the Government created for it. The creation and modification 
of the Regulations and Instructions was another important development and was part of 
the Navy's professionalization well as a document that would clearly state the 
Admiralty's expectations for its officers, whether at home or deployed abroad. The 
Royal Navy's development in this period was mostly strongly influenced on the one 
hand by increasingly global peacetime pressures and requirements, and on the other 
hand by long-term political stability and the clear emergence of attributes of the 
'Westminster Model' in the British state. However, these changing circumstances did not
fundamentally alter the Royal Navy’s development in the 'Westminster Model'. The next
chapters examines the period 1742-1749, the circumstances leading to the alteration and
replacement of the Articles of War. 
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CHAPTER 5: REPLACING THE ARTICLES OF WAR
The Royal Navy's development in the 1740s was affected by two important 
changes. First, the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748) put stresses on the 
Royal Navy that did not exist during the long period of peace that preceded it. There 
were not many successes during the first years of the war, and the Battle of Toulon 
(1744) in particular provided a focus for criticism. Second, following the resignation of 
Walpole as Prime Minister, there was a substantial shift in the administration of the 
Admiralty and an overhaul in the appointments to the Board of Admiralty. From 1742 
until after 1749, the First Lord of the Admiralty was a politician, rather than an admiral. 
Further, some of the individuals who were appointed to the Board had a specific 
philosophy that emphasized discipline that they wanted to impart upon the Navy and 
indeed more widely. These individuals were members of Parliament, both from the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords, and this put them in the perfect place to 
use Parliament's authority to implement changes that were in the Admiralty's interest as 
part of the attributes of the Royal Navy that Parliament had defined since 1660. 
The Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing (1749) was the single most 
important development for the Navy during the 1740s. It must, however, be placed in 
the context of other substantial changes.  In 1661 the professional definitions and 
culture were largely adopted from the existing State's Navy and the focus of the 
amendments to the Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea was on defining the navy's 
structural attributes. In comparison, in 1749 the changes almost entirely focused on the 
Navy's professional culture and specifically the creation of a new institutional 
disciplinary philosophy.686  Between the continued development of the convention 
686  This is much like Blake's push for the creation of the Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea in 
1652.
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definitions, the creation of new statutes that defined court-martial procedures, 
amendments to the existing Articles of War, and the rationalization of the other existing 
statutory definitions, the changes in the 1740s reflected a much more intricately defined 
and complex institution than existed in 1661.  
This chapter will argue that these developments, specifically the Establishments 
and other frameworks for managing the Royal Navy's resources, the Regulations and 
Instructions, and the differentiation of the Royal Navy from the Land Forces, are 
indicative of how the Board of Admiralty and the Navy Board normally defined the 
Navy. In contrast, the statutory definitions for the Royal Navy in this period also reflect 
the ability of the Board of Admiralty to use Parliament to define the Navy of which the 
replacement of the Act for the Establishing Articles in 1749 was the most extreme 
example. It does not represent the maturation or pinnacle of a singular approach to 
defining the navy. 
Still, the rationalization of the Royal Navy's statutory definitions was much more
important than it had been following the Hanoverian Succession, and the continuation 
of the developments that began particularly in the 1730s provides necessary context.  
This chapter begins, therefore, with a discussion of state development, followed by 
changes to the Royal Navy's administration. Then, a discussion of the development of 
the definitions for the Navy is divided thematically, beginning with the development of 
Royal Navy institutional identity. In the 1740s, the Royal Navy became increasingly 
differentiated from the Army, especially in terms of how it was presented to external 
audiences. This is followed by a discussion of the continuation of the frameworks for 
managing the Royal Navy's resources, which highlights continuity from the previous 
period and effectively creates a baseline for the Board of Admiralty and the Navy Board
defining the institution through their traditional means and jurisdictions. This is 
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followed by the discussion of the creation of statute definitions and highlights how the 
active presence of Board of Admiralty members in Parliament extended the authority of 
the Board, in particular, beyond its traditional bailiwick.
 
State Development Context
In 1742, Walpole resigned, and the 'Patriot Whigs' replaced the 'Establishment 
Whigs' in government.687 According to Kinkel, this provided an opportunity for yet 
another faction to gain influence, the Authoritarian Whigs. She describes their 
philosophy in comparison to the other factions as follows: 
Like the Patriot Whigs, they believed that Britain had not gone far enough in
expanding and securing its empire. Unlike the Patriot Whigs, they believed 
that the empire needed to be controlled. Like the Establishment Whigs, they 
did not want to expand access to power either at home or abroad. These 
Authoritarian Whigs advocated policies that emphasized hierarchy and 
discipline, without which they feared Britain would descend into anarchy... 
[R]eligiously, they supported the Anglican church; and in foreign policy, 
they strongly pushed to bring Britain's empire under centralized, 
rationalized control, so that colonies would become ordered, disciplined, 
and obedient.688
These attitudes would guide their efforts at redefining the culture and indeed philosophy
of the British state through statute and policy. Kinkel developed the concept of the 
Authoritarian Whigs, for her PhD thesis.689 This can be slightly problematic, however, 
because they participated in ministries of both the so-called 'Establishment' and 'Patriot' 
Whigs. Nevertheless, her identification of a group of Whigs led by the Duke of Bedford 
and the Earl of Sandwich is convincing, along with her description of their general 
philosophy. It is an idea that has gained currency with other historians and, crucially, it 
is borne out in the definitions created for the RN in this period.690 
687 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 41. 
688 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 42-43.
689 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 4.
690 Jeremy Black, British Politics and Foreign Policy, 1744-1757: Mid-Century Crisis (New York: 
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225
The 1st Earl Wilmington replaced Walpole as 'Prime Minister' although Lord 
Carteret of the 'Patriot Whigs' held real power, and they were in a coalition with 
Walpole's 'Establishment Whig' successors, Henry Pelham, and his brother the Duke of 
Newcastle.691 Following Wilmington's death in 1743, Pelham replaced him and was 
Prime Minister until 1754. This faction was not necessarily ideologically committed to 
the Royal Navy or indeed to naval warfare. Pelham and the Duke of Newcastle both 
spoke against naval war in the 1740s and 1750s.692 Despite this, they formed ministries 
that provided the Authoritarian Whigs substantial control over the Royal Navy's 
administration by naming several of them to the Board of Admiralty. However, that was 
not the limit of their success. Kinkel argues:
In the 1740s, the Duke of Bedford and his parliamentary followers were a 
party on the rise. The party had strong leadership in the House of Lords, 
including Bedford, Sandwich, the Earl of Halifax, the Duke of Bridgwater, 
and the Tory Lord Gower. They had little following in the Commons at the 
election of 1741—only five people—but this increased to sixteen by 1747. 
By 1748, the Authoritarian Whigs controlled four major offices (First Lord 
of the Board of Trade, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department, and Lord Privy Seal) and four lesser ones.693
For this thesis, it is their success with the Board of Admiralty which is particularly 
relevant. The appointment of the Authoritarian Whigs to that Board did not alter the 
reality that it was the ministers of the Cabinet who set foreign policy and determined 
how the Royal Navy was to be used. It was the Board of Admiralty's ability to define 
the Royal Navy's professional aspects and their ability to also use Parliament to define 
the Navy that is also important. Where Kinkel's work identified the Authoritarian Whigs
and described their philosophy and intention to change the Navy, this thesis considers 
the changes they brought forth within the context of the Royal Navy's development 
from 1660 and especially in the 1730s. Likewise, the role of the Duke of York as a 
691 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 116-17.
692 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 119.
693 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 117.
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member of the House of Lords in the creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles in 
1660, and Parliament’s assumption of the Admiralty’s duties after 1688 provide critical 
context for the Board of Admiralty’s use of Parliament to define the Navy.
Another factor that affected state development in this period was the continued 
rule of George II. Like his father, George II maintained an active and personal role in 
the rule and government of Hanover, spending a total of twelve summers there.694 His 
divided loyalties split political opinion in Britain and exacerbated tensions, including 
within the Navy, which came to a head in the period of war from 1738 to 1748.  
At this time, too, although there were few new statutory definitions for the state, 
they reflected an approach that was reflected in the navy. The Wales and Berwick Act of 
1746/7, for example, defined England as including Wales and Berwick-upon-Tweed.695 
This was a sufficiently minor bill that it did not warrant extended comment in the House
of Lords. It received all three readings and was passed in the Lords within the first ten 
days of February 1747.696 Nevertheless, it reveals an attitude about hierarchy, discipline 
and the normalization of legislation that is also represented in the Royal Navy's 
development in this period. 
Thus, the political atmosphere at end of Walpole's long tenure as 'Prime Minister'
provided an opportunity for the Authoritarian Whigs to gain a greater influence over the 
Royal Navy. Their desire to redefine the British state's political culture is reflected in the
changes made to the Articles of War in 1749 and was also a reflection of Britain's 
greater international reach as a state with interventionist foreign policy.
Defining The Navy
694 Andrew C. Thompson, George II: King and Elector (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) 6.
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The Naval Administration
In March 1742, the Earl of Winchelsea, another member of the 'Patriot Whigs' 
replaced Admiral Charles Wager who had been First Lord of the Admiralty since 1733.  
This was an important change because an unbroken succession of Royal Navy admirals 
had served as First Lord since October 1714. 
In 1744, Commodore George Anson returned (with a substantially diminished 
squadron) from his mission to the Pacific Ocean and was made a public and political 
hero. This coincided with one of the few clean sweeps of the Board of Admiralty. On 27
December of that year, all but one were replaced. New members included the Duke of 
Bedford as First Lord, the Earl of Sandwich, and the newly returned Anson as a naval 
Lord. In 1748, the Duke of Bedford became Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, and he was replaced as First Lord by the Earl of Sandwich.697 These 
individuals were members of the Authoritarian Whigs who were able to influence the 
British state's political culture and philosophy.698 These changes placed individuals, 
specifically Anson, who were determined to change the nature of the Royal Navy's 
professional culture, into positions that allowed them to do so. It did not fundamentally 
change the structure of the Navy's administration nor its basic relationship with the 
Parliament or the Cabinet.
Defining Institutional Identity
Twenty-five years sharing a monarch with Hanover did not put the associated 
issues to bed for the British state or for the Royal Navy. During this phase of the Royal 
Navy's development, the comparison of two prominent examples of British victories, 
697 'Lord High Admiral and Commissioners of the Admiralty 1660-1870,' in Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 4, Admiralty Officials 1660-1870, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-
holders/vol4/pp18-31.
698 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 112.
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only one of which was used for a Royal Navy warship name, illustrate how the king's 
dual crowns complicated matters. 
In 1747, a newly-built warship was supposed to be named Culloden, to celebrate
the victory over the Jacobite resistance to the Hanoverian government, but that ship was
renamed the Prince Henry to celebrate the birth of Frederick Prince of Wales' sixth child
and fourth son.699 Culloden's significance was undimmed, of course, and the name was 
used later that same year for another third-rate ship, one that would become one of the 
Royal Navy's first 74-gun ships.700 This was entirely within the established precedents 
for naming warships for British and royal victories. For example, the Salisbury had been
renamed Preston in 1715 to honour the victory over the Jacobites there.701 
The Jacobite rebellion was not the only armed conflict in which Britain was 
engaged, nor was Culloden the only important British victory with personal importance 
to the monarch. The War of the Austrian Succession included, for the first time since the
War of the Spanish Succession, a significant British army fighting in continental 
Europe. In 1743, George II had personally led the joint British/Hanoverian Army at 
Dettingen, where they achieved victory over the French. Given this involvement in the 
battle, it would have made sense, building on the precedent established by the ships 
named for William III's victories such as the Boyne, and ships such as Ramillies named 
for the Duke of Marlborough's victories, for a ship to named after Dettingen. Curiously, 
however, this did not happen. 
The War of Austrian Succession raised uncomfortable questions about George 
II's Hanoverian persona and responsibilities. Although commemorated as the last battle 
in which a British monarch personally led a British Army, this is really an 
oversimplified interpretation that lacks important context. The British forces were in 
699 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 172.
700 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 56.
701 Winfield, British Warships 1714-1792, 138.
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Europe as part of a combined force, the 'Pragmatic Army' composed of the forces of the 
nations that supported the 'Pragmatic Sanction' of 1713. The British regiments were part
of the allied army along with the Hanoverian and the Austrian forces. Indeed, the British
forces were roughly equal within the army to those of their two allies. Further, although 
the English army was under General Lord Stair before the King’s arrival, Hanoverian 
officers were effectively in command.702 Recall that in 1743, the 'Patriot Whigs', who 
were opposed to pro-Hanoverian politics, held the office of Prime Minister.703
At Dettingen, George II commanded an allied army, rather than a British army, 
but this technicality did not matter when he wore a yellow, rather than red sash, 
expressing a primary identity as Elector of Hanover, rather than King of Great Britain.704
The victory at Dettingen, while celebrated in Britain, was nevertheless a topic of fierce 
debate over the relationship between Britain and Hanover. There was both high-minded 
debate over the reality of union and more public partisan attacks which pointed out that 
the yellow sash associated with Hanover was also the colour of cowardice.705 Given the 
ferocity of this debate, it is perhaps understandable that a warship was not named 
Dettingen. In comparison, Culloden was a much less controversial symbol because the 
battle had been one of the British monarchy defending itself from usurpers. That a ship 
was named to celebrate Culloden but not Dettingen is an indication of how 
contemporary politics influenced the creation and expression of the Royal Navy's 
institutional identity and the relationship between Parliament and the Monarchy in the 
use of the royal association with the Royal Navy. 
While the use of warship names to express royal symbols and associations was 
built on firmly established precedents that dated to the Restoration (and well before), the
702 Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire 1700-1837 (Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 120. 
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differentiation of the Royal Navy from the land forces and the expression of Royal 
Navy officer profession as an aspect of institutional identity were much newer. These 
two definitions were clearly influenced and in some ways instigated by the operational 
experiences of the War of Jenkins' Ear and War of the Austrian Succession. In both 
cases, they marked a transition from developments largely aimed at internal audiences 
to those aimed at external audiences.
As discussed in the previous chapter, in 1734 an instruction had been made to 
provide some equivalencies so that forts and garrisons could provide the appropriate 
respects to flag officers. That was created for an external audience, specifically the land 
forces. However, it was a limited definition, and there was no formal system that fully 
defined how officers in the Royal Navy or land forces compared in rank. Further, there 
were no definitions regarding their authority in the others service. A November 1747 
memo further explained the issue:
The experience of this as well as of former wars having long shown the 
inconveniences arising from the want of an establishment of rank and 
precedence between your Majesty's sea and land officers ... 
[A regulation of 1734 concerning marks of respect to be paid to flag officers
by land forces in the forts and garrisons]... serves to show the necessity of 
having one more complete, which should comprehend all the sea 
commission officers and settle their respective ranks parallel with the army 
according to the quality and trust of the posts they serve in; and by 
ascertaining the distinction they have a right to, not only animate them to 
support the dignity of their rank by a proper deportment and distinction in 
their several stations, but be attended with many good consequences to your 
Majesty's service; in particular, when it shall be necessary for the seamen 
and land forces to act together ...706
The result was an order-in-council from 10 February 1747/8 which laid out the 
relationship between the officers' ranks of the Royal Navy and the land forces in more 
detail. In addition to those comparisons already mentioned, captains with three or more 
years’ seniority in a post-ship were compared to colonels, while those with less were 
706 'Admiralty Memorial to the King in Council' 13 November 1747 in Baugh, Naval Administration 
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lieutenant-colonels. Captains without appointment to post-ships were rated as majors, 
naval lieutenants as captains.707 Interestingly, it was ordered that, amongst the same 
class of rank, for example naval lieutenants and land forces captains, seniority was to be
determined by the date of commission, the same as the Navy's internal procedures.708 
The final clause of the order was as follows:
That nothing in this Regulation shall give any Pretence to any Land Officer 
to command any of His Majesty's Squadrons or Ships; nor to any Sea-
Officer to command at Land, nor shall either have a Right to demand the 
Military Honours due to their respective Ranks, unless such officers are 
upon actual Service.709
This instruction differentiated the Royal Navy from the land forces by explicitly 
limiting authority to within their own institution and by fully defining how each 
professional hierarchy related to the other. These new definitions, written for the Royal 
Navy, were created with external audiences in mind. 
The same issues, and the same sense of socio-professional difference, informed 
the roughly concurrent creation of uniforms for the Royal Navy. During Anson's voyage
to the Pacific, he had seen how uniforms could be useful for Royal Navy officers in 
duties that required them to go ashore and be impressive.710 Amy Miller argues that:
The officers of the Royal Navy originally wanted a uniform to distinguish 
them by rank, but also to ensure their status within society ashore might be 
made clear. They wanted a uniform that would serve them instantly as 
officers in the King's service so that they may gain respect appropriate to 
this role. Additionally, a dress uniform based on court clothing …. provided 
a visual construct of refinement, a quality not often associated with officers 
or ratings.711
This is reinforced by the presence of contemporary documents that reflected the Royal 
Navy's operational interactions with land forces. In the November 1747 Admiralty 
memo to the King-in-Council quoted above, there had been an additional item, crossed 
707 'Regulations and Instructions' NA Kew, ADM 7/202 f227.
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out, requesting a naval uniform.712 Further, there was a letter from 'the admirals, captains
and lieutenants of His Majesty's royal navy', which included the following request:
We do also beg leave to make it our request to your Lordships that an 
uniform military clothing be appointed, thereby to distinguish the rank of 
each officer from the other; and with regard to petty officers, if no rank 
should be thought proper to be given them with the army, yet that every 
person acting in quality of mate or midshipman may carry that appearance 
which is necessary to distinguish it as the post of a gentleman, as well as to 
give him a better credit and figure in his command, we beg leave to 
recommend it to their Lordships to appoint an uniform military clothing for 
them.713
This letter was signed by four flag officers, 26 captains and 45 lieutenants.714 Clearly 
this was important to Royal Navy officers collectively, although the Admiralty did not 
implement it until the next year. The instruction implementing uniforms described the 
reasoning as follows:
Whereas we judge it necessary, in order the better to distinguish the Ranks 
of Sea Officers, to establish a Military Uniform Clothing... in order to 
carrying the appearance which is necessary to distinguish their Class to be 
Gentlemen...715
Just like the previous example, the creation of Royal Navy officer uniforms was largely 
for external audiences. As shown, it was the increased interaction between the Royal 
Navy and land forces that created both operational and socio-professional reasons for 
the Royal Navy officer profession to have its own visual identifying markings. This 
would not only happen on land, because the Transport Board had been abolished 
following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, which made the Royal Navy 
responsible for transporting land forces troops abroad. This brought both institutions 
into very close contact aboard ship for extended phases of time.716 In this period, the 
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land forces were again deployed abroad and indeed on a much wider variety of fronts 
than they had been during William III's wars against Louis XIV. This resulted in the 
land forces having definitions created that provide direction comparisons to the Royal 
Navy's structural definitions as rationalized in the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing. The analysis of that act later in this chapter will include further comparisons 
between the Royal Navy's statutory definitions and the land forces' equivalents. 
Managing Institutional Resources
Although between 1715 and 1740 the Board of Admiralty and Navy Board had 
defined the Royal Navy so that it could respond to the demands placed on it by the 
ministers of the Cabinet, the solutions were not completely implemented and 
frameworks created had not entirely solved the existing issues. After 1740, the 
Establishment of Dimensions and the methods for increasing the number of junior 
officers and superannuating non-useful officers continued to be developed, along with 
the Regulations and Instructions.  
The final major Establishment of Dimensions was promulgated in 1745, in 
response to several years of combat in the War of the Austrian Succession. The prelude 
to the creation of the 1745 Establishment of Dimensions included much consultation, 
including from respected senior officers. A letter from Admiral Vernon in June 1744 
brings to light the process, as well as the issues that were identified. 
If what we meet in the public prints be true, of the French ships Captain 
Martin was detached out singly to chase, and by whom he was taken, after a 
gallant defence against so superior a power, one of them is called of 68 guns
and said to have had seven hundred men, and the other 64 guns and 650 
men. But if we had the opportunity of knowing the dimensions of their 
sixty-four gun ships, I doubt not but the[y] would be found of greater 
dimensions than those we call such with us, and at least as big as our 
seventy-gun ships. For they don't generally crowd their ships with guns as 
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we do, in which I think them much in the right, and that we cripple our ships
by it, without any real convenience arising from it.717
This confirms the documents and the trends from the previous chapter, where the Royal 
Navy's warships were lengthened and expanded to improve upon their sailing and 
handling qualities. Later in his letter, Vernon blamed the Royal Navy's apparent 
stagnation on Sir Jacob Acworth, who had held the office of the Surveyor of the Navy 
since 1715 and was largely responsible for the contents of the Establishments.718 
And fear his usurping the whole direction, or having been permitted to do it.
With his too much pride and self-sufficiency to be capable of being better 
informed, and too little good sense or solid judgment for being capable of 
directing all himself, [he] has made ours a declining navy in the art of 
shipbuilding, at a time when both Spain as well as France have been greatly 
improving in it.719
This was a criticism of both the Establishments and the role of the Surveyor of the Navy
in their creation. Vernon also proposed that each of the builders of the royal dockyards, 
as well as the private shipyards should be able to submit designs in competition for the 
selection of the best design and the promotion of shipbuilding.720
In November 1745, an ad-hoc committee of senior officers submitted the new 
Establishment to the Admiralty. While the entire document is too long to quote in any 
substantive way, portions do speak to the development process and the consideration of 
the Establishment. 
We shall now proceed to acquaint your Lordships that the Master 
Shipwrights, having in pursuance of our order prepared the principal 
scantlings for a ship of each class, which, being both larger and stronger 
than those now in use, were approved of by us; but in order to those ships 
being brought to one uniform size and standard... and sending them 
herewith... do offer it as our opinion to your Lordships that they should be 
717 'Admiral Edward Vernon to Admiralty Secretary 18 June 1744' in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-
1750, 223-24
718 "Principal officers and commissioners," in Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Volume 7, Navy Board 
Officials 1660-1832, ed. J M Collinge (London: University of London, 1978), 18-25. British History 
Online, accessed September 12, 2016, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol7/pp18-25.
719 'Admiral Edward Vernon to Admiralty Secretary 18 June 1744' in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-
1750, 224-25
720 'Admiral Edward Vernon to Admiralty Secretary 18 June 1744' in Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-
1750,  224.
235
fixed as standards or establishments, and that there should not be the least 
variation therein till experiments have been made of their qualities; for in 
our opinion such care hath been taken in the construction of these bodies 
that they will answer every service for which they are designed721
The suggestion that 'there should not be in the last variation therein', was completely 
unlike the development that had previously occurred. The corresponding changes to the 
Establishment for Guns was discussed in an April 1748 memo from the Admiralty to the
King-in-Council:
Your Majesty having been pleased by your Order in Council dated the 25th 
of April 1743 to direct that 64 and 58 guns should be carried on board two 
classes of ships of your royal navy, but the dimensions of ships of those 
classes being enlarged in consequence of the establishment directed to be 
observed by your Majesty's Order in Council dated the 27th March 1746 so 
as to be built for carrying 70 and 60 guns; we do humbly propose that your 
Majesty will please to direct that the said number of 70 and 60 guns of the 
natures undermentioned may be established, instead of 64 and 58, for the 
ships of those classes in your Majesty's royal navy722
This piecemeal approach to the Establishment of Dimensions exacerbated the lack of 
rationalization with other Establishments. This is a reflection of the reality that creating 
consistency amongst the Navy’s ships was a much more substantial proposition than 
producing a single, centralized set standards for Royal Navy officers. The continued 
development of the  Establishments in different documents provides an interesting 
counterpoint to the rationalization seen in both the Regulations and Instructions and in 
the statutory definitions. 
The Board of Admiralty's development of measures for managing Royal Navy 
officers as a resource also continued after 1740. Like the Establishments, this provides 
context because it involves the creation of professional definitions, which were at the 
focus of the amendments made to the Articles of War.
721 'Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Officers to Admiralty Board 27 November 1745' in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 230-31.
722 'Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Officers to Admiralty Board 27 November 1745' in Baugh, Naval 
Administration 1715-1750, 233.
236
The pensions scheme the Board of Admiralty had created for superannuating the 
most senior lieutenants did not entirely solve the problem. Indeed, it was equally a 
problem for higher ranks as it was for lieutenants. It was entirely possible to promote 
younger officers to flag rank in preference to senior officers. However, this practice was
not without issues, as the Admiralty noted in 1747. The following is an Admiralty 
Memorandum, of 7 March 1746/47:
May it please your Majesty,
It having been long a complaint among the captains in the navy, and a 
matter of great discontentment to them, that notwithstanding the length of 
their services, it happens to several of them to see themselves superseded by
junior captains being made flag officers over their heads; and this in many 
cases where no positive misbehaviour of theirs could be alleged or any 
neglect of duty, whilst they were in the service. But as on the other hand it 
would be attended with great prejudice to the service and danger to the 
public if, from a single regard to length of service, captains should be 
preferred to be made flag officers whose age or want of capacity render 
them unequal ...723
This memorandum proposed a new mechanism for the removal of officers from the 
seniority list:
We do therefore humbly propose: that at the next promotion of flag officers, 
such captains in the navy who from their seniority shall happen to be set 
aside by such promotion, as well as those who have been already set aside 
by former promotions and those who shall hereafter be set aside by future 
promotions, be appointed by commissions from us to be rear admirals in 
general terms, without expressing any squadron or division of colours used 
in the fleet; that they be esteemed as superannuated sea officers, and placed 
for the rest of their lives on the Ordinary Estimate of the Navy with a 
pension equal to the half pay of a rear admiral.724
 This new measure accomplished several things; first, it would allow for the 
superannuation of captains who would never be employed as flag officers, and who 
would also not be content to be passed over for promotion. Second, it created a 
mechanism that would do so and provide a way for those officers to have a satisfactory 
pension, specifically the half-pay of a rear-admiral. Third, it was consistent with the 




Royal Navy's established half-pay practices and directly built upon the rules created for 
superannauated lieutenants. Finally, this was an example of the application of the 
'Authoritative Whigs' new discipline-first philosophy in that it would allow the Board of
Admiralty to not employ officers who did not reflect the level of discipline that Anson 
and others desired. This measure has been linked to the failures of the Battle of Toulon, 
but it must be considered in the context of the framework created for managing the 
Royal Navy's supplies of Lieutenants in the 1730s as well as the Royal Navy's other 
assets.725 
This development, along with the framework for the superannuation of 
lieutenants created in 1737, the creation of the Naval Academy in 1733, and the 
development of the Establishment of Dimensions, was part of the classic pattern of 
development for the Royal Navy since the Restoration: piecemeal definitions created in 
response to specific issues and pressures. As with the un-rationalized Establishments, 
this was not produced as part of a single document that defined Royal Navy doctrine for
how the Admiralty managed its professional assets from the beginning of officers' 
careers to their end. 
The differences between the further development of the Establishments and the 
framework for superannuating captains, and the rationalization of much of the Royal 
Navy's definitions in the Regulations and Instructions are a reflection of the scale of the 
intended audience. The Rules and Instructions was designed to be a package set for the 
Navy's officers to be able to consult when necessary. The rationalization of the Articles 
of War in 1749 create a similar, standard and handy package. Indeed, these packages 
were easier to parse than handbooks published for Royal Navy officer use in the 1740s, 
such as Signals for the Royal Navy and Ships Under Convoy. These contained the 
725 “Anson, George, Baron Anson (1697–1762),” N. A. M. Rodger in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. David 
Cannadine, May 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/574 (accessed October 27, 2016).
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Articles of War as published in 1661 as well as other Statutes that defined the Navy.726 
Neither the diverse Establishments nor the procedures for superannuating officers 
required that size of audience. Indeed they were documents that would be limited to the 
Admiralty, the Navy Board and its dockyards, and to the Ordnance. They could be kept 
distinct and referred to as needed. 
Statutory Definitions: Defining the Royal Navy's Institutional Culture
Following the appointment of the Authoritarian Whigs to the Board of 
Admiralty, there were three pieces of legislation that created new statutory definitions 
for the Royal Navy. Two acts, in 1744 and 1748, provided further definitions for courts-
martial proceedings as well as the Royal Navy's authority ashore. They were (relatively)
quickly repealed and replaced along with the other statutory definitions still in effect in 
1749. However, these first two acts are important because they do show the influence of
the Admiralty on Parliament to define the Royal Navy. Indeed, they the first two Acts 
build up to the much more substantial and significant Act for Amending, Explaining and
Reducing passed in 1749.
The first piece of legislation that defined the Royal Navy in this period of 
development was the 1744/5 Act for the further regulating and better Government of 
His Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea: and for regulating the 
Proceedings upon Courts-Martial in the Sea Service.727 This was the first supplementary
legislation to lay out rules for courts-martial proceedings. On 8 April 1745, it was 
moved that 'That Leave be given to bring in a Bill ſor explaining and amending an Act, 
made in the 13th Year of the Reign of King Charles the Second,' and so a committee 
726 'Signals for the Royal Navy and Ships under Convoy, sailing and fighting instructions, Articles of 
War, Regulations etc., with the additional signals of Adm Vernon and the flags of all nations, 1748' 
NMM HOL/13
727 HMSO, Public General Acts, 18 Geo. II, Vol. 35, 1744-45. 637.
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was formed in the House of Commons, led by George Grenville and Sir John Hind 
Cotton.728 It was sent to the House of Lords on the 24th of April, and returned with 
alteration on the 29th after several discussions on the Act. The next day, the House of 
Lords passed the bill.729 
This was a rather short piece of legislation, of which only the second paragraph 
contained new content. However, what it contained was substantial. For example, those 
who failed to serve as witnesses were to forfeit £100, and matters of perjury or attempts 
to pervert were to be prosecuted before the King's Bench. The act also provided that 
crewmen waiting courts-martial were still be to be paid until they were discharged. 
Further, the authority of the Articles of War was to be extended to crews of wrecked 
ships, although not those of ships taken by the enemy.730 The act also partially integrated
courts-martial with the established English legal code. For example, perjury would be 
punishable by death under the 1729 Perjury Act.731 Yet, the Court of King's Bench was 
not given jurisdiction over courts-martial themselves, unlike under the statute of 
1694.732   These new definitions were important and set precedents for the next act, 
but what is more important is that this act was the first statute that implemented the 
Authoritarian Whigs’ focus on discipline. There are several pieces of evidence for this. 
First is the leading role of George Grenville, who was a Commissioner for the 
Admiralty, in the creation of the bill. Further, both the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of 
728 House of Commons, Journals of the House of Commons Vol 24, 25 June 1741 to 19 September 1745 
(London: House of Commons, 1803) 859.
729 Journals of the House of Commons Vol 24, 881.  'House of Lords Journal Volume 26: April 1745, 21-
30,' in Journal of the House of Lords Volume 26, 1741-1746 (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1767-1830), 485-494, accessed December 24, 2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-
jrnl/vol26/pp485-494
730 Ruffhead, Ed. Statutes at Large, Vol VI, 3 Geo. II to 20 Geo II.  (London: Mark Basket, 1764) 637.
731 Ruffhead, Ed. Statutes at Large, Vol V, 1 Geo. I to 3 Geo II.  (London: Mark Basket, 1763), 699. 
732 "William and Mary, 1694: An Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall [Chapter 
XXV Rot. Parl. pt. 5. nu. 5.]," in Statutes of the Realm: Volume 6, 1685-94, ed. John Raithby (s.l: 
Great Britain Record Commission, 1819), 507. British History Online, accessed April 27, 2017, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol6/p507a.
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Sandwich were present in the House of Lords for the vote.733 Anson was already an MP 
for Hedon, in Yorkshire.734
The second piece of evidence is the final sentence of the first paragraph:
And whereas by reason of some Defects in the said At of parliament, and in 
the Constitution and Proceedings of such Courts-Martial,.. several Crimes 
and Offences... may escape Punishment to the great Prejudice and 
Dishonour of these Kingdoms, Therefore for the remedying and supply the 
said Defects, and for maintaining a proper and strict Government and 
Discipline of His Majesty' Navy...735
This language directly addressed the focus of the Authoritarian Whigs. This statute was 
wartime legislation and was directly influenced by operational results. At the same time 
that Parliament was debating what would become of the Act for the further regulating, it
was also actively investigating the fallout of the Battle of Toulon, which was regarded 
as a disastrous failure for the Royal Navy. The content of this legislation clearly marks it
as something the Admiralty would want passed, but it also contains definitions that 
could not have been implemented without Parliament's authority to define the 
relationship between the Royal Navy and the state as a whole. 
For example, the Board of Admiralty could use its own authority to create 
regulations that the flag officers who convened a court-martial could not preside or that 
witnesses who failed to appear could be fined. Indeed, the definitions contained in this 
act built directly on those contained in the 1731 Regulations and Instructions and which
remained intact through the 1746 edition.736 However, making courts-martial subject to 
the Perjury Act, giving the Court of King’s Bench jurisdiction over those who 
committed perjury during a court-martial, and extending the authority of the Admiralty 
733 'House of Lords Journal Volume 26: April 1745, 21-30,' in Journal of the House of Lords Volume 26, 
1741-1746 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 485-494, accessed December 24, 
2015, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol26/pp485-494
734 “Anson, George, Baron Anson (1697–1762),” N.A.M. Rodger in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography.
735 HMSO, Public General Acts, 18 Geo. II, Vol. 35, 1744-45. 637.
736 Privy Council, Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea 1731, 3-6. Privy
Council, Regulations and Instructions Relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea 1734, 3-6. 
'Regulations and Instructions' NA Kew, ADM 7/202 f3-6.
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to those ships were lost or wrecked required Parliament’s ability to redefine the 
relationship between the State and the Navy.
Following the passage of this legislation, a number of captains were tried and 
court-martialled and cashiered for their actions at the Battle of Toulon. In 1747, Admiral
Thomas Mathews was also tried at court-martial, and he too was cashiered.737 This 
legislation provided additional courts-martial procedures than had existed previously 
and would have been used for those courts-martial. However, it did not fully address the
issues with Royal Navy discipline, nor did it change the Articles of War themselves.
In 1748, An Act for further regulating the proceedings upon Courts-martial in 
the Sea Service; and for extending the Discipline of the Navy to the Crews of His 
Majesty's Ships, wrecked, lost or taken; and for continuing to them their Wages upon 
certain Conditions continued the expansion of authority.  This was a much more 
substantial piece of legislation than the 1745 Act, nearly eight pages in length compared
to two paragraphs. Like the previous act, this one resulted from the efforts of the 
members of the Board of Admiralty in Parliament. Indeed, in February 1747 William 
Barrington, George Greville and William Ponsonby (then Lord Duncannon) were all 
made part of the committee that created the bill.738 Lords Barrington and Duncannon 
had been appointed to the Board of Admiralty in June, 1746.739 
This second act was partially created in response the return to England of the 
former crew of HMS Wager. The Wager had been wrecked in 1741 during Anson's 
expedition to the Pacific Ocean, and the loss of the ship had resulted in a loss of 
discipline. In 1746, when the crew returned to England, there was discussion of court-
737 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 242-245.
738 House of Commons, Journals of the House of Commons, Vol 25,  October 17, 1745- November 22 
1750 (House of Commons, 1803), 530. 
739 "Lord High Admiral and Commissioners of the Admiralty 1660-1870," in Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 4, Admiralty Officials 1660-1870, ed. J C Sainty (London: University of London, 
1975), 18-31. British History Online, accessed April 22, 2017, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-
holders/vol4/pp18-31
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martialling them but under the terms of the existing statutes, there was no authority to 
do so. The difference with the Wager mutiny was that it had occurred after the wreck of 
the ship, and the mutineers argued that the wreck of the ship meant that they were no 
longer in active service or being paid and therefore were no longer under the jurisdiction
of the Articles of War.740 
[W]ith respect to the Crews of such of his Majesty's Ships that are wrecked, 
or any otherwise lost or destroyed, from the Time of their being so wrecked,
lost or destroyed, and all the Pay and Wages of the Officers and Seaman of 
such ship or ships cease and determine at the same Time; which is attended 
with many great Inconveniences with respect to his Majesty's ships741
The futile attempts to court-martial the mutineers, rather than the loss of the Wager 
itself, more directly led to the passage of the Act for further regulating the proceedings 
upon Courts-martial. Following the creation of this statutory definition, it was not 
retroactively applied to the 'mutineers' from the Wager, largely over public controversy 
relating to Vernon's dismissal from the flag list in April 1746. As a member of 
Parliament, Vernon had been critical of the Board of Admiralty and Ministry after his 
return to England in 1743, and the publication of two pamphlets publicly criticizing the 
Admiralty resulted in his being cashiered.742
While the circumstances are important, the contents of the bill are even more so. 
In the previous Act, the new content was listed in a quick series of clauses in a single 
paragraph. This substantially builds upon the section that defines who may hold a court-
martial, court-martial procedures, and indeed the expanded applicability of the Articles 
of War to the crews of wrecked and lost ships. For example, from the short phrase which
in the 1745 act stated that the Lord High Admiral or Commissioners could themselves 
grant commissions to hold courts-martial, the 1748 legislation contained six paragraphs 
740 S.W.C. Pack, The Wager Mutiny (London: Alvin Redman, 1964) 246.
741 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 36, 21 Geo. II, 588
742 Richard Harding, ‘Edward Vernon, 1684-1757’ in Precursor's of Nelson: British Admirals of the 
Eighteenth Century, Peter Le Fevre & Richard Harding Eds. (London: Stackpole Books, 2000) 173-
74. 
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upon the same subject. These delineated what would happen if the admiral had to resign
their commission and the delegation of authority to hold courts-martial to senior officers
of detached squadrons amongst others.743 The bill then continued with multiple 
paragraphs that provided an extensive outline to court-martial proceedings including 
how they should be composed with different numbers of senior officers available. 
Further, the Act contained new oaths to be taken by the members of the court-martial 
and repealed the section of the 1690 Act concerning the Commissioners of the 
Admiralty that contained such oaths.744
The final section of the act addressed the scenario of the Wager mutineers:
... all the Powers given by the several Articles of War, Rules, Orders and 
Directions established by the said Act above-mentioned shall remain and be 
in full force with respect to the Crews of such of his Majesty's ships as shall 
be wrecked, or be otherwise lost or destroyed, and all the command, power 
and authority given to the Officers of the said ship or ships, shall remain and
be in full force, as effectually as if such ship or ships to which they did 
belong were not so wrecked, lost or destroyed... 745
Further, it was ordered that the crews were to be paid for the time after the ship was lost 
if they were found to have behaved well.746 This directly built on the language contained
in the Act for the Establishing Articles that limited courts-martial to those actively on 
duty aboard warships. 
These two acts not only applied the Authoritarian Whigs’ new philosophy of 
discipline to the Navy, but they were also smaller-scale examples of the how the Board 
of Admiralty could use Parliament to directly define the Navy. These two pieces of 
legislation were the last created to supplement the Act for the Establishing Articles 
before it was replaced in 1749. 
Replacing and Amending the Articles of War
743 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 36, 21 Geo. II, 583-585
744 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 36, 21 Geo. II, 585-588, 590
745 HMSO, Public General Acts Vol. 36, 21 Geo. II, 589
746 Ibid.
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In 1922 Reginald Acland, the former Judge Advocate General, argued that 'the 
changes made in the [1749] Articles of War were slight, were chiefly verbal, or dealt 
with punishments.'747 Acland did not appreciate the significance of the changes, because 
the process of repealing and replacing the Act for the Establishing Articles was an 
unprecedented action in the Royal Navy's development process. For the first time since 
the Restoration, the most important of the Royal Navy's defining statutes was not just 
supplemented or expanded upon, but entirely replaced. 
Like the Act for the Establishing Articles, the Act for Amending Explaining and 
Reducing into One Act was strongly driven by individuals and personalities. Due largely
to his success during the circumnavigation of the world in the early 1740s and the Battle
of Cape Finisterre of 1747, Anson had a lot of respect and influence. He had been 
appointed Vice-Admiral of England and was ennobled as the 1st Baron Anson. His 
position on the Board of Admiralty and in the House of Lords provided him the 
opportunity to be the singular driving force behind the replacement of the Articles of 
War. Indeed, Horatio (Horace) Walpole noted in a 1749 letter to Sir Horace Mann, a 
British diplomat in Italy that Anson's efforts on behalf of the Act had essentially 
exhausted the opposition:
Our debates on the two military bills, the naval one of which is not yet 
finished, have been so tedious, that they have rather whittled down the 
Opposition, than increased it... This bill was chiefly of Anson's projecting, 
who grows every day into new unpopularity.748
Anson's role personally driving the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducting built 
upon role of the Board of Admiralty's MPs in directly contributing to the previous two 
pieces of legislation. It is, indeed, the extreme example of this trend, in that he 
personally was identified so strongly with the bill in Parliament.
747 Acland, 'Naval Articles of War', 200.
748 The Letters of Horace Walpole, Earl of Orford: Including Numerous Letters First Published from the 
Original Manuscripts Vol. II 1744-53, (London: Richard Bentley, 1840) 263-4 Letter to Sir Horace 
Mann, 23 March 1749
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To implement a new institutional, and specifically professional, culture would 
require more than another supplementary statute. Indeed, these definitions Anson sought
to change were explicitly stated in the Act for Establishing Articles. This, then, required 
the full repeal of the Act for the Establishing Articles. Such a fundamental change 
naturally triggered the broader effort to incorporate all the additional legislation within 
the new document as well. In this way, Anson's ambitions also required each of those 
prior laws to be repealed.
As expressed in the title, the 1749 legislation performed three functions. 
Although the 'amending' aspect is the part that has received the most attention, it also 
contained greater explanation of Royal Navy processes, and rationalized the Royal 
Navy's statutory definitions into a single act. The analysis of the Act for Amending, 
Explaining and Reducing discusses each individually in order to put them into 
perspective.
Amending
Anson's amendments to the Articles of War reflected his disappointment in the 
Royal Navy's captains who failed to perform their duty as expected. He did not respond 
by simply increasing the maximum punishments. Rather, the introduction of 'mandatory
minimums' would be the best way to summarize the changes in the Royal Navy's 
punitive measures.  The ceiling for many offences was already the death penalty under 
the 1661 Articles of War, though considerable leeway was permitted in sentencing.749 
Unable to increase that, Anson's amendments removed clauses that allowed courts-
martial freedom to determine sentences. In the case of the determination of guilt, the 
members of courts-martial now had their options limited by minimum as well as 
749 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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maximum sentences.750  For some offences, there was only one possible sentence: death.
The maximum penalty was increased to death only in those cases where the court-
martial retained the power to determine its own sentences. 
Important changes can be detected in the subtle alterations of the wording of 
specific articles. These reveal that Anson (and the Authoritarian Whigs) were concerned 
with consolidating socio-professional developments in addition to changing 
punishments. The articles that were most substantially altered deal with expectations for
behaviour in combat. The most important alterations were obviously the adjustment of 
the penalties. However, the language within the articles was often reorganized so that 
they were more clearly stated and altered so to have more inclusive language. Article X,
which addressed preparation of ships for combat, and Article XII, which set the standard
for the 'intensity' which proclaimed the penalties for 'failure to engage at the expected 
intensity' are two excellent examples of Anson's primary amendments.
In the 1661 version, Article X was rendered as follows
Every Captain or Commander who upon signall or order of fight or view or 
sight of any Ships of the Enemy Pirate or Rebell or likelihood of 
Engagement shall not put all things in his Ship in a fitt posture for fight and 
shall not in his owne person and according to his place hearten and 
encourage the Inferior Officers and common men to fight couragiously and 
not to behave themselves faintly shall bee casheire And if he or they shall 
yield to the Enemy Pirate or Rebells or cry for quarter he or they soe doeing 
shall suffer the paines of death or such other punishment as the offence shall
deserve.751
There were several alterations in the 1749 version:
Every Flag Officer, Captain, and Commander in the Fleet, who, upon Signal
or Order of Fight, or Sight of any Ship which it may be his Duty to engage, 
or who, upon Likelihood of Engagement, shall not make the necessary 
Preparations for Fight, and shall not in his own Person, and according to his 
Place, encourage the inferior Officers and Men to fight courageously, shall 
suffer Death, or such other Punishment, as from the Nature and Degree of 
the Offence a Court-martial shall deem him to deserve; and if any Person in 
750 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
751 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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the Fleet shall treacherously or cowardly yield or cry for Quarter, every 
Person so offending, and being convicted thereof by the Sentence of a 
Court-martial, shall suffer Death.752
The amendments in 1749 clarified the article, which described two behaviours as 
contrary to the Articles of War. The first proscribed behaviour was failure to fight, or to 
prepare to fight, or to encourage one's crew to fight. In 1660, this was punishable by 
dismissal from the service. In 1749, the maximum penalty was raised to death. The 
second offence within the article was surrendering from cowardice, which in 1660 was 
punishable by death or a lesser sentence, but in 1749 was only punishable by death. A 
new addition to the 1749 version was the specification of 'treacherously or cowardly 
yield', which would provide room to excuse those who had surrendered honourably 
from punishment under this clause. 
Article XII addressed a similar topic, and appeared in the 1661 Articles as 
follows
Every Captaine and all other Officers Mariners and Souldiers of every Ship 
Frigott or Vessell of War that shall in time of any fight or engagement 
withdraw or keepe backe or not come into the fight and engage and do his 
utmost to take fire kill and endamage the Enemy Pirate or Rebells and assist
and releive all and every of His Majesties Ships shall for such offence of 
cowardice or disaffection be tried and suffer paines of death or other 
punishment as the circumstances of the offence shall deserve and the Court 
martiall shall judge fitt.753
This was then revised in 1749 to:
Every Person in the Fleet, who through Cowardice, Negligence, or 
Disaffection, shall in Time of Action withdraw or keep back, or not come 
into the Fight or Engagement, or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy 
every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage, and to assist and relieve all 
and every of his Majesty's Ships, or those of his Allies, which it shall be his 
Duty to assist and relieve, every such Person so offending, and being 
convicted thereof by the Sentence of a Court-martial, shall suffer Death.754
752 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact' 
http://southseas.nla.gov.au/biogs/P000354b.htm, Accessed May 29, 2012. 
753 Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm
754 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact' 
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In this case, only one behaviour is described. Here, as in the second half of Article X in 
1661, the maximum penalty was already death. Again, like the second part of Article X 
in 1749, the minimum penalty was removed, leaving only death.
Both articles show the changes to more inclusive and general descriptions of the 
offences. For example, both halves of the Article X in 1661 refer to the 'enemy pirate or 
rebell,' and in the 1749 version this has been changed to 'any ship which may be his 
duty to engage.'755 Where the 1661 version of Article XII contained 'Every Captaine and 
all other Officers Mariners and Souldiers of every Ship Frigott or Vessell of War' the 
same sentiment became 'Every Person in the Fleet' in the 1749 version.' Similarly, what 
was expressed in the earlier version as 'assist and relieve all and every of His Majesties 
Ships' became ' all and every of his Majesty's Ships, or those of his Allies, which it shall
be his Duty to assist and relieve' in 1749.756 These changes reflected ninety years of 
institutional development and in particular conceptions of the Royal Navy as a 
professional institution. The language in the 1661 act described an institution composed 
of very different professional groups under a single authority, while the language in 
1749 described an institution that was much less internally differentiated.
Another example is Articles XXV (1661) / XXVI (1749), regarding the duty of 
care for the steering of the ship and ship handling. The 1661 version stated:
That care be taken in the conducting and steering of the Ships that through 
wilfulnes negligence or other defaults none of His Majesties Ships be 
stranded or run upon any Rocks or Sands or Split or hazarded upon pain that
such as shall be found guilty therein be punished by Fine imprisonment or 
otherwise as the Offence by a Court martiall shall be adjudged to deserve.757
The 1749 article provided:
755 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.,National Library of 
Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
756 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.. National Library of 
Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
757 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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Care shall be taken in the conducting and steering of any of his Majesty's 
Ships, that through Wilfulness, Negligence, or other Defaults, no Ship be 
stranded or run upon any Rocks or Sands, or split or hazarded, upon Pain, 
that such as shall be found guilty therein, be punished by Death, or such 
other Punishment as the Offence by a Court-martial shall be judged to 
deserve.758
This article again displays Anson's changes to the levels of punishment, and like in the 
first part of Article X in 1749, the maximum penalty for the offense was increased to 
death. In this case, much less of the actual article itself was altered or amended. But for 
the inclusion of punctuation, the list of unacceptable behaviours remained unchanged. 
This was unlike Articles X and XII, where the specific lists of 1661 were replaced with 
a more general description in 1749. This was not an article directly relating to behaviour
in combat, but it referred to maritime aspects of an officer's duties. This reinforces the 
idea that Anson was mostly concerned with addressing Royal Navy officers' behaviour 
in combat, and the ability to punish failure in that situation. Accordingly, the 
punishment for this article was increased as part of the general trend, but did not receive
as detailed changes as, for example, Articles X and XII.
Some articles were modified to emphasize discipline, hierarchy and duty, but 
without changing the punishments. One example is Article XI, in which the original text
from 1661 is:
Every Captaine Commander and other Officer Seaman or Souldier of any 
Shipp Frigott or Vessell of Warre shall duly observe the Commands of the 
Admirall or other his Superior or Commander of any Squadron as well for 
the assailing or setting upon any Fleete Squadron or Ships of the Enemy 
Pirate or Rebells or joyning Battel with them or making defence against 
them as all other the Commands of the Admirall or other his Superior 
Commander upon pain to suffer death or other punishment as the quality of 
his neglect or offence shall deserve.759
It was replaced in 1749 by:
758 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
759 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
1628-80, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
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Every Person in the Fleet, who shall not duly observe the Orders of the 
Admiral, Flag Officer, Commander of any Squadron or Division, or other 
his superior Officer, for assailing, joining Battle with, or making Defence 
against any Fleet, Squadron, or Ship, or shall not obey the Orders of his 
superior Officer as aforesaid in Time of Action, to the best of his Power, or 
shall not use all possible Endeavours to put the same effectually in 
Execution, every such Person so offending, and being convicted thereof by 
the Sentence of the Court-martial shall suffer Death, or such other 
Punishment, as from the Nature and Degree of the Offence a Court-martial 
shall deem him to deserve.760
Just as with Article XII, the list of those subject to its terms became more inclusive. 
More important were the changes that emphasized duty and discipline. The added text 
in the 1749 version emphasizes the importance of full effort in the performance of one's 
duties in battle. Also important was the shift of tone or emphasis. The direct voice in the
text from the Act for the Establishing Articles stresses the positive duties expected to be 
performed, but the text from the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing is 
expressed in the negative, which reflects a greater emphasis on transgression and thus 
punishment. This kind of change in the language is more illustrative of the 
implementation of the Authoritarian Whigs’ intent than the mere increase in 
punishments.
Numerous articles from the Act for the Establishing Articles were not updated in 
the same manner as those examined above. Prominent examples are those dealing with 
the intelligence and letters, specifically Articles III and IV from 1661 and 1749, and 
Article XVIII in 1661, which was renumbered Article V in 1749. In the first two 
articles, the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing retains the language 'Officer, 
mariner or soldier,' and in Article XVIII/V the text 'Captaine Officer Mariner or other of
the Navy or Fleete' is slightly amended to 'Captain, Officer, Mariner, or other in the 
Fleet.'761 The retention of the archaic language, even slightly modified, further 
760 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
761 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
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emphasizes the inconsistent editing and the lack of focus on the articles that did not 
address the issues that Anson was concerned with.
The amendments made in the Royal Navy's Articles of War in 1749 illustrate the 
complexity of the process of updating and replacing a document as critically important 
to the Royal Navy as the Act for the Establishing Articles. The overall nature of the 
amendments, including the inconsistencies, demonstrates that the process was neither 
straightforward nor easy. Indeed, that Anson as an individual was the driving force 
behind the changes suggests one reason for the inconsistencies.762 Although he was able,
through energy and sheer force of personality, to reduce the opposition in Parliament, 
this was not so true for opposition from the Royal Navy officer corps. 
Anson's efforts to make officers on half-pay subject to potential court martial, in 
particular, was an attempt to remove at least one of the limits on the authority of the 
office of Lord High Admiral that had been imposed by the legislation of 1661. Further, 
the Admiralty was frustrated that officers on half-pay were not subject to the Articles of 
War. This allowed officers to avoid unwanted deployments or commissions, or refuse 
employment without punishment.763
The passage of yet another Mutiny Act in 1749 provides important context for 
the use of statutes to define the Royal Navy. On 25 February 1749, the Remembrancer 
published a letter which discussed the extension Articles of War over officers on half-
pay. In particular, it asked: 
If officers in half-pay are to be equally subject to discipline, and to 
command, as if in actual full pay, what necessity is there to put the nation to 
the expense of whole pay?764
762 The Letters of Horace Walpole, 232/263 Letters from 4 & 19 March 1749s
763 Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 39.
764 E. Cave, Ed. The Gentleman's Magazine, and Historical Chronicle Vol. XIX For the Year M.DCC 
(London: Edward Cave, 1749) 83.
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 Another author argued that the extension of authority over half-pay officers as well as 
officers in full service was essentially to deprive the former of their liberty and freedom 
from tyranny.765 These arguments were reminiscent of the reasons for putting explicit 
limits on the authority of the Lord High Admiral in the Act for the Establishing Articles.
More importantly they were representative of the competing philosophies of the 
different factions of the Whigs.
Horace Walpole's letters from March 1749 describe the parliamentary debates 
over the Mutiny Act as less divisive than the naval legislation. 'In the Lords, the Mutiny-
bill passed pretty easily, there happening a quarrel between Lord Bathurst and Lord 
Bath on the method of their measures'766 However, the Gentleman's Magazine presented 
a different perspective.
So that all those severe articles which able either to protect themselves 
against make it death for a sentinel to be found sleeping on his post, or to 
occasion false alarms in his quarters &c &c. And which seem to be without 
pretence or excuse, except in time of war, according to this draught, are still 
to be the rule of duty in time of peace.767 
Clearly, the debate regarding the creation of a new culture, with a different approach to 
hierarchy and discipline was not limited to the Navy. 
Anson's amendments to the Articles fit into an established pattern of incomplete 
implementation of changes. Previously, definitions such as professional qualifications, 
procedures for superannuating officers, or the Establishment of Dimensions had been 
implemented in a piecemeal way and not applied across the entire institution. The 
irregular amendment and editing of the Articles of War certainly belongs in that pattern. 
However, the resistance that led to the failure to implement the changes placing officers 
765 E. Cave, Ed. The Gentleman's Magazine, 83.
766 The Letters of Horace Walpole, 264.
767 E. Cave, Ed. The Gentleman's Magazine, 128.
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on half-pay under the authority of the Articles of War means that that attempted change 
does not fit within that pattern.
Explaining the Articles of War
The Act for the Establishing Articles had not merely contained the Articles of 
War, but it also contained the Proviso, which contained those most important definitions
for the Royal Navy as an institution.768 Likewise, the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing also contained more than the modified Articles of War. Indeed, the Articles 
were the second section of the act, and there were a further twenty-four sections that 
provided context and explanation for the Articles.
Some of the content for these sections was derived from the Act for the 
Establishing Articles of 1661. The most important of these were the sections that 
replaced the Proviso of 1661 and contained the definitions for the authority and 
jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral.
Section 4 of the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing contained the 
following language:
Provided also, That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be 
construed to extend, to impower any Court-martial to be constituted by 
virtue of this Act, to proceed to the Punishment or Trial of any of the 
Offences specified in the several Articles contained in this Act, or of any 
Offence whatsoever (other than the Offences specified in the fifth, thirty-
fourth, and thirty-fifth of the foregoing Articles and Orders), which shall not
be committed upon the main Sea, or in great Rivers only, beneath the 
Bridges of the said Rivers nigh to the Sea, or in any Haven, River, or Creek 
within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty, and which shall not be committed 
by such Persons at the Time of the Offence committed shall be in actual 
Service and full Pay in the Fleet or Ships of War of his Majesty, his Heirs or 
Successors, such Persons only excepted, and for such Offences only, as are 
described in the fifth of the foregoing Articles and Orders.769
768 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
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This section directly perpetuated the Proviso from the Act for the Establishing Articles, 
but only part of it. Other language was incorporated into the Articles themselves, but 
also in the Articles of War. The following was included as article XXXIV:
Every Person being in actual Service and full Pay, and Part of the Crew in or
belonging to any of his Majesty's Shore Ships or Vessels of War, who shall 
be guilty of Mutiny, Desertion, or Disobedience to any lawful Command, in 
any Part of his Majesty's Dominions on Shore, when in actual Service 
relative to the Fleet, shall be liable to be tried by a Court-martial, and suffer 
the like Punishment for every such Offence, as if the same had been 
committed at Sea on Board any of his Majesty's Ships or Vessels of War.770
Article XXXV was similar in nature:
If any Person who shall be in the actual Service and full Pay of his Majesty's
Ships and Vessels of War, shall commit upon the Shore in any Place or 
Places out of his Majesty's Dominions, any of the Crimes punishable by 
these Articles and Orders, the Person so offending shall be liable to be tried 
and punished for the same in like Manner, to all Intents and Purposes, as if 
the said Crimes had been committed at Sea, on Board any of his Majesty's 
Ships or Vessels of War.771
These definitions were clearly built upon the geographic definitions for the authority of 
the Lord High Admiral contained in the Proviso in 1660, as well as the language from 
the An Act Concerning the Commissioners of the Admiralty from 1690. However, 
Article XXXIV was entirely new language, a logical extrapolation of what had been 
contained in The Act for Making Perpetual (1719). Its addition is also entirely consistent
with the Authoritarian Whigs' emphasis on the extension of discipline. 
In addition, some of the explanation was created by moving text that had been 
contained in the Articles in 1661. Article XXIV from 1661 stated that the Lord High 
Admiral had the authority to grant commissions to hold courts-martial. This text, 
slightly changed, was moved to the explanation section as Section 6.772 Articles XXXIV 
and XXXV of the Act for the Establishing Articles had contained courts-martial 
procedures, for example about the selection of the death penalty, and about the 
770 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
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administration of oaths. That content was removed from the Articles and added to the 
supplementary sections. However these changes were largely overshadowed by the 
substantial expansion of those procedural directions which were incorporated from the 
acts of 1745 and 1748.
Some of the 'explanation' was original to the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing. By 1749 there were (theoretically) no soldiers in the fleet under the authority 
the Board of Admiralty and the naval Articles of War, as the last of the marine regiments
had been abolished in 1748 after being transferred from the War Office.773  And Section 
5 of the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing specifically exempted the land 
forces from the Navy's Articles of War as follows. 
Provided also, That nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be 
construed to extend, to impower any Court-martial to be constituted by 
virtue of this Act, to proceed to the Punishment or Trial of any Land Officer 
or Soldier on Board any Transport Ship, for any of the Offences specified in 
the several Articles contained in this Act.774
The addition of Section 5 was necessary because the Transport Board had been 
abolished following the Hanoverian Succession, and responsibility for transporting land 
forces troops had been assigned to the Royal Navy.775 Under the language in the Act for 
the Establishing Articles, soldiers aboard Royal Navy ships were subject to the Articles 
of War, and indeed in 1694 the Solicitor-General and Attorney-General had ruled that 
the Marines were subject when aboard ship.776 It was also absolutely consistent with the 
differentiation of between the officers Royal Navy and Land Forces that was described 
in the Regulations and Instructions, specifically that, while those sections provided the 
773 Britt Zerbe, The Birth of the Royal Marines 1664-1802, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013) 28-
29
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equivalencies between Navy and Army ranks, officers only had authority within their 
own service.777
The land forces' defining documents provide important context for the 
explanations included in the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing. The Mutiny 
Act did not contain the same types of definitions for the land forces as the Act for 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing did for the Navy. Instead they were contained 
within the Rules and Articles for the better government of our horse and foot-guards, 
and all other our land-forces in Great Britain and Ireland, Dominions beyond the sea 
and Foreign Parts, which were the land forces equivalent of both the Articles of War 
and the Regulations and Instructions.
The Rules and Articles contained a great many instructions for the handling of 
courts-martial, because even though one held a commission to serve aboard a single 
ship, just like an army officer held a commission in a single regiment, the Royal Navy 
was a far more integrated institution than the land forces. With the single institutional 
structure, the Royal Navy (and Marines, when deployed into the fleet) was all subject to
the same Articles of War. In comparison, each corps and regiment of the land forces was
an independent jurisdiction, with its own instance of the Rules and Articles. For 
regimental courts-martial or courts-martial involving only a single corps, this did not 
present an issue. However, armies were composed of units from different corps, 
including Regiments of Foot, Regiments of Horse, Foot Guards, Horse Guards, 
Artillery, and Engineers, each of which were essentially independent. The land forces' 
Rules and Articles included articles that created definitions for the relation of officers of
each corps. For example, consider Article IV of the Land Forces' Rules and Articles:
in like manner also, the Officers of Our Three Regiments Of Foot Guards, 
when appointed to hold Courts-martial for Differences or Crimes as 
aforesaid, shall of themselves compose Courts-martial, and take Rank 
777 Regulations and Instructions' NA Kew, ADM 7/202 f228.
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according to their Commissions. But for all Disputes or Differences which 
may happen between Officers or soldiers belonging to Our said Corps of 
Horse Guards, and other Officers arid Soldiers belonging to Our Regiments 
of Foot Guards, or between any Officers or Soldiers belonging to either of 
those Corps of Horse or Foot Guards, and Officers and Soldiers of Our other
Troops, the Courts-martial to be appointed in such cases shall be equally 
composed of Officers belonging to the Corps in which the Parties 
complaining, and complained of, do then serve ; and the President to be 
ordered by Turns, beginning first by an Officer of One of Our Troops of 
Horse Guards, and. so on in Course out of the other Corps.778
Article V provided similar definitions:
The Members both of General and Regimental Courts-martial shall, when 
belonging to different Corps, take the; same Rank which they Hold in the 
Army; but when Courts-martial shall be composed of Officers of one Corps,
they shall take their Ranks according to the Dates of the Commissions by 
which they are mustered in the said Corps.779
In these is a declaration of army and regimental rank, but at the same time a firm 
differentiation between the corps when possible. These can be compared to the 
procedures for courts-martial contained in the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing, specifically sections 12 through 14, which specified the procedures for the 
composition of court-martial panels. Section 12 specifically ordered that
... no Court-martial, to be held or appointed by virtue of this present 
Act, shall consist of more than thirteen, or of less than five Persons, to be 
composed of such Flag Officers, Captains, or Commanders then and there 
present, as are next in Seniority to the Officer who presides at the Court-
martial.780
In addition, section 14 stated
That in case any Court-martial shall, by virtue of this Act, be appointed to 
be held at any Place where there are not less than three, nor yet so many as 
five Officers of the Degree and Denomination of a Post Captain, or of a 
superior Rank to be found, then it shall be lawful for the Officer, at the Place
appointed for holding such Court-martial, who is to preside at the same, to 
call to his Assistance as many of the Commanders of his Majesty's Vessels, 
under the Rank and Degree of a Post Captain, as, together with the Post 
Captains then and there present, will make up the Number of five, to hold 
such Court-martial.781
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Where the regiments and corps of the land forces had to provide a mechanism to deal 
with the interaction of ostensibly different entities, the Royal Navy had a more 
integrated officer corps.
Related to the holding of courts-martial, explanation was necessary for how the 
Royal Navy's judicial mechanisms would relate to the greater English justice system. In 
1661, the Royal Navy had been defined as explicitly external to it.782 However, the 
statutory definitions of the 1740s had changed this. Perjury was not punishable under 
the Articles of War directly in the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing, but 
would be punished under the Perjury Act: 
every Person and Persons who shall commit any wilful Perjury, in any 
Evidence or Examination upon Oath at any such Court-martial, or who shall
curruptly procure or subborn any Person to commit such wilful Perjury, 
shall and may be prosecuted in his Majesty's Court of King's Bench by 
Indictment or Information.783 
 In comparison Article II of section XX of the land forces' Rules and Articles stated the 
following:
Notwithstanding its being directed in the Eleventh Section of these Our 
Rules and Articles, that every Commanding Officer is required to deliver up 
to the Civil Magistrate all such Persons under his Command, who shall be 
accused of any Crimes which are punishable by the known Laws of the 
Land, yet in Our Garrison of Gibraltar, Island of Minorca, Forts of Placentia
and Annapolis Royal, where Our Forces now are, or in any other Place 
beyond the Seas, to which any of Our Troops may be hereafter commanded, 
and where there is no Form of Our Civil Judicature in Force, the Generals or
Governors, or Commanders respectively, are to appoint General Courts-
martial to be held, who are to try all Persons guilty of Wilful murder, theft, 
Robbery, Rapes, Coining, or Clipping the Coin of Great Britain, or of any 
foreign Coin, current in the Country or Garrison, and all other Capital 
Crimes or other Offences, and punish Offenders according to the known 
laws of the Land, or as the Nature of their Crimes shall deserve.784
Where the Royal Navy was specifically defined in section 25 of the Act of Amending, 
Explaining and Reducing as being external to the judicial system (except in the case of 
782 'Charles II, 1661: An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders', Statutes of the Realm Volume 5, 
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perjury), the land forces' Rule and Articles declared members of the army to be subject 
to the civilian legal system as well as the Army's private legal code contained with the 
document. There was one important way in which the land forces and Royal Navy were 
similar, however. The physical space of the warships and the physical space of the 
garrisons (or other space occupied by the land forces) both served to define jurisdiction, 
rather than nominal control over territory.
The 'explanation' aspect of the Act for the Amending, Explaining and Reducing is
important for two reasons. First, the alteration of the Proviso into several distinct 
articles and sections demonstrated the growth and development of the Royal Navy as a 
jurisdiction beyond the original definitions. Second, it reflects the reality that the 
implementation of the Authoritarian Whigs' new institutional culture of discipline could 
not consist only of new, harsher penalties for offences. It also had to include very 
detailed procedures for how to enforce that new culture, with as few gaps in the 
definitions as possible. As such, the 'explanation' aspect of the Act for the Amending, 
Explaining and Reducing is not consistent with the piecemeal implementation of 
definitions seen in other areas.
Reducing into one Act (Rationalization)
Although some of the 'explanation' aspect of the Act for Amending, Explaining 
and Reducing was adapted from existing language in the Act for Establishing Articles or
created anew, the majority was incorporated from the Royal Navy's other statutory 
definitions. Indeed, the thoroughness of the 'explanation' sections is a result of the final 
aspect, the rationalization of all the Royal Navy's statutory definitions still in effect in 
1749. It was not strictly necessary to rationalize all the statutory definitions for the 
Navy, but given that the Act for the Establishing Articles needed to be repealed to make 
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Anson's amendments, the rationalization of the supplementary legislation was a logical 
step. The inclusion of already approved legislation would almost certainly be less 
contentious than Anson's intended amendments. The rationalization also provides a 
different view on the professionalization of the Royal Navy than Anson's amendments, 
because they represented definitions created by many different administrations and 
under as many different circumstances. They also represented responses to a larger 
number of influences and situations in comparison to Anson's unhappiness with the 
Royal Navy's performance in the War of the Austrian Succession. The supplementary 
legislation also defined the Royal Navy's existence and duties in peacetime, in addition 
to the wartime expectations upon which Anson focused. Given that so much of the 
explanatory framework, and indeed some of the offences, were imported from 
supplementary legislation, the comparison between those acts and the Act for 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing provides an opportunity to examine how they were
or were not altered when they were included into the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing, particularly as these definitions primarily addressed those aspects of the 
Royal Navy's definitions that were traditionally subject to Parliament's authority to 
define, rather than the professional culture which Anson and the Authoritarian Whigs 
sought to change and which was absolutely consistent with the traditional jurisdiction of
the Board of Admiralty.
The first piece of additional legislation rescinded was An Act Concerning the 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, originally passed in 1690. It contained two important 
definitions for the Royal Navy. It legally confirmed that the office of Lord High 
Admiral could be placed into commission. It also defined part of courts-martial 
procedure with the inclusion of a specific oath for those officers involved in a court-
martial. These developments were not included 'as is' in the 1749 legislation but rather 
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were adapted. In the case of the former definition, the phrase ‘the Lord High Admiral of 
Great Britain, or the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of 
Great Britain for the Time being’ was used multiple times, specifically in the sections of
the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing that that delineate the powers of the 
Lord High Admiral.785 It was used in Section 6, which described the authority to grant 
commissions. Sections 10 and 11 described the ability to direct officers of certain rank 
to hold courts-martial, and numerous other sections thereafter (sections 13, 19, 23, 24, 
and 25) that described the regulations for, and restrictions upon holding courts-
martial.786 The repeated use of this clause resulted of the maintenance of the structure of 
the Articles of War, where authority was stated explicitly in each case, rather than once 
and applied to the whole document. 
The oath in the second aspect of the Act had been repealed by the 1748 Act for 
further Regulating of Proceedings, which included replacement oaths. Accordingly, it 
was those oaths that were incorporated into the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing.
An Act for making perpetual (1719) was the second supplementary act repealed 
under the 1749 Articles of War. This was an omnibus act that addressed several previous
pieces of legislation. Since this act extended the authority of the Articles of War ashore, 
it was important to include it in the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing. In this 
case, it was a straightforward transfer, although the text was somewhat reduced in the 
latter legislation and included as Article XXXV. There were several minor changes in 
the text, for example in the first and third lines where 'or persons' was removed, and in 
the second to last line where 'upon the main sea' was altered to 'at Sea'. These changes 
are not surprising, because it would have been considered along with Article XXXIV, a 
785 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
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new creation which for the first time provided the Navy with the authority to prosecute 
for 'Mutiny, desertion and disobedience' in 'any Part of his Majesty's Dominions on 
Shore.'787 Slightly altering the text to match the new language would have been a small 
matter.
In comparison to the two previous acts, the Act for the More Effectual 
Suppression of Piracy (1721) was not repealed in its entirety but rather only in the 
portions that were superseded by 1749 Articles of War. The text was included as Article 
XVIII, and rendered as follows:
If any Captain, Commander, or other Officer of any of his Majesty's Ships 
or Vessels, shall receive on board, or permit to be received on board such 
Ship or Vessel, any Goods or Merchandizes whatsoever, other than for the 
sole use of the Ship or Vessel, except Gold, Silver, or Jewels, and except the 
Goods and Merchandizes belonging to any Merchant or other Ship or Vessel
which may be shipwrecked, or in imminent Danger of being shipwrecked, 
either on the High Seas, or in any Port, Creek, or Harbour, in order to the 
preserving them for their proper Owners, and except such Goods or 
Merchandizes as he shall at any Time be ordered to take or receive on board 
by Order of the Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, or the Commissioners 
for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral for the Time being; every 
Person so offending, being convicted thereof by the Sentence of the Court-
martial, shall be cashiered, and be for ever afterwards rendered incapable to 
serve in any Place or Office in the Naval Service of his Majesty, his Heirs 
and Successors.'788
There was a significant reduction in the text between the original legislation and that in 
1749. However, article XVIII was supplemented by section Section 24. 
And whereas by the said Act, intituled, An Act for the more effectual 
suppressing of Piracy; it is amongst other Things enacted in the following 
Words, That the said Captain, Commander, or other Officer of the said Ship 
or Vessel of War, and all and every the Owners and Proprietors of such 
Goods and Merchandizes, put on board such Ship or Vessel of War as 
aforesaid, shall lose, forfeit, and pay the Value of all and every such Goods 
and Merchandizes so put on board as aforesaid; one Moiety of such full 
Value to such Person or Persons as shall make the first Discovery, and give 
Information of or concerning the said Offence; and other Moiety of such full
Value to and for the Use of Greenwich Hospital: all of which Forfeitures 
shall and may be sued for and recovered in the High Court of Admiralty: 
Now for making the said in part recited Act more useful and effectual, be it 
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enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That from and after the twenty-fifth Day
of December one thousand seven hundred and forty-nine, if any Captain, 
Commander or other Officer of any of his Majesty's Ships or Vessels shall 
receive on board, or permit or suffer to be received on board such Ship or 
Vessel, any Goods or Merchandizes, contrary to the true Intent and Meaning
of the Eighteenth Article in this Act before-mentioned and hereby enacted, 
every such Captain, Commander, or other Officer shall, for every such 
Offence, over and above any Punishment inflicted by this Act, forfeit and 
pay the Value of all and every such Goods and Merchandizes so received or 
permitted, or suffered to be received on board as aforesaid, or the Sum of 
five hundred Pounds of lawful Money of Great Britain789
There were some changes and deletions. For example, the original flowery language of 
'great interruptions and inconveniences' caused by officers bringing commercial goods 
aboard warships was deleted.790 As part of the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing, there would no longer be the need for the same kind of preamble as in the 
earlier legislation. The limited modification of the text suggests that the content was 
considered sufficiently important that it had to be included in the Act for the 
Establishing Articles and also that it sufficiently reflected the new culture of discipline 
that it did not have to be further altered.
The inclusion of the Act for Further Regulating and Better Government (1745) 
and the Act for Further Regulating of Proceedings (1748) into the Act for the 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing was also critical. They were statutory definitions 
created by the Authoritarian Whigs, and they were written to instill the same kind of 
culture of discipline as Anson’s amendments to the Articles of War. As the latter was 
much longer than the former and contained many more instructions for courts-martial 
procedures, its impact upon the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing was much 
greater. However, they together provided the text for much of the explanatory sections 
that followed the Articles of War. Indeed, much of the Act for Further Regulating of 
Proceedings was imported effectively unchanged.
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For example, Sections 6 through 15, which first defined the power to grant 
commissions to hold courts-martial and then the selection of officers to empanel a 
court-martial panel, were directly adopted with only minor changes to the text. This 
adoption was not just limited to topics described and definitions set, but also included 
the replication of the order of the paragraphs.791 This process was continued, with the 
oaths contained in the latter act incorporated into the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing. In the Act for Further Regulating of Proceedings, the oath or members of the 
Court was as follows
I, A.B. do swear, that I will duly administer Justice, according to the Articles
and Orders Established for the regulating and better Government of His 
Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea, without Partiality, 
Favour, or Affection...792
This was subsequently modified in the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing, to 
appear as follows.
I A.B. do swear, That I will duly administer Justice, according to the Articles
and Orders established by an Act passed in the twenty-second Year of the 
Reign of his Majesty King George the Second, for amending, explaining, 
and reducing into one Act of Parliament, the Laws relating to the 
Government of his Majesty's Ships, Vessels, and Forces by Sea, without 
Partiality, Favour, or Affection...793
This pattern of close copying, and specifically only changing the text to recognize the 
change in the act that provided the authority, was continued by the oath taken by the 
Judge Advocate.794 Following that, section 17 of the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing proceeded to combine the next two paragraphs of the Act for Further 
Regulating of Proceedings, which addressed perjury, 'Contempt and Misbehaviour.'795 
791 HMSO, Public General Acts, 21 Geo II, Vol. 37, 1748 584-586; National Library of Australia, 
'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
792 HMSO, Public General Acts, 21 Geo II, Vol. 37, 1748, 586.
793 National Library of Australia, 'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
794 HMSO, Public General Acts, 21 Geo II, Vol. 37, 1748,586-587.; National Library of Australia, 
'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
795 HMSO, Public General Acts, 21 Geo II, Vol. 37, 1748, 587. ;National Library of Australia, 'Articles 
of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact' 
265
This continued, paragraph for paragraph, until section 21, which contained the latter 
act's definitions concerning the crews of ships wrecked, otherwise lost or destroyed.796
In terms of the text of the statute definitions that were incorporated into the Act 
for the Amending, Explaining and Reducing, the rationalization of the Royal Navy's 
statutory definitions was relatively straightforward. Some of the definitions were 
applied as necessary throughout the Articles of War, for example with the incorporation 
of the text of the Act concerning the Commissioners of the Admiralty throughout. Others
were expanded upon (the 1719 Act for Making Perpetual). The Piracy Act (1722) and 
the Act for the Further Regulating of Proceedings effectively incorporated with a 
minimum of modification. This was very similar to the rationalization of standing 
orders in the Regulation and Instructions. The creation of the Act for Amending, 
Explaining and Reducing also created a single, centrally defined set of expectations that 
could be disseminated much more easily than the patchwork of legislation that already 
existed. This is shown by the civilian produced handbooks and Vade-Mecum that were 
created as pocket guides for naval officers.797
However, the text of the statutes did not exist in a vacuum. The definitions 
reflected the administrations that created them and the circumstances that influenced 
them, and they also critically represented drastically different institutions. For example, 
the Act concerning the Commissioners of the Admiralty from 1690 was a product from a
period in which the relationship between the Admiralty and Parliament was very 
different than it was in 1749, and also one when there was no certainty over whether the
role of the Office of Lord High Admiral would be performed by an individual or by a 
commission. However, there were also some similarities, for the disbanding of the 
796 HMSO, Public General Acts, 21 Geo II, Vol. 37, 1748, 588-589.; National Library of Australia, 
'Articles of War- South Seas Companion Cultural Artefact'
797 'Signals for the Royal Navy and Ships under Convoy, sailing and fighting instructions, Articles of 
War, Regulations etc., with the additional signals of Adm Vernon and the flags of all nations, 1748' 
NMM HOL/13.
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Marines which led to the expansion of the authority of the Articles of War ashore in 
foreign territory in the Act for Making Perpetual would still have seemed relevant in 
1749 after the disbanding of the Marine Regiments the year before. That these statutes 
remained in force and were incorporated into the Act for Amending, Explaining and 
Reducing with minimal modification indicates that the circumstances of their creation 
did not affect their applicability and that they, along with the Act for the Establishing 
Articles, formed the foundation upon which the new definitions in the Act for the 
Further Regulating of Proceedings were built. 
The rationalization of the Royal Navy’s statutory definitions into the Act for 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing resulted in more than a single, compact package 
that contained a more expansive set of definitions. It also brought together content that 
built on the structural definitions in the Act for the Establishing Articles just as the 
Authoritarian Whigs provided new professional definitions. 
Conclusion
Sarah Kinkel argues that:
...the turning point in Britain's rise to naval greatness came with the 
implementation in the 1740s of this new culture of naval service based on 
order, discipline, and hierarchy. This was part and parcel of a wider project 
intended to reinstate order and obedience in Britain's imperial relationships 
with its colonies and also within the domestic sociopolitical sphere.798
Kinkel’s identification of the 1740s as a turning point in naval development is 
problematic. Although the agenda of the Authoritarian Whigs was a response to both the
Royal Navy's failures during the War of the Austrian Succession and involved a stricter 
sense of hierarchy and discipline, it was by no means a substantial change of direction 
for the Royal Navy's development. Indeed, the Authoritarian Whig’s efforts to define the
798 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 2-3.
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Navy both in convention and in statute can only be fully appreciated given the context 
of the Royal Navy’s development from 1660.
Although the Royal Navy's development in this period continued directly on the 
precedents and frameworks established following the Hanoverian succession, James II’s
creation of General Instructions, the creation of Royal Navy-specific professional 
qualifications for officers from the 1670s, and the rationalization of the different 
documents into the Regulations and Instructions in 1731 occurred in order to increase 
the general standard of professional discipline.
In terms of the creation of statutory definitions, Anson's drive to modify the 
Articles of War is a reasonable parallel to the Duke of York leading the push for the 
modification of the Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea in 1661, in that they both 
straddled the Admiralty and the House of Lords, and were personally involved in the 
creation of statutory definitions for the Royal Navy that contained both the Articles of 
War and definitions for the relationship between the Royal Navy and the state. Also, the 
efforts of the Authoritarian Whigs to define the Navy in the Act for Further Regulating 
and Better Government, and the Act for Further Regulating of Proceedings must be 
viewed in context of the Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall of 
1694. 
Although Anson and the Authoritarian Whigs on the Board of Admiralty used 
Parliament to directly define the Navy in a way that had not been done before, their 
actions did not fundamentally change the relationship between the Board and 
Parliament. The amendments to Articles of War were the concern of the Board of 
Admiralty, at least much more so than they were Parliament’s concern. The definitions 
of the Admiralty's authority and of the relationship between the Navy's judicial 
procedures and those of the state, which were Parliament’s bailiwick, were largely 
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unaltered. So while the creation of the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing was 
first and foremost an extraordinary example of the Board of Admiralty continuing to 
define the Navy, the changes were restricted to professional culture. 
The passage of the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing ended the Royal 
Navy's first development cycle in the Westminster Model. First, it directly replaced the 
Act for the Establishing Articles as the statute that defined the authority of the 
Admiralty. Second, it rationalized and incorporated all the existing statutory definitions 
for the Royal Navy. At that point, many of the Royal Navy's major sets of definitions, 
specifically the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing, the Regulations and 
Instructions, and the Establishments were the result of rationalization. Thus they 
provide an excellent basis for considering the definition of the Royal Navy from 1660 to
1749 as a whole. Further, they could as the foundations for the Royal Navy’s next 
development cycle in the ‘Westminster Model’
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CONCLUSION
Taken together, the years 1660-1749 can be seen as a coherent developmental 
cycle shaped by what can be considered a Westminster Model of development. The 
Royal Navy was a palimpsest of sorts, for whether building on or reacting against 
foundations that were laid during the Restoration, subsequent changes in statute and 
convention defined the navy. The identification of this feature of these years brings an 
additional perspective to the existing literature on the development of the Royal Navy.
The term Westminster Model is traditionally applied to the process of state 
development in the twentieth century following independence from Britain or to the 
nature of the state itself that eventually emerged.  More recently, however, it has proven 
itself to be a more flexible concept used to describe the ongoing development of, and 
very specifically the continuing creation of definitions for, states such as Japan. Also, 
recent scholarship directly examines the relationship between modern state development
and the development of military institutions in Westminster Model states like Canada. 
The particular attribute of the Westminster Model, that constitutional definitions are 
contained within both statute and convention, means that it can be applied even more 
widely and usefully to an institution like the Royal Navy, which is not a state, and to a 
far earlier period of British history. 
The purpose of this thesis was to present another, original, perspective on the 
Royal Navy’s development from 1660-1749, one that would complement rather than 
challenge or seek to overturn the existing frameworks, perspectives and arguments. The 
emphasis placed on defining the Royal Navy is that new perspective. 
At and immediately after the Restoration, both Charles II and Parliament directly
defined the navy. In this phase of development, the focus was on the creation of 
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definitions that defined its structural attributes, most importantly around authority and 
identity. Charles II’s naming of warships, and recreation of the office of Lord High 
Admiral resulted in some of the Navy’s attributes, being fundamentally linked to 
definition by royal prerogative such as the creation of institutional identity through 
warship names.  In comparison, Parliament’s creation of the Act for the Establishing 
Articles resulted in the authority to define the relationship between the navy and the 
state as part of Parliament’s bailiwick. Where the creation of structural attributes for the 
Navy was important in this period, the professional attributes were entirely adopted 
from what existed in the existing State’s Navy. At this point, the Navy had definitions in
both statute and in convention, but this was only the foundations for the Royal Navy’s 
continued development in the Westminster Model 
The history of the Royal Navy, and indeed the development of the English state 
between 1660 and 1749, is dominated by the issues of the conflict between King and 
Parliament over royal prerogative and funding. The application of the Westminster 
Model to the Royal Navy’s development in this period has provided a new perspective, 
one that complements the existing literature. In particular, it showed that while at the 
Restoration both Parliament and Charles II directly defined the navy, from 
approximately 1663 onwards, The King’s ability to do so continued essentially largely 
unrestricted, while Parliament’s curtailed almost completely. With the exception of the 
1677 Act for the Speedy Building, Parliament only defined the Navy indirectly, by 
defining the state and by placing limits on the King’s use of royal prerogative. This was 
accomplished for example with the 1673 and 1677 test acts. In comparison, both 
Charles II and James II maintained their ability to directly define the Navy. They did so 
through the selection of officers, naming warships, the creation of foreign policy and the
deployment of Royal Navy forces. Although Parliament provided funds, the actual daily
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management and development of the Royal Navy was driven by the Admiralty and 
Navy Board. 
The development of definitions in the period up to the Glorious Revolution 
largely followed the respective jurisdictions laid down at the Restoration. For example, 
Parliament’s creation of the Test Acts excluded certain groups from serving as Royal 
Navy officers, and as such was a limit on royal prerogative, but it did not directly define
the selection of officers. The one exception was the 1677 Act for Speedy Building, 
which specified both the number of ships to be built of various rates and the size of each
type to be built. Even though those figures had been provided by the Navy Board, this 
was an important precedent for Parliament to directly define aspects of the Navy which 
did not have to do with its relationship with the state or the authority of the office of 
Lord High Admiral.
The study of the definitions created for the Royal Navy (or as William III would 
have referred to it, the Navy Royal) in the period 1688-1714 also provided new context 
for the established argument that, in that period, the Admiralty in particular was weak, 
and that Parliament more directly defined the Navy than it had during the previous 
period. However, it also placed that development in perspective. Following the Glorious
Revolution, there were developments that built directly on the precedents established at 
the Restoration and later. For example, the naming of warships such as the Royal 
William followed precedents set by the naming of the Royal Charles and Royal James. 
Likewise, Parliament in 1690 created a definition that provided statutory space for the 
office of Lord High Admiral to be placed in commission, which was the first statutory 
definition that directly expanded upon the Act for the Establishing Articles.
Conversely, the Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall also 
defined the relationship between the Navy and the state, but with the purpose of 
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allowing the state to prosecute offences against the Articles of War if the Navy failed to 
do so. Parliament also involved itself in the business of the Admiralty by creating 
statutes that directly defined deployments to defend English and British maritime 
commerce. In 1694, 1707 and 1713, Parliament specifically defined how many ships 
were to be deployed as ‘cruisers’. For the latter, Queen Anne specifically delegated 
authority to Parliament. While Parliament had not taken upon themselves the entirety of 
the business of the Admiralty, the measures they did take were unprecedented since the 
Restoration. Likewise, the Act for Granting to their Majesties severall Additional 
Duties of Excise upon Beere Ale and other Liquors for foure yeares directly built upon 
how Parliament had exercised some of the authority of the Navy Board with the Act for 
the Speedy Building in 1677.
Distinct in this period was the use of statute and convention together to address 
specific issues. In particular, the relationship between the Establishments for Half-Pay, 
and the Acts for the Encouragement and Encrease addressed the problem of managing 
the Royal Navy’s personnel resources from two different angles. First, half-pay was the 
Admiralty’s approach. Instead of being a reward for past service as it had been during 
the reign of Charles II, it became a retainer for future service that also perpetuated 
officers’ seniority through times of peace. The Acts for the Encouragement and 
Encrease of 1694 and 1695 were the Parliamentary approach and provided a similar 
program. That the Admiralty’s half-pay programs continued into the future and became 
a fixture of the Royal Navy’s professional attributes while the acts for registering 
seamen were not repeated is a reflection that Parliament’s direct assumption of the 
Admiralty’s authority was not permanent nor complete.
Shortly before the Hanoverian Succession, the First Lord of the Admiralty once 
again became part of the Cabinet and remained so following the succession itself. The 
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definitions created for the Royal Navy after 1715 reflect a resurgence in the political 
strength of the Admiralty, so much so that Parliament only created two acts, the Act for 
Making Perpetual of 1719 and the Piracy Act of 1721 that directly defined the navy and
directly supplemented the definitions existing in the Act for the Establishing Articles. 
The re-creation of the Board of Admiralty in this period was definitely a reaction to the 
political inadequacies of that body following the Glorious Revolution. However, its 
long-term existence and survival owed much to the development of the Westminster 
Model state and the continued development of cabinet government. Walpole’s two-
decades-long term as Prime Minister was absolutely key, for it provided a stable 
relationship between the Admiralty and the governing ministers for a much longer 
period than had occurred for any other arrangement since the Restoration. 
The mechanisms created and developed after 1715 to manage the Royal Navy’s 
professional and other resources built on established precedents and underscored the 
reconstituted hierarchy between the ministers who created foreign policy and the 
Admiralty and Navy Board who developed and defined the Navy in order to execute 
that foreign policy. The Board of Admiralty and Navy Board clearly became 
subordinate to the minsters in Parliament, but remained an independent department of 
the state that reflected royal, not parliamentary, authority. One expression of the King’s 
authority over the Admiralty, and direct relationship with the Navy was shown by the 
resurgence of naming warships for members of the royal family. 
This thesis places greater emphasis on the end of the 1740s and the repeal and 
replacement of the Act for the Establishing Articles than other histories, which tend to 
emphasize the Seven Years War (1756-1763). However, the repeal of this act and its 
replacement with the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing was critical, as it 
rationalized the statute definitions for the navy, just as the Regulation and Instructions 
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rationalized the convention definitions from 1731. It was the end of the navy’s first 
cycle of development in the Westminster Model and formed the statute foundations for 
the navy’s future development. The identification of the development cycle from the 
Restoration to the replacement of the Act for the Establishing Articles with the Act for 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing is original and frames a new perspective for 
understanding the Royal Navy’s development. 
In the 1740s, the importance of having individuals in a position of power to 
define the Navy, and using their authority to do so is even further emphasized. The 
actions of the Board of Admiralty from 1744 to 1749 built directly on the established 
patterns of the previous two decades, as they continued to define the Navy so that it 
could achieve the goals that the ministers set for it. However, the Board of Admiralty 
used Parliament to directly define the Royal Navy for the Admiralty’s benefit, passing 
legislation in 1744 and 1748 that defined court-martial procedures and then again in 
1749 with the replacement of the Act for the Establishing Articles with the Act for 
Amending, Explaining and Reducing. Anson’s personal attachment and role in the 
passage of the last act is well understood, and the methodology used in this thesis has 
identified a development pattern to put that into perspective. The amendments to the 
Articles of War definitely represented the new discipline-centred culture the 
Authoritarian Whigs desired to implement in the Royal Navy. That implementation, and
Anson’s personal role in that effort was not representative of the whole, but was simply 
the most strident example of the trend. 
The application of the Westminster Model to study the Royal Navy’s 
development provided the opportunity to identify long-term patterns across the whole 
period 1660 to 1749. The most important is that the Royal Navy’s development was 
critically framed by the foundations set at the Restoration, not just in terms of identity, 
275
culture, professionalization, and assets, but also that specific entities had specific areas 
of jurisdiction for defining the institution. These frameworks did not always hold true, 
and the exceptions illustrate the complexity of the relationship between the Royal Navy 
as an institution and those that had the authority to define it. 
For example, in 1661 the Duke of York was Lord High Admiral and also played 
a significant role in the creation of the Act for the Establishing Articles as a member of 
the House of Lords. In the 1680s, even though Charles II had placed the office of Lord 
High Admiral into commission, he still took a very active role in defining the Navy, 
often working around the Commissioners he had put in place. Likewise, James II 
commissioned Roman Catholic officers despite the Test Acts, therefore usurping 
Parliament’s role in defining that aspect of the Royal Navy. Although Parliament had 
set the groundwork for being able to directly define the Navy following the Restoration,
by the end of Charles II’s reign, and during the reign of James II, that authority was 
shunted aside, the Royal Navy entirely defined using royal prerogative and authority.
Following the Glorious Revolution, the office of the Lord High Admiral was 
politically weak. This was problematic not because it meant the Royal Navy could not 
influence the rest of government, but because there was no longer a person to take 
responsibility for it the way that it as there had been prior to 1688. Without a person to 
charge with developing the Navy as an institution, Parliament intervened when 
necessary. This is demonstrated by the way that statutory definitions and convention 
together created procedures for managing the Royal Navy’s professional assets in the 
acts for registering seamen and continued development of the half-pay schemes. That 
Parliament created the ‘Convoys and Cruisers’ statutes in addition to redefining the 
office of Lord High Admiral, gave the Court of King’s Bench jurisdiction over offences 
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against the Articles of War and only emphasizes Parliament’s assumption of aspects of 
the Admiralty’s business. 
After the Hanoverian Succession, the relations between the Board of Admiralty 
and Parliament changed again. The Ministers of the cabinet defined policy: the Board of
Admiralty and the Navy Board defined the Navy in order to carry out that policy. This 
recreated the structure that had been effectively achieved at the Restoration. The 
appointment of the ‘Authoritarian Whigs’ Bedford, Sandwich and Anson in 1744 did not
fundamentally change either the relationship between the Ministers and the Board of 
Admiralty, nor between the Board and Parliament. Thus, that the Board of Admiralty 
used Parliament to define the Navy three times in rapid succession is even more 
important because it did so without threatening the relatively stable government 
hierarchy that had developed and survived Walpole’s resignation. 
The application of the Westminster Model concept to the Royal Navy’s 
development provided the necessary framework to appreciate the similarities and 
differences between the creation of definitions for the Royal Navy and the modifications
to the Articles of War in 1661 and 1749. Further, this study has emphasized that the 
ability to define the Royal Navy as an institution was distinct from the ability to fund it, 
to deploy it, or to wield it in battle. In this way, it provides an understanding of the 
Royal Navy’s development that builds on and adds to the existing literature.
This thesis was very much inspired by the socio-cultural histories, such as those 
of Bernard Capp, J.D. Davies and N.A.M. Rodger. These works provided the basis for 
further development. For example the social history approach in Cromwell’s Navy, 
Gentlemen and Tarpaulins and The Wooden World inspired questions about expressions 
of institutional culture that this thesis has explored. Likewise, this thesis builds on the 
multi-threaded approach used in Safeguard of the Seas and Command of the Ocean by 
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identifying and discussing the relationship between the definition of the Royal Navy’s 
structural and professional definitions and their integration over time. The ‘Cultural 
Turn’ and the rise of post-structural approaches to the study of history were also 
important, and particularly influential on the approach and methodology, including an 
‘archaeological’ approach to the sources which allowed for the identification of the 
Royal Navy’s development process as a whole from the many definitions created for it 
from 1660-1749. Yet where J.D. Davies and Rodger considered the Royal Navy as a 
social body, this thesis considers it foremost as a legislated space, that has both 
structural and professional attributes.
In terms of the institutional and structural histories, this thesis most directly 
builds on the work of Michael Braddick and Sarah Kinkel. The direct inspiration was 
Braddick’s advocacy for ‘concentration on the process of state formation, as distinct 
from a concentration on the state as an entity.’799 This thesis similarly focuses on the 
process of development of the Royal Navy as opposed to offering a history of the 
institution itself. Indeed, the Royal Navy’s development was one aspect of the English 
and British state’s development. 
This focus on process supports Braddicks’ argument that ‘[i]nstitutional change 
is the outcome of negotiating legitimate responses to political problems and 
opportunities,' and indeed it is clear that the politics that affected and spurred English, 
or British, state development also had a substantial effect on the Royal Navy’s 
development.800 At the same time however, the definitions examined make clear that in 
1660 at least, the Royal Navy was defined as somewhat outside the English state, 
although certainly not outside English politics. The Navy did become much more 
integrated with the state, and this was a complex process that involved the creation of 
799 Braddick, “State Formation and Social Change in Early Modern England: A Problem Stated and
Approaches Suggested”, Social History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), p 1.
800 Braddick, State Formation, 427.
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statute definitions that specifically defined connections between the Navy and state such
as: the 1694 statute Act for the better discipline of theire Majesties Navy Royall 
providing the Court of King’s Bench jurisdiction over crimes against the Articles of 
War and the 1744 Act for the further regulating and better Government of His 
Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea: and for regulating the Proceedings 
upon Courts-Martial in the Sea Service which made perjury during a court-martial 
punishable under an Elizabethan statute. It also involved the creation of conventions and
precedents where first Parliament defined the Navy and took the authority of the 
Admiralty upon themselves and later in 1749 where members of the Board of Admiralty
in Parliament used that body’s authority to directly define the Navy and implement their
professional and institutional philosophy via changes to the Articles of War. This thesis 
takes its inspiration from Braddick’s study of the process of state development, to show 
that the Royal Navy’s development was not simply a reflection of the development of 
the state development, but sufficiently distinct to be worthy of study in its own right. 
In her PhD thesis, Sarah Kinkel examined the context for the creation of a new 
institutional and professional culture for the Royal Navy after 1744, and this thesis 
directly builds on the idea of examining the defining of the Royal Navy in this way. 
There are substantial differences however, in that Kinkel examines the debates and 
concerns first and foremost. She also describes her approach as exploring ‘why’ the 
Royal Navy’s institutional philosophy changed so dramatically during the 1740s and 
1750s and provided the basis for naval success in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, in comparison to how Rodger, Morriss and others study ‘how’ the Royal 
Navy’s administration and logistical organization contributed to the same.801 The 
identification of the Royal Navy’s development in the Westminster Model certainly 
counts as a study of ‘how’, like Rodger and Morriss and unlike Kinkel, albeit although 
801 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, 15-18
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the question is not ‘how did the Royal Navy come to dominate’, but rather, ‘how did the
it develop?’ As such, this study builds on and complements both Kinkel’s analysis and 
that of Rodger and Morriss.
In terms of the professionalization histories, this thesis builds on them by 
considering the development of the Royal Navy Officer profession from a new 
perspective, that is, as part of the Royal Navy’s development in the Westminster Model.
In particular, the discussion of the integration of the Royal Navy’s professional and 
structural attributes is original.
The recognition that there was a Westminster Model of change in the Royal 
Navy that resulted from the process of comparing and analyzing the outcomes of 
countless political debates and pressures allowed for the successful identification of a 
consistent development process for the Royal Navy from the Restoration in 1660 to the 
repeal and the replacement of the Act for the Establishing Articles in 1749. This 
approach, with its focus on the statutes and conventions also provided a framework that 
highlighted the significant differences in the creation of definitions for the institution in 
each of the different periods identified. Because the Royal Navy is not a state but an 
institution, certain common features of the Westminster Model, such as a bicameral 
legislature and distinct heads of government and state are not directly applicable. 
However, the focus upon the creation of statute and convention definitions uncovered a 
process that was less antagonistic between the navy’s development and that of the state 
than we might otherwise have assumed.
Although there are many aspects of the navy’s development which the 
methodology adopted here does not touch upon, it does bring put several strands of 
development into context. Specifically, the discussion of professionalization, the 
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development of the Royal Navy’s warships and the Royal Navy’s written instructions 
such as the Regulations and Instructions allows for identification of similarities. 
The methodology and questions posed by this thesis provide a basis for further 
research. The first opportunity would be to solidify and expand upon the theoretical 
examination of the Royal Navy’s development in this period. For example, adding the 
perspective of institutional theory would be beneficial.  Another area would be an 
expansion of what was examined in this thesis. For example, more detailed analysis of 
the expansion of the Royal Navy’s dockyards, and discussion of the fabric of the Navy’s
warships, particularly their decoration like figureheads and carving. 
This thesis has argued that the Royal Navy’s first cycle of development in the 
Westminster Model ended with the repeal of the Act for the Establishing Articles. 
However it also laid the foundations for the Royal Navy’s continued development. On 
the statute side, the Act for Amending, Explaining and Reducing was amended, although
not fully replaced in 1779 by An Act to explain and amend an Act made in the Twenty-
second Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King George the Second, intituled "An Act 
for amending, explaining, and reducing into One Act of Parliament the Laws relating to
the Government of His Majesty's Ships, Vessels, and Forces by Sea", but was not more 
fully replaced until the Naval Discipline Act of 1860.802 In terms of convention, the end 
of the Establishments of Dimension in the 1750s was a dramatic change in how the 
Royal Navy built its warships. It would be worthwhile to examine whether the Royal 
Navy did continue to be defined as it had been from 1660-1749, and whether there was 
a second phase of development in the Westminster Model, particularly as the British 
state continued to develop more of the attributes of the Westminster Model itself. 
802 N.A.M. Rodger, The Articles of War: The Statutes Which Governed Our Fighting navies 1661, 1749, 
1886, 11.
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There is also further research to be done on closely related topicss during the 
period studied in this thesis. The primary example is the British land forces or Army, 
and its development from the Restoration through to the Seven Years War (1756-1763). 
The investigation of whether the Land Forces were defined in the Westminster Model 
like the Royal Navy was would build on existing literature like Manning’s An 
Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702. The statute 
definitions of the Mutiny Acts, and the decentralized, regimental structure of the Land 
Forces, would provide a very different institutional makeup to reflect the Westminster 
Model of development than the navy. Likewise, the comparison of the Royal Navy’s 
development specifically in terms of institutional differentiation and professionalization 
also should be compared to processes like the emergence of the Company of Surgeons 
in 1745 from the Company of Barber-Surgeons that had been created two centuries 
before. 
Further afield, there is certainly scope to expand this methodology to other 
nations. Of course, the application of the Westminster Model is not really applicable to 
France, the Netherlands, or Spain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as 
their state-development processes were very different. Consideration of the 
development processes of those nations’ military institutions in light of their state 
development processes would be the appropriate application of the methodology used in
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ADM 2/72 Lords' Letters: Orders And Instructions, May 1748 - May 1749
ADM 2/1740 Lord's Letters. Precedent book of orders and instructions 1660 - 1684
ADM 2/1741 Lord's Letters: King Charles II and King James II, 1684 - 1687
ADM 2/1742 Lord's Letters: King James II, 1687-1688
ADM 6/424 Seniority List of Post-Captains, giving date and circumstances of 
death, dismissal &c..
ADM 7/168 Admiralty: Miscellanea, Estimates 1673-1689
ADM 7/169 Admiralty: Miscellanea, Estimates 1689-1730
ADM 7/201 General Instructions, 1746
ADM 7/202 General Instructions, 1747 with corrections.
ADM 7/639 Misc. Instructions for Navy Board officials 1660-1735
ADM 7/647 Misc. Naval Instructions, 1715
ADM 7/827 Entry book entitled `Duke of York's Orders and Instructions' of orders,
memoranda, establishments, etc. relating to the Admiralty, Navy 
Board and Navy, 1565 and 1649 to 1695, some entered or certified by 
Samuel Pepys.
ADM 7/831 Copies of papers relating to the court martial of Arthur, Earl of 
Torrington, admiral commanding at the battle of Beachy Head. 1690
ADM 7/1009 Volume of hand-written instructions and orders for naval officials, 
warrants and patents outlining appointments, successions, and 
removal of officials, as well as operational actions and general 
instructions regarding the workings of the boards. Entitled 'The Navy 
Boards'
ADM 8/1 Admiralty: List Books, disposition of ships, names of officers 1673-
1689
ADM 8/2 Admiralty: List Books, disposition of ships, names of officers 1689-
1692
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ADM 10/10 Admiralty: Alphabetical list of captains and flag officers. 
Chronological list of commanders, with annotations 1660-1688. 1688-
1746
ADM 10/15 Commissioned Officers' Service Register 1660-1685
ADM 25/1 Navy Board, and Admiralty, Accountant General's Department: 
Officers' Half Pay Registers 1693-1704
ADM 25/2 Navy Board, and Admiralty, Accountant General's Department: 
Officers' Half Pay Registers 1697-1699
ADM 25/3 Navy Board, and Admiralty, Accountant General's Department: 
Officers' Half Pay Registers 1700
ADM 25/8 Navy Board, and Admiralty, Accountant General's Department: 
Officers' Half Pay Registers 1713-1714
ADM 33/189 Ships' pay books 1696-1697, various ships.
ADM 33/219 Ships' pay books 1699-1703, various ships.
ADM 33/304 Ships' pay books 1707-1715, various ships.
ADM 36/6 Muster Books, Adventure, 1730-1731
ADM 36/3074 Muster Books, Royal York, 1748. Medieval vellum used as binding
ADM 36/3259 Muster Books, St Paul  (Fireship) 1688-1694
ADM 36/4636B Muster Books, Woolf (Hired Ship) 1708-1709
ADM 36/4727 Muster Books, York, 1706-1707
ADM 51/3847 Captain's Log, Fubbs, 1728-1736
ADM 51/3937 Captain's Log, Poole, 1699-1702
ADM 51/3940 Captains Log, Portland, 1744-1748
ADM 51/4143 Captain's Log, Charlotte, 1711-1719
ADM 52/27 Master's Log, Elizabeth, 1695-1696
ADM 106/5 Admiralty In-Letters, May-June 1661
ADM 106/320 Navy Board, In-letters, 1676
ADM 107/1 Lieutenant's Passing Certificates, 1691-1703
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ADM 107/2 Lieutenant's Passing Certificates, 1703-1712
ADM 107/3 Lieutenant's Passing Certificates, 1712-1745
ADM 118/1 Commissioned sea officers 1717-1742
ADM 118/2 Commissioned sea officers 1743-1747
ADM 118/3 Commissioned sea officers 1747-1750
PC/1/5/13 Committee report on Admiralty proposals for a new establishment of 
men and guns for ships of the Navy
PRO 30/24/34/17List of H.M. Navy Royal, with dimensions, number of men, and guns. 
Wages of seamen. Estimate of the ordinary charge of the Navy from 
June 1660 to June 1661.
National Maritime Museum
ADL/A/8 James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral. Order to Capt Richard 
Haddock, Commander of the Portland, to join the fleet, 8 Sep 1666
ADL/A/14 Document addressed to the Admiralty by 95 naval officers, approving 
the Bill for the government of the navy, 23 Feb 1748
ADL/B/3 Three letters dealing with naval finance and one estimate of the cost of
building a second rate, addressed to Sir Thomas Osborne, the 
Treasurer of the Navy, 1672-3. Signed by Samuel Pepys and other 
members of the Board, 4 Jan 1672-19 May 1673
ADL/P/3 1745 'Establishment of Dimensions'
ADL/Q/20 Commissions
ADL/Q/22 Commissions
ADM/A/1758 Navy Board In-Letters, March-April 1689
ADM/A/1759 Navy Board In-Letters, May 1689
ADM/A/1776 Navy Board: In letters, Aug-Sep 1691
ADM/A/1934 Navy Board in-Letters, 1706
ADM/A/2355 Navy Board in-letters, Apr 1746
ADM/B/120 Board of Admiralty, In-Letters, Oct-Dec 1742
ADM/B/134 Board of Admiralty, In-Letters, Nov 45 – Feb 1746
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ADM/B/143 Board of Admiralty, In-Letters, May- December 1750
ADM/K/2 Abstracts of, and indexes to Admiralty Orders, 1698-Sep 1708
ADM/L/C/304 Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Centurion 1743: Lt J Nutt (journal of 
the prize Nuestra Senora de Cavadonga)
ADM/L/C/305 Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Centurion 1743: Lt W Langdon. 
(journal of the prize Nuestra Senora de Cavadonga)
ADM/L/C/306 Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Centurion 1743: Capt P Saumarez. 
(journal of the prize Nuestra Senora de Cavadonga))
ADM/L/D/213 Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Dreadnought 1679
ADM/L/G/53 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Gloucester 1740 - 1744; HMS 
Centurion 1742 - 1744 (Continuation Log of Gloucester)
ADM/L/M/254/A Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Montague 1678 - 1694 (Tangier 
Expedition). (Includes certificates bound in) signed by Samuel Pepys.
ADM/L/M/254/B Lieutenant's logbook for HMS Mary Rose, 8 May 1678 - 17 
March 1678/9, kept by John Lomax, includes 'observations for our 
keeping compass in our voyage to Ostende and fighting instructions in
case wee meet with an enemie.'
ADM/L/R/156 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Roebuck 1745 - 1748; HMS Rye 1745 
- 1748
ADM/L/S/253 Lieutenant's logbook, Shark, 1732-08-31 – 1741-06-30.
ADM/L/Y/3-4 Lieutenant's logbooks for HMS Yarmouth 1694 - 1703, 1696 - 1702
AGC/7/13 Letter, Keppel to Anson, 25 May 1748
AGC/S/25 Letter, Shovell to Admiral Lord Berkeley, 12 July 1695
AGC/19/7 Pepys, Samuel. Proof of the several lists and computations in Samuel 
Pepys' Collection of the number of warrants for sea-employments 
passing his Office of Secretary of the Admiralty, between Midsummer 
1673 and Midsummer 1679
CAD/A/2 Navy and Marine Orders, 1660- 1712
CAD/A/3 Instructions for Lord High Admiral and Navy Board, 1660-1716
CAD/A/4 Accounts for the Royal Navy, 1684
CAD/A/5 Estimate of the Charge of the Navy, 1684
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CAD/A/9 Instructions for the Lord High Adm and Navy Board, 1660-1715
CAD/A/16 Admiralty Instructions, 2 Feb 1683-4 Oct 1699
CAD/B/3 Contract for victualling the Navy, 1677-78
CAD/B/4 Victualling, proportions and wages etc. of HM Navy, c.1684
CAD/B/10 Navy Instructions, 1660-1699
CAD/B/12 Papers relating to the Navy, 1684-99
CAD/B/15 Navy Office: an estimate of the debt of Her Majesty's Navy, 1712-20, 
CAD/D/17 1707 Convoys Report to House of Lord by Lord High Admiral
CAD/D/20 Charges of neglect in the Administration of the Navy, 1693
CAL/6 Orderbook of Adm Henry Osborn 1747-57
CLE/1/1 logbook of HMS Syren 1748-49
CLU/2 Naval Notes, 1659-1731, notes and copies
CLU/4 Orders for the regulation of the Navy, 1660-1743
CLU/5 Record book of the Naval Orders in Council issued between 1660-
1720
CLU/6 Naval notes and wages tables, 1732. 
CLU/8 Transcripts compiled by William Locker for his History of the Navy
CLU/9 The settlement of the Navy at the coming in of King Charles the 
Second
CLU/10 Miscellaneous manuscripts, dealing mainly with naval subjects. 
DOU/1 Journal of Sir James Douglas, 1734-36
DUF/1 Various logbooks for Robert Duff, 1744-1757
DUF/8 Signals and instructions, HMS Rochester 1745-59
FFX/1 Commissions for Robert Fairfax, 1689-1708
FFX/2 Fairfax documents, Orders, courts-martial papers, minutes 1689-1710
FFX/3 Correspondence between Fairfax and various Admiralty offices
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GRI/2 Logbooks of Barfleur 12 Apr-27 Oct 1718 and Orford 28 Oct 1718-19
Nov 1720
GRI/18 Orderbooks of Princess Mary, orders received 12 Feb 1745-15 Jul 
1747 and orders issued 14 Mar 1745-21 Apr 1748
GRI/19 Orderbook of Princess Mary, orders issued 23 Apr 1748-25 Mar 1749
HOL/4 Instructions made by the Rt. Hon Edward Russel, Adm, for the year 
1691 for the better ordering of the Fleet in sailing by day and night, 
printed
HOL/9 The Sailing and Fighting Instructions or Signals as they are observed 
in the Royal Navy of Great Britain, Jonathan Greenwood, 1714
HOL/12 The Seaman's Vade-Mecum and Defensive War by Sea, London, 
William Mountain, teacher of Mathematics, 1744, also signature of 
John Busenil on fly-leaf
HOL/13 Signals for the Royal Navy and Ships under Convoy, sailing and 
fighting instructions, Articles of War, Regulations etc., with the 
additional signals of Adm Vernon and the flags of all nations, 1748
HSR/A/1 Report of the capture of Cadiz, 1596
HSR/A/2 Examination of Nicholas Gattonsby, Master of the WORCESTER, 
before Adm Robert Blake, 22 Jan 1652
HSR/A/3 Report to King Charles II of an action fought against the Dutch, Jun 
1666, by Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albermarle
HSR/A/7 Draft account of the examination of Capt James Waller, Lt-Governor 
of Kinsale, before Sir Richard Pyne, Lord chief Justice, on a charge of
embezzlement, ca.1697; and a memorandum to Waller from L. 
Corneille, in French, from Fort Charles, 29 Jun 1694
HSR/H/1 Order from the Council to the Earl of Pembroke, Lord Lt of Wiltshire, 
to take measures for manning the fleet, 7 Apr 1692
HSR/H/2 Memo of Cdre G Anson to George Murray, Cdr of HMS Wager, 29 
Jan 1740
HSR/H/3 Refitting and sailing orders from the Admiralty to Capt Legge of the 
Severne or, in his absence, to Capt George Murray of the Pearl, at Rio,
11 Feb 1741
HSR/H/4 Order from Vice-Adm John Byng to Capt Murray of the Revenge, 18 
Sep 1747
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HSR/H/10 Order of Richard Lestock to Capt Hodsoll, Ann Galley, 
Mediterranean, 12 Feb 1741
HSR/H/15 Copy of Admiralty instructions to Adm Hosier about operations in the 
West Indies and extracts from letters written to him, 1726-27,. 
transferred from BGY/4/13)
HSR/H/16 'Line of Battle going in to Redondelle', issued to Vice-Adm Sir 
Thomas Hopson 13 Oct 1702, following the Battle of Vigo Bay; and 
Line of Battle and signals to be observed by His Majesty's Fleet under 
the Command of Adm Sir George Walton at Spithead, 2 Aug 1734, 
issued to Capt Robert Trevor of the Newark
HWK/1 Orderbook containing orders received and issued, 21 July 1747 to 21 
June 1759
KEP/1 Orderbook, Aug 1748-Dec 1758. Mediterranean Station, 1748-Jul 
1751; North American Station 1754-1755;
LEC/5 Instructions issued by the Earl of Northumberland for the management
of fleets under his command, 1636-37; with journals of voyages May-
Oct1636 and Apr-Sep 1637; a brief discourse
LEC/7 A brief discourse of the Navy, 26 Jan 1638, including; Commendation 
of the Navy and the benefit of its well being; The present state of its 
government in harbour by the four principal officers; A way proposed 
to rectify the government and abuses therein of the Navy.
LEC/8 'Observations and overtures for a sea fight upon our coasts', with 
orders and directions to be given by an Admiral and rules for the men 
on board the ships, c.1607
LEC/9 A copy of 'The Seaman's Dictionary' by Sir Henry Mainwaring, 
c.1623
LRN/8 Copy of Lord Anson's list on H.M. Royal Navy, 1747-50 and list of 
earliest steam vessels, 1816-50
PLA/P/9/2 Royal Navy Records: commissions and appointments for sea officers 
granted by the Admiralty, Admirals and Captains, 1746 - 1793, 
including 3 signed by J. Byng.
PRN/4 List of Captains of the Royal Navy, 1688-96
PRN/7 An account of the names of the Lord High-Adm and Commissioners 
from King Charles to 1735
PRN/18 List of Captains in the Royal Navy, 1688-1732, with remarks up to 
1739, and an index possibly added in the later 18th century
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RUSI/NM/6 A list of His Majesty's Ships and Sloops that are Gunn'd agreable to 
the Establishment in 1746, and the Irregular Ships, Sloops and Yachts,
that are not Gunn'd to that establishment, n.d.
RUSI/NM/135 General instructions to be observed by the Commanders of HM Ships,
last entry 1683
SER/106 General account collected from the several pay books of H M Ships 
employed at sea, 1660-85, of the commission officers serving at that 
time
SER/107 General list of officers, H M Royal Navy, 1668-97, inscribed 'This is a
copy of a book presented to King William by Mr Lydell and myself in 
the year 1688. Cha. Sergison'
SER/108 Account of the names of Flag Officers and commanders employed in 
His Majesty's fleet, 1 Jan 1697-31 Mar 1700, showing their qualities, 
names of ships and time of service
SER/109 List of her Majesty's ships and vessels including numbers of men and 
guns established for them by her Majesty's order in council, 17 Jan 
1702-3, made at the Admiralty Office, 22 Jan 1702-3, with a covering 
letter from Prince George of Denmark
SER/136 List of captains serving in command of HMS ships, distinguishing the 
ships and time of service, 1688-1716
SGN/A/1 'Instructions for the better ordering of his majesties fleet in sailing, 
given by Prince Rupert and George, Duke of Albermarle on board the 
Royal Charles at the Bay of the Nore, 1 May 1666',. formerly SM1)
SGN/A/2 'Instructions for the better ordering of his majesties ships under 
command in sailing ... and in fighting', issued by Henry, Duke of 
Grafton, Vice-Adm of England and Chief Command of his Majesties 
shipps...' to Capt Giffard, Cdr of the Mermayd, 1687
SGN/A/3 'Instructions for the better ordering of his majesties fleet in sailing, 
given by Prince Rupert and George, Duke of Albermarle on board the 
Royal Charles at the Bay of the Nore, 1 May 1666',. formerly SM1)
SGN/A/5 Printed sheets of signals giving Day, Night, Fog, Fighting and 
additional chasing signals, also Fireship signals 'Observ'd by His 
Majestys Ships of War and Merchants Ships that Sail with Convoy. 
Abstracted by William Coard an officer in the Navy'. formerly SP128)
SIG/A/3 'Sailing and Fighting Instructions', containing also additional signals 
in manuscript and issued to Capt Kirktowne by Sir George Rooke in 
the QUEEN at Spithead, 1695; loosely inserted is a manuscript line of 
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battle issued to Capt Kirktowne by Sir George Rooke in the 
BRITANNIA at Spithead, 1697,.
SIG/A/5 'Instructions for the better Ordering His Majesties Fleet in 
Sayling...Fighting', signed by Charles Sergison, 1689,. formerly SP1)
SOC/5 Plan of learning: J.N.P. Nott, 1748. Navigation Textbook
SOC/21/ Royal Navy Club, established by commanders and officers of the 
Royal Navy, c.1675, contemporary document and correspondence,. 
see appendix)
TRN/11 Typed List of Lieutenant's Passing Certificates, 1740-47
TUN/166 Printed book: 'Six Dialogues about sea services between an High-
Admiral and a Captain at sea.', Nathaniel Botelier, 1685
TUN/168 Printed pamphlet: 'God's Dominion over the Seas, and the Seaman's 
Duty, considered in a Sermon Preached at Long Reach, August 10th 
1701', Rev Philip Stubs, 1701
VAU/X/1 Admiralty office to and from Captains of Ships at Plymouth, including
general orders, 1696 – 1832.
VAU/Z/1/10 John Smith at Devonport to. ?)
VAU/Z/11 Out-Letters. copies) from the Plymouth Commissioners. Henry 
Greenhill) to the Navy Board.
VAU/Z/12/1 In- Letters. copies), Navy Board to Plymouth Commissioners, 1706 - 
1749.
VER/1/2/AA Orders issued by Admiral Vernon, 1739-1742 Vol 1
VER/1/2/BB Orders issued by Admiral Vernon, 1739-1742 Vol 2
National Museum of the Royal Navy
Mss 121: The Papers of Thomas Corbett. (d. 1751), Secretary of the Admiralty v.1 - 21
VB 363 GRE General Instructions, issued by Prince George of Denmark as LHA
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